IR 05000528/2013008

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IR 05000528-13-008; 05000529-13-008, 05000530-13-008, 01/28/2013 - 02/14/2013, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Triennial Fire Protection Team Inspection
ML13067A312
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde  Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 03/08/2013
From: Geoffrey Miller
NRC/RGN-IV/DRS/EB-2
To: Edington R
Arizona Public Service Co
References
IR-13-008
Download: ML13067A312 (28)
v • d • e


Text

March 8, 2013

SUBJECT:

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE INSPECTION REPORT 05000528/2013008, 05000529/2013008, AND 05000530/2013008

Dear Mr. Edington:

On February 14, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed in an exit meeting on February 14, 2013, with Mr. D. Mims, Senior Vice-President, Regulatory and Oversight, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is listed in this report. NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide a written response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RE G IO N I V 1600 EAST LAMAR BLVD ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4511 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Geoffrey B. Miller, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-528, 50-529, 50-530 License Nos. NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-74

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000528/2013008, 05000529/2013008, and 05000530/2013008 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

Electronic Distribution for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Electronic distribution by RIV:

Regional Administrator (Elmo.Collins@nrc.gov)

Deputy Regional Administrator (Steven.Reynolds@nrc.gov)

DRP Director (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov)

Acting DRP Deputy Director (Michael.Scott@nrc.gov)

Acting DRS Director (Tom.Blount@nrc.gov)

Acting DRS Deputy Director (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov)

Senior Resident Inspector (Tony.Brown@nrc.gov)

Resident Inspector (Dustin.Reinert@nrc.gov)

Administrative Assistant (Revonna.Stuart@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, DRP/E (Don.Allen@nrc.gov)

Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E (Ray.Azua@nrc.gov)

Project Engineer, DRP/E (Jim.Melfi@nrc.gov)

Project Engineer, DRP/E (Dan.Bradley@nrc.gov)

Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)

Public Affairs Officer (Lara.Uselding@nrc.gov)

Project Manager (Balwant.Singal@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Ray.Kellar@nrc.gov)

RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)

Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)

Technical Support Assistant (Loretta.Williams@nrc.gov)

Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov)

RIV/ETA: OEDO (John.Cassidy@nrc.gov)

DRS/TSB STA (Dale.Powers@nrc.gov)

ADAMS: No Yes SUNSI Review Complete Reviewer Initials: JMM

Publicly Available Non-Sensitive JMM

Non-publicly Available Sensitive EB2/SRI EB2/RI EB2/RI EB2/RI C:DRP\\E C: EB2 JMMateychick BKCorrell NPOkonkwo SRAchen DBAllen GBMiller

/RA/

/RA/

/RA/

/E/

/RA/

GAP/for 3/4/013 2/26/13 2/27/13 3/4/13 3/4/13 3/8/13

S:\\DRS\\REPORTS\\PV 2013008 TFP.docx ML13067A312

- 1 -

Enclosure

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket:

50-528, 50-529, 50-530 License:

NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-74 Report Nos.:

05000528/2013008, 05000529/2013008, 05000530/2013008 Licensee:

Arizona Public Service Company Facility:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Location:

5951 S. Wintersburg Road Tonopah, Arizona Dates:

January 28 thru February 14, 2013 Team Leader:

J. Mateychick, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2 Inspectors:

S. Achen, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2 B. Correll, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2 N. Okonkwo, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2 Accompanying Personnel:

C. Speer, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2 Approved By:

Geoffrey B. Miller, Branch Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety

- 2 -

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000528/2013008; 05000529/2013008; 05000530/2013008; 01/28/2013 - 02/14/2013; Palo

Verde Nuclear Generating Station; Triennial Fire Protection Team Inspection.

The report covered a two-week triennial fire protection team inspection by four specialist inspectors from Region IV. One Green finding, which was a non-cited violation (NCV), was evaluated by the inspectors. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green,

White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Findings for which the significance determination process (SDP) does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

None

Licensee-Identified Violations

A violation of very low safety significance that was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and the associated corrective action tracking number are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R05 Fire Protection

Main article: IP 71111.05T

This report presents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.05T, Fire Protection (Triennial), at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. The inspection team evaluated the implementation of the approved fire protection program in selected risk-significant areas, with emphasis on the procedures, equipment, fire barriers, and systems that ensure the post-fire capability to safely shutdown the plant.

