IR 05000528/1982007
| ML20050K992 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 03/26/1982 |
| From: | Eckhardt J, Vorderbrueggen NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20050K919 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-82-07, 50-528-82-7, 50-529-82-03, 50-529-82-3, 50-530-82-03, 50-530-82-3, NUDOCS 8204140241 | |
| Download: ML20050K992 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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50-528/82-07
REGION V
50-529/82-03 Report No.
50-530/82-03 Docket No.
50-528. 50-529.
License No. CPPR-141, CPPR-Safeguards Group 50-530 142, CPPR-143 Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Company P.
O.
Box 21666 Phoenix. Arizona 85036 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1,
2, and 3 Inspection at:
Palo Verde Construction Site, Wintersburg, Arizona Inspection conduc ed:
February 1-26, 1982 Inspectors
[.[si 8/Ef/8E L/ E.
Vordehrueggen f'
Oate signed senior Resident Inspector Date Signed Date Signed Approved By:
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3'Mir4/82 H.
Eckhardt, Acting Chief D6te Signed cactor Projects Section 1 Summary:
Inspection on February 1-26, 1982 (Report Nos. 50-528/82-07 t 50-529/82-03, and 50-530/82-03
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Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspector of construction activities associated with installation of reactor coolant pressure boundary and other safety-related piping in Unit 2; welding of stainless steel liner for Unit 2 condensate storage tank; quality records pertaining to Unit 1 electrical components and systems; QA program procedures governing the installation of Unit 3 reactor coolant pressure boundary and other safety-related piping; follow-up on 50.55(e) items; and general activities in progress throughout the plant site.
The inspection involved 48 inspector-hours on-site by one NRC inspector.
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Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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l 8204140241 820329 PDR ADOCK 05000528 G
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RV Form 219 (2)
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted a.
Arizona Public Service Company (APS)
- J.
A.
Roedel, Corporate Quality Assurance Manager
- D.
B.
Fasnacht, Nuclear Construction Manager
- R.
J.
Kimmel, Field Engineering Supervisor
- W.
E.
Ide, Site QA Supervisor R.
Forrester, QA Engineer D.
Wittas, QA Engineer P.
Moore, QA Engineer b.
Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
- S.
M.
Nickell, Project Superintendent
- D.
R.
Hawkinson, Project QA Supervisor R.
M.
Grant, Project QC Engineer
- M.
A.
Rosen, QC Supervisor H.
Mear, QC Supervisor K.
Schechter, Civil Design Group Supervisor P.
Wong, Civil / Structural Design Engineer Other persons contacted during the inspection period included construction craftsmen, inspectors, and supervisory personnel.
- Management Meeting attendees.
2.
Unit 1 - Electrical Components and Systems - Review of Quality Records The records pertaining to the receipt, care and installation of the electrical components listed below were examined in order to verify their availability and to ascertain that they reflect work accomplishment consistent with quality requirements and commitments.
a.
Emergency Diesel Generator B and its Auxiliary Electrical Panels b.
4160-volt Switchgear Unit No. PBB-SO4 c.
480-volt Loadcenter No. PBG-1.32 d.
480-volt Motor Control Center No. PIIB -M3 2 c.
480-volt Motor Control Center No. Pil B-M 3 4 The records review focused principally on material requirements; receipt inspection for shipping damage and verification that purchase order requirements were satisfied; installation in-spection and protection after installation; and, qualification of personne r
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-2-No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Unit 2 - Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Other Safety-Related Piping Systems The four safety relief valves and the, associated piping for the Unit 2 pressurizer were examined for the purpose of verifying the conformance of the actual installation with the final /as-built piping drawings.
The drawings were 13-P-RCF-114, Rev.
7, two associated Design Changes Notices (DCN's), and six approved Field Change Requests (FCR's).
All documents displayed proper review and approval signatures and no discrepant conditions were observed in the physical installation.
