IR 05000518/1981011

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IE Insp Repts 50-518/81-11,50-519/81-11,50-520/81-11 & 50-521/81-11 on 810622-26.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Previous Insp findings,safety-related Components, Piping & Welding
ML20010A499
Person / Time
Site: Hartsville  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 07/15/1981
From: Coley J, Herdt A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20010A491 List:
References
50-518-81-11, 50-519-81-11, 50-520-81-11, 50-521-81-11, NUDOCS 8108110484
Download: ML20010A499 (10)


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'o UNITED STATES

i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

E REGION 11

101 MARIE TT A ST., N.W., SUl(E 3100 o

ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30303

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Report Nos. 50-518/81-11, 50-519/81-11, 50-520/81-11, 50-521-81-11 Licensee:

Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga,TN 37401 Facility Name:

Hartsville Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-518, 50-519, 50-520, 50-521

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License Nos. CPPR-150,, CPPR-151, CPPR-152, & CPPR-153 I

Inspection at Hart ville Nuclear Plant near Hartsville, TN Inspecto :

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J. L. Col y Uate Signed Approved by:

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A. R. Herdt, Section Chief Da'te Signed

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i Engineering Inspection Branch Engineering and Technical Inspection Division SUMMARY

Inspection on June 22-26, 1981 Areas Inspected

. This routine, unannounced inspection involved 33 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of previous inspection findings (Units A1, A2, B1 & B2), safety-related

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components - observation of work and work activities (Unit A1), safety-related piping - observation of work and work activities (Unit A1), safety-related pipe welding - observation of work activities (Unit A1) and safety-related compon-ents - review of Q.A. implementing procedures.

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Results

Of the fiv'e areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

i 8108110484 810720

PDR ADOCK 050005181 G

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REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees R. T. Hathcote, Project Manager

  • W. T. Quinn, Construction Engineer
  • R. E. McClure, Mechanical Engineering Branch, Supervisor
  • S. P, Stagnolia, Welding Engineering Branch, Supervisor
  • J. J. Ritts, ENDES-Licensin;, Knoxville
  • D. Hudson, ENDES-Licensing, Knoxville
  • R. D. Zill, Construction QAB, Knoxville
  • A. W. Crevasse, Division of Power QA, Chattanooga Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, QC personnel and office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspector

  • W. B. Swan, NRC Resident Inspector
  • Attended exit interview 2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 26, 1981 with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The inspector descr: bed the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below:

(0 pen) Unresolved item 50-518/81-11-01:

Verification of Valve Locking Devices, paragraph 8.b.

(0 pen) Inspector Follow-up item 50-518/81-11-02: Craft Training on Lifting Restrictions, paragraph 7.a.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Firidings a.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 518, 519, 520 & 521/81-04-05, Computer print-out does not agree with pipe markings. NRC had reported that welders on the computer readout for weld numbers A1ARH0130002 and A1ARH0130004 did not agree with the welders stencil on the welds in the field. The licensee investigated this item and found that this was an isolated example which had resulted from a computer operator's misinterpretation of a welder's I.D. on the weld data cards. Based on a review of the licensee investigation into this matter, this item is considered closed.

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b.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 518, 519, 520, 521/81-04-06, Control. of Limited Thickness Welders. NRC had reviewed TVA's General Construction Specification G-29M, Process Specification 1.M.2.2(a), Performance Qualification Test No. GT-SM-6-4-0-3-L Revision 2 and found that the licensee had been granting welders unlimited thickness qualification based on this test. ASME Interpretation IX-78-92 dated September 25,

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1978 limits the qualification on a tested welder for the above tested conditions to 1-h inch thickness maximum. The licensee reviewed all welds made by welders qualified to the above welding performance qualification test and did not find any welder who had violated this restricted certification.

In addition the licensee has presently retested and recertified approximately 43 welders to a heavier wall welding procedure.

Ten welders remain to be recertified and their certification to the above process specification has been restricted until their recertification is complete.

This item is considered closed.

c.

(Closed) Infraction 518 & 520/80-17-01, Inadequate Magnetic Particle Examination Program.

TVA Hartsville Nuclear Project (HNP) letter of September 22, 1980 with supplemental letters-of October 27, 1980 and January 13, 1981, have been reviewed by Region II. The inspector held discussions with the licensee and examined corrective action taken by the licensee. The inspector concloded that TVA-HNP had determined the full extent of the subject noncompliance, issued a change to QCIN-201 rev. 7 to clarify lighting requirements, examination coverage, powder application and removal, and had developed the necessary corrective action to preclude recurrence of similar circumstances. This item is considered closed.

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(Closed) Infraction 518, 520/80-17-02, Inadequate Qualification Requirements for Visual Inspectors. TVA-HNP letter of September 22, 1980 with supplemental letters of October 27, 1980 and of January 13, 1981 have been reviewed Region II. The inspector held discussions with the licensee and examined corrective action taken by the licensee. The inspector concluded that TVA-HNP had determined the full extent of the subject noncompliance, performed the necessary followup a ions correct the present condition and developed the necessary correctivs,ction to preclude recurrence of similar circumstances. This item is considered closed.