Inspection Procedure 71111.05T requires the selection of three to five fire areas for review. The inspection team used the fire hazards analysis section of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Individual Plant Examination of External Events to select the following four risk-significant fire zones in three fire areas (inspection samples) in Unit 2 for review:

  • Fire Area I Fire Zone 7A Channel A DC equipment room
  • Fire Area II Fire Zone 5B Train B engineered safety feature switchgear room
  • Fire Area XVI Fire Zone 47A Channel A electrical penetration room

The inspection team evaluated the licensees fire protection program using the applicable requirements, which included plant Technical Specifications, Operating License Condition 2.C.(5), NRC safety evaluations, 10 CFR 50.48, and Branch Technical Position 9.5-1. The team also reviewed related documents that included the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Section 9.5; the fire hazards analysis; and the post-fire safe shutdown analysis.

Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment. Three inspection samples were completed.

.01 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the piping and instrumentation diagrams, safe shutdown equipment list, safe shutdown design basis documents, and the post-fire safe shutdown analysis to verify that the licensee properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for fires in the selected fire areas. The team observed walk-downs of the procedures used for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown in the event of a fire to verify that the procedures properly implemented the safe shutdown analysis provisions.

For each of the selected fire areas, the team reviewed the separation of redundant safe shutdown cables, equipment, and components located within the same fire area. The team also reviewed the licensees method for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48; Branch Technical Position 9.5-1, Appendix A; and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G. Specifically, the team evaluated whether at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path remained free of fire damage in the event of a fire.

In addition, the team verified that the licensee met applicable license commitments.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.02 Passive Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The team walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe the material condition and configuration of the installed fire area boundaries (including walls, fire doors, and fire dampers) and verify that the electrical raceway fire barriers were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area. The team compared the installed configurations to the approved construction details, supporting fire tests, and applicable license commitments.

The team reviewed installation, repair, and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to ensure the fill material possessed an appropriate fire rating and that the installation met the engineering design. The team also reviewed similar records for the rated fire wraps to ensure the material possessed an appropriate fire rating and that the installation met the engineering design.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.03 Active Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the design, maintenance, testing, and operation of the fire detection and suppression systems in the selected fire areas. The team verified the automatic detection systems and the manual and automatic suppression systems were installed, tested, and maintained in accordance with the National Fire Protection Association code of record or approved deviations, and that each suppression system was appropriate for the hazards in the selected fire areas.

The team performed a walkdown of accessible portions of the detection and suppression systems in the selected fire areas. The team also performed a walkdown of major system support equipment in other areas (e.g., fire pumps, Halon supply systems and

carbon dioxide supply systems) to assess the material condition of these systems and components.

The team reviewed the electric fire pump and diesel fire pumps flow and pressure tests to verify that the pumps met their design requirements. The team also reviewed the halon suppression system and carbon dioxide suppression system functional tests to verify that the system capability met the design requirements.

The team assessed the fire brigade capabilities by reviewing training, qualification, and drill critique records. The team also reviewed pre-fire plans and smoke removal plans for the selected fire areas to determine if appropriate information was provided to fire brigade members and plant operators to identify safe shutdown equipment and instrumentation, and to facilitate suppression of a fire that could impact post-fire safe shutdown capability. In addition, the team inspected fire brigade equipment to determine operational readiness for fire fighting.

The team observed an unannounced fire drill, conducted on February 12, 2013, and the subsequent drill critique using the guidance contained in Inspection Procedure 71111.05AQ, Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly. The team observed fire brigade members fight a simulated fire in the Unit 3 Control Building. The team verified that the licensee identified problems, openly discussed them in a self-critical manner at the drill debrief, and identified appropriate corrective actions. Specific attributes evaluated were:

(1) proper wearing of turnout gear and self-contained breathing apparatus;
(2) proper use and layout of fire hoses;
(3) employment of appropriate firefighting techniques;
(4) sufficient firefighting equipment was brought to the scene;
(5) effectiveness of fire brigade leader communications, command and control;
(6) search for victims and propagation of the fire into other areas;
(7) smoke removal operations;
(8) utilization of pre-planned strategies;
(9) adherence to the pre-planned drill scenario; and
(10) drill objectives.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.04 Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The team performed plant walkdowns and document reviews to verify that redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown, which are located in the same fire area, would not be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems. Specifically, the team verified that:

