IR 05000528/1982012
| ML20058D298 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 07/09/1982 |
| From: | Eckhardt J, Vorderbruggen NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058D268 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-82-12, 50-529-82-06, 50-529-82-6, 50-530-82-06, NUDOCS 8207270073 | |
| Download: ML20058D298 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 50-528/82-12
REGION V
50-529/82-06 Report No. 50-530/82-06 Docket No. 50-528. 50-529.
License No. CPPR-141. CPPR Safeguards Group 50-530 142, CPPR-143 Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Company P.
O.
Box 21666 Phoenix. Arizona 85036 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1, 2, and 3 Inspection at:
Palo Verde Construction Site. Wintersburg. Arizona Inspection conducted:
Anril 5-30. 1982 Inspectors: C f
- ff y 7/t//gr f L/E.'Vorderbrueggen D(te Signed Jenior Resident Inspector Date Signed Date Signed Approved By:
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-7/e//pg H. Eckhardt, Acting Chief Dale Signed
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eactor Projects Section 1 Summary:
Inspection on April 5-30, 1982 (Report Nos. 50-528/82-12, 50-529/82-06, and 50-530/82-06 Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of construction activities associated with installation of reactor coolant pressure boundary and other safety-related piping in Units 1 and 2; quality re-cc: ds pertaining to Unit 1 safety-related electrical equip-ment; load testing of Unit 3 polar crane bridge; Unit 3 Containment electrical penetrations; Unit 3 ex-core nuclear instrumentation ducts; follow-up of 50.55(e) items and licensee action on previous inspection items; and general activities in progress throughout the plant site.
The in-spection involved 80 inspector hours on-site by one NRC inspector.
Results:
One item of noncompliance was identified pertaining to piping installation in Unit 2.
8207270073 820709 PDR ADOCK 05000528
PDR RV Form 219 (2)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Arizona Public Service Company (APS)
- E.
E. Van Brunt, Jr., Vice President Nuclear Projects Management
- J. A. Roedel, Corporate Quality Assurance Manager
- D.
B. Fasnacht, Nuclear Construction Manager R. J. Kimmel, Field Engineering Supervisor
- D.
B. Fullbright, Field Engineer
- W.
E. Ide, Site QA Supervisor D. Wittas, QA Engineer P. Moore, QA Engineer b.
Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
- S. M. Nickell, Project Superintendent
- D.
R. Hawkinson, Project QA Supervisor
- C.
J. Dun, Assistant Project Field Engineer R. M. Grant, Project QC Engineer
- M. A. Rosen, QC Supervisor H. Mear,'QC Supervisor M. Stam, Welding Lead Field Engineer J. Arnold, Rigging Engineer c.
Reliance Truck Company (R/T)
R. Simpson, Superintendent Other persons contacted during the inspection period included construction craftsmen, inspectors, and supervisory personnel.
- Management Meeting attendees.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items a.
(Closed) Follow-up Item (50-529/81-05/02) : Modification Change l
Notice (MCN) Procedure and Welding Standard WD-1 Changes
WPP/QCI No. 32.0 was issued on 4/20/81 and appears to provide adequate provisions for issuing and controlling MCN's.
l Welding Standard WD-1 and its welding check list forms WR-5 and WR-5A, along with WPP/QCI 101.0, " Welding Con-
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trol", were revised to clarify QC inspection provisions
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on pipe hanger components.
j This item is closed.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-529/82-03/01): " Dry Washing" Weld Surfaces This matter was promptly and thoroughly investigated by Bechtel and the Licensee.
Discussions with the Boiler-maker Welders led to the identification of the specific weld seams that were involved.
These were recorded on i
Nonconformance Report No. W-Y-525.
A welding procedure specification was developed and qualified which demonstrated no detrimental effects on the metallurgical properties of the materials.
On this basis, the involved weld seams were judged to be' acceptable.
The licensee decreed, how-ever, that the procedure was not to be used for any sub-sequent work.
Additionally, the welders were reminded that they are expected to know the requirements of the procedures in which they are qualified, and that any violation of a welding procedure is grounds for dismissal.
This item is closed.
3.
Unit 1 - Safety Related Piping The installed 14-inch suction and 10-inch discharge piping for Train "A" LPSI Pump (SIA-POI) at the 40-foot elevation in the auxiliary building was examined to verify that the installation was in conformance with Specification 13-PM-204, Drawings 13-P-l SIF-201 and -207, and WPP/QCI 202.0.
Also examined for confor-
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mance with the same specification, WPP/QCI and Drawings 13-P-SIF-202 and -204 was the installed 10-inch suction and 4-inch discharge piping for Train "B" HPSI Pump (SIB-P02), also at the 40-fo'ot elevation in the auxiliary building.
The inspector verified that all changes to the drawings identified above were properly controlled and documented in regard to engineering review and approval.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Unit 1 - Electrical Components and Systems - Review of Quality Records
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The records pertaining to the receipt, care and installation of the electrical components listed below were examined in order to verify their availability and to ascertain that they reflect work accomplishment consistent with the quality requirements and commitments:
a)
Train "B" 4160 volt Aux Feed Pump Motor (AFB-P01)
b)
Train "A" 4160 volt HPSI Pump Motor (SIA-P02)
c)
Train "B" 4160 volt LPSI Pump Motor (SIB-P01)
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Train "A" 4160 volt ECW Pump Motor (EWA-P01)
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Train "A" 125 volt de Battery Charger (E-PKA-Hil)
f)
Train "BD" 125 volt de Battery Charger (E-PKB-H16)
g)
Motor Operator (de) for 16-inch Shutdown Cooling Isolation Valve in Loop 2 (Valve UV-654)
h)
Motor Operator (ac) for 16-inch Shutdown Cooling Isolation Valve in Loop 1 (Valve UV-655)
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Motor Operator (ac) for 12-inch LPSI Inlet Valve to Reactor Cold Leg 1B (Valve UV-645)
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Motor Operator for 6-inch Steam Supply Valve to Train "A" Aux Feed Pump Turbine (UV-134)
The records review focused principally on material requirements, receipt inspection for shipping damage, verification that purchase order requirements were satisfied, installation in-spection and protection after installation, and qualification of personnel.
Proper control and dispositioning of the associated nonconformance reports were also verified.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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5.
Unit 2 - Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping 12-inch safety injection line SI-202 was examined from check valve V-134 inside containment, through check valve V-542, and.
then to its junction with 14" line SI-207 which connects SI tank 1A to reactor cold leg 1A.
The installation was verified to conform with Drawing 13-P-SIF-103 and Specification 13-PM-204.
Particular attention was given to the correctness of configuration, absence of defects on the component surfaces, and completion status of hangers and supports.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Unit 3 - Polar Crane Bridge Load Test The inspector observed the load test which was performed to demonstrate the capability of the polar crane bridge to lift and set the main NSSS components.
The total weight lifted by the hoist was calculated to be 860 tons.
This amounts to 111 percent of the combined weight of a steam generator (the heaviest single component) and its associated rigging equipment.
The test load was lifted, traversed the path to be taken by steam generator No. 2, and returned to the pick-up point.
The deflection of both girders of the crane bridge was measured at predesignated trolley locations.
The Bechtel Construction In-spection Plan (WPP/QCI No. 350.84) which recorded the deflection
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-4-data and the completion of the procedural steps was subsequently examined and found to be in order.
The maximum bridge deflection (at centerspan) was seen to be within the allowable' limit of 2.375-inches established by the crane' manufacturer (Whiting Co.).
The deflection data included the accumulated creepage associated with the components involved in the girder / support structure combination.
This deflection compared very well with the measure-ments made on the Units 1 and 2 crane bridges.
The test was conducted in a well organized manner even though a delay was encountered by the necessity of repairing a severe leak in the hoist hydraulic system.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Containment Electrical Penetrations - Unit 3 The circumferential fillet weld attaching the slip-on flange to the liner sleeve for 2 electrical penetrations was examined to ascertain compliance with the requirements of Conax Co. Drawing 7848-10003, and Bechtel procedures WPP/QCI 101.0 and 259.1.
The penetration sleeves were located at the 106'-6" elevation at azimuths 194-and 198-degrees.
Both welds had been recently completed and the workmanship appeared satisfactory.
A properly filled out Field Welding Check List (WR-5A Form) was present at the work locations with hold points and NDE callouts specified.
The quality control inspections required to this point in the work process were properly signed off.
The material specifications were in accordance with the specified requirements.
The Filler Metal Withdrawal Authorization form and the qualifica-tion records of the welder were examined and found satisfactory.
The inspector also observed the satisfactory performance of dye penetrant examination on both welds by a qualified NDE examiner.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Unit 3 - Ex-Core Nuclear Instrumentation Ducts Eight 6-inch conduits, vertically oriented at 90-degree intervals in pairs around the reactor vessel, serve as ducts for the movable fission chambers which measure neutron flux exterior to the re-actor core.
The 6-inch conduit segments are butt-welded to-gether in order to provide a smooth surface for the insertion and removal of the fission chambers.
An anonymous caller left a recorded message on the telephone answering machine in the resident inspector's office pertaining to those ducts.
The caller identified a " serious problem" in that a non-qualified welder had joined the conduit segment....
-5-Upon investigation, the inspector learned that the responsible Bechtel QC engineer discovered that the welder was not appropri-ately qualified when he reviewed the welding documentation as a part of the normal welding inspection process.
The inspector found that the subject welder had been employed as an electrician welder for two years and was considered by his foreman to be an excellent welder.
He had qualified in the SMAW procedure for plate welding, the normal welding done by the electrical discipline; however, he was not qualified for the,SE\\W procedure for pipe welding.
The situation had been documented on Nonconformance Report No. W-C-545 which was dispositioned as "use-as-is" based on the welder taking and passing the qualification test in the specified SMAW procedure for pipe welding's(PI-A-Lh).
The in-spector examined the record of the welder performance qualifica-tions test and observed that the test weld was found acceptable by radiographic examination.
The inspector concluded that there was no basis for judging the welder's work on the instrumentation ducts not to be acceptable.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Review of 50.55 (e) Items - All Units During this reporting period, the inspector reviewed 21 items which the licensee had identified to the NRC as having potential 50.55 (e) reportability significance.
Each item was documented on a Deficiency Evaluation Report (DER) as required by the licensee's procedure.
The DER describes the discrepant condition, identifies supporting documents and the corrective action to be taken, and is the basis for the licensee's report to the NRC.
The licensee's reports covering 7 items that were considered reportable under the 50.55 (e) criteria were judged to be acceptable by the inspector and are closed.
The corresponding DERs were as follows:
DER NO.
SUBJECT 79-10 Pipe Hanger Welds not Meeting Minimum ASME/AWS Code Requirements 80-11 Faulty Pressure Switch in Chlorine Detectors 80-16 Seal Table Anchor Bolts - Inadequate Embedment for Seismic Category 1 81-16 Bearing in General Electric Circuit Breakers Subject to Deformation 81-51 Inadequate Wiring Separation - Unit 1 Diesel Generator Control Cabinets
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-6-81-53 Inadequate Wiring Separation - Unit 1 Main Control Room Panels 81-12 Instrument Tubing Clamp Calculations - Seismic and Thermal Expansion Requirements not Considered For several of the above items, the licensee had submitted interim reports because of the time required for evaluating the nature and extent of the problem, and for determining the most appropriate corrective action.
For all items, the records indicate that the licensee's evaluations were thorough and that satisfactory correc-tive action had been completed or has been arranged.
The following 14 DERs were judged by the licensee not to be reportable and the inspector concurs with that decision:
DER NO.
SUBJECT 79-8 Cracked Casing on Auxiliary Switch - ITE Gould 480-volt Load Center 79-9 Incorrect Pipe Spool Heat Treatment - Air Quench Used Instead of Water Quench 80-14 Pipe Support Anchor Strap Configuration Precludes Full Weld Length Achievement 80-33 Lack of Valid Material Test Reports for Structural Steel 80-42 Bolts Supplied by Texas Bolt Company - Failure to comply with Material Test Requirements of ASME Code 81-28 Split Jacket Material on Four Flexible Conduits in Unit 1 Containment 81-52 Loose Fitting Anti-Rotational Pins - Unit 1 LPSI and CS Pumps 81-56 Insufficient Fillet Welds - Letdown Heat Exchangers 82-7 Questionable Grout Strength Attainment -
Closure of Unit 1 Containment Construction Opening 82-9 Thermowells in Diesel Generator Piping - No ASME Class 3 Certification 82-10 Unit 2 Corner & Lada Pipe Supports - Material Identification Obliterated by Galvanizing 82-11 Weld Porosity in Six Nozzles in Bottom Head -
Unit 2 Reactor Vessel 82-13 8 - #8 Dowel Bars Omitted in Basemat - Unit 3 Fuel Building 82-16 Mislocated Mounting Straps - 24 Unit 1 Instrument Condensate Pots No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie r,,,773--- - - - - - -
-7-10. Inspection Tours of Plant Site At various times during this inspection period, the inspector toured the plant site in order to observe general housekeeping conditions, care and preservation of equipment, handling of heavy components, tagging and identification of material, absence of welding electrode stubs lying around the various work areas, adequacy of caps over pipe openings not being worked on, and presence of cribbing under stored pipe spools, valves, and other components.
During an inspection tour on the second shift of April 20, 1982, after the cessation of work for that day, five pipe end openings were found uncovered in the " wrap-around" region of the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building at the approximate 80-foot elevation.
They were as follows:
a)
Penetration No. 22 for 10-inch containment spray line SI-130 at azimuth 146-degrees.
b)
Penetration No. 21 for 10-inch containment spray line SI-088 at azimuth 214-degrees.
c)
1-inch sockolet fitting on top of spool 005 of line SI-194 (16-inch shutdown cooling loop No. 2).
This fitting had a small welding purge gas hose inserted in it.
d)
Spool 002 (elbow) of line SI-220 connecting to penetration No. 20 at azimuth 230-degrees (12-inch LPSI line to loop 1B).
c)
1-inch socklet fitting on top of spool 112 in (d) above.
Paragraph 9.5.6 of Bechtel Specification No. 13-PM-204, Field Fabrication and Installation of Nuclear Piping Systems, requires
that if work is interrupted after a pipe spool end closure has l
been removed,
"a temporary closure shall be provided by covering j
the end with plastic and taping or otherwise scaling".
Since this requirement had not been followed in the cases identified above, this is an apparent item of noncompliance.
(50-529/82-06/01)
11. Management Meeting A meeting was held on May 7, 1982, with the Licensee and Bechtel representatives identified in Paragraph 1.
During the meeting, the inspector summarized the scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the inspection findings as described in this report.
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