IR 05000498/2024003
| ML24310A255 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 11/07/2024 |
| From: | Patricia Vossmar NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/PBA |
| To: | Harshaw K South Texas |
| Bywater R | |
| References | |
| IR 2024003 | |
| Download: ML24310A255 (36) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2024003 AND 05000499/2024003
Dear Kimberly A. Harshaw:
On September 30, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. On October 3, 2024, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Four findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. All of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Patricia J. Vossmar, Chief Reactor Projects Branch A Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000498 and 05000499 License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Nos:
05000498 and 05000499
License Nos:
Report Nos:
05000498/2024003 and 05000499/2024003
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2024-003-0009
Licensee:
STP Nuclear Operating Company
Facility:
South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Wadsworth, TX 77483
Inspection Dates:
July 1, 2024 to September 30, 2024
Inspectors:
C. Alldredge, Senior Health Physicist
B. Baca, Health Physicist
R. Bywater, Senior Project Engineer
J. Ellegood, Senior Resident Inspector
L. Flores, Resident Inspector
N. Greene, Senior Health Physicist
S. Hedger, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
D. Holman, Senior Physical Security Inspector
C. Jewett, Senior Physical Security Inspector
V. Lee, Project Engineer
J. O'Donnell, Senior Health Physicist
J. Vera, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Patricia J. Vossmar, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch A
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Ensure Fire Door was Closed and Latched Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000498/2024003-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71111.05 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of renewed license NPF-76, license condition 2.E, Fire Protection, for the licensees failure to ensure that fire door 1-MAB-DOOR-089, located between the Unit 1, train B component cooling water pump and essential chiller room, and the train C component cooling water pump and essential chiller room, was closed and latched. The door provides a 3-hour fire barrier between these two separate fire areas.
Failure to provide accurate shipping documentation for a Type B(U) radioactive waste shipment Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Public Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000498,05000499/2024003-02 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71124.08 The NRC identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 6.8.1 because the licensee failed to follow their procedure, 0PRP03-ZR-0002, revision 29, Radioactive Waste Shipments," when it shipped a radioactive waste package with incorrect information. Specifically, the licensee shipped a Type B package (UN2916) of dewatered bead resin. The associated Straight Bill of Lading, a shipping paper, identified the shipment as a low specific activity (LSA-II) shipment (UN3321). This inaccuracy was not identified during the licensee's peer review process and the shipment left the site with the incorrect shipping documentation.
Failure to Provide Adequate Work Instructions Results in Inoperable Essential Chiller Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000498/2024003-03 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71153 The inspectors documented a self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a for the licensees failure to provide adequate work instructions appropriate to the circumstances for Essential Chillers as required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation), Revision 2, Appendix A, section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide adequate work instructions to clean shaft seal parts during compressor mechanical seal replacement, resulting in the inoperability of the Unit 1 train C essential chiller (12C).
Foreign Material in Breaker Results in Inoperable Emergency Core Cooling Subsystem Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000498/2024003-04 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71153 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a for the licensees failure to properly perform adequate foreign material inspections for breaker replacement of the Unit 1, Train A Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI 1A) pump in accordance with written procedures and documented instructions appropriate to the circumstances in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation), Revision 2, Appendix A, section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance. Specifically, in 2023, the licensee replaced the LHSI 1A pump breaker but failed to identify foreign material (FME) in the circuit breaker during pre-installation inspections resulting in the inoperability of LHSI 1A pump. As a result, Train A Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystem was inoperable for greater than its allowed Technical Specification (TS) outage time.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status NOV 05000498,05000499/20 23003-02 Failure to Establish Adequate Corrective Actions for Out-of-Tolerance Essential Cooling Water System Expansion Joints 71152A Closed LER 05000498/2023-003-01 LER 2023-003-01 for South Texas Project, Supplement to Unit 1, Two Essential Chilled Water Trains Inoperable Resulting in a Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function 71153 Closed LER 05000498/2023-003-00 LER 2023-003-00 for South Texas Project, Unit 1, Two Essential Chilled Water Trains Inoperable Resulting in a Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function 71153 Closed LER 05000498/2024-003-00 LER 2024-003-00 for South Texas Project, Unit 1, 71153 Closed
Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Potential Loss of Safety Function Due to Inoperable Low Head Safety Injection Pump
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On July 24, 2024, the unit automatically tripped due to a main generator lockout and loss of offsite power resulting from the failure of shunt reactor 2 and resulting switchyard fire, entering forced outage 1F2403 to perform repairs. The main generator breaker was closed on August 1, 2024, ending forced outage 1F2403. The unit returned to rated thermal power on August 3, 2024, and remained there for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On July 24, 2024, the unit lowered power to 90% due to a partial loss of offsite power resulting from the failure of shunt reactor 2 and resulting switchyard fire, and then returned to rated thermal power later on July 24, 2024.
The unit remained at rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather due to Hurricane Beryl for Units 1 and 2 on July 8, 2024.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 2, train B safety injection system on July 2, 2024
- (2) Unit 1, train D auxiliary feedwater system on September 10, 2024
- (3) Unit 1, train A essential cooling water system on September 12, 2024
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 2, train B mechanical auxiliaries building safety injection system cubicle on July 3, 2024
- (2) Unit 1, train A electrical auxiliaries building cable spreading room on July 10, 2024
- (3) Unit 2, train A diesel generator building on July 11, 2024
- (4) Unit 1, mechanical auxiliaries building heating, ventilation, and air conditioning outside exhaust equipment on July 12, 2024
- (5) Unit 2, FLEX diesel room on July 13, 2024
- (6) Unit 1, FLEX diesel room on July 13, 2024
- (7) Unit 1, train C mechanical auxiliaries building component cooling water pump and essential chiller on August 28, 2024
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill involving a Unit 1 ECW Train B traveling screen motor fire on September 6, 2024.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Unit 1 control room during startup and power ascension from forced outage on August 1, 2024.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification training on August 13 and August 20, 2024.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Unit 1, train A LHSI pump failure to start on August 12, 2024
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)white risk for planned maintenance the week of August 5, 2024 (2)white risk and planned CRMP entry the week of September 2, 2024
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 2, train C diesel generator due to lube oil filter high differential pressure on July 11, 2024
- (2) Unit 1, Steam Dump PV-7493 repeated failures during forced outages on September 23, 2024
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
- (1) Unit 2, train C essential chiller after failed post-maintenance testing, troubleshooting and restoration on July 24, 2024
- (2) Unit 1, train B diesel generator post-maintenance testing following planned maintenance window on September 24, 2024
- (3) Unit 1, train B essential cooling water system post-maintenance testing following planned maintenance window on September 24, 2024
- (4) Unit 1, train B essential chiller post-maintenance testing following planned maintenance window on September 24, 2024
- (5) Unit 1, train B component cooling water system post-maintenance testing following planned maintenance window on September 24, 2024
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1, train C low head safety injection pump inservice test on August 19, 2024
- (2) Unit 1, train C high head safety injection pump inservice test on August 19, 2024
- (3) Unit 1, train A E1A11 1E battery combined service and performance surveillance test on September 4, 2024
Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 FLEX diesel generator functional testing on September 20, 2024
71114.01 - Exercise Evaluation
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the biennial emergency plan exercise conducted on July 17, 2024. The exercise scenario simulated a steam generator tube leak; loose parts monitoring indications which resulted in the steam generator tube leak developing to a rupture; an unisolable steam line break connected to the ruptured steam generator; and continued fuel cladding damage contributing to a simulated radiological release.
