IR 05000528/1982026
| ML20027D173 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 10/07/1982 |
| From: | Vorderbrueggen, Thomas Young NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20027D172 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-82-26, 50-529-82-10, 50-530-82-11, NUDOCS 8210280372 | |
| Download: ML20027D173 (12) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 50-528/82-26
REGION V
50-529/82-10 Report No. 50-530/82-11 Docket No. 50-528, 50-529 License No. CPPR-141. CPPR-Safeguards Group 50-530 142, CPPR-143 Licensee: Arizona Public Service Company P. O. Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85036 Facility Name: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1, 2, and 3 Inspection at: Palo Verde Construction Site, Wintersburg. Arizona Inspection conducted:
July 13 - Septem)ner 3, L982
/8" b hb Inspectors:
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L7 E. Vordei br@ i; gen
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Date Signed Senior Residend/ Inspe6kor Y Date Signed
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Date Signed Approved by:
W.
[d"7" E Young, Jr.,
gjiet, j
Date Signed Reactor ProjectsvSection 2, Reactor Projects Branch No. 1 Date Signed Summary:
Inspection on July 13 - September 3, 1982 (Report Nos. 50-528/82-26, 50-529/82-10, and 50-530/82-11 Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of construction activities associated with grouting of temporary underground piping in Units 1 and 2; containment post-tensioning in Unit 2; containment penetra-tions in Unit 2; reactor coolant pressure boundary and other safety-related piping in Unit 2; electrical components in Unit 2; Unit 3 reactor vessel protection; Unit 3 containment dome liner; reactor coolant pipe. welding in Unit 3; follow-up of 50.55(e) items and licensee action on previous item of noncompliance; follow-up of improper work allegations; and, general activities in progess throughout the plant site.
The inspection involved 152 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
e210280372 e21013 RV Form 219 (2)
DRADOCKOSOOOg
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Arizona Public Service Company (APS)
- E.
E. Van Brunt, Jr., Vice President, Nuclear Projects Management
- J. A. Roedel, Corporate Quality Assurance Manager
- D.
B. Fasnacht, Nuclear Construction Manager
- W.
E. Ide, Construction Quality Assurance / Quality Control Manager
- R.
J. Kimmel, Field Engineering Supervisor D. Wittas, QA Engineer P. Moore, QA Engineer S. Penick, QA Engineer R. Forrester, QA Engineer b.
Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
- S.
M. Nickell, Proj ect Superintendent
- D.
R. Hawkinson, Proj ect QA Supervisor
- R. M. Grant, Project QC Engineer
- W. A. Miller, Assistant Project Field Engineer
- C.
J. Dun, Assistant Project Field Engineer R. Senczyszyn, Civil / Structural Specialist P. Yen, Civil / Structural Specialist H. Mear, QC Supervisor A. Robertson, QC Engineer J. Donaldson, Field Engineer-Welding J. Johnson, Lead Field Engineer-Welding - Unit 3 0. Ostereich, Welding Engineer - Unit 3 W. Hathcock, Electrical Superintendent - Unit 3 D. McIlrath, Electrical General Foreman - Unit 3 T. Dehne, Electrican Welder (Alleger)
- Denotes personnel present at the management meeting.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Noncompliance Item (50-529/82-06/01): Pipe Openings Uncovered After Work Interruption The corrective action identified in the licensee's response letter, dated August 10, 1982, was reviewed.
Bechtel's re-indoctrination program covering the ' project requirements,for maintaining pipe cleanliness was well documented and was' attended by all Area Field Engineers and Pipefitter Supervisors assigned to all three units.
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-2-This item is closed.
3.
Units 1 and 2 - Grouting of Temporary Underground Piping The discovery of a leak in the temporary fire protection system line (4-inch) in Unit 1 and the resultant disturbance of the soil backfill in the vicinity of the southeast corner of the Auxiliary Building was discussed in IE Inspection Report No. 50-528/81-24, paragraph 3.
The licensee's investigation of this situation disclosed that Unit 2 had experienced a similar occurrence in early 1980.
