IR 05000498/1990011
| ML20043A393 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 05/14/1990 |
| From: | Persinko D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20043A392 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-90-11, 50-499-90-11, NUDOCS 9005220006 | |
| Download: ML20043A393 (16) | |
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APPENDIX
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I
REGION IV
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NRC Inspection Report:
50-498/90-11.
Operating - Licen se: NPF-76'
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50-499/90-11 NPF-80
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.Deckets:
50-4b8 50-499 i
Licensee:
Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)
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.P.O. Box 1700
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Houston, Texas 77251 Facility Name:
South Tevas Project (STP), Units 1 and 2'
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Inspection At:
STP. Matagorda County,. Texas'
Inspection Conducted: April 1-30, 1990 Inspectors:
J. I. Tapia, Senior Resident Inspector, Project Section D Division of Reactor. Projects
R. J. Evans, Resident ~ Inspector, Project Section D
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Division of Reactor Projects
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Approved:
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S-/4-96
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D. Persinko, Acting Chief, Project Soction D Date.
Division of Reactor Projects f
Inspection Summary L
Inspection Conducted Ap. 11 1-30,1990 - (Report 50-498/90-11: 50-499/90-11)
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection which. included plant: status, onsite followup of events at operating power reactors, licensee: action on
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previous inspection findings, monthly maintenance observations, monthly
~3 surveillance observations, operational safety-verification, refueling-activities, spent fuel pool activities, and balance of plant inspection.'
Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified.. Three maintenance activities (Section 5.0) and four surveillance activities.
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(Section 6.0) were observed.
Operational safety' verification. inspections were performed, including inspections of the platt for housekeeping. The l' nit 2
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L isolation valve' cubicle (IVC) building was. noted to need cleaning (paragraph 7).
L Selected Unit I refueling activities were observed (paragraph-8).
Operator staffing and performance'as well as Unit I containment housekeeping and radiological controls were considered. good.
Selected Unit I spent fuel pool activities were also observed (paragraph 9). Housekeeping was-being well
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-2-maintained around the area of the spent fuel pool. Selected plant systems were i
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walked down and their system operating procedures were. reviewed during this I
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inspection period.
The systems included.the Unit 2 main steam system (paragraph 7),' Unit I containment heating.. ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system (paragraph 8), and the Unit I technical support
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center (TSC) HVAC and chilled water systems (paragraph 10). All components were
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noted to be in the correct positions to support plant operation, vS the
exception of several nonsafety-related components in the TSC HVA.
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chilled l
, water systems.
Licensee response to plant events.was effective'ir. 6dentifying.
i root cause, and actions taken to preclude recurrence were good.
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
- W. J. Jump, Maintenance Manager
- A. C..McIntyre, Manager,. Support Engineering.
- S. M. Dew, Manager, Nuclear. Purchasing Material Management
- A. H. Harrison, Supervisor, Licensing Engineer.
- C. A. Ayala, Supervising Engineer
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- V. A. Simonis, Plant Operations Support Manager
- L. R. 0111ver-Lucas, Supervisor,-Information Management
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- A. K. Khosla, Senior Engineero Licensing W. H. Kinsey, Plant: Manager
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G. E. Vaughn,-Vice President, Generation
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D. P. Hall, Group Vice President, Nuclear
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J. W. Loesch, Plant Operations Manager J. R.'Lovell, Technical Services Manager'
In addition to the above, the inspectors also held discussions with.
various licensee, architect engineer (AE), maintenance, and other J
contractor personnel during this inspection, i
- Denotes those individuals attending.the. exit interview conducted on May 1,.-
1990.
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2.
plant Status l
Unit 1 began this inspection period in Mode 4, cooling down.for the _
beginning of the second refueling outage.
During this. inspection period, the licensee successfully unloaded the reactor core, performed
safety-injection check valve and low pressure turbine' inspections, and q
initiated various scheduled plant modifications. At the close of this inspection period, the licensee was in the process of reloading the reactor core and the scope of the outage was approximately 50 percent
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Unit 2 began this inspection period in Mode 3 awaiting completion of j
l repairs to a main feedwater regulating valve. Mode I was attained on
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April 5, 1990. On April 8, 1990, Unit 2 was brought back to Mode 2 in j
L order to break condenser vacuum for. replacing a main turbine governor l
valve and repairing the main turbine rupture discs.
Mode 1 was'again
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L attained on April 12, 1990. On April 14, 1990, Unit 2 experienced a-l L
reactor / turbine trip from 99 percent reactor power when an electrohydraulic.