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Emergency Plan, revision 1 (NRC notified of revision on February 7, 2024). Also, a recent change to the Evacuation Time Estimate study was reviewed. Screenings and evaluations associated with the 10 CFR 50.54(q) emergency plan change process were reviewed as well. These evaluations do not constitute NRC approval.
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Additional Drill and/or Training Evolution (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated a full site integrated drill that involved a LOCA, large break LOCA, radiological release, and a general emergency on August 28,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (9 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:
(1)personnel contamination monitors at the radiologically controlled area (RCA) exit in Unit 1 and Unit 2 (2)portable friskers throughout the RCA in Unit 1 and Unit 2 (3)benchtop instruments used for analysis of contamination levels in Unit 1 and Unit 2 (4)portable ion chambers available for use in the RCA in Unit 1 and Unit 2 (5)area radiation monitors in the mechanical auxiliary building and fuel handling building for Unit 1 and Unit 2 (6)process radiation monitoring systems in the mechanical auxiliary building, fuel handling, and reactor building for Unit 1 and Unit 2 (7)effluent radiation monitors in the mechanical auxiliary building and turbine building for Unit 1 and Unit 2 (8)gamma exit monitors at the RCA exit in Unit 1 and Unit 2 (9)continuous air monitors in the Unit 2 mechanical auxiliary building
Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (14 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection instruments:
- (1) Canberra GEM-5, gamma exit monitor, EQID# 155-00003-002, October 17, 2023
- (2) Canberra ARGOS-5AB, personnel contamination monitor, EQID# 155-00004-002, November 27, 2023
- (3) Thermo Electron SAM-12, small article monitor, EQID# 15500149-007, May 22, 2024
- (4) Ludlum Model 3, survey instrument (frisker), EQID# 400-00031-053, March 20, 2024
- (5) Ludlum Model 177-64, alarming ratemeter (frisker), EQID# 400-00047-037, August 22, 2024
- (6) Eberline AMS-4, continuous air sampler (beta), EQID# 400-00099-016, June 4, 2024
- (7) Ludlum Model 78, stretch scope, EQID# 400-00147-007, August 1, 2024
- (8) Ludlum 3030P, alpha/beta sample counter, EQID# 400-00153-003, February 17, 2024
- (9) Unit 1, detector 2, gamma spectroscopy, S/N# 11781, particulate filter surface calibration verification, October 5, 2023
- (10) Unit 2, component cooling water system monitor, N2RA-RT-8040, June 7, 2023
- (11) Unit 2, fuel handling building entry area radiation monitor, N2RART8089, February 6, 2024
- (12) Unit 1, mechanical auxiliary building entry hallway area radiation monitor, N1-RA-RT 8069, June 6, 2024
- (13) Unit 1, containment high range area radiation monitor, C1-RA-RT-8051, April 10, 2023
- (14) Unit 1, containment atmosphere radiation monitor, N1-RA-RT-8011, August 9, 2023 Effluent Monitoring Calibration and Testing Program Sample (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and maintenance of the following radioactive effluent monitoring and measurement instrumentation:
- (1) Unit 1, unit vent particulate and iodine effluent radiation monitor, N1-RA-RT-8010A, August 21, 2023
- (2) Unit 1, waste monitor tank pumps 1A, B, and C discharge radiation monitor (liquid waste effluent), N1-RA-RT-8038, June 14, 2023
71124.06 - Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radioactive effluent systems during walkdowns:
- (1) Unit 1, liquid waste processing system discharge
- (2) Unit 1, plant vent
- (3) Unit 2, fuel handling building exhaust
- (4) Unit 2, reactor containment building purge
- (5) Unit 2, steam generator blowdown liquid monitor (RT-8022 and RT-8023) to component cooling water system discharge monitor (RE-8040)
Sampling and Analysis (IP Section 03.02) (4 Samples)
Inspectors evaluated the following effluent samples, sampling processes and compensatory samples:
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2, main steam tritium sampling and analysis, dated September 10, 2024
- (2) Unit 1, plant vent RT-8010A particulate (HC15829/VE15828) and iodine (HC15830/VE15827) sampling and analysis, dated September 10, 2024
- (4) Unit 2, waste monitoring tank 2E sampling and analysis for release permit 3812, dated September 12, 2024
Dose Calculations (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following dose calculations:
- (1) Unit 1, gaseous effluent release permits: 648, 657, 683, 697
- (2) Unit 2, gaseous effluent release permits: 688, 690, 692, 701
- (3) Unit 1, waste monitoring tank 1E release permit 3609 and unit 2 waste monitoring tank 2E release permit 3812 Abnormal Discharges (IP Section 03.04)
The inspectors evaluated the inspection period and identified no abnormal discharges to review.
71124.07 - Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
Environmental Monitoring Equipment and Sampling (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated environmental monitoring equipment and observed collection of environmental samples.
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the licensees radiological environmental monitoring program.
GPI Implementation (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of the Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI) program to identify incomplete or discontinued program elements. No incomplete or discontinued elements of the GPI were identified.
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, &
Transportation
Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 03.01)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance in controlling, labeling and securing the following radioactive materials:
(1)sealed sources stored in the 1MAB218 (MAB: Mechanical Auxiliary Building),1MAB331, 2MAB218, and Unit 1 53-foot radioactive material source (RMS) cage areas of the radiologically controlled area (RCA)
- (2) Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources stored in the West Gate House (WGH)
Facilities Building (3)items stored inside and outside of warehouse 44
Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 03.02) (3 Samples)
The inspectors walked down the following accessible portions of the solid radioactive waste systems and evaluated system configuration and functionality:
- (1) Advance Liquid Processing System (ALPS) in Unit 2
- (2) Self-Engaging Dewatering System (SEDS) in Unit 1 (3)solid waste processing corridor and filter handling area
Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following characterization and classification of radioactive waste:
(1)high activity spent resin in Unit 2 (2)process filters in Unit 1 and Unit 2 (3)spent resin storage tanks in Unit 1
Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) STP 1-24-043, limited quantity (LQ), resin and zeolite samples to GEL Laboratories, September 11, 2024
Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through a record review:
- (1) STP 1-23-013, UN3321, low specific activity (LSA-II), dewatered bead resin, May 24, 2023
- (2) STP 1-23-017, UN2915, Type A, refuel metal boxes, April 26, 2023
- (3) STP 1-24-020, UN2916, Type B(U), RQ-radionuclides, dewatered bead resin, May 15, 2024
- (4) STP 2-22-060, UN2915, Type A, steam generator primary equipment, December 5, 2022
- (5) STP 2-24-001, UN2916, Type B(U), RQ-radionuclides, dewatered bead resin, January 31,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05)===
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2023, - June 30, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2023, - June 30, 2024)
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2023, - June 30, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2023, - June 30, 2024)
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2023, - June 30, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2023, - June 30, 2024)
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Sample (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2023, - June 30, 2024 EP02: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2023, - June 30, 2024 EP03: Alert And Notification System (ANS) Reliability Sample (IP Section 02.14)
In April 2022, the ANS was changed such that it relies on Integrated Public Alert & Warning System (IPAWS) as the primary means of public notification. Therefore, the ANS Reliability Performance Indicator and associated data are no longer reported by the licensee, and thus are not subject to further inspection/verification per IP 711151. Evaluation of the licensee's non-siren based ANS is completed separately per IP 71114.02, "Alert and Notification System Evaluation."
