Information Notice 1991-79, Deficiencies in the Procedures for Installing Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Materials

Deficiencies in the Procedures for Installing Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Materials

ML031190449
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	12/06/1991
From:	Rossi C E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-91-079, NUDOCS 9112020091
Download: ML031190449 (5)

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 December 6, 1991 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE 91-79: DEFICIENCIES

IN THE PROCEDURES

FOR INSTALLING

THERMO-LAG

FIRE BARRIER MATERIALS

Addressees

All holders of operating

licenses or construction

permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees

to problems that could result from improperly

installed THERMO-LAG

330-1 fire barriers that are used to satisfy NRC fire protection

requirements

for safe shutdown components.

It is expected that recipients

will review the information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice are not new NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.iDescription

of Circumstances

NRC Information

Notice (IN) 91-47, "Failure of THERMO-LAG

Fire Barrier Material to Pass Fire Endurance

Test," reported a number of installation

deficiencies

identified

at the River Bend Station (RBS) and discussed

a ASTM E-119 fire endurance

test conducted

for Gulf States Utilities (GSU) in October 1989 at Southwest

Research Institute (SwRI) that ended with a failure of a 3-hour THERMO-LAG

330-1 cable tray protective

envelope system. On August 23, 1991, the vendor, Thermal Science, Incorporated, (TSI), issued a letter to a number of licensees

that discussed

specific installation

issues raised in IN 91-47 and concluded

that the SwRI fire endurance

test was not a valid, test because of deficiencies

in the installation

of the test article.Other licensees

have also identified

instances

of THERMO-LAG

fire barrier configurations

that were not installed

in accordance

with the vendor's instal-lation procedures

manual. For example, Cleveland

Electric Illuminating

Company CEI) reported in Licensee Event Report 91-020 that the mechanical

fasteners banding straps) on the fire barrier enclosures

at Perry Nuclear Power Plant had not been installed

in accordance

with the vendor's installation

procedures

manual. CEI identified

the installation

discrepancies

while conducting

routine fire wrap inspections

using revised inspection

criteria.

The licensee (=91 d onat/91120209 K_> <_ IN 91-79 December 6, 199i 1 identified

that no fire endurance

tests or engineering

analysis had been performed

to support the installed

configuration.

The licensees

that have experienced

installation

problems have attributed

most of the reported installation

problems to contractor

installer

errors, incomplete

or incorrect design documents, and inadequate

quality control oversight.

The NRC has also identified

a number of installation

variations

as it has continued

to review the vendor's installation

procedures

and the installation

specifications, procedures, and practices

for specific plants. Some of the installation

variations

observed by the NRC do not appear to be in accordance

with the vendor's installation

procedures

manual and may comprise configurations

that have not been qualified

by fire endurance

testing or engineering

analyses.

In several cases such as at the River Bend Station (RBS) and Washington

Nuclear Power Unit 2 NWNP2), the installation

methods used during initial construction

of the plant that deviated from the vendor's installation

procedures

manual were found unacceptable

when subsequent

qualification

fire endurance

testing resulted in fire barrier failures.On October 17, 1991, the NRC met with TSI to discuss issues regarding

instal-lation and qualification

testing. The vendor stated that it had not included several essential

application

steps and precautions

in its installation

procedures

manual because the information

was presented

during the TSI certifi-cation training for installers.

The vendor stressed the importance

of using skilled and certified

craftsmen, and qualified

quality control inspectors

to achieve an adequate fire barrier enclosure.

In addition, several licensees have related to the NRC receiving

supplementary

written and verbal installation

guidance-front

TSI- representatives-that-is--not-included-in- the-TSI-instaIlation

procedures

manual.The NRC has discussed

installation

details with licensees, and visited a number of sites. The staff has observed variations

among the installation

procedures

and practices

regarding

the following

fabrication

details:-Methods for sealing and filling joints between panel sections.-The orientation

and application

methods for stress skin.-The requirements

for raceway support protection.

-Allowable

gap widths between panel sections.-The configuration

and orientation

of structural

ribs.-Methods for installing

vaults and firewalls.

-Banding material and application

methods.-Scoring and grooving of panels for fabricating

and bending the panels around bends in raceways.-Thickness

acceptance

criteria.For example, an important

task during the installation

of THERMO-LAG

fire barrier's

is the filling of the joints between adjoining

prefabricated'panel

sections with trowel-grade

material to the full depth of the panels. Some facilities

use a method in which the ends of individual

panel sections are butt joined to one another and the seam between the panel sections is filled and covered with THERMO-LAG

trowel grade material (commonly

referred to as dry-fitting').