That distrubance, however, was caused by a leak in the two inch domestic service water line and, at tnat same time, a leak was discovered in the three inch compressed air line in the same underground area.
Both lines were valved out of service and abandoned.
The inspector has been following Bechtel's program for determining the location of the pipe failures, the approximate locations of soil backfill voiding, and the potential consequences of severe loss of soil support under the Auxiliary Building in the vicinity of the leaks.
The program included the following:
Progressive isolation of selected portions of the affected a.
lines by means of inflatable " packers" and then pressure testing the isolated portions to detect leaks.
b.
Core drilling at selected locations through the lean concrete wide space between the Units 1 and 2 Auxiliary and Control Buildings and probing through these holes with a cone pene-trometer to evaluate soll conditions below the slab.
Obtaining and evaluating soil samples from selected' holes c.
in the space mentioned in item b, above.
d.
Observation of settlement markers of buildings in the I
area of the pipe leaks to determine trends in building settlement, e.
Performance of structural analyses of the Auxiliary Building using the conservative assumption that there is a complete loss of soil support under the Southeast corner of the basemat.
f.
Development of a pressure grouting procedure to fill the abandoned temporary lines and any loose areas in the soil surrounding the pipes at the points of leakage, as well as, any voided areas resulting from soil dis-placement.
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-3-It should be noted that on February 2, 1982, while probing with a cone penetrometer at Unit 2 (see item b, above), another leak was discovered coming from the four inch temporary fire line.
From the soil saturation evidence and other available signs, it was obvious that the leak was small and that it had started several weeks before discovery.
The effort has been comprehensive and well organized with appropriate expertise applied in the various technical areas.
The licensee submitted their final Part 50.55(e) report on May 20, 1982.
The report concludes that the examinations and evaluations that were performed show that the present soil conditions are adequate for the safe performance of the structures with a substantial safety margin.
Additionally, the grouting program (item f, above) will provide assurance that the safety margins are maintained by stabilizing the soil densities in the affected areas.
The inspector sat in on several meetings of Bechtel and licensee personnel that were held to finalize the grouting program.
The services of a professional grouting consultant were also engaged.
The inspector reviewed the grout mix design test results, the final approved grouting procedure, and observed a portion of the initial grouting activities being performed in Unit 1.
The work was well organized, under appropriate supervisory control and inspection, and was being appropriately documented.
The grouting program was satisfactorily completed in Unit 2 the last week of August.
The inspector has no further questions on this subject and considers the matter closed.
4.
Unit 2 - Containment Post-Tensioning The inspector observed the " field end" anchor head installation and the buttonheading on vertical tendon No. V-57.
The iron-workers were experienced in the use of the equipment and were knowledgeable in the requirements of Western Concrete Structures Co. Procedure No. PTP-7, Installation of Field Anchor Heads and Field Button Heading.
The QC inspector was present and was per-forming the required gaging of the finished buctonheads and documenting the work on the specified Certifieste of Inspection Form.
The Bechtel QC engineer was also present surveilling the contractor's work activities.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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l 5.
Unit 2 - Containment Penetrations The inspector reviewed the work activities associated with the
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installation of the main personnel access hatch.
The work had
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been completed and good workmanship.was evident.
Welding.and HDE activities had been performed in accordance with the specified
procedures and by qualified personnel.
The installation appeared to be in accordance with the design requirements.
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6.
Unit 2 - Safety-Related Piping
A portion of the low pressure safety injection / shutdown cooling line serving reactor coolant loop 1A was examined to verify that i
the installation was in conformance with the design requirements.
The portion examined was in the west " wrap-around section of the
Auxiliary Building at the 70 to 88 ft. elevations, and comprised
20-inch line SIA-070 from flow orifice FE-306, through motor-i operated valve UV-635, then through 12-inch line SIA-202 up to containment penetration No. 19.
The governing documents were Specification 13-PM-204 and Drawing 13-P-SIF-207.
The installation was essentially complete except for hanger welding.
The inspector examined weld 023 in the 16-inch suction line for LPSI Pump No. 1 from Shutdown Cooling Loop No. 1 (Line SIA-241),
and weld 001 in the 12-inch suction line (same pump) from the Fuel Storage Pool (Line SIA-002).