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Corrective actions associated with Unit 2, train C power operated relief valve after it failed to close during startup from 2RE23.
- (2) The inspectors reviewed the licensees response to NOV
===05000498,05000499/2023003-02 and determined that the reason, corrective actions taken and planned to address recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved for this violation is adequately addressed and captured on the docket.
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Follow up (IP Section 03.01)===
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the shunt reactor failure and fire in the switchyard, the resulting Unit 1 trip, and the licensees response on July 24, 2024.
Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000498/2024-003-00, "Unit 1, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Potential Loss of Safety Function Due to Inoperable Low Head Safety Injection Pump," (ADAMS Accession No. ML24183A174). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER and an associated non-cited violation are documented in this report under the inspection results section. This LER is Closed.
- (2) LER 05000498/2023-003-00, "Unit 1, Two Essential Chilled Water Trains Inoperable Resulting in a Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function,"
(ADAMS Accession No.ML24009A282) and LER 05000498/2023-003-01, "Supplement to Unit 1, Two Essential Chilled Water Trains Inoperable Resulting in a Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function, (ADAMS Accession No. ML24171A011). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER and an associated non-cited violation are documented in this report under the inspection results section. This LER is Closed.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Ensure Fire Door was Closed and Latched Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000498/2024003-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71111.05 The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of renewed license NPF-76, license condition 2.E, Fire Protection, for the licensees failure to ensure that fire door 1-MAB-DOOR-089, located between the Unit 1, train B component cooling water pump and essential chiller room, and the train C component cooling water pump and essential chiller room, was closed and latched. The door provides a 3-hour fire barrier between these two separate fire areas.
Description:
On May 22, 2024, during a plant walkdown of the Mechanical Auxiliaries Building, including the component cooling water/essential cooling water heat exchangers and essential chiller trains, the inspectors observed that fire door 1-MAB-DOOR-089 was not fully closed and latched. 1-MAB-DOOR-089 separates fire area 27, zone Z139 and fire area 29, zone 140 and is credited as a 3-hour fire barrier between the two areas. The door was subsequently closed by the inspectors and remained closed and latched when challenged.
The inspectors notified the control room, and the licensee notified the fire marshal, and a fire impairment was initiated. The licensee documented the condition in condition report (CR) 24-5336.
Zone Z139 of fire area 27 contains the train C essential chiller and its associated support cables and equipment in addition to electrical cables required for safe shutdown. An ionization fire detection system is provided in the zone with an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system at ceiling level over concentrated cabling, in addition to manual firefighting equipment.
Zone Z140 of fire area 29 contains the train B essential chiller and its associated support cables and equipment in addition to electrical cables required for safe shutdown. An ionization fire detection system is provided in the zone and manual firefighting equipment.
Corrective Actions: Door hardware was checked and lubricated, and functions were tested satisfactory using procedure 0PTP03-FP-0126, Fire Door Visual Examination, Open and Release Mechanisms Functional Check, and Supervision System Functionality Check, Rev. 22 on May 23, 2024.
Corrective Action References: CR 2024-5336
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to ensure that fire door 1-MAB-DOOR-089, a 3-hour rated fire barrier, located between the train B component cooling water pump and essential chiller room and the train C component cooling water pump and essential chiller room, was closed and latched was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to ensure that the 3-hour rated fire door 1-MAB-DOOR-089 was closed and latched degraded the defense and depth of the fire protection program. In the event of a fire in either area, the fire could spread to the other area and affect safe shutdown of the plant.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. The inspectors assigned the finding a fire finding category 1.4.4 using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, 1, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process Worksheet, dated May 2, 2018, because the finding involved fire confinement, fire finding category 1.4.4. The inspectors determined that the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because the fire finding involved failure of the fire door to properly latch but did not affect the ability of the fire door to close, and the fire door does not protect an area with a gaseous fire suppression system.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to adhere to 0PGP03-ZA-0514, Controlled System or Barrier Impairment, Rev 21 which requires, in part, for station personnel to secure fire doors properly after traversing by closing and ensuring the doors are properly latched after traversing through them.
Enforcement:
Violation: License Condition 2.E, Fire Protection, of renewed license NPF-76 requires, in part, that the licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Fire Hazards Analysis Report. Section 4.1 of the Fire Hazards Analysis Report, Amendment Number 27 contains a comparison of the licensees fire protection program to the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. The Fire Hazards Analysis Report states, in part, that fire doors shall be self-closing or provided with closing mechanisms and shall be kept closed.
Contrary to the above, on May 22, 2024, the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that fire door 1-MAB-DOOR-089, located between the train B component cooling water pump and essential chiller room and the train C component cooling water pump and essential chiller room, was kept closed.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to provide accurate shipping documentation for a Type B(U) radioactive waste shipment Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Public Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000498,05000499/2024003-02 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71124.08 The NRC identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 6.8.1 because the licensee failed to follow their procedure, 0PRP03-ZR-0002, revision 29, Radioactive Waste Shipments," when it shipped a radioactive waste package with incorrect information. Specifically, the licensee shipped a Type B package (UN2916) of dewatered bead resin. The associated Straight Bill of Lading, a shipping paper, identified the shipment as a low specific activity (LSA-II) shipment (UN3321). This inaccuracy was not identified during the licensee's peer review process and the shipment left the site with the incorrect shipping documentation.
Description:
While reviewing radioactive waste shipping packages, the inspectors identified that the bill of lading shipping paper included with shipment STP 1-24-020, dated May 15, 2024, contained incorrect information for the package's description. The bill of lading is required by the United States Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations per Title 49 CFR as a shipping paper, as implemented by NRC regulation 10 CFR 71.5. The bill of lading includes the name and address of the shipper, the name and address of the consignee, a description of the goods (i.e., radioactive waste/material) being shipped, the quantity of the goods, the method of transportation, and the date of shipment. In this case, the licensee did not provide an accurate description of the radioactive waste on the "Straight Bill of Lading" shipping paper as it was being shipped to the consignee, Waste Control Specialist LLC, by way of a carrier for transport.
A bill of lading shipping paper is a type of transportation document, as provided for a shipment. However, it must contain specific elements of applicable information per 49 CFR 172.201, 172.202, and 172.203(d). This includes, in part, the applicable DOT proper shipping name and hazard class, such as Radioactive Material, per 49 CFR 172.101, letters "RQ" or "X" in the column captioned HM per 49 CFR 172.203(c)(2), and the applicable identification number (UNXXXX) from 49 CFR 172.101. In this case, for shipment STP 1-24-020, the "Straight Bill of Lading" hazard classification of "UN3321, Radioactive material, low specific activity (LSA-II), 7, RQ-Radionuclides," did not match the actual and correct classification for the shipment of "UN2916, Radioactive material, Type B(U) package, 7, RQ-Radionuclides,"
as documented on the associated shipping manifest (NRC Form 540/541).
The incorrect "Straight Bill of Lading" was peer reviewed as part of the shipping package by the licensee and then provided to the carrier for transport of the radioactive waste with incorrect information. On the "Straight Bill of Lading" document reviewed by the inspectors, dated May 15, 2024, both the licensee and carrier signed statements that certified, in part, that the above-named materials were properly classified and described. This was not accurate and was not identified as an error by either party. In addition, as part of the shipping package peer review, the licensee requires signatures by a first and second reviewer per procedure 0PRP03-ZR-0002, Form 8, "Radioactive Waste Shipment Document Package Cover Sheet." Shipment STP 1-24-020 was signed and dated by two different individuals as part of the completed peer review.
Licensee procedure, 0PRP02-ZR-0002, "Radioactive Waste Shipments," revision 29, section 5.13, states in part, "ENSURE the shipping papers and manifest are in the format desired by the disposal facility and State and Federal agencies. Department of Transportation (DOT)shipping paper requirements are described in full in 49 CFR 172.200-204." This section further states the Straight Bill of Lading can be generated by any means available.
Section 6.8.1 of this procedure requires, as a minimum, the "Straight Bill of Lading" to be completed, signed, and given to the driver as part of the shipment documentation.
Additionally, per procedure 0PRP03-ZR-0002, the Straight Bill of Lading is required to accompany the shipment per Form 1 of this procedure and is provided as part of the instructions to drivers of exclusive use vehicles per Form 5.
The NRC inspectors did confirm that the correct emergency response information and paperwork was provided as part of the shipping package for a UN2916 shipment.
Corrective Actions: As part of their corrective actions, the licensee coached their radwaste management team and reviewed their radioactive materials shipping procedures for enhancements and additional error reduction tools. The licensee also ensured their shipment package STP 1-24-020 included the updated and corrected Straight Bill of Lading shipping paper for its record.
Corrective Action References: CR-2024-08896
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to follow their radioactive material shipping procedures when they provided inaccurate shipping papers for a Type B(U) package is a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Program & Process attribute of the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain as a result of routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Additionally, the finding was similar to Example 6(l) in Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Power Reactor Inspection Reports - Examples of Minor Issues," in that the error in the shipping papers impacted the identification number and proper shipping name on the "Straight Bill of Lading" provided.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix D, Public Radiation Safety SDP. The inspectors determined the finding had very low safety significance (Green) because, although the finding involved transportation:
- (1) the incorrect packaging was not used,
- (2) no radiation limit was exceeded,
- (3) there was no package breach,
- (4) there was no Certificate of Compliance finding,
- (5) there was no near-surface disposal nonconformance, and
- (6) there was no failure to make notifications or provide the correct emergency response information.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, there were peer reviews of the shipping documentation completed by different individuals and the shipping paper error was not caught, which stems from an environment of complacency, not planning for the possibility of mistakes, and implementing appropriate error reduction tools.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 6.8.1, Procedures, states, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the following activities:
- (a) the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Section 7 of Appendix A recommends procedures for control of radioactivity for limiting materials released to the environment.
Procedure 0PRP02-ZR-0002, "Radioactive Waste Shipments," revision 29, section 5.13, implements the above requirement, in part, by stating, "ENSURE the shipping papers and manifest are in the format desired by the disposal facility and State and Federal agencies.
Department of Transportation (DOT) shipping paper requirements are described in full in 49 CFR 172.200-204." This section further states the Straight Bill of Lading can be generated by any means available. Section 6.8.1 of this procedure requires, as a minimum, the "Straight Bill of Lading" to be completed, signed, and given to the driver as part of the shipment documentation.
Contrary to the above requirements, on May 15, 2024, the licensee failed to ensure the "Straight Bill of Lading" shipping paper, which was completed, signed, and given to the driver as part of the shipment documentation for STP 1-24-20, was in the format desired by Federal agencies (i.e., DOT). Specifically, per 49 CFR 172.200-204, the "Straight Bill of Lading" did not include the correct U.S. DOT description when it failed to document the DOT proper shipping name, hazard class, and identification number. The associated Straight Bill of Lading incorrectly described the shipment as "UN3321, Radioactive material, low specific activity (LSA-II), 7, RQ-Radionuclides" instead of correctly describing the shipment as "UN2916, Radioactive material, Type B(U) package, 7, RQ-Radionuclides," as required.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Provide Adequate Work Instructions Results in Inoperable Essential Chiller Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000498/2024003-03 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71153 The inspectors documented a self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a for the licensees failure to provide adequate work instructions appropriate to the circumstances for Essential Chillers as required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation), Revision 2, Appendix A, section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide adequate work instructions to clean shaft seal parts during compressor mechanical seal replacement, resulting in the inoperability of the Unit 1 train C essential chiller (12C).
Description:
The essential chilled water system provides chilled water to safety-related air handling units (AHU) to provide a suitable environment for personnel and Class 1E equipment located in the Electrical Auxiliaries Building, Mechanical Auxiliaries Building, and the Fuel Handling Building. It is designed to remain functional during and following design basis accidents and plant safe shutdown. It consists of three, 50-percent-heat-removal-capacity redundant and independent trains. The chiller in each train consists, in part, of a compressor whose shaft mechanical seal prevents air in-leakage into the system to maintain compressor discharge pressure within limits.
On November 10, 2023, essential chiller 12C was started for equipment rotation. Following startup, the licensee noted that the chiller compressor discharge pressure was high and had an excessive purge alarm, indicating air in-leakage. Troubleshooting determined that the compressor mechanical seal had degraded and prematurely failed. The compressor mechanical seal had been replaced during planned preventive maintenance on July 19, 2023; it was on a 5-year replacement preventive maintenance schedule and failed after four months.
The licensee sent the compressor mechanical seal to a vendor to perform a failure analysis.
The failure analysis documented that there was circumferential scoring and wear on the sealing surfaces, attributed to abrasive wear. The vendor identified silica particles embedded in the sealing surface, which are abrasive and would result in the observed wear and elevated seal leakage. The licensee also reviewed possible sources where silica could be introduced into the seal and determined that the likely source to be a Scotch-Brite scouring pad that was used for preparing and cleaning the shaft for seal installation.
The replacement of the compressor mechanical seal is performed using licensee procedure 0PMP05-CH-0003, Addendum 16, York Chiller Inspection & Maintenance 300 tons, Compressor Mechanical Shaft Seal Replacement, Rev. 17. Step 4.1 states, in part, thoroughly clean and lubricate the shaft seal parts prior to assembly. This step does not provide any direction or detail on what materials to use or avoid, nor how to clean the area.
The licensee used the scouring pad followed by wipe down with a lint-free cloth, alcohol, and lubricating oil.
The inspectors reviewed the vendor technical manual, VTD-Y018-0005, Open turbopak Centrifugal Liquid Chillers Service Instruction Model OT A1 A1 B1 Thru OT F3 S3 C2 (Style B) 150-400 Tons, Rev. 0, and noted that the instructions state, in part, all parts should be thoroughly washed with an approved safety solvent and lint free cloth. Contrary to the manual, the licensee used an abrasive scouring pad to prepare and clean the shaft in addition to a lint free cloth, thereby introducing silica and prematurely degrading the seal and resulting in the inoperability of essential chiller 12C.
Corrective Actions: The licensee replaced the compressor mechanical seal and restored operability of the chiller on November 20, 2023, after successful post maintenance testing.
The licensee initiated an action to evaluate appropriate materials to be used to clean the shaft prior to installation of the seal.
Corrective Action References: CR 2023-10352
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to provide adequate work instructions to clean shaft seal parts during compressor mechanical seal replacement was a performance deficiency.
Specifically, the work instructions to replace the compressor mechanical seal did not provide direction on what material to use for cleaning nor how to clean the shaft. As a result, silica particles were introduced into the shaft seal assembly which caused abrasive wear on the seal, and it prematurely failed.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, essential chiller 12C was declared inoperable due to high compressor discharge pressure resulting from air in-leakage due to a failed compressor mechanical seal.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined that this finding required a detailed risk evaluation because essential chiller 12C represented a loss of PRA function for one train of a multi-train system for greater than its TS allowed outage time of 7 days.
A senior reactor analyst performed a detailed risk evaluation. The analyst assumed that the performance deficiency resulted in the essential chiller 12C being in a condition where it would have been unable to perform its required function from November 10, 2023, through November 20, 2023, due to the condition of the compressor mechanical seal. No recovery credit for this function was applied. The analyst referenced a detailed risk evaluation that was previously performed for a similar issue involving the same safety function (essential chiller 12C), which was documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000498/2024001 and 05000499/2024001 dated May 6, 2024. This previous risk evaluation, which determined the significance of this condition for an exposure time of 13 days and 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />, was determined to be applicable as a bounding analysis for purposes of determining the significance of this finding for which a 10-day exposure time is applicable.
The following is a summary of the previously documented analysis. Using the SPAR Model version 8.82 along with SAPHIRE version 8.2.9, the analyst set the basic event CHW-CHL-FR-300TC (300-Ton Chiller C Fails) to TRUE in the Events and Conditions Assessment (ECA) workspace for an exposure time of 13 days and 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />. The analyst included credit for the use of Diverse and Flexible Coping (FLEX) Strategies Flex by adjusting the basic event FLX-XHE-XE-ELAP (Operators Fail to Declare ELAP When Beneficial) probability to 1.0E-2. The analyst quantified the SPAR model according to the assumptions described above to obtain a result of 5.32E-7/year for an increase in average annual core damage frequency (delta-CDF) associated with internal events. The dominant sequences involved loss of all feedwater with failure of the feed-and-bleed function, as well as small and medium loss of coolant accident sequences with failure of the low pressure and high pressure recirculation functions.
The increase in risk associated with external events attributable to this degraded condition was also evaluated. Using the SPAR model, the analyst obtained a result of 1.04E-7/year for a delta-CDF associated with the external events of hurricane, straight line high winds, tornado, and seismic events. Since the SPAR model did not include modeling of fire events, the analyst determined that best available information associated with the risk attributable to fire events would be obtained from the licensees fire PRA model. The analyst obtained and reviewed the results of the licensees fire PRA modeling of the impact of this condition and concluded that the increase in risk for this condition associated with fire events was best estimated to be a delta-CDF of 1.33E-7/year.
The risk significance of the finding was also evaluated for impact on large early release frequency (LERF). The analyst evaluated the increase in LERF using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process. The finding was treated as a Type A finding because it could influence the likelihood of accidents leading to core damage as well as being a contributor to LERF. The analyst reviewed all sequences contributing to CDF for any elements affecting LERF and screened out all sequences except those associated with a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event. For the SGTR sequence, the analyst applied the applicable assessment factor of 1.0 from table 6.2, phase 2 Assessment Factors - Type A Findings at Power. This resulted in an increase in LERF from internal and external events (minus fire events) of 1.81E-8/year. From a review of the licensees fire risk analysis, the analyst determined the best estimate of increase in LERF due to fire events was 1.46E-9/year.
Based on best estimates of 7.69E-7/year for total delta-CDF and 1.96E-8/year for total delta-LERF for the previously evaluated finding, the analyst concluded that the risk significance of this finding was determined to be very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, the procedure for replacing the compressor mechanical seal did not provide specific instructions for cleaning the shaft prior to reassembly, which resulted in silica particles being embedded into the shaft seal and premature failure of the compressor mechanical seal.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained in accordance with Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2. Appendix A, Section 9, "Procedures for Performing Maintenance."
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2 requires, in part, that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly pre-planned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances.
Contrary to the above, from November 10 until November 20, 2023, for maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment, the licensee failed to properly pre-plan and perform the activity in accordance with written procedures appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide an adequate procedure for cleaning the compressor mechanical seal shaft during replacement, resulting in the unplanned inoperability of Essential Chiller 12C.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Foreign Material in Breaker Results in Inoperable Emergency Core Cooling Subsystem Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000498/2024003-04 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71153 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a for the licensees failure to properly perform adequate foreign material inspections for breaker replacement of the Unit 1, Train A Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI 1A) pump in accordance with written procedures and documented instructions appropriate to the circumstances in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation), Revision 2, Appendix A, section 9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance. Specifically, in 2023, the licensee replaced the LHSI 1A pump breaker but failed to identify foreign material (FME) in the circuit breaker during pre-installation inspections resulting in the inoperability of LHSI 1A pump. As a result, Train A Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystem was inoperable for greater than its allowed Technical Specification (TS) outage time.
Description:
The ECCS consists of, in part, three subsystems, each train containing a LHSI pump, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) heat exchanger, and a High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pump. The LHSI pumps are designed to supply borated water into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cold legs following a design basis accident for short term cooling/cold-leg injection and to recirculate borated water from the containment sump to the RCS hot or cold legs during long-term cooling/recirculation phase and will automatically start upon receiving a safety injection initiation signal or when manually started from the control room.
On April 2, 2023, while performing surveillance testing, the LHSI 1A pump breaker failed to close when the licensee attempted to manually start the pump using the control room hand switch. The licensee documented the issue in condition report (CR) 2023-3527 and began troubleshooting under work authorization number (WAN) 687244. The licensee performed as-found breaker inspections and determined that the breaker needed to be replaced due to a vendor-identified variation in angular velocity of the closing springs. The licensee replaced the installed breaker with a new breaker on April 3, 2023, using WAN 687244, performed post maintenance testing, and returned the pump to operable status on April 4, 2023.
On April 21, 2024, while performing surveillance testing, the LHSI 1A pump again failed to start due to the breaker failing to close when the licensee attempted to manually start the pump using the control room hand switch. The licensee documented the issue in CR 2024-4015 and performed troubleshooting under WAN 706819. During troubleshooting, foreign material (a washer) was found resting on the support plate above the A-phase vacuum interrupter of the circuit breaker. The washer was located close to the copper shaft of the breakers moving contacts. The licensee concluded that the washer was in a location that could have prevented the moveable contacts from closing due to vibration caused by the closing force of the breaker. The licensee determined the pump to be inoperable from April 4, 2023, until the breaker was replaced, tested, and returned to operable status on April 25, 2024.
The inspectors reviewed the work instructions in WAN 687244 and noted two different steps that directed performing foreign material inspections during the breaker replacement work. In step 6 of the Troubleshoot-Attachment 1 section of WAN 687244, cleanliness checks and inspections were performed using vendor technical manual, VTD-S125-0023, Siemens Medium Voltage Replacement Breakers, Rev. 0, which states, in part, that the the vacuum interrupter, upper and lower connection pads must be free of any foreign objects.
Additionally, step 17 of the Troubleshoot-Attachment 1 section of WAN 687244 stated to verify NO FME in the circuit breaker prior to restoring all barriers that were removed for internal breaker inspections.