  • A fire in one of the selected fire areas would not directly, through production of smoke, heat, or hot gases, cause activation of suppression systems that could potentially damage all redundant safe shutdown trains.
  • A fire in one of the selected fire areas or the inadvertent actuation or rupture of a fire suppression system would not directly cause damage to all redundant trains (e.g., sprinkler-caused flooding of other than the locally affected train).
  • Adequate drainage is provided in areas protected by water suppression systems.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.05 Alternative Shutdown Capability

a. Inspection Scope

Review of Methodology

The team reviewed the safe shutdown analysis, operating procedures, piping and instrumentation drawings, electrical drawings, the Final Safety Analysis Report, and other supporting documents to verify that hot and cold shutdown could be achieved and maintained from outside the control room for fires that require evacuation of the control room, with or without offsite power available.

Plant walkdowns were conducted to verify that the plant configuration was consistent with the description contained in the safe shutdown and fire hazards analyses. The team focused on ensuring the adequacy of systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor decay heat removal, process monitoring instrumentation, and support systems functions.

The team also verified that the systems and components credited for safe shutdown would remain free from fire damage. Finally, the team verified that the transfer of control from the control room to the alternative shutdown location would not be affected by fire-induced circuit faults (e.g., by the provision of coordinated fuses and isolation transfer switches for alternative shutdown control circuits).

Review of Operational Implementation

The team verified that licensed and non-licensed operators received training on alternative shutdown procedures. The team also verified that sufficient personnel to perform a safe shutdown were trained and available onsite at all times, exclusive of those assigned as fire brigade members.

A walkthrough of the post-fire safe shutdown procedure with licensed and non-licensed operators was performed to determine the adequacy of the procedure. The team verified that the operators could be reasonably expected to perform specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits. Time critical actions that were verified included restoring electrical power, establishing control at the remote shutdown and local shutdown panels, establishing reactor coolant makeup, and establishing decay heat removal.

The team also reviewed the periodic testing of the alternative shutdown transfer capability and instrumentation and control functions to verify that the tests were adequate to demonstrate the functionality of the alternative shutdown capability.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.06 Circuit Analysis

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the post-fire safe shutdown analysis to verify that the licensee identified the circuits that may impact the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

The team verified, on a sample basis, that the licensee properly identified the cables for equipment required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions in the event of a fire in the selected fire areas. The team verified that these cables were either adequately protected from the potentially adverse effects of fire damage or were analyzed to show that fire induced circuit faults (e.g., hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to ground) would not prevent safe shutdown. The team reviewed the circuits associated with the following components:

For this sample, the team reviewed electrical elementary and block diagrams and identified power, control, and instrument cables necessary to support their operation. In addition, the team reviewed cable routing information to verify that fire protection features were in place as needed to satisfy the separation requirements specified in the fire protection license basis.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.07 Communications

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected the contents of designated emergency storage lockers and reviewed the alternative shutdown procedure to verify that communication systems were available, operable, and adequate for the performance of designated activities. The team verified the capability of the communication systems to support the operators in the conduct and coordination of their required actions. The team also verified that the design and location of communications equipment such as repeaters and transmitters would not cause a loss of communications during a fire. The team identified that a Unit 3 Turbine Building fire would disable all three units radio system, however, radio-to-radio communications or sound powered phones would not be affected. The team discussed system design, testing, and maintenance, and conducted a communication system visual inspection with the system engineer.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.08 Emergency Lighting

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the portion of the emergency lighting system required for alternative shutdown to verify that it was adequate to support the performance of manual actions required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions, and to illuminate access and egress routes to the areas where manual actions would be required. The team evaluated the locations and positioning of the emergency lights during an in-plant walkthrough of the alternative shutdown procedure.