The welding had been completed j
and the surface preparation for the specified NDE (radiography)
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appeared satisfactory on both welds.
The inspector also examined l
the NDE records for the above designated welds and for the follow-ing additional completed welds:
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a.
Welds 003 and 004 in 12-inch Shutdown Cooling return line to Reactor Coolant Loop 1A (Line SIA-202).
b.
Welds 002 and 003 in 22-inch Shutdown cooling return line
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to Reactor Coolant Loop 1B (Line SIB-220).
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The records demonstrated that the work had been accomplished j
in accordance with the established procedural requirements.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Unit 2 - Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping
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Weld 002 in the 12-inch Pressurizer Surge line from Reactor
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Coolant Hot Leg RC-032 (line RC-028), and weld 005 in the
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three inch Charging Line (No. CH-005) connecting to Reactor Coolant Cold Leg RC-079 were examined by the inspector.
Both
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welds had been completed and the surface preparation for the i
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-5-specified NDE (radiography) appeared satisfactory.
The NDE
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l records for those welds were examined by the inspector, as well as the records for the following additional completed welds:
a.
Welds 001 and 004 in 30-inch Reactor Coolant Line RC-073 between Pump 2A and Steam Generator No. 2.
b.
Weld 005 in the 12-inch Pressurizer Surge Line RC-028.
c.
Weld 006 in the 3-inch Charging Line CH-005.
The records showed that the work had been accomplished in accordance with the established procedural requirements.
No items of noncompliance or deviaitions were identified.
8.
Unit 2 - Electrical (Components and Systems II)
The Class IE equipment listed below was examined by the inspector to ascertain that the requirements of the specifi-cations, drawings, and WPP/QCI work and inspection procedures were satisfied, a.
Train B Diesel Generator b.
125-volt DC Eatteries C and D and the associated racks c.
125-volt DC Control Center PKB-M42 d.
125-volt DC Distribution Panel PKB-D22 The examination was directed primarily to the correctness of equipment identification and inscallation location; inspection during and subsequent to installation; qualifications of personnel; post-installation protection and cleanliness preservation; work and inspection procedure revisicn control; and identification and control of nonconforming components / materials.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Unit 3 - Reactor Vessel Protection The reactor vessel has a heavy structural cover across the vessel flange to keep out foreign objects and debris.
The work platforms and ladders inside the vessel are metallic or made of treated wood to minimize fire hazards.
Nozzle welding activities are in progress and openings not being worked are covered for protection from adjacent construction work.
The inspector verified that the procedures for protection of the installed reactor vessel were being implemented.
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-6-No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Unit 3 - Containment Dome Liner Installation During this reporting period, the 12 prefabricated dome liner segments were lifted and set in place for welding.
The inspector examined the initial fitup after the segments had been set.
It was observed that all vertical seams were being positioned within the specified weld gap spacing with minimal force exerted by the standard pinning devices used for fairing out the seams.
The horizontal fit of the segments at the cylindrical " spring line" exhibited no evidence of localized bulging or distortion.
The precision of the overall fit demonstrated that the vertical liner as well as the dome segments, had been carefully assembled within the specified tolerances.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
11.
Unit 3 - Reactor Coolant Pipe Welding The inspector observed the in-process welding of two welds in the reactor coolant system to ascertain if the requirements of the applicable specifications, codes, standards and procedures were being met.
The welds were:
a.
Weld 001 in line RC-032 - 42 I.D. hot leg to reactor inlet nozzle b.
Weld 002 in line RC-063 - 42-inch I.D. hot leg to Steam Generator No. 2 inlet nozzle Both welds had reached the 1/4 wall thickness point and acceptance check radiographs had been made._ Good workmanship was in evidence.
Both welds were being made by the simultaneous use of two independently operated automatic welding machines utilizing welding procedure PI (G2)-T-I-0- (ITP).
A properly filled out Field Welding Check List (WR-5 Form) was present at'the work location of each weld with hold points and NDE' call-outs speci-fled.
The machine settings for voltage, current, travel speed, filler metal wire feed speed, oscillation frequency and ampli '
tude were verified to be within the ranges listed on the welding procedure specification.
The weld identification, material specification, shielding gas flow rate, and interpass temperature-were in accordance with the requirements specified on the WR-5 Form.
The inspector verified that the WR-5 provisions were in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code,Section III, 1974 edition.
Interpass cleaning was being performed with stain-less wire brushes.
Filler metal issue slips and the qualification
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-7-records of the welders involved were examined and found to be acceptable.
The inspector observed that quality control inspection and supervisory surveillance were being performed to an appropriate degree.
Also, the preheat control and vessel growth monitoring stations were observed to be under adequate control.
Drawing No. 13-P-ZCG-103, Rev. 5, Containment Building - Reactor Coolant Loops, governed both welds, and the applicable specifica-tion was 13-PM-204, Field Fabrication and Installation of Nuclear Piping Systems.
WPP/QCI 101.0, Welding Control, and WPP/QCI 202.0, Piping System Installation were the controlling work plan and in-spection documents for both welds.
No items of concompliance or deviations were identified.
12.
Review of 50.55(e) Items - All Units
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During this reporting period, the inspector reviewed and closed out 20 items which the licensee had identified to the NRC as having potential 50.55(e) reportability significance.
Each item was documented on a Deficiency Evaluation Report (DER) as required by the licensee's procedure.
The DER describes the discrepant condition, identifies supporting documents and the corrective action to be taken, and is the basis for the licensee's report to the NRC.
For each of the 20 items, the records in-dicate that the licensee's evaluations were thorough and that satisfactory corrective action had been completed or has been arranged.
In the DER tabulation below, only the five marked with an asterisk (*) were judged by the licensee to be. reportable under
the 50.55(e) criteria and have been satisfactorily-reported:
the other 19 were considered not reportable.
The inspector concurs with the licensee's decisions.
DER NO.
SUBJECT
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- 81-57 Excessive Length of Flexible Leads ~on Moveable Contracts - G. E. Co. HMA Auxiliary Relays"
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82-1 Unacceptable Attenuation on Unit 1 Ex-core Neutron Monitoring Cable Installation 82-2 Code Weld Discrepancies - Unit 1 Shutdown Heat Exchanger Nozzle to Pipe Welds
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- 82-4 Code Threaded Fastener Locks not Specified -
Instrumentation Mountings
- 82-14 Code Certification Uncertainty of Bolting Materials - Units 1 and 2 Instrumentation Installations
- 82-15 Structural Components not Traceable to r
Material Certifications - Unit 1 Code Pipe Supports 82-18 Metal Filings / Chips in Lubricating Oil -
Unit 1 HPSI Drive Motors 82-19 G. E. Co. Class IE Motor Control Module Short Circuit upon Installation - Unit 1 MCC 82-21 Unacceptable _ Welds on Certain Members.-
Unit 2 CEDM Cable Support Structure
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82-23 Pipe Wall Thickness Degredation from Weld Grinding - Unit 1.LPSI System 82-24 Unqualified Procedure used by' Vendor Ametek -
Straza on Pipe Stops for NSSS Hot Legs -
Units 1, 2 & 3
82-26 Broken Mounting for-Position Indicating Switches - Unit -l Safety Injection System Valves
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82-27 Incomplete Welding on Gate Support Assembly -
Units 2 & 3 Fuel Building Cask Decontamination Areas 82-28 Undertorqued Blade Locknuts on Joy Fans -
Unit 3 Fuel Building Essential Exhaust AHU
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82-30 Inadequate Zone III Control on Upper Internals Structure - Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Internals 82-31 Annunciator Reset Wiring Error - Unit 1 Main Control Panel B01 82-32 Purge Dam Material Blocking Valve Closure -
Unit 1 Volume Control Tank 4-inch Outlet Check Valve
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82-33 Set Screw Tack Weld Missing on Anchor Darling
3-inch Check Valve - Unit 1 Containment Utility Instrument Air System
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82-34 1.25 Cubic Foot Concrete Void below Wall
Penetration - Unit 1 Main Steam Support
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- 82-36 Faulty Terminal Lug Crimping by Vendor - Unit 1 Diesel Generator Control Panels ho items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
I 13.