The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 0PGP03-ZA-0014, Foreign Material Exclusion Program, Rev. 40, and noted that electrical breaker work requires a minimum of FMEZ2 controls. Step 2.10.2.5 of 0PGP03-ZA-0014 for FMEZ2 controls states, in part, a two-person closeout inspection shall be documented within the work package. The inspectors noted that step 17 was marked as having been completed but did not see documentation that it was a two-person FME closeout inspection. The inspectors questioned the licensee if a two-person closeout inspection was performed, and the licensee affirmed that the two-person closeout inspection was performed; however, the FME was not identified.
The inspectors determined that the licensee had reasonable opportunity to identify the FME during cleanliness checks and inspections performed in step 6 and during the closeout inspection in step 17 of 0PGP03-ZA-0014.
Corrective Actions: The licensee replaced the LHSI 1A pump breaker under WAN 706819 and performed cleanliness checks and inspections and a two-person FME closeout inspection to ensure no foreign material was present. Additionally, an extent of condition review was performed to identify other breakers procured under the same purchase order.
LHSI 1A pump was declared operable on April 25, 2024.
Corrective Action References: CR 2024-4015, 2023-3527
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to perform an adequate foreign material closeout inspection for the replacement of the LHSI 1A pump breaker was a performance deficiency.
Specifically, in 2023, the licensee replaced the LHSI 1A pump breaker but failed to identify FME in the circuit breaker during both pre-installation inspections and FME closeout inspection.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, LHSI Pump 1A was inoperable from April 3, 2023, until April 25, 2024, because the presence of the unrestrained washer affected the seismic qualification of the pump breaker and thus did not provide reasonable assurance that the pump would start on an automatic nor manual initiation.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined that this finding required a detailed risk evaluation because the inoperability of LHSI pump 1A represented a loss of PRA function for one train of a multi-train system for greater than its TS allowed outage time.
A senior reactor analyst performed a detailed risk evaluation. The analyst assumed an exposure time of 22 days, assuming the new breaker would not have functioned for the 18 days that it was installed along with the 4 days of repair time to ensure the pump had a properly functioning breaker. The analyst set basic event LHI-MDP-FS-1A, LHSI Pump P1A Fails to Start, to TRUE in the South Texas Project SPAR model, version 8.80, run on SAPHIRE, version 8.2.11, to estimate an increase of 2.13E-7/year in core damage frequency from internal events. For external events, the analyst used licensee fire model information to estimate the increase in core damage frequency from fire events to be 2.32E-7/year. Other external events were not appreciable contributors to the significance. The dominant sequences were medium and large break losses of coolant accidents, which were mitigated with the other trains of low head injection.
The analyst referenced Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, to determine that the results of this finding were not dominated by the increase in large early release frequency and therefore would be best characterized by the increase in core damage frequency. The analyst combined these values to estimate a total increase in core damage frequency of 4.5E-7/year, making the significance of this finding characteristic of very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify FME in the breaker during both the pre-installation inspection and FME closeout inspection when the breaker was replaced on April 3, 2023, which resulted in FME being left in the breaker from April 3, 2023, until April 25, 2024.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained in accordance with Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2. Appendix A, Section 9, "Procedures for Performing Maintenance."
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2 requires, in part, that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly pre-planned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances.
Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2, ECCS Subsystems - Tavg Greater than or Equal to 350F, requires, in part, that three independent ECCS subsystems shall be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3, with each subsystem comprised of a) one operable HHSI Pump, b) one operable LHSI pump, c) one operable RHR heat exchanger, and d) one operable flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) on a Safety Injection (SI) signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation through a HHSI Pump into the RCS and through a LHSI Pump and its respective RHR heat exchanger into the RCS. TS 3.5.2 action statement (a)requires, in part, that with less than the above subsystems operable, but with at least two HHSI pumps operable, two LHSI pumps and associated RHR heat exchangers operable and sufficient flow paths to accommodate the operable SI pumps and RHR heat exchangers, within 7 days restore or apply the requirements of the Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP), or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in hot shutdown within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Contrary to the above, on April 3, 2023, for maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment, the licensee failed to properly pre-plan and perform the activity in accordance with written procedures appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly perform foreign material inspections in accordance with written procedures when the LHSI 1A pump breaker was replaced such that FME was not identified during breaker installation. Subsequently, the breaker failed to operate on April 21, 2024, resulting in LHSI Pump 1A being inoperable from April 4, 2023, until April 25, 2024. As a result, Train A ECCS subsystem was inoperable for greater than the TS allowed outage time permitted by TS 3.5.2 action
- (a) for less than the above subsystems operable, and the unit was not placed in hot standby within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On September 3, 2024, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness exercise inspection results to Kimberly A. Harshaw, Acting President, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On September 13, 2024, the inspectors presented the Radiation Safety inspection results to Jason Tomlinson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On October 3, 2024, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Kimberly A. Harshaw, Acting President, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
24-8870, 2024-8891
Drawings
5N129F05013#1
Safety Injection System
Drawings
5R289F05038#1
Sh 1
Essential Cooling Water System Train 1A
Drawings
5S142F00024, Sh
Procedures
Procedures
0001
Essential Cooling Water Operations
Procedures
Safety Injection System Initial Lineup
Calculations
7Q270MC5800
Combustible loading of Safety Related Areas
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
24-5336
Drawings
7M149M24513#1
Mechanical and Electrical Auxiliary Building Plan at EL. 10'0
Fire Plans
Fire Preplan for Diesel Generator Building, Train A
Fire Plans
Fire Preplan Electrical Auxiliary Building Cable Spreading
Room Train A
Fire Plans
Fire Preplan Mechanical Auxiliary Building CCW Pump and
Chiller, Train C
Fire Plans
Fire Preplan Mechanical Auxiliary Building CCW Pump and
Chiller, Train B
Fire Plans
Fire Preplan Mechanical Auxiliary Building HVAC Outside
Exhaust Equipment
Fire Plans
0601
Fire Preplan Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure Pump
Room Train B
Miscellaneous
Training Logs
Fire brigade member training logs
Procedures
STPEGS Fire Brigade
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
24-4015, 2023-3527
Procedures
Siemens HKR Vacuum Breaker Maintenance and Tests
Procedures
Risk Management Actions (RMA's)
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
0006
Procedures
Protected Components
Procedures
Protected Components
Procedures
Online Class 1E 125 V DC Battery and Inverter Removal
from Service and Restoration
Procedures
Online Class 1E 125V DC Battery and Inverter Removal from
Service and Restoration
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
24-3751
Drawings
5Q159F22542 #2
Piping and Instrument Diagram Standby Diesel Lube Oil
Engineering
Changes
23-6773-1
Approve Alternate Lube Oil for the Engineered Safety
Features Diesels
Miscellaneous
5Q159MB1023
Design Basis Document - Standby Diesel Generator System
Miscellaneous
VTD-C634-0048
Vendor Technical Document for Section 5 Lubricating Oil
System
Work Orders
Work
Authorization
Number
591852
Procedures
FLEX Diesel Generator Performance Test
Procedures
Low Head Safety Injection Pump 1C(2C) Inservice Test
Procedures
High Head Safety Injection Pimp 1C(2C) Inservice Test
Procedures
0007A
Train A - 125 Volt Class lE Battery Modified Performance
Surveillance Test
Work Orders
Work
Authorization
Number
661298, 661299, 652833, 666746, 670867, 675330, 679754
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
2-5187, 22-8022, 23-2163, 23-2496, 23-4123, 23-4261, 23-
9373,24-757, 24-912, 24-4733, 24-6392, 24-7042, 24-7043,
24-7127, 24-7128, 24-7129, 24-7130
Miscellaneous
24 Blue Team Exercise Management Critique
08/15/2024
Miscellaneous
KLD TR-1383
South Texas Project Electric Generation Station, Evacuation
Time Estimate Sensitivity Study, Roadway Closure of FM
21
2/29/2023
Miscellaneous
EP0004.001
STPEGS Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) Study
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
Evaluation CR
Tracking Number:
23-78-45
50.54(q) Screen Evaluation, EP0001.001 STPEGS
01/4/2024
Miscellaneous
Evaluation CR
Tracking Number:
CR #22-5917-11
50.54(q) Effectiveness Evaluation - Replace the Current ETE
Report Based on 2010 US Census Data with New ETE
Report Based on 2020 US Census Data
09/12/2023
Miscellaneous
NOC-AE-
24004014
South Texas Project Units 1 and 2; Docket Nos. STN 50-
498; STN 50-499; 72-1041; Change to South Texas Project
Electric Generating Station (STPEGS) Emergency Plan
2/7/2024
Procedures
Emergency Preparedness Document Changes
Calibration
Records
WAN 374514
Transfer Calibration Solid Sources (RD-52 detector)
05/18/2010
Calibration
Records
31318336
Supplement to 0PEP0S-RA-2050, Primary Calibration
Particulate Detectors (RD-56B) performed 11/14/97 for
detector SIN 374
03/23/2000
Calibration
Records
400-00031-013
Ludlum Model 3, survey meter
08/24/2024
Calibration
Records
400-00312-001
F and J, L-5 Supreme Plus, personal air sampler
08/06/2024
Calibration
Records
AccuScan
Total Body Scan Efficiency Calibration
01/11/2024
Calibration
Records
EAR1-0
Gamma Geometry Standardization Package
11/07/2019
Calibration
Records
Stand Fast
Whole Body Scanning Calibration Verification
05/09/2024
Calibration
Records
Unit 1, Detector 2
Gamma Spectroscopy Detector, S/N# 11781, charcoal
cartridge surface calibration verification
10/23/2023
Calibration
Records
WAN 619848
Calibration of the Condenser Air Removal System Wide
Range Gas Monitor, N1RA-RT-8027
07/25/2022
Calibration
Records
WAN 662691
Calibration of the PASS Area Radiation Monitor, N2-RA-RT-
8097
2/06/2024
Calibration
Records
WAT4-0
Gamma Geometry Standardization Package
11/06/2019
Corrective Action
CR-20YY-
2-11263, 22-11724, 22-11962, 22-12323, 22-09381, 22-
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
NNNNN
09819, 23-10104, 23-01064, 23-11127, 23-01873, 23-02688,
23-03419, 23-03986, 23-04547, 23-00467, 23-05087, 23-
05122, 23-05506, 23-05856, 23-05988, 23-06183, 23-07076,
23-07743, 23-07866, 23-08633, 23-08710, 23-09377, 23-
09513, 23-09687, 24-01208, 24-01703, 24-02425, 24-03195,
24-04389, 24-04903, 24-05030, 24-05850, 24-07478, 24-
08159
Miscellaneous
Report of Performance Testing Results for Canberra
Industries Model GEM-5, Gamma Exit Monitor, South Texas
Project Passive Monitoring < 1% Annual Limit on Intake
Sensitivity Testing
2/14/2014
Miscellaneous
ETC-1301
NIST Certificate of Calibration for Tc-99 standard beta
source S/N J919
2/01/2000
Miscellaneous
ETC-1459
NIST Certificate of Calibration for Tc-99 standard beta
source S/N 48326
01/01/2004
Miscellaneous
ST-HS-
HS:033948
RO-2, RO-20, and Frisker Response to Co-60 Beta radiation
04/02/1996
Procedures
Quality Assurance for Radioanalysis Instrumentation
Procedures
Radiological Instrumentation Control Program
Procedures
Primary Calibration Gas Detectors (RD-52)
Procedures
Radiation Monitoring System Alarm Response
Procedures
Radiation Monitoring System Alarm Response
Procedures
Health Physics Instrumentation Program
Procedures
Unit Vent Radiation Monitors Source Check
Procedures
8010A
Unit Vent Particulate and Iodine Effluent Monitor Calibration
(RT-8010A)
Procedures
Calibration of Counting Instruments
Procedures
Calibration of Handheld Survey Meters / Ion Chambers
Procedures
Calibration of Personnel Contamination Monitors
Procedures
Monitor Calibration of Canberra GEM-5 Gamma Exit
Monitors
Procedures
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-20YY-
NNNNN
21-07387, 21-07976, 21-08114, 21-09618, 21-12205, 22-
04652, 22-05891, 22-08771, 22-11633, 23-01873, 23-09554,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
23-10023, 24-00881, 24-04794, 24-05955, 24-06521, 24-
06581, 24-07478
Miscellaneous
23 Land Use Census
11/09/2023
Miscellaneous
Unit 1 Radiation Monitors Inoperable-Operable from Control
Room Logs
08/28/2024
Miscellaneous
Unit 2 Radiation Monitors Inoperable-Operable from Control
Room Logs
08/28/2024
Miscellaneous
August 2024 10 CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Analysis: DAW
Common 2024 (0PRP03-ZR-0009)
08/18/2024
Miscellaneous
STI 35309178
South Texas Project Units 1 & 2 - 2021 Radioactive Effluent
Release Report
04/26/2022
Miscellaneous
STI 35457470
South Texas Project Units 1 & 2 - 2022 Radioactive Effluent
Release Report
04/20/2023
Miscellaneous
STI 35586807
South Texas Project Units 1 & 2 - 2023 Radioactive Effluent
Release Report
04/24/2024
Procedures
Waste Monitor Tank Sampling
Procedures
Continuous Atmospheric Monitors
Procedures
Liquid Scintillation Counting System - Analysis, Operation
and Calibration
Procedures
Gaseous Effluent Particulate and Iodine Sampling and
Analysis
Procedures
Gaseous Effluent Noble Gas and Tritium Sampling and
Analysis
Calibration
Records
Primary Meteorological System Calibration (60 Meter Tower)
10/04/2023
Calibration
Records
Primary Meteorological System Calibration (60 Meter Tower)
2/06/2024
Calibration
Records
Primary Meteorological System Calibration (60 Meter Tower)
05/21/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-20YY-
NNNNN
2-12465, 22-12503, 23-02394, 23-02976, 23-05421, 23-
05644, 23-05810, 23-07705, 23-10838, 23-11412, 24-00317,
24-02519, 24-04904, 24-06386
Miscellaneous
EPRI Groundwater Protection Program; Groundwater
Protection Initiative Assessment; STP Nuclear Operating
05/01/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Company; South Texas Project Electric Generating Station
Miscellaneous
Groundwater Protection Plan;
South Texas Project
06/14/2023
Miscellaneous
Offsite Dose Calculations Manual (ODCM)
Miscellaneous
STI 35307197
South Texas Project Units 1 & 2 - 2021 Annual
Environmental Operating Report
04/26/2022
Miscellaneous
STI 35454866
South Texas Project Units 1 & 2 - 2022 Annual
Environmental Operating Report
04/13/2023
Miscellaneous
STI 35584603
South Texas Project Units 1 & 2 - 2023 Annual
Environmental Operating Report
04/25/2024
Procedures
REMP Sample Collection
Procedures
Environmental Dosimetry Monitoring
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-20YY-
NNNNN
2-09903, 22-11747, 22-11933, 22-12377, 22-12490, 23-
2802, 23-10066, 24-02458, 24-06537, 24-08585, 24-08587,
24-08589, 24-08590, 24-08591, 24-08592, 24-08592, 24-
08594, 24-08595, 24-08596, 24-08597, 24-08603, 24-08685,
24-08702
Miscellaneous
STPGES UFSAR - Chapter 11: RADIOACTIVE WASTE
MANAGEMENT
Miscellaneous
STP Radioactive Source Surveillance Test
07/24/2023
Miscellaneous
STP Radioactive Source Surveillance Test
01/11/2024
Miscellaneous
Tech Spec Source Inventory
09/12/2024
Miscellaneous
Dry Active Waste (DAW) Common 2022 - Nuclide
Distribution Report
2/01/2022
Miscellaneous
7R309F90023
Flow Diagram Liquid Waste Processing System
Miscellaneous
Figure 11.4-3
Process Flow Diagram Solid Waste Processing System
Miscellaneous
HPI1970
CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Analyses: Unit 2 Process
Filters Combined Waste Stream
10/17/2022
Miscellaneous
HPI2776
CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Analyses: Unit 1 Spent Resin
Storage Tank (SRST)
2/21/2023
Miscellaneous
HPI4562
CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Analyses: Unit 1 Spent Resin
Storage Tank (SRST)
01/15/2024
Miscellaneous
HPI4596
CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Analyses: 2023 Unit 2 High
Activity Spent Resin (HASR)
11/15/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
STI 35309178
South Texas Project Units 1 & 2 - 2021 Radioactive Effluent
Release Report
04/26/2022
Miscellaneous
STI 35457470
South Texas Project Units 1 & 2 - 2022 Radioactive Effluent
Release Report
04/20/2023
Miscellaneous
STI 35586807
South Texas Project Units 1 & 2 - 2023 Radioactive Effluent
Release Report
04/24/2024
Procedures
Radioactive Waste Process Control Program
Procedures
Radioactive Material Control Program
Procedures
Preparation of the Radioactive Effluent Release Report
Procedures
0002
High Integrity Container (HIC) Dewatering for Shipment and
Burial
Procedures
Determination of Radioactive Material Curie Content,
Reportability, DOT Sub-Type, and Waste Classification
Procedures
Radioactive Waste Shipments
Procedures
10CFR61 Sampling and Analysis Program
Procedures
Shipment of Radioactive Material
Procedures
Processing, Tracking and Loading of Spent Radioactive
Filters
Procedures
Receipt of Radioactive Material
Procedures
Security
Instruction 1015
Part 37 Program Implementing Instruction
Radiation
Surveys
29595
Radwaste Truck Bay
06/23/2024
Radiation
Surveys
29595
Radwaste Yard
06/23/2024
Radiation
Surveys
29595
Old Reactor Vessel Head (ORVH) Slab
06/23/2024
Radiation
Surveys
29817
Warehouse 44 and Yard
07/23/2024
Radiation
Surveys
130086
Unit 1 Radwaste Truckbay and Radwaste Yard
08/24/2024
Radiation
Surveys
130135
41' Unit 2 MAB - Task Group 2
09/01/2024
Radiation
130142
41' Unit 1 MAB - Task Group 2
09/01/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Surveys
Self-Assessments
24 71124.08 Snap Shot Self-Assessment
06/20/2024
Self-Assessments Att. to MN-23-0-
109089
Monitoring of Radioactive Waste Equipment and Systems
03/31/2023
Self-Assessments Att. to MN-23-1-
109189
Monitoring of Health Physics Material Control Radiological
Controls during 1RE24 (RC) MSL Rev. 19, 7E
04/25/2023
Self-Assessments Att. to Monitor
Report MN-24-2-
109525
Monitoring of Health Physics Material Control Radiological
Controls during 2RE23 (RC) MSL Rev. 20, 7B, 7E, 4a
05/01/2024
Shipping Records
STP 0-23-035
UN2916, RAM, Type B(U) package, 7, RQ-radionuclides
09/20/2023
Shipping Records
STP 1-23-013
UN3321, Radioactive material (RAM), low specific activity
(LSA-II), 7
05/24/2023
Shipping Records
STP 1-23-017
UN2915, RAM, Type A package, 7
04/26/2023
Shipping Records
STP 1-24-020
UN2916, RAM, Type B(U) package, 7, RQ-radionuclides
05/15/2024
Shipping Records
STP 2-22-060
UN2915, RAM, Type A package, 7
2/05/2022
Shipping Records
STP 2-24-001
UN2916, RAM, Type B(U) package, 7, RQ-radionuclides
01/13/2024
71151
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Reports
24-7051
71151
Miscellaneous
South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, 2023 Red
Team Combined Functional Drill, September 13, 2023,
Evaluation Report
09/27/2023
71151
Miscellaneous
STP 2023 Licensed Operator Requal Cycle 233 EPlan
Scenarios Evaluation Report, August 8 - September 5, 2023
05/14/2024
71151
Miscellaneous
STP 2023 KeROP Drill 4th Quarter EPlan Scenarios
Evaluation Report, October 17, 2023
11/7/2023
71151
Miscellaneous
STP 2024 1st Quarter 2024 DEP Drills EPlan Scenario
Evaluations Report, January 1 - March 31
04/30/2024
71151
Miscellaneous
South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, 2023 Blue
Team Combined Functional Drill, August 2, 2023, Evaluation
Report
09/2/2023
71151
Procedures
MSPI Bases Document
71151
Procedures
EP Performance Indicator Evaluation and Tracking
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71151
Procedures
Preparation and Submittal of NRC Performance Indicators
71151
Procedures
SEG-0007
Mitigating System Performance Indicator Collection,
Processing and Maintenance of Data
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
23-9775, 19-12557, 21-8976, 24-4183, 24-4879
Drawings
00009E0VAAC#2
Single Line Diagram Vital 120V AC Distribution Panels
DP002, DP1204 Channel IV
Drawings
8344--00047QE
Paul Monroe Hydraulics Wiring Diagram
2/12/2012
Miscellaneous
VTD-P095-0010
Operation Manual & Specifications Servo Amplifier
Miscellaneous
VTD-P095-0031
Miscellaneous
VTD-P095-0046
Installation, Operation and Maintenance Manual for (8)
Linear Valve Modulating Operator Assembly
Procedures
0001A
Essential Cooling Water Pump Maintenance (Product-
Lubricated Bearing Design)
Procedures
WCG-0003
Planner's Guide
Procedures
WCG-0008
Prevent Recurring Equipment Problems (PREP)
Work Orders
Work
Authorization
Number
707082, 707849, 621914
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
23-10352
Miscellaneous
Failure Analysis of Compressor Shaft Seal
04/24/2024
Miscellaneous
VTD-S125-0023
Siemens Medium Voltage Replacement Breakers
Miscellaneous
VTD-Y018-0005
Open Turbopak Centrifugal Liquid Chillers Service
Instruction Model OT A1 A1 B1 Thru F3 S3 C2 (Style B)
Procedures
Foreign Material Exclusion Program
Procedures
0003
York Chiller Inspection & Maintenance 300 Tons
Work Orders
Work
Authorization
Number
659148, 687244, 706819