The team verified that the licensee installed emergency lights with an 8-hour capacity, or had credited appropriate emergency DC powered lights to meet the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.J. The team verified that the licensee maintained the emergency light batteries in accordance with industry standards, and tested and performed maintenance in accordance with plant procedures and industry practices. The team verified through a sample of maintenance records that emergency DC lights, and battery operated lights were repaired within appropriate times. The team verified through in-plant inspections and engineering calculation reviews that required access and egress routes, and manual actions of safe shutdown components were adequately illuminated with emergency lighting fixtures.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.09 Cold Shutdown Repairs

a. Inspection Scope

The team verified that the licensee identified repairs needed to reach and maintain cold shutdown and had dedicated repair procedures, equipment, and materials to accomplish these repairs. The team noted that the licensee did not have proceduralized repairs as part of their cold shutdown strategy or credited the repair of equipment to reach cold shutdown based on the safe shutdown methodology implemented. The licensee stated that as long as at least one train of safe shutdown equipment remains free of fire damage, then PVNGS can reach and maintain cold shutdown conditions without repairs.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.10 Compensatory Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The team verified that compensatory measures were implemented for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features (e.g., detection and suppression systems and equipment; passive fire barriers; or pumps, valves, or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions). The team also verified that the short-term compensatory measures compensated for the degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective action could be taken and that the licensee was effective in returning the equipment to service in a reasonable period of time.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.11 B.5.b Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of guidance and strategies intended to maintain or restore core, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire as required by Section B.5.b of the Interim Compensatory Measures Order, EA-02-026, dated February 25, 2002, and 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2).

The inspectors reviewed the strategies to verify that they continued to maintain and implement procedures, maintain and test equipment necessary to properly implement the strategies, and ensure station personnel are knowledgeable, trained, and capable of implementing the procedures. The inspectors visually inspected the fire truck with

remote controlled extension ladder mounted spray nozzle, B.5.b equipment storage trailer, storage lockers strategically located within the plant that contained materials and equipment necessary to implement B.5.b strategies, and other equipment used to implement the strategies to ensure the availability and material readiness of the equipment. The licensee implemented their strategies in accordance with Procedure 79IS-9ZZ05, PVNGS Severe Accident Management Guidelines, Revision 13. The inspectors selected the following two specific strategies for this inspection sample:

  • External Spent Fuel Pool Makeup

The inspectors completed two samples.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

[OA]

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Corrective Actions for Fire Protection Deficiencies

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected a sample of condition reports associated with the licensee's fire protection program to verify that the licensee had an appropriate threshold for identifying deficiencies. In addition, the team reviewed the corrective actions proposed and implemented to verify that they were effective in correcting identified deficiencies. The team also evaluated the quality of recent engineering evaluations through a review of condition reports, calculations, and other documents during the inspection.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Main article: IP 71153

Closed: Licensee Event Report 05000528; 529; 530/2012-005-00, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Remote Shutdown System Control Circuit Deficiencies

The licensee identified that control circuit isolation features in the remote shutdown system did not properly isolate three circuits from potential effects of a control room fire.

The licensee has revised Procedure 40AO-9ZZ19, Control Room Fire, to address this finding. The enforcement aspects of this finding are discussed in Section 4OA7.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

The team presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Mims, Senior Vice-President, Regulatory and Oversight, and other members of the licensee staff at an exit meeting on February 14, 2013. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation.

License Condition 2.C.(6), Fire Protection, requires the licensee to maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program described in listed regulatory documents. Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report 5 states the alternative shutdown capability for PVNGS 1-3 complies with the requirements of Section III.L of Appendix R and, therefore, is acceptable. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.L.3 requires that the alternative shutdown capability shall be independent of the specific fire area. Contrary to the above, the design of three circuits in the remote shutdown system was not independent from the effects of fire damage in the case of a fire in the control room. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Palo Verde Action Request 4311694 and Palo Verde Action Request 4329210 and issued Licensee Event Report 05000528; 529; 530/2012-005-00. The licensee has revised Procedure 40AO-9ZZ19, Control Room Fire, to address this finding.