Allegations of Unacceptable Work
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a.
Electrical Unistrut Welding
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On August.16, 1982, the NRC was contacted by an electrician /
welder who claimed _that he had been fired from his job at
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Palo Verde Unit :3 fo.r refusing to weld in violation of a l
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welding' procedure., He stated that the normal practice was
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to grind off the~ galvanize. coating on unistrut members before welding'them to structural supports.
When he refused his foreman s instructions to weld without the prior galvanize
. removal, he was discharged for insubordination.
The inspector reviewed the specified welding requirements and the specified welding procedure specification (Pl-A-c-Structural), as well as the applicable General Welding Standard (GWS-Structural), and the welding control procedure (WPP/QCI No. 101.0).
GWS-Structural makes no mention of removal of galvanize before welding.
WPP/QCI 101.0, Section 5, Paragraph 5.13, states that galvanized coatings need not be i
removed from non-pressure retaining, nonstructural components,
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such as unistrut, provided the material thickness at the joint is 1/4-inch or less, and that E6010 filler metal is used for the weld root pass.
Procedure Specification
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j Pl-A-c-Structural is an AWS Dl.1 prequalified procedure and requires the use of E6010 electrodes.
Also, the j
welding records show that the alleger was qualified in i
that welding procedure and that he had been issued E6010 electrodes for the use of that procedure on several occa-sions prior to the morning of his termination.
The inspector also had discussions with the alleger's foreman and the Unit 3 Electrical Su7erintendent who
were involved.
They both verified that the alleger had t
refused to refrain from grinding off the galvanize coat-
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ing on the unistrut members and was promptly discharged i
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-10-for insubordination.
They also related that there were no harsh words, or any other indications of anger by any party 's at the time of the occurrence.
In response to the inspector question, the Unit 3 Lead Welding Engineer related that the practice of grinding off the galvanize coating prior to welding was initially established in order to provide the welders relief from the noxious zine vapor that is given off during the welding process.
The decision to eliminate the grinding option was made when it was observed that many welders were spending an excessive amount of time with the grinding operation and delaying production.
The inspector contacted the alleger and informed him of the details of the investigation that had been conducted, and that there was no procedural violation involved in his being instructed to weld without grinding.
b.
Improper Post Weld Heat Treatment (PWHT)
During the NRC's public hearing on the Palo Verde operating license application held in Phoenix, Arizona, a former employee of the PWHT subcontractor (Western Stress, Inc.) alleged that thermocouple manipulations by coworker electricians resulted in faulty heat treatment of welds on which he was controlling the heat input.
The inspector interviewed the alleger on May 25, 1982 in an attempt to obtain the identity of specific welds or loca-tions involved in the alleged faulty work.
He was unable to be specific, and spoke only in generalities about the work in Unit 1.
He did, however, identify the names of the subcontractor personnel with whom he worked.
Due to the broad scope of the allegation, the investigation was t
taken over by the NRC Region V Investigation Staff; a formal report of their findings will be issued.
During this reporting period, as technical suppo't for r
the Region V investigation, the inspector reviewed a substantial number of temperature recordings and other documents developed during PWHT operations performed by-
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the alleger.
Bechtel engineering personnel in the field welding group provided assistance and cooperation in this effort.
The inspector has not identified any evidence of malpractice or inadequacy in the PWHT operations in which the alleger participated.
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14.
Inspection Tours of Plant Site At various times during this inspection period, the inspector toured the plant site in order to observe general housekeeping conditions, care and preservation of equipment, handling of heavy components, tagging and identification of material, absence of welding electrode stubs lying around the various work areas, adequacy of caps over pipe openings not being worked on, and presence of cribbing under stored pipe spools, valves,
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and other components.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
15.
Management Meetings Meetings were held on August 3, and September 3, 1982, with the licensee and Bechtel representatives identified in para-graph 1.
During the meetings the inspector summarized the
scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the inspection findings as described in this report.
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