In addition, various work ectivities associated with handling and installation of Unit 2 piping system components were examined to ascertain compliance with the ASME Code, FSAR, and specification / drawing requirements.
The systems involved were the Spray Pond A, 24-in. spray header No. 2-SPA-059 and the low pressure safety injection inlet for loop 2A in the auxiliary building (12-inch line 2-S1B-072 to containment isolation valve UV615 and up to penetration No. 17).
Farticu-lar attention was given to the handling and supporting of components, removal of arc strikes and o th e~r surface imper-fections, weld crown contour, correctness of configuration, use of specified materials, qualification of personnel, and protection of components that had been completed.
The specifi-cation governing the installation of both systems was No. 13-PM-204.
Both installations appeared to be in conformance with their respective designs drawings (No. 13-P-ZYA-061 and 13-P-SIF-208).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Unit 2 - Condensate Tank Liner - Welding Procedure Violation During a tour of the Unit 2 area, the inspector observed l
welding operations in progress at the top of the stainless l
steel liner of the condensate storage tank.
The weldment
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being worked was the attachment of a 3x3x1/4 inch angle to the 1/4 - inch liner plate using a 3/16 - inch fillet weld.
The 3x3 angle is a part of the transition from the vertical wall to the roof truss liner.
The fillet weld had been completed using the SMAW (stick) process, leaving the surface rough and irregular.
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The inspector observed two welders " washing" the fillet weld surface using the GTAW (TlG)< torch,without the de-position of filler metal,_ purportedly to provide a surface condition that would be free of porosity and crevices so that no difficulties would,be encountered during the dye penetrant examination.
This practice was contrary to the specified welding procedure (No. P8-T-b) which calls for the deposition of filler metal.
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Although this tank liner is considered Class R (non-safety related), the inspector considers this deliberate procedure violation to be of serious concern because the licensee uses the same procedural controls for all work and this occurrence indicates an unhealthy degradation of attitude on the part of certain supervisory personnel.
The inspector expressed this concern to the licensee and a wide-reaching investigation was promptly initiated.
This item is considered to be unresolved pending further evaluation.
(50-529/82-03/01).
5.
Unit 3 - QA Implementing Procedures for Piping Installation The various documents which control the installation of safety-related piping in Unit 3 were reviewed by the in-spector in order to verify that necessary plans, instructions and procedures are in place and that they conform to the facility QA program as described in the SAR.
Particular attention was given to the availability of procedures governing the performance and control of specific activities associated with piping spools, valves, fittings, weld filler metal, and other materials.
The activities of special interest were receiving inspection; storage and l
issuance of components; handling and protection from physical damage and contamination; component installation j
and assembly; quality control acceptance inspection; and, j
NDE and hydrostatic testing.
All of the foregoing topics i
appeared to the inspector to be appropriately and adequately
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addressed.
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The inspector had no remaining concerns regarding continuing progression of piping installation.
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6.
Review of 50.55(c) Items - All Units l
During the previous reporting period, the reportable item j
pertaining to the structural adequacy of the safety in-
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jection tank foundations (DER No.80-24) was reviewed and closed out by the inspector.
This close out decision
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was based on the acceptability of the licensee's final report; however, the inspector was unable to examine the supporting analytical calculations because they were not present at the plant site.
During this reporting period those documents were made available to the inspector by Bechtcl home office design personnel.
The calculation
" package" (No. 13-CC-ZC-205) was seen to be quite compre-hensive and well documented.
The calculated stresses were based on the actual seismic response. spectra approved for the Palo Verde site rather than the previously used CE System 80 generic seismic spectra.
Also, the actual component weights and structural steel framing arrangement, along with the actual developed strength values of the associated concrete, were employed instead of the previously used, overly conservative, assumed design parameters.
The calculated structural loading stresses were seen to be below the allowable limits and, when consideration is given to some additional structural members that are present and were not taken into account in the analysis, each tank'
structure has a conservative design margin.