4.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia-tions. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 8.b.(3).

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5.

Independent Inspection Effort - Construction Activities (Unit Al and A2)

The inspector conducted a general inspection of Units Al & A2 fuel auxiliary and reactor buildings to observe construction progress and construction activities such as welding, nondestructive examir:ation, material handling and control, housekeeping and storage.

Within the area inspected no violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Previously Identified Inspector Followup Items

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i (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 518; 520/80-17-03, Improper placement of

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lead letter "B" on film cassette. This item reported that the lead letter

"B" used to detect back scattering on a radiographic film is not always positioned behind the specimen being radiographed. The inspector reviewed film cassettes of the sizes that would be used for radiographic inspection of pipe welds and found that all film cassettes observed had lead letter "B" at the corner and in the center of the cassette. Based on this review item is considered closed, (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 518; 520/80-17-04, Inadequate practical exam for radiographic film reader. This item reported that the practical examination for Level II film readers did not include. film depicting two major defects:

cracks and root oxidation. The licensee has now included film with these types of indications into the practical examination for the Level II film reader.

The inspector reviewed this film and considers corrective actions taken by the licensee to be satisfactory. This item is considered closed.

(Closed) Inspector following item 518, 520/80-17-5, Inadequate te~ speci-men's for the training qualification of ultrasonic examiners.

This item reported that the training / qualification program does not include a test specimen of a weld joining a pipe to an elbow fitting. This test specimen was considered important since examination of weld from the elbow side, particularly on the inner bend of the elbow, presents difficulty in ultrasonic examination. The licensee has fabricated test specimens that now include a weld joining a pipe to an elbow and this test specimen has now been included into the training / qualification program. The licensee correc-tive action for this item is considered satisfactory and this item is considered closed.

Within the area inspected, no violations or deviations were observed.

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7.

Safety-Related Piping (Unit A1)

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The inspector observed non-welding and welding work activities for safety-related piping outside of.the reactor coolant pressure boundary es described below to determine whether applicable code and procecure requirements were being met. The applicable code for safety-related piping is the ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Subsections NC and ND, 1974 edition with addenda through

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summer 1974.

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a.

Observation of Non-Welding Activities Observation of specific work activities were conducted.to determine conformance, where applicable, with the following; inspection and/or work procedures, record keeping requirements, installation specifica-tions or plans, specified materials, specified NDE, calibration requirements and use of proper test equipment and qualified inspection and NDE personnel.

SYSTEM

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ACTIVITY COMP 0NENT CLASS UNIT Handling Spool pc 17AB COND 3-1

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Spool pc 17AB COND 18-3

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Spool pc 17AB HPCS 5-1

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Spool pc 17AB MS-206-4

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Protection 16" Dia Valve; MPL #E22F001

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10" Dia Valve; MPL #E22F011

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24" Dia Valve; MPL #E22F015

Al Spool pc 17AB HPCS 5-1

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Storage Spool pc 17FBFPCC 20-8

Al NDE Pipe Hanger on Spool pc

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  1. 17ABRHR7-4

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Installation Spool pc #17ABRHR 7-4

Al Spool pc #17ABRHR 9-3

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i Spool pc #17ABMS206 - 4

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With regards to the above inspection on June 28, 1981 the inspector j

observed a chainfall rigged from a 12" diameter pipe (spool pc 17AB

COND 18-3) and apparently supporting an 18" pipe (spool pc 17AB COND

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3-1).

Riggers in the area observed the inspector recording this condition and demonstrated for the inspector that the full load of spool pc #17AB COND 3-1 was not supported by spool pc 17AB COND 18-3.

However when the inspector question the riggers concerning lifting l

restrictions as delineated in the -licensee's procedure SOP-65 the

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riggers were not aware of these requirements. The inspectur noted that

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SOP-65 had recently been written and implemented at Hartsville. This

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apparent failure of the craft to be aware of contents of this instruc-

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tion was discussed in detail with the licensee. ' A memo was written by

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the Supervisor of Mechanical Engineering Branch to the General Con-struction Superintendent and the Construction Engineer to insure that

SOP-65 is distributed to the craft and that craftmen are informed of its content.

In addition project engineering groups would be required

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to list SOP-65 as a reference in future work packages or process control documents. The licensee's action appears satisfactory, however l

the inspector reported this item as inspection followup item 50-518/

81-11-02, Rigger's Training on Lifting Restrictions, so that implemen-

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tation of SOP-65 requirements can be verified at the craft level on a subsequent inspection.

b.

Observation of Welding Activities The inspector observed in process welding activities of safety-related piping field welds as described below to determine whether applicable code and procedure requirements were being met.

(1) Welding

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The welds listed below were examined in process to determine:

i whether work was conducted in accordance with travelers; welder identification and location; welding procedure; WPS assignment; welding technique and sequence; materials identity; weld geometry; fit-up; temporary attachments; gas purging; preheat; electrical characteristics; shielding gas; welding equipment condition interpass temperature; interpass cleaning; process control

systems; identity of. welders; qualification of inspection personnel; and weld history records.

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STAGE OF

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UNIT SIZE

_F.ABRICATION SYSTEM.

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A1AMS2060003 A1 6" Dia. X.280" Fit-up Reaction Core Isolation Cooling Sys.

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A1AMS2060003 A1 6" Dia. X.280" Welding Out Reaction Core Isolation Cooling Sys.

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AIAM52060003 A1 6" Dia. X.280" NDE of Reaction Core

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Complete weld Isolation Cooling L

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l TA1 ALP 0002214 Al 12" Dia. X.F o Welding Out Low Pressure Air

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Within the area inspected no violations or deviations were observed.

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e 8.

Safety-Related Components (Unit Al & A2)

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The inspector reviewed implementing procedures and observed component work activities.for safety-related components as described below to aetermine whether applicable code and procedure requirement were being met.

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applicable code for safety-related components is delineated in paragraph 7

above.

a.

Review of Quality Assurance Implementing Procedure

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j The inspector reviewed TVA Hartsville OEDC Quality Assurance Manual for ASME Section III Nuclear Power Plan Components (NCM) and TVA's Quality

i Assurance Program Requirements Manual for Design, Procurement & Con-struction (PRM) to determine whether adequate quality assurance plans,

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established in the facility QA Manual, and whether these documents conformed to NRC requirements, ASME Code requirements and the QA program as described is section 17 of the licensee's PSAR.

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The inspector verified the following elements in the licensee's NCM &

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PRM:

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(1) organizational structure including qualifications, i

training and stop work authority; l

(2) audits including procedures, checklist, scope, freauency and qualifications of auditors; (3) general quality requirements relative to material specifications, test reports, procurement documents,

i deviations, and control of components, and systems; (4) work and inspection procedures including provisions for review, approval and control;

j (5) contrcl of material including traceability, handling, shipping storage, and identification or nonconforming

material; (6) procedures for control of pacesses including special

processes; (7) procedures for corrective action; (8) document control including control of QA Manual and periodic review for adequacy of document control; (9). quality records

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b.

Observation of Work and Work Activities (Unit A1)

The inspector performed an independent evaluation of work performance by direct observation of work in progress, completed work and by j

verifying the conditien of components that are in storage.

l (1) The following components were selected for inspection:

(a) Mainsteam Isolation Valve B21F028 j

serial no. G13952 (storage, protection & maintenance)

i (b) Mainsteam Isolation Valve B21F022 serial no. 3-13952 (storage, protection & maintenance)

(c) RHR Pumps E12C002 j

serial nos. 1428 & 1429 (storage protection & maintenance)

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(d) RHR Pump Motors E12C002

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serial nos. 103027 & 103028 (storage, protection & main-

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tenance)

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(e) RHR Discharge Isolation Valve E12F048A serial no. E6318-40-1 (installation, protection & main-tenance)

( f) RHR Valve E-12F003A serial no. E6318-39-1 (installation, protection and mainten-

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ance)

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(g) RHR Valve E-12F029A lj serial no. E6318-15-1 (installation, protection and main-l tenance)

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(h) Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Pump & Turbine Pump MPL l

  1. E51-C001 serial no. 152-10032 Turbine MPL #E-51-C002 serial no.14N-7134-0 (installation, protection and maintenance)

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(2) The following attributes were-verified for the components identi-l fied above:

j (a) Storage Handling and Protection

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Storage environment and protection

Handling

Identification, issue and records

Cleanliness preservation

Surveillance during storage i

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(b)

Installation

Work and inspection activities

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2 Location

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Placement and mounting / supporting

Generation and maintenance of inspection records I

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(c) Protection After Installation

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Inspection activities - scope and. frequency

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Protection provided as required, including i

protection against adverse temperature, humidity

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and foreign material (d) Nonconforming Components or Activities

Records

Identification

Segregation

Corrective action (e) Utilization of QA Inspnctian (QC) Personnel

Number and qualification of those at the construction site - commensurate with the work in progress

Performance of their assigned duties and responsibilities.

(3) With regard to the inspection of components in storage, on Jure 25, 1981, the inspector noted that most of the valve locking plates on the bottom spring cap for mainsteam isolation valves 821F028 & B21F022 were not bent against the flat of the fasteners.

In one instance where an attempt had been made by the vendor to bend the valve locking plate, the locking plate had been damaged.

L The inspector was concerned.that failure on the part of the vendor to properly engage these locking devices could go entirely through the licensees planned inspection program (receiving inspection, installation inspection and operational' checks) and not be detected, since no inspection attribute presently exist that would verify design safety features such as locking devices are correctly installed.

The inspector noted that the licensee's operational inspection procedure for these valves had not been prepared at this time.

Discussions were held with the licensee concerning inserting an

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4 attribute in the operational inspection procedure that would verify design safety features of these valves.

The licensee agreed to add this attribute, in addition the licensee stated that other carrective action would be initiated ct the vendor level.

This item was reported as unresolved item 518/81-11-01, verifica-tion of valve locking devices.

Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were observed.

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