The finding was evaluated for safety significance using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process,

1. The finding was assigned a low degradation rating due to the

performance and reliability of the remote shutdown following a control room evacuation being minimally impacted by the finding. Based on the low degradation rating, the finding screened as having a very low safety significance (Green) in Phase 1, Task 1.3.1, Qualitative Screening for All Finding Categories, Question 1.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

N. Aaronscooke, Engineer, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
D. Agazzi, Fire Captain, Fire Department
R. Anderson, Mechanic Team Member, Fire Protection Maintenance
G. Andrews, Department Leader, Operations
G. Archambault, Supervisor, Communications
K. Atkinson, Shift Manager, Performance Improvement
D. Baldwin, Senior Evaluator, Nuclear Assurance
D. Barnes, Director, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
S. Beckman, Senior Engineer, Design Electrical
L. Berberich, Audit Team Leader, Nuclear Assurance
J. Boothroyd, Senior Engineer, Fire Protection Engineering
J. Cadogan, Vice-President, Nuclear Engineering
G. Cameron, Fire Protection Engineer, Fire Protection Engineering
R. Carbonneau, Department Leader, Nuclear Assurance
C. Coles, Department Leader, Security Operations
D. Crane, Consultant
P. Custodio, Electrical Engineer, Fire Protection Engineering
J. Delgado, Auxiliary Operator
C. Denny, Electrical Team Member, Fire Protection Maintenance
S. Dodd, Fire Marshal, Fire Department
E. Dutton, Director, Nuclear Assurance
D. Elkinton, Senior Consultant, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
M. Fallon, Director, Communications
R. Fenecit, Chairman, Offsite Safety Review Committee
K. Foster, Department Leader, Fire Protection
J. Glass, Department Leader, Maintenance
R. Garcia, Electrical Team Member, Fire Protection Maintenance
T. Gavigan, Department Leader, Nuclear Training
E. Gouvier, Engineer, Design Electrical
S. Hardy, Fire Protection Engineer, Hughes Associates
M. Harkins, Nuclear Training Instructor, Fire Protection
S. Haroy, Consultant
J. Harrison, Mechanic Team Member, Fire Protection Maintenance
A. Hartwig, Department Leader, Design Engineering
D. Hautala, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
R. Henry, Site Representative, Salt River Project
C. Holland, Maintenance Leader, Fire Protection Maintenance
T. Hook, Section Leader, Probabilistic Risk Assessment
M. Hooshmand, Department Leader, Design Engineering
D. Horton, Fire Chief, Fire Department
C. Johnson, Administrative Coordinator, Support Services
W. Jordan, Engineer, I&C/Electrical Design
D. Kassebaum, Captain, Fire Department
A. Krainik, Department Leader, Operations
M. Lacal, Vice-President, Operations Support
T. Lam, Trainer, Information Technology
A. Lee, Safe Shutdown Engineer, Fire Protection Engineering
P. Maningat, Engineer, Nuclear Assurance
D. Marley, System Engineer, Systems Engineering
D. Martin, Control Room Supervisor, Operations
S. Martin, Nuclear Training Instructor, Fire Protection
M. McGhee, Manager, Operations Support, Regulatory Affairs
P. McSparran, Director, Nuclear Training
R. Merryman, Department Leader, Site Procedures Standards
D. Mims, Senior Vice-President, Regulatory and Oversight
D. Odom, Supervisor, Support Operations
N. Pappas, Shift Manager, Operations
A. Ramey, Shift Manager, Operations
R. Rendler, Nuclear Training Instructor, Operations Training
S. Rosenbaum, Reactor Operator, Operations
M. Schjoll, Senior Program Advisor, Fire Protection
D. Sefton, Fire Captain, Fire Department
C. Seifert, Senior Nuclear Auxiliary Operator, Operations
G. Shanker, Director, Site Programs
E. Shouse, Site Representative, El Paso Electric
J. Springan, Senior Nuclear Auxiliary Operator

A.Thibodeaux, Nuclear Training Instructor, Nuclear Training

R. Timmons, Department Leader, Nuclear Training
K. Viswanathan, Engineer, Hughes Associates
K. Wagley, Department Leader, Electrical/HVAC
T. Weber, Department Leader, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
A. Wheeler, Director, Performance Improvement
J. Wieser, Engineer, Design Electrical
R. Wilfred, Department Leader,Operations

NRC personnel

M. Baquera, Resident Inspector
T. Brown, Senior Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Opened and Closed

None

Closed

05000528; 529; 530/2012-005-00 LER Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Remote Shutdown System Control Circuit Deficiencies (Section 4OA3)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

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