Information Notice 1985-83, Potential Failures of General Electric PK-2 Test Blocks

Potential Failures of General Electric PK-2 Test Blocks

ML031180272
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill
Issue date:	10/30/1985
From:	Jordan E NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-85-083, NUDOCS 8510250543
Download: ML031180272 (3)

SSINS No.: 6835 IN 85-83 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 October 30, 1985 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-83: POTENTIAL FAILURES OF GENERAL ELECTRIC

PK-2 TEST BLOCKS

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a

construction permit (CP).

Purpose

This information notice is to alert recipients of a potentially significant

problem involving fractures of PK-2 test block terminal posts that could lead

to inoperability of essential electrical equipment. It is expected that

recipients will review this information for applicability to their facilities

and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem occurring

at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this information notice

do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written

response is required.

Description of Circumstances

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) reported to General Electric (GE) and the

NRC that the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant experienced fracture failure of

terminal posts on some PK-2 test blocks during routine testing of a circuit

that was not safety related. TVA subsequently tested PK-2 blocks at the Watts

Bar Nuclear Plants and found that terminal post fractures could be induced, in

some cases, by wiggling by hand. No failures were identified by TVA on PK-2 safety-related applications. GE is investigating to determine the root cause

of the failures. However, because of the broad usage of the test blocks, GE

has notified the NRC that GE is unable to determine all of the possible PK-2 class IE installations and therefore is unable to assure specific notification

of the problem to each utility.

Discussion:

Failure of PK-2 test blocks could occur either during testing or at other

times. Failure during circuitry testing could result in the inoperability of

essential electrical equipment. In this case, the loss of the electrical

equipment would be detected during the testing. The possibility also exists

for the fracture failure to occur at the completion of the circuit testing or

as the result of bumping during other maintenance. Such an occurrence would

8510250543

I,

IN 85-83 October 30, 1985 result in an open circuit and the unavailability of the associated electrical

equipment could go undetected in certain applications. Though the failures

noted by TVA were not safety related, the usage of PK-2 test blocks includes

safety related equipment such as emergency diesel generator relay boards. In

addition to the possible loss of safety related equipment there is a potential

personnel safety concern if an open circuit is developed on a current trans- former circuit during testing.

General Electric has recommended that, in addition to visual inspection, a

force of about five pounds in any direction perpendicular to the terminal posts

can be applied to detect incipient failures.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional

Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.

Edward Jordan, Director

Divisi 4 of Emergency Preparedness

and hgineering Response

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

James C. Stewart, IE

(301) 492-9061 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

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Attachment 1 IN 85-83 October 30, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to

Diesel Generator Differen- 10/18/85 All power reactor

85-82 facilities holding

tial Protection Relay Not

Seismically Qualified an OL or CP

Problems Resulting In 10/17/85 All power reactor

85-81 facilities holding

Erroneously High Reading

With Panasonic 800 Series an OL or CP and

Thermoluminescent Dosimeters certain material

and fuel cycle

licensees

Timely Declaration Of An 10/15/85 All power reactor

85-80 facilities holding

Emergency Class Implementa- tion Of An Emergency Plan, an OL or CP

And Emergency Notifications

Possible Sticking Of ASCO 10/1/85 All power reactor

85-17 facilities holding

Sup. 1 Solenoid Valves.

an OL or CP

Inadequate Communications 9/30/85 All power reactor

85-79 Between Maintenance, facilities holding

Operations, And Security an OL or CP.; research

Personnel and nonpower reactor

facilities; fuel

fabrication and

processing facilities

85-78 Event Notification 9/23/85 All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

Possible Loss Of Emergency 9/20/85 All power reactor

85-77 Notification System Due To facilities holding

Loss Of AC Power an OL or CP

Recent Water Hammer Events 9/19/85 All power reactor

85-76 facilities holding

an OL or CP

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit