IR 05000528/1982003
| ML20049J851 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 03/01/1982 |
| From: | Bishop T, Vorderbruggen NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20049J845 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-82-03, 50-528-82-3, 50-529-82-02, 50-529-82-2, 50-530-82-02, 50-530-82-2, NUDOCS 8203290157 | |
| Download: ML20049J851 (8) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t
50-528/82-03
REGION V
50-529/82-02 Report No. 50-530/82-02 Docket No.50-5 2 8.
50-529.
License No. CPPR-141. CPPR-145gfeguards Group 50-530 C?PR-143 Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Company P.
O.
Box 21666
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Phoenix, Arizona 85036 Facility Name: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1,
2, and 3 Inspection at: Palo Verde Construction Site, Wintersburn. Arizona Inspection conducted:
January 4-29, 1982 Inspectors:
l'M. l O b M
L.
E.
Vorderbrueggen u
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Date Signed Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed
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Date Signed Approved by:
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Date Signed T.
W.
Bishop, ChiefV
Reactor Projects Section 1 Date Signed Summary:
Inspection on January 4-29, 1982 (Report Nos. 50-528/82-03, 50-529/82-02, and 50-530/82-02 Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of construction activities associat(d with:
reactor coolant pressure boundary piping (Unit 2);
containment penetrations (Unit 2); containment basemat con-
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crete (Units 1 and 2); follow-up on 50.55(e) items; and a
plant inspection tours.
The inspection involved 47 inspector-o hours on-site by one NRC inspector.
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Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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0 RV Form 219 (2)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Arizona Public Service Company (APS)
- E.
E.
Van Brunt, Jr.,
Vice President, Nuclear Projects Manager
- J.
A.
Roedel, Manager, Quality Assurance
- W.
E.
Ide, Site QA Supervisor G.
Pankonin, QA Engineer R.
D.
Forrester, QA Engineer
- A.
C.
Rogers, Nuclear Engineering Manager
- B.
S.
Kaplan, Quality Systems Supervisor
- D.
B.
Fasnacht, Site Construction Manager b.
Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtcl)
J.
L.
Black, Resident Engineer
- D.
R.
Hawkinson, Project QA Supervisor J.
E.
Pfunder, Project QA Engineer
- R.
M.
Grant, Project QC Engineer H.
Mear, QC Supervisor W.
Sturm, QC Test Lab Coordinator
- Management meeting attendees.
2.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping - Unit 2 i
Various work activities associated with the installation of piping components in Unit 2 containment building were examined i
to ascertain compliance with Specification 13-PM-205, the ASME code, and SAR requirments.
The systems involved were the 10-inch overpressure relief systems from both train
"A" and train
"B" shutdown cooling lines (2-SIA-241 and 2-SlB-194) to the building sumps.
Particular attention was given to supporting of pipe spools, grinding and PT of attachment welds, weld surface prepara-tion for pre-and in-service iraspection, bolting and torquing of relief valve flanges, and protection of the components in the completed systems.
Except for two pipe supports on train
"B",
the installation of both relief systeme is essentially complete as required by the specification and Drawing 13-P-SIF-151.
Also verified was the satisfaction of requirements pretaining to work performance / inspection procedures, use of specified materials, generation and care of records, and qualification of personnel.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Unit 2 Containment (Pentrations) - Review of Quality Records The records pertaining to the fabrication, installation and inspection of three containment penetrations were examined in order to verify their availability and to demonstrate that all quality requirements and commitments have been met.
The penetra-I tions were the following:
a.
Piping penetration No. 44 -- Flued head for 3-inch schedule 40 stainless steel drain line for the Reactor Drain Tank --
Line 2-CHN-283.
b.
Electrical penetration No. N45 -- Serving 12,000 H.P.
Main Coolant Pump 1A Drive Motor, c.
Personnel Access Hatch (lower) at elevation 103-feet 10-inches and azimuth 22-degrees.
The records review focused principally on material requirements; receipt inspection for shipping damage and verification that purchase order requirements were satisfied; installation in-spection for positioning, alignment, welding materials and pro-cedures; and leak testing of the electrical penetration.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Review of 50.55e Items - All Units During this reporting period, the int.pector reviewed 51 items which the licensee has identified to the NRC over the past several months as having potential 50.55e reportability significance.
Each item was documented on a Deficiency Evaluation Report (DER)
as required by the licensee's procedure.
The DER describes the discrepant condition, identi'fies supportive documents and the corrective action to be taken, and is the basis for (and identified on) the licensee's report to the NRC.
Of the 51 DERs reviewed, 10 have not been finally dispositioned, and 12 are to be given further review by the inspector.
14 DERs
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were judged by the licensee not to be reportable and the inspector concurs with that decision; they were:
i DER NO.
SUBJECT 80-4 Possible Disqualification of Rockbestos Class IE Cable 80-7 Weld Documentation Error-Interpass Temp. - ASME III, l
Class 2, CVN Tested Material
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80-44 Missing Mounting Screw on Certain Foxboro Instruments i
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-3-81-1 Small Concrete Void - Unit 2 Auxiliary Bldg. -
El. 125-feet 81-2 Radiograph Interpretation on 2 Pipe Spool Weld Seams 81-3 Possibly Faulty Contact Fingers on Fuse Blocks 81-4 Mistaken Identification Stamp on Corner & Lada Sway Strut 81-8 Weld Surface Defects on PX Engineering Pool Gates 81-11 Broken Fiber Contact Base on Relay Armature 81-18 Frayed Varglas Wire Ties in MCC Panels 81-26 Water Soluable Felt Plugs in Steam Generator Tubes 81-30 Longitudinal Indication in ASME 2-inch Steel Pipe 81-32 Discolored Scarings and Sleeves on HPSI Pumps 81-41 Possible Steam Generator Nozzle Stress from Pipe Spool Misalignment The licensee's reports covering 15 items that were considered reportable under the 50.55e criteria were judged to be acceptable by the inspector and are closed.
The corresponding DERs were as follows:
DER NO.
SUBJECT 80-21 Borg - Warner MOV Stem Extensions Could Fail and Prevent Valve Operation 80-23 Possible Bushing and Paddle Disengagement on Corner
& Lada Sway Struts 80-24 Foundation Loading by Safety Inj ec tion Tanks -
Possible Overstressing Under Seismic Conditions 80-31 Faulty Mechanical Interlock on Battery Chargers 80-37 Concrete Void in Unit 2 Control Building Basemat 80-39 Three Cable Tray Supports Installed / Accepted and Drawing Requirements Not Met 80-45 Three No. 10 Reinforcing Bars Omitted From Ur.it 2 Fuel Building South Wall 80-47 Fuel Transfer Tube Housing Design Deficiency 81-6 Cracked Turnbuckle Assemblies -
Control Room Lighting Supports 81-13 Violation of Class IE Separation Requirements in 4160 Volt Switchgear 81-20 4 Pipe Support Drawings Show Welding Details Contrary to ASME III Requirements 81-22 Premature Timeout Condition on Diesel Generator Control Panel Relays 81-46 Possible Failure to Operate - SI System MO Valve Installed in Horizontal Orientation 81-48 Defective Cylinder Head on Unit 2 Diesel Generator 81-49 Possible Erroneous Readings from Faulty Installation -
NSSS Water Level Transmitters
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-4-For many of the above items, the licensee had submitted laterim reports because of the time required for evaluating the t ture and extent of the problem, and for determining the most appropriate corrective action.
For all items, the records indicate that licensee's evaluations were thorough and that satisfactory correc-tive action has been completed or has been arranged.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Containment Basemat Concrete - Units I and 2
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During the proceedings conducted by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board pursant to the licensee's application for the Palo Verde i
Operating License, an allegation was made by the Intervenor re-garding the adequacy of the Containment Building basemats.
This allegation was admitted by the Board as an issue in controversy l
(Contention No. 8) which reads as follows:
"The basemats for Units 1 and 2 are not structurally able to support the system and equipment inside containment, because some of the concrete slump tests performed by Engineering Testing Labs for Units 1 and 2 were falsified."
The Intervenor refused to identify the witnesses to the alleged falsification (the informants) because of their fear of jeopardy of their standing with their employers.
Even though the witnesses were not available for questioning, the inspector examined the licensee's records associated with the subject concrete placements i
and talked with Bechtel and licensee personnel that were involved.
The following information was obtained:
The concrete for the containment basemats is specified to
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be Class D-2 with pozzolan, Mix P-601-Y, developing a strength of 5000 psi after 91 days, and having a nominal slump of
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3*l/2-inches at the location of the placement.
The specifi-cation governing the basemat concrete placement was Bechtel Specification No. 13-CM-365, " Installation Specification for Forming, Placing, Finishing and Curing Concrete."
This specification allows for a slump " inadvertency margin" of
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up to 1-inch above the specified maximum ( 3 1/2-inches)
for an individual batch (9-cubic yards).
Thus, a slump value of 4 1/2-inches is acceptable for an individual batch.
This " inadvertency margin" is only permitted to be applied, however, when all subsequent batches or the last 10 batches tested, whichever is fewer, do not exceed the maximum limit (3 1/2-inches).
The placement specification permits the use of concrete having a slump lower than the specified minimum provided such concrete is properly placed and consolidated in the forms.
At Palo Verde, it is normal for the mixed l
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concrete to lose (drop) 1-inch of slump between the batch plant and the point of transit truck discharge, and anotler 1-inch between the truck discharge and the point of placement when a concrete pump is used.
For both basemats, concrete pumps were used; consequently, slump measurements at the batch plant, where they are normally made, of 5 1/2-inches were acceptable.
If the " inadvertency margin" were applied, some batch plant slump measurements up to 6 1/2-inches were permissibic.
The sluap measurement records for the basemats show that none were outside the specified limits.
Also, the records show that the " inadvertency margin" was not used for either placement.
Statistics for the two basemat installations are listed in the tabulation at the end of this section.
As shown in the tabulation, all concrete batches tested for each placement exceeded the 5000 psi 91-day design requirement by a substantial margin.
The values for slump and strength should be reasonably accurate because the measurements were made by the same individuals using identical procedures and just one compression test machine.
There should be little uncertainty in the test results because of the degree of supervision over the test personnel and the nature of the controls exercised over the taking of specimens, and the casting, handling, and curing of the compression test cylinders.
According to Bechtel site construction personnel, slump values are of litt1? meaning or importance in regard to the adequacy and/or acceptability of a concrete structure.
Structural adequacy is based soley on the strength values demonstrated by the compression testing of the cured speci-mens that were molde' at the time the concrete was manufac-tured at the batch piant.
During the discussions with the site personnel involved in the basemat placements, it was pointed out that the QC act-
> l ties of Engineers Testing Laboratories (ETL) are essentially unoer the direct supervicion of Bechtel's QC Test Lab Coordina-tor.
Prior to concrete batching for any placement, he estab-i l
Lishes the testing program and the test frequency, both as I
defined in Bechtel Specification 13-CM-365.
lie also was responsible to see that the compression test specimens were properly cured and compression tested by the ETL test tech-
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nicians when the specified aging time had clapsed.
Bechtel
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QC inspectors were on continous duty at the batch plant and at the placement locations to assure that the specified measurements of concrete temperature, slump, air content and unit weight were properly and timely made, and that compression test specimens were properly cast and handled as specifie *
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the batch plant verified the concrete mix proportions for each batch and after this veri-fication signed the batch deliver ticket which is automatically printed by the batching console.
He indicated on the delivery ticket when a slump and temperature measurement was to be made at the point of placement for slump loss correlation informa-tion.
He also was responsible to see that the ETL test technicians made the specified tests at the batch plant and at the proper frequency.
As stated above, Bechtel QC in-spectors were on duty at the point of placement to provide direction and surveillance of the ETL test technicians.
The Bechtel QC inspectors also monitored the placement activities of the Bechtel workmen to assure that the requirements of the installation specifications were satisfied.
Additionally, Bechtel QA personnel performed essentially continuous audits of the batching, testing, and placement activities to assure that the assigned individuals and organ-izations were following their respective procedures and
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satisfying the specified requirements.
The records also show that APS QA engineers, in conjunction with Bechtel QA personnel, audited the QA programs of the concrete manufac-turer (Champion) and ETL to an appropriate degree prior to the containment basemat placements, and no problems of any significance were identified during those audits.
Also, at the time of the placements, APS QA engineers devoted essen-tially continuous surveillance to the activities of Champion, ETL and Bechtel.
The inspector has concluded that the falsification of slump tests
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and/or test records is highly unlikely for two principal reasons.
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First, because of the large number of testing personnel involved in an around-the-clock operation, a collusion of large magnitude would have to be arranged.
Second, the performance of ETL test ing personnel and their test results were continuously monitcred by Bechtel engineers and QC personnel throughout placement operations.
On the basis of the licensee's records and the statements of principal personnel involved in the construction of the Units 1 and 2 containment basemats, the inspector concluded that the allegation had no substantiation.
CONTAINMENT BASEMAT PLACEMENT STATISTICS UNIT 1 UNIT 2
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Placement Number ar-Date 1C012 - 6/28-29/77 1C012/13 - 5/24-26/78 1C013 - 7/7 - 8/77 l
Placement Time (continuous 1C012 - 38 1/2
hours)
IC013 - 19 1/4
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Quantity of Concrete 1C012 - 4486 7216 (cubic yards)
1D013 - 2606 Number of Slump Tests 1C012 - 156 248 1C013 -
- Slump Measurement Range 2 - 5 1/2 2 1/2 - 5 1/2 (inches)
L Design Strength (at 91 days)
5000 5000 Number of Strength Test 1C012 - 100 160 t
(cylinders tested at 91 days)
1C013 -
- Strength Measurement 1C012 - 5020 to 5915 5750 to 7260 Range (psi)
1C013 - 5100 to 6130 i
- - Lower slump number was measured at point of placement.
liigher
number was measured at the Batch Plant.
The range indicated for r
Unit 1 applies to both placements.
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6.
Inspection Tours of Plant Site At various times during this inspection period, the inspector toured the plant site in order to observe general housekeeping conditions, care and preservation of equipment, handling of heavy components, tagging and identification of material, absence of welding electrode stubs lying around the various work areas, adequacy of caps over pipe openings not being worked on, and presence of cribbing under stored pipe spools, valves, and other components.
i No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Management Meeting
A meeting was held on January 29, 1982.
Licensec and Bechtel representatives in attendance at the meeting are identified in paragraph 1.
During the meeting, the inspector summarized the scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the inspection findings as described in this report.
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