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fluid line to a.high pressure turbine governor valve ruptured. Afte
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repairs, Unit 2 was again brought critical on April 16, 1990, and reached.
l 100 percent power on April 19, 1990. On ?ril 20, 1990, the unit was-.
l-brought to 14 percent reactor power in order to fix a turbine-intercept.
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valve.
Unit 2 again reached 100 percent power on April. 22, 1990, and remained at that power level at the close of this inspection period. _
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L 3.
Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Power Plants (93702)
On. April 9, 1990, at 11:30 a.m., flooding of the Unit I reactor refueling cavity was commenced in preparation fer reactor vessel refueling
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The' reactor vessel head had been.previously detensioned and l
the head lifted approximately 5 inches to allow flooding of the reactor i
refueling cavity through the reactor vessel.
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During this flooding operation, plant personnel reported water spilling.
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onto the lowest containment elevation. ' Investigation revealed that the l
- refueling' cavity filtration system had 'not been properly aligned.
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system misalignment.resulted in approximately 17,000 gallons of borated water spilling into the containment building. The spill was localized to-i the "D" reactor. coolant pump area and no injuries or contaminations
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resulted from this event.
The containment purge system was in operation-at the time of the spill and, although an increase in the effluent
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radiation monitors was noted, no iodine release was identified and all i
maximum permissible concentrations were not exceeded. Additionally, no
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radioactivity increase was noted at the site boundary.
During normal power operation, two 6-inch lines are left open from the-
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. lower reactor vessel. internals storage area in the reactor refueling cavity to_the lower containment,.These lines provide a path for. water to drain from the refueling cavity to the containment sumps in the event that
'r the containment spray system is activated.
Prior to flooding the i
refueling cavity, reducing elbows'are installed in order to connect these open lines to the reactor cavity filtration system.
This work it r
specified in the general procedure for rapid refueling, however.;the procedure was not clear'in specifically requiring the installation of Ltwo
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reducing elbows in two separate-locations. - As.a result, one elbow was not
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installed and borated water leaked through.'the.line which was not l
connected to the filtration system,;r approximately 15 minutes,. No possibility existed for draining the reactor vessel as a result'of the
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improper lineup since the location of the drain lines.is separated from the top of the reactor vessel flange.
I The licensee suspended refueling operations in order to evaluate tht root-cause of the event.
The results of.the investigation revealed that the procedure was deficient in the following' areas:
no independent:
verifications for critical steps, multiple actions given in one-step, less than adequate specificity to describe an activity, and lack of sign-offs for critical steps in the procedure.
Following this identification, the licensee initiated a review of the procedures that: implement refueling-
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procedures to support core off-load, cavity drain-down, reactor coolant
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system (RCS) drain down to mid-loop, RCS fill and vent, and head disassembly and reassembly-. The review was conducted.by a multidiscipline team, including the department manager resporsible for the activity, quality assurance, independent safety engine. ring. group, and a licensed
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senior reactor operator.
In addition, work was~not commenced until
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personnel implementing the procedures became thoroughly acquainted with
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the directions given in the procedure.
These actions were adequate to
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identify procedure improvements and to preclude misunderstanding of
procedure requirements by implementing personnel.
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10n April 14, 1990, at 5 p.m.', Unit 2 trip W I from 100 percent. The trip l
was. initiated by low electrohydraulic control (EHC) pressure which was caused by a broken supply line-to high pressure turbine governor Valve
No. 4.
One complication was experienced as a result-of the trip. The "C" power operated relief valve did not function correctly.
It' opened to only-
about 13 percent inLthe automatic mode and then went closed very, slowly when placed in the manual control mode. Subsequent investigation'
I disclosed hydraulic fluid leaking past a valve stem 0-ring.on the.-
L associated solenoid valve. The'0-ring was subsequently replaced.,
Investigation'into the cause of the EHC line failure disclosed that-the 1/2-inch stainless steel line failed due to11ow-cycle fatigue. The
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licensee subsequently determined that the line was not adequately.
supported from the governor valve to the EHC supply header. A temporary
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l-modification was implemented to install temporary supports on all'affected
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linas. The licensee is investigating the existing cyclic frequencies to
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provide a permanent fix.
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4.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)'
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(Closed)OpenItem(499/8911-03): Discrepancies on How to Check Essential
Chiller Oil Levels
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In a previous inspection, discrepancies were identified between system operating procedures and vendor instructions on how to verify if the oil levels in the essential chillers'were adequate. The. system operating procedures provided instructions that were not.in agreement with the vendor instructions for < adequate oil levels.