Some licensees

fill the Joints by tpre-buttering" the edges of the individual

panel sections with trowel grade material before they Join the

• -IN 91-79 December 6, 1991 panels to ensure that the gap between the panels is completely

filled. The vendor did not list this method as an option for installing

cable tray enclo-sures in its current installation

procedures

manual. However, on October 17, 1991, the vendor stated to the NRC that this method was acceptable

for installing

THERMO-LAG

panels to cable trays. In its August 23, 1991, letter to licensees, the vendor stated that stress skin must be placed over panel Joints to ensure a continuous

outer layer of stress skin for 3-hour barriers and a recent vendor procedure, TSI Technical

Note 20684-AL, of October 1989, provides updated installation

procedures

for aluminum cable trays and requires that each butt joint be covered by an additional

layer of stress skin and trowel grade material.

The current vendor's generic installation

procedures

manual does not provide any guidance for installing

a continuous

layer of stress skin.TheANRC has not been able to verify that all of the specific installation

variations

observed have been qualified

by independent

qualification

testing or engineering

analyses.

The NRC is continuing

to review other technical

issues regarding

THERI4O-LAG

330-1 fire barriers, including

issues concerning

the adequacy of qualification

testing. Generic Letter 86-10, "Implementation

of Fire Protection

Requirements," provides additional

NRC guidance on fire barrier qualification

test acceptance

criteria and evaluation

of deviations

from tested configurations

to substantiate

field installations.

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear cactor Regulati on (NRR) project manager., -Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts:

Ralph Architzel, NRR (301) 492-0804 Loren R. Plisco, NRR (301) 492-1013 K. Steven West, NRR (301) 492-1220 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices

M 9 an:11 -ar, C 5Z4 Cu, mo)I C 0#M>:0 zmC I0!: C13D 21 Z I 3 a >5 tn _.c Attachment

IN 91-79 December 6, 1991 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMIATION

NOTICES Information

Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 88-92, Potential

for Spent 11/29/91 All holders of OLs or CPs Supp. 1 Fuel Pool Draindown

for nuclear power reactors.91-78 Status Indication

of 11/28/91 All holders of OLs or CPs -Control Power for for nuclear power reacto Circuit Breakers Used in Safety-Related

Appli-cations 90-57. Substandard.

Refur- 11/27/91 All holders of OLs or CPs Supp. 1 bished Potter & Brum- for nuclear power reactors.field Relays Repre-sented as New 91-77 Shift Staffing at 11/26/91 All holders of OLs or CPs Nuclear Power Plants for nuclear power reactors.91-76 10 CFR Parts 21 and 11/26/91 All holders of OLs or CPs 50.55(e) Final Rules and vendors for nuclear power reactors.91-75 Static Head Corrections

11/25/91 All holders of OLs or CPs Mistakenly

not Included for nuclear power reactors.In Pressure Transmitter

Calibration

Procedures

91-74 Changes In Pressurizer

11/25/91 All holders of OLs or CPs Safety Valve Setpoints

for nuclear power reactors Before Installation

y 91-73 Loss of Shutdown Cooling 11/21/91 All holders of OLs or CPs During Disassembly

of High for nuclear power reactors.Pressure Safety Injection System Check Valve 91-72 Issuance of a Revision to 11/19/91 All holders of OLs or CPs the EPA Manual of Protec- for nuclear power reactors.tive Action Guides and Protective

Actions for Nuclear Incidents OL -Operating

License CP a Construction

Permit p

Pi -IN 91-79 December 6, 1991 panels to ensure that the gap between the panels is completely

filled. The vendor did not list this method as an option for installing

cable tray enclo-sures in its current installation

procedures

manual. However, on October 17, 1991, the vendor stated to the NRC that this method was acceptable

for installing

THERMO-LAG

panels to cable trays. In its August 23, 1991, letter to licensees, the vendor stated that stress skin must be placed over panel Joints to ensure a continuous

outer layer of stress skin for 3-hour barriers and a recent vendor procedure, TSI Technical

Note 20684-AL, of October 1989, provides updated installation

procedures

for aluminum cable trays and requires that each butt Joint be covered by an additional

layer of stress skin and trowel grade material.

The current vendor's generic installation

procedures

manual does not provide any guidance for installing

a continuous

layer of stress skin.The NRC has not been able to verify that all of the specific installation

variations

observed have been qualified

by independent

qualification

testing or engineering

analyses.

The NRC is continuing

to review other technical

issues regarding

THERMO-LAG

330-1 fire barriers, including

issues concerning

the adequacy of qualification

testing. Generic Letter 86-10, "Implementation

of Fire Protection

Requirements," provides additional

NRC guidance on fire barrier qualification

test acceptance

criteria and evaluation

of deviations

from tested configurations

to substantiate

field installations.

This information

notice requires you have any questions

about the of the technical

contacts listed Reactor Regulation (NRR) project no specific action or written response.

If information

in this notice, please contact one below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contacts:

Ralph Architzel, NRR (301)492-0804 Loren R. Plisco, NRR (301)492-1013 K. Steven West, NRR Q01y492-1220

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Informatio

,:D/DOEA:NRR:

0rl 55* y lY_:12,-/91 : an J AJ AA R//1VS4/9/

A1L0J OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name: IN 91-79Pitsco/O3/91