The inspector has no further qu.estions on this matter.
During this reporting period, the' inspector reviewed 68 items which the licensee had identified to the NRC'as having potential 50.55(e) reportability significance.
Each item was documented on a Deficiency Evaluation Report (DER) as required by the licensee's procedure.
The DER describes the discrepant condition, identifies supporting documents and the corrective action to be taken, and is the basis for the licensee's report to the NRC.
Of the 68 DERs reviewed, 43 will be reviewed further by the in-spector.
The following 18 DERs were judged by the licensee not to be reportable and the inspector concurs with that decision:
DER NO.
SUBJECT 79-1 Handling of Overdue Corrective Action Reports 79-4 Suspected Longitudinal Weld Defects in Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Nozzles 79-11 Shim Movement - Unit 1 Steam Generators 79-13 Possible Design Deficiency - Configuration of HPSI Pump Suction Piping 80-3 Specified Size of Structural Steel Fillet Welds
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-5-80-5 Visual Inspection Instead of Penetrant Inspection of 2" thru 4" ASME III, Class 3 Pipe Welds 80-8 Suitability of Hilti HDE Concrete Anchors 80-18 Blocked Tendon Sheaths - Units 1 and 2 Containments 80-19 Missing Rebar Dowels in Containment Shell/Basemat Joint - All 3 Units 80-20 Jammed Studs - Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Support Pad 1A 80-26 Lack of Full Penetration Welds - Unit 2 Main Control Panels 80-35 Possible Nonlinear Transmitter Output Controlling Main Steam and Feedwater Isolation Valves 80-46 Preservice Ultrasonic Examination on 32" Diameter Safety Injection System Elbow Showed Reportable Indication 80-7 Piping / Pump Nozzle Mismatch Causing Overstress Condition - Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedpump No. 1 81-25 Maintenance Problems Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps -
All Units 81-37 Failed Qualification Tests - Foxboro Display Electronics - All Units 81-42 Thrust Bearing Housing Imperfections - Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Pump No. lA 81-47 Small Concrete Void under Grout Patch - Unit 1 MSSS Building Slab at 100-ft. Elevation The licensee's reports covering 7 items that were considered reportable under the 50.55(e) criteria were judged to be acceptable by the inspector and are closed.
The corres-ponding DERs were as follows:
DER NO.
SUBJECT 79-12 Low Strength of Pneumatically Placed Grout in Rock Pocket Repairs - Unit 2 Containment Build-ing Interior j
80-6 Undersize Fillet Welds - ITT Grinnell Sway i
Struts Fabricated Prior to 11/15/78 80-9 Ruskin Vertical Fire Dampers Failure to Close Completely Due to Frame Distortion - All Units
80-28 Possible Corrosion and Erroneous Controller l
Indication from Acid Flux Sealer - Units 1
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and 2 Air Handling and Filtration Units l
80-29 Pump Motor Shaft Failure - Post LOCA Hydrogen Monitoring System - All Units For many of the above items, the licensee had submitted interim reports because of the time required for evaluat-
ing the nature and extent of the problem, and for determin-ing the most appropriate corrective action.
For all items,
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the records indicate that the licensee's evaluations were thorough and that satisfactory corrective action has been comple*
or has been arranged.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Inspection Tours of Plant Site At various times during this inspection period, the inspector toured the plant site in order to observe general house-keeping conditions, care and preservation of equipment, handling of heavy components, tagging and identification of material, absence of welding electrode stubs lying around the various work areas, adequacy of caps over pipe openings not being worked on, and presence of cribbing under stored pipe spools, valves, and other components.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations.
An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 4.
9.
Management Meeting A meeting was held on March 4,
1982.
Licensee and Bechtel representatives in attendance at the meeting are identified in Paragraph 1.
During the meeting, the inspector summarized the scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the in-spection findings as described in this report.