Additionally, a, maintenance
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work request (MWR) was written to add oil to a chiller that did not need
oil. The MWR was a conservative, but unnecessary, action. Open
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l Item 499/8911-03 was used to ensure that the procedures were revised and operators were trained on the proper ways to check chiller oil levels..
Procedure 2 POP 02-CH-0001, " Essential Chilled Water System, Revision 3, was revised and includes updated instructions on'how to verify that the proper oil level exists prior to starting a chiller.. A chiller training
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manual was also developed and operations personnel were trained by a i
vendor representative on all aspects of chiller operation. The' inspector i
determined that the licensee's actions were satisfactory.
This item is
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closed.
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(Closed) Violation (498/8938-01):
Failure to Follow Procedures During li 't 1 Refueling Activities j
During an inspection performed on September 13, 1989,-three examples of
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failure to follow approved procedures were observed. At that time, the'
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licensee was transferring fuel between the fuel handling building (FHB)-
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and reactor containment building (RCB) in Unit 1.
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failure to follow procedures were:
(1) failure to follow the procedure'
for the FHB fuel transfer contrcl console, (2) failure to have an approved,
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.l up-to-date procedure at the FHB fuel transfer control console, and j
(3) failure to follow procedural precautions during operation of the RCB refueling machine (loose items found on bridge).
y The root cause of the violation was' determined to be a lack of attention f
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Immediate corrective; actions were taken by the licensee for examples (2).
l and(3).. Long-term corrective actions.for all three examples included i
development of an action plan for the station's procedure compliance
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policy. This act' ion plan has been completed by..the licensee. Also, a e
. refueling briefing was held and all refueling procedures were reviewed by
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' licensee s operators prior to the outage.
The movement of fuel was
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observed during this-inspection period. The RCB and FHB fuel transfer i
control console operators were noted to be.using up-to-date procedures and
were adhering-to them.
No loose items were noted on either the spentifuel
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pool bridge in the FHB or RCB refueling bridge..The inspector determined i
.that the licensee's corrective actions were appropriate.. This item is
closed.
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5.
Monthly Maintenance Observations (62703)
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Selected maintenance activities'were observed to verify whether the-activities were being conducted in accordance with approved procedures.
The activities observed included:
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Preventive Maintenance (PM) EM-1-AF-87011441, Inspection, Test, and
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i Lubrication of Auxiliary Feedwater Motor' Operated. Valve Al-AF-MOV-0048
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PM EM-1-HE-87014029, Inspection and Test-of_ Air Handling Unit' Heating'
j Coil VHX012
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Work Request (WR) ES-128650, Rework of No. 21 West Intercept. Valve E
The inspector verified that the activities were conducted in accordance
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with approved work instructions-and procedures, test equipment was within
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the current calibration cycles, and housekeeping was being maintained in an acceptable manner.
All observations made were referred to the licensee
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for appropriate action.
PM EM-1-AF-87011441 was performed by electrical department technicians on Motor Operated Valve Al-AF-MOV-0048. The-technicians also performed
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Procedure OPMP05-ZE-0300, "Limitorque MOV Motor Inspection and Lube,"~
Revision 10, on Al-AF-MOV-0048.
Step 6.4.2.of OPMP05-ZE-0300'provided
instructions to explain in the REMARKS section.the reason if diagnostic testing could not be performed at that time.
Diagnostic testing was not
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performed and no explanation was provided in the REMARKS section. This
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was pointed out to the job foreman who subsequently initiated correctiva actions.
During performance of Step 6.6.5 (verify valve stem lubricated and free of contaminants), a significant amount of rust was found on the l-upper part of the stem.
The PM was. postponed pending further work.
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instruction. The rust was later removed, the valve stem lubricated, and
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j valve maintenance and testing was completed without any further problems, t
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PM-EM-1-HE-87014029.was performed by electrical technicians on. electrical
L auxiliary building air handling. unit' Heating: Coil 11B (VHX012).
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technicians also' performed Procedure:0PMP02-ZG-0004, Fastener Torquing
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e and Detensioning," Revision 1. on the heating coil panel. The, work consisted ofiremoving 68 panel door bolts,1 cleaning. and inspecting the
interior, closing the door,~retorquing the bolts, and then measuring the
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heater circuit running current.
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WR ES-128650 was performed to rework the No. 21 west intercept' valve.. Thef work instructions (Revision 2 instructions) required instrument and
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control (I&C) technicians to replace the. intercept. valve's' solenoici and i'
dump valve, if required..Although nonsafety-related, this activity was observed because the" work had the potential.of. tripping the Unit 2 turbine.
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The work scope consisted of isolating' hydraulic fluidoto the intercept
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valve, bleeding pressure of f of the valve, replacing the ' solenoid, and t
then replacing the dump valve if necessary, d
While trying to bleed pressure.off,of1the valve'per Step B3.06, a ball.
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L check valve in the electrohydraulic control (EHC) fluid emergency trip header failed to seat *, - This. allowed EHC= fluid to leak out of the_ system :
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in an uncontrolled manner.
Unit 2 operations personnel-began ramping'down
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I the main turbine'and manually took the turbine offline:tocavoid an
l, automatic turbine / reactor trip. The reactor remained' steady lin Mode-1 at 14 percent power following removal of the turbine generator from the grid.
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The EHC. pumps were secured'to stop the EHC fluid loss.
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With the EHC fluid pressure gone, the No. 21 west intercept valve was-
. reworked per WR ES-128650p The rework consisted of installation of new-
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i solenoid and check valves.
The-intercept valve was then. tested to verify
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operability.
The" turbine.was brought back online and reactor pcwer.
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increased to just under 50 percent. The power limitation was due to
accumulated penalty minutes (axial flux distribution out.'of: the target (
band). The reactor was later increased to 100 percent.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspection.
6.
Monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)
..e Selected surveillance activities were observed to ascertain whether the
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surveillance of safety significant systems and components were being l
conducted-in accordance with Technical. Specifications (TS) and other requirements.
The following surveillance tests were observed and the I
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documents reviewed:
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OPSP02-SI-0955, " Accumulator C Level Group 4 Analog Channel
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Operational Test (ACOT)," Revision 0-d 2 PSP 02-RC-0430, " Delta T and T Average Loop 3 Set 3 ACOT," Revision 0 l
IPSP06-NZ-0006, " Molded Case. Breaker Functional Test.and Inspection,"
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1 PSP 06-DJ-0004, "125 Volt Class IE Battery Service Surveillance Test," Revision 4 Specific. items inspected included verifying that as-left data was within acceptance criteria;11mits, test equipment used was within acceptance criteria limits and within current calibration cycles, and test performers
.were adhering to approved procedures.
In addition to observation by the inspector of the surveillance ~ activities,- the procedures were ~ reviewed for technical accuracy and for conformance to TS requirements.
Procedure OPSP02-SI-0955 was performed by I&C technicians on the Unit 2 Safety Injection Accumulator 20 high/ low level alarms circuits. The procedure verified that.the high/ low-level alarms were within the.
allowable setpoint tolerances. No concerns were identified with this>
' procedure nor with the observed work.
Procedure 2 PSP 02-RC-0430 was performed by I&C technicians on the Unit 2 differential temperature and Average Temperature Channel B2RC-T-0430..
During the performance of the procedure, the overtemperature/ differential temperature reactor trip and control rod withdrawal block setpoints were-found below the minimum. allowed setpo " Sut above the TSiallowed setpoint.
The setpoints were readjusted into allow-) limits and_the as-left Mata was-noted to be within allowed tolerances.- Annunciator 2-05M-3, Window 4A.-was recently revised and was titled " Delta T. Rod Withdrawal Block Alert."' This.
annunciator was referenced ir Steps 6.3.L 7.4.12.J.- and 7.9.27.J.
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three steps used the out-of-ste alarm title of " Overpower Rod Withdrawal Blocked." This discrepancy was pointed 'out to: the I&C technicians.
Step 7.4.15 of Procedure 2 PSP 02-RC-0430 instructed technicians to e
record the as-found position of the test permissive switch (TPS) in'
Panel ZLP-678-1. The as-found position of-the:TPS was TEST.. Step 7.9.20 instructed the technicians to return-the switch to the.as-found position, following test completion (TEST position). However.1 Step:7.9.21(ensure TPS light is 0FF) could not be performed because the procedure was written
assuming TPS was returned to 0FF position, not TEST.- The test had to be j
suspended until the switch was returned to 0FF. This discrepancy was.
reported to the iob foreman and shift supervisor.
Following the licensee's
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review, the TPS.was determined to be out of position.. : A previous WR:
(AM-125386) placed the TSP in TEST but failed to return-the switch to 0FF.
A second WR was written to return the switch to 0FF and a station problem-report was written to review the mistake. The shift supervisor determined that an operability concern never existed, and the procedure was subsequently completed.
Procedure 1 PSP 06-NZ-0006 was performed by electrical technicians.on.
Reactor Supp,rt Exhaust Fan FN037, primary breaker at. Motor Control Center 185, Cubicle Bl.
This procedure applied to-both the 18-and the.-
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60-month'surve111ance requirements, however, the procedure scope, Step 1.2, referred only to the 60-month surve111ar.ce.
Step 4.7.1' listed'
recommended test equipment, however, the NOTE prior to Step 7.1.1.3 provided more detailed information on which test equipment to use based on
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the :csrent levels'of the. circuit breakers.D Step 4.7.1 should,have had -
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.the:same level of detail'that was~provided in Step 7.11.3.-lThe work'
q li instructions 'provided in Step' 7.9 (perform continuity checkTof each -
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. breaker pole);did.not match the corresponding: data sheet signoff wording?
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in that the data sheet signoff; required information that was n'ot in the>
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. Step 7.9 instructions. (continuity. check acceptance: criteria)L
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Step:7.11.3 J provided instructions on how-to set;up-the current
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meas'urement test" set. ' Steps 7.12.3c and"7.;12.4'were repeats of?
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- Step 7.11.3.B and;should have been; deleted (this comment also applied;to j
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LSection17.13). LStep?7c.12.6.1-performed multiple actions;(adjust (dial!
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- settings,1 repeat
- steps, record-as-left data) and should have been. broken.
j down into individual-steps-Thereiwere:three blanks onithe dataJsheet for
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as-left breaker. dial settings. The wording,of_ Step 7.12.6.1 implied thati
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di.a1 settings only: haVel to1 be. recorded if the breaker failed toLmeeti
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acceptance criteria.
The procedure 1should have.been clearer on recording.
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of as-found orLas-left dialosettings; One typographical <erroriwas^ observed
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in Step 7.13.'1'.cjStep'7.13.1 referred the test performer to_ Step 7,12'.3,,
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but should have referred the performer to Step 7.11.S.
Procedure 1 PSP 06-DJ-0004 was performed by electrical (technicians on Unit 1 Class IE Battery E1C11, The1 est provided instructions on how to perform-t
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a'2-hour battery capacity surveillanceDtest..During the test, the-NRC:
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inspector prompted the technicians twice.
Fi rst,' foll owi ng. performance' of-Step 6.7;4 (provided.instructionsLon how to connect testileads to
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battery),' the. technicians;were reminded..to check the battery' wiring'
connections because two leads were! connected to the wrong, battery?
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terminals. -Second,.the technicians were reminded to ensure that.
j Stepi6.10.2.was completed (record initial data) prion to: starting the 2-hour timed test.' Step 6.7.3 (turn on. power'to lloadLun.it) wassnoted to
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be. performed after Step 6.10.1, but this had 'no: effect on> the test or test results. The test was stopped 4 1/2 minuter into theLtest-because'of a a
i test; equipment failure. The test equipment was. removedman?equali:cing:
charge was initiated to recharge the batteries,L and the quar.terly; surveillance test was. then perfonned..The. final testidata was' reviewed.
Battery _ data (current and voltage) was. recorded ever9 10'minutesiduridg the test. The initial data recorded (battery current)lstLa time of-
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o 120 minutes was actually the data for-a time ofE119 minutes. :This error
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was brought to the' attention of the_ test supervisor who promptly~ corrected.
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ihe errcr. However, battery current: readings.were'for?information only a
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and not subjected to-acceptance criteria lim'ts.
Only battery. voltage
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readings have specifind acceptance criteria limits. Overall battery..
voltage ; dropped to :111.0 volts:during, the.2 hour: test, a> value'!above-the
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acceptece criteria limit 'of' 106.0 ydc.
No violations or. deviations were identified in th*is area of the inspection.
7.
O_perat'onal Safety Verification (7170D The purpse of this inspection was to ensure that the facility was be'ing.
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o srated safely and in conformance with license and regulatory
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i 1 requirements.. This inspection also included = verifying: that: selected'
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activities of the licensee's radiological protection-program were being-j
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implemented in conformance with requirements and procedures and that the A
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y L11censee was Hn compliance with its;aoproved physical security plann
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t The inspectors visited the control room; on.i routine basis ~and: verified i
that ' control-. roomistaf fing, operator deccruir,: shif t tui sover, adherence to '
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'.TS limiting conditions' of operationc(LCOs), and overall controle room
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ddecorum were in.accordance with requirements, The inspectors: conducted:
