IR 05000518/1981002

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IE Insp Repts 50-518/81-02,50-519/81-02,50-520/81-02 & 50-521/81-02 on 810105-30.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Open items,A-1 Drywell Penetration Frames & A-1 Weir Wall
ML19350B905
Person / Time
Site: Hartsville  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 02/11/1981
From: Cantrell F, Swan W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19350B904 List:
References
50-518-81-02, 50-518-81-2, 50-519-81-02, 50-519-81-2, 50-520-81-02, 50-521-81-02, NUDOCS 8103240162
Download: ML19350B905 (5)


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Report Nos. 50-518/81-02, 50-519/81-02, 520/81-02, and 521/81-02 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility: Hartsville Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-518, 50-519, 50-520, and 50-521 License Nos. CPPR-150, CPPR-151, CPPR-152, and CPPR-153 Inspection at Hartsville site near Hartsville, TN

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Inspector:

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W. K Swan

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Bate / Signed Approved by:

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F. S. ~Can'trell, Sectiod Uh /RC&ESBranch

/Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on January 5, - January 30, 1981 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 60 inspector-hours onsite by the resident inspector in. the areas of A-1 drywell penetration frames; A-1 and A-2 steel containments; A-1 weir wall; concrete; open items; and independent inspec-tion effort.

Re'alts Of the areas inspected, no violations were identified.

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • R. T. Hathcote, Site Project Manager W. T. Quinn, Construction Engineer R. E. Young, Assistant Construction Engineer, Project Engineering J. T. Dorman, Assistant Construction Engineer, Second Shift H. S. Sheppard, Assistant Construction Engineer, Quality Control P. F. Gillespie, Supervisor, Technical Services B. F. Huffaker, Supervi,sor, Materials QC Unit R. C. Nixon, Supervisor, Document Control Unit F. E. Laurent, Unit Supervisor, STRIDE Mechanical Project Engineering G. A. Gonsalves, QA Unlt Supervisor A. G. Debbage, QA Audit Supervisor M. U. Rudolphi, Unit Supervisor, Project Engineering, Hangers and Supports Other licensee employees contacted included four document control personnel, eight QC technicians, and two QA unit auditors.
  • Attended exit interview 2.

Exit Interview The inspection s: ope and findings were summarized with the Project Manager on January 9,19, 26, and 3C,1981.

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Licensee Action or. Previous Inspection Findings (0 pen) 518, 519, 520, 521/80-18-01, Infraction - Failure to Take Timely Corrective Action on Drawing Control Findings Periodic Sampling and a QA Unit reaudit January 22-24, 1981 revealed that 26 of 469 drawings examined were superceded.

These findings led to the conclusion by the QA audit unit, that the control procedure is deficient rather than its implementation. A Confirmation of Action Letter was issued to TVA on January 30, 1951, requiring a 100% audit, a written evaluation of any construction using obsolete drawings, an investigation by TVA to deter-mine the reason for the recurrence of superceded drawings, and a report to the NRC.

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Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

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Independent Inspection Effort The inspector made random unannounced surveillance tours during which the status of project work was noted, and construction activities were inspected on nuclear safety related structures, systems and facilities.

Inspection

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effort was concentrated on Plant A areas, but outlying structures were covered.

Forming, installation of rebar, positioning of embedments, placements and post placement curing were inspected as work progressed in the Plant A fuel buildings, auxiliary buildings, control buildings, and essential service water pump houses. Completed concrete and new forming were inspected in the intake pumping system. Repairs to concrete in Plant B structures and in the recently placed Unit A-1 weir wall were inspected intermittently.

During inspection of activities for structural concrete in these areas, confor-

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mance with the requirements of C. F. Braun Specification 300-01, Revision 8,

" Concrete", TVA Construction Specification G-2, QCI C-201, Rev. 4, and C.E.P. 9.02, Rev. 5, was verified.

Numerous cadwelds were made in this period joining #18 rebars to sleeves on top of the A-1 vent wall and to vendor installed sleeves on penetration frames for the drywell above the vent wall. The inspector verified that

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installation requirements of Enrico Products Company, manufacturer of the cadweld hardware components were being met.

Weld joint preparations for joining the upper section of Frame 9 to the installed lower section of this penetration frame in the A-1 drywell, were inspected and fitup of the joints between the sections was inspected. No deviations from the controlling drawing notes and dimensions was identified.

Preliminary installation of piping systems in the A-1 and A-2 control buildings and auxiliary buildings was observed.

Fitup of welds ahead of welding was inspected on a sampling basis and found to conform to drawing requirements.

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The inspector again verified that subassemblies of piping moved from the l

fabrication shops to the installation areas were kept adequately capped and l

supported above storm water and construction debris.

During walk-through inspections of installation of piping and pipe supports, the inspector confirmed the presence of TVA mechanical and welding inspectors in work areas.

Removal of the 1,050-ton temporary gantry crane used to set the A-2 reactor pressure vessel was commenced.

The concrete and steel template used to i

assemble rings of the A-1 steel containment wall was removed to clear the area for follow on installations. The inspector verified that blasting and other demolition activities were performed in a manner to avoid damage to new concrete and other facilities.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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6.

Licensee Identified 50.55(e) Items a.

Previously Identified Items I

(0 pen) 518/80-08-01, Cracks in A-1 RPV Shield Wall (NCR HNP-A-091) 10 CFR 50 Part 21 was applicable.

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By final report dated December 31, 1980, the licensee states that repair of the shield wall structure was completed using materials and

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procedures approved by GE.

Procedures for minimizing chances for

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future cracking are approved. This NCR was closed by TVA January 20, 1981. The corrective actions will be reviewed during a future inspec-tion.

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Newly Identified Items

(0 pen) 518, 519, 520, 521/81-02-01, Fillet Weld Misspecification (HTRD

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81-01)

Fillet welds were specified in applications where AISC Standards t

require beveled groove welds.

Licensee is evaluating the Standards

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requirements and affected welds.

A final report is due by April 6, 1981.

(0 pen) 518, 519, 520, 521/81-02-02, Pressure Drop in Essential Service l

- Water Piping Analysis of the ESW System (Division III) for Hartsville using new criteria (greater pressure drops due to corrosion products) shows the

need for system modificatir ; to ensure adequate water supply to l:

components. The licensee's final report is due by March 20, 1981.

(0 pen) 518, 519, 520, 521/81-02-03, Standby Gas Treatment (SGTS) Design I. -

Deficiency l

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Part 21 is applicable.

I Drainage provisions for deluge water-for the SGTS water spray fire

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protection system, designed and supplied by CTI Nuclear is inadequate.

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Proposed redesign by CTI Nuclear must be approved by GE/C. F. Braun and i

TVA.

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. A final report is due by May 29, 1981.

'7.

Status of OIE Bulletins (Closed) 80-22, Automation Industries Model 200-520-008 Sealed-Source Connectors This bulletin was sent to licensees authorized to use byproduct material

' under 10 CFR 34 and is not applicable to Hartsville.

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(Closed) 80-24, Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Containment This bulletin was issued to operating BWR plant and is not applicable to Hartsville.

(Closed) 80-25, Operating Problems with Target Rock Safety-Relief Values of BWRs Action is to be taken for BWR plants with an operating license or a pending near-term operating license; so it is not applicable to Hartsville.

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Status of IE Circulars (Closed) 80-25, Case Histories of Radiography Events This circular was issued to industrial radiographers.

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