Information Notice 1985-67, Valve-Shaft-To-Actuator Key May Fall Out of Place When Mounted Below Horizontal Axis

Valve-Shaft-To-Actuator Key May Fall Out of Place When Mounted Below Horizontal Axis

ML031180220
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill, Crane
Issue date:	08/08/1985
From:	Jordan E NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-85-067, NUDOCS 8508050453
Download: ML031180220 (3)

SSINS No.: 6835 IN 85-67

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555

August 8, 1985

IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-67:

VALVE-SHAFT-TO-ACTUATOR KEY MAY FALL OUT OF

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a

construction permit (CP).

Purpose

This information notice is provided to alert recipients of a potentially

significant problem pertaining to the renewed possibility of the

valve-shaft-to-actuator key falling out of place when the motor operator is

mounted below the horizontal axis.

It is expected that recipients will review

the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if

appropriate, to preclude a similar problem occurring at their facilities.

However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC

requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Background

On January 17, 1980 the Tennessee Valley Authority notified the NRC (NCR 19P)

of the failure of a containment isolation valve to operate properly at their

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. The utility's investigation indicated

that the failure was caused by the key, which locks the Bettis actuator to the

Henry Pratt valve shaft, falling out of place.

On May 1, 1980, the Henry Pratt Company notified the NRC of this condition.

The company indicated that they had alerted all of their nuclear customers of

the problem and that they had provided their customers with recommendations for

field modifications to correct the problem.

On the basis of the above notifications and a belief that other manufacturers

may be using a similar connection method, the NRC issued IE Circular No. 80-12,

"Valve-Shaft-to-Actuator Key May Fall Out of Place When Mounted Below Horizon- tal Axis," on May 14, 1980.

Description of Circumstances

On December 14, 1984 the Arizona Nuclear Power Project notified the NRC (DER

84-101) of the failure of a containment isolation system valve to operate

properly at their Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3. The

utility's investigation indicated that the failure was caused by the key, which

locks the Limitorque actuator to the Henry Pratt valve, falling out of place.

8508050453

IN 85-67 August 8, 1985 On May 23, 1985, the Henry Pratt Company notified (Part 21 Report No.85-267)

the NRC of this condition and indicated that they had alerted all of their

nuclear customers of the problem.

The company indicated that they had recom- mended that their customers inspect the actuator to shaft connections and that

they had provided their customers with recommendations for changes to their

valve installation, repair, and replacement procedures.

These procedure

changes recommended that ". .

. Loctite 242 (formerly designated as CV) or 271 (formerly designated as AV) should be applied to all four sides of the key

prior to reassembly if valve/operator connection is broken for any reason.

Loctite Grade 277 is also acceptable although its higher shear strength may

make its disassembly more difficult."

Henry Pratt also recommended that the NRC issue a supplement to IE Circular No.

80-12 to emphasize ". . . that when actuators of any type and manufacture are

removed from Pratt valves and reinstalled in the field . . ." Loctite should

be used.

Because circulars are no longer issued, this recommendation is being

met by this information notice.

It must be noted that this type of problem can occur not just in valves manu- factured by Henry Pratt, but in any valve that uses a key to attach the actua- tor to the valve shaft when the actuator is mounted below the horizontal axis.

While the NRC cannot recommend the use of Loctite on valves manufactured by

companies other than Henry Pratt, it does suggest that each utility contact its

valve manufacturers to determine the appropriate method of preventing the keys

from-falling-out.--

-,--

-,

-

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional

Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.

V. /ordan, Director

Divisijbn if Emergency Preparedness

and En ineering Response

Office'of Inspection and Enforcement

Technical Contacts:

Richard J. Kiessel, IE

(301) 492-8119

Edward R. Schweibinz, RIII

(312) 790-5542 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

Attachment 1

IN 85-67

August 8, 1985

LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information

Date of

Notice No.

Subject

Issue

Issued to

85-66

85-65

85-64

85-63

85-62

85-61

85-60

85-59

Discrepancies Between

As-Built Construction

Drawings And Equipment

Installations

Crack Growth In Steam

Generator Girth Welds

BBC Brown Boveri Low-Voltage

K-Line Circuit Breakers, With

Deficient Overcurrent Trip

Devices Models OD-4 and 5 Potential for Common-Mode

Failure of Standby Gas Treat- ment System on Loss of Off- Site Power

Backup Telephone Numbers to

the NRC Operations Center

8/7/85

7/31/85

7/26/85

7/25/85

7/23/85

All power reactor

facilities holding

holding an OL or CP

All PWR facilities

holding an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power riagtop..,

facilities holding

an OL and certain

fuel facilities

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL and certain

fuel facilities

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

All power reactor

facilities designed

by B&W and CE holding

an OL or CP

Misadministrations to Patients 7/22/85

Undergoing Thyroid Scans

Defective Negative Pressure

Air-Purifying, Fuel Facepiece

Respirators

7/17/85 Valve Stem Corrosion Failures 7/17/85 Failure Of A General Electric 7/17/85 Type AK-2-25 Reactor Trip

Breaker

85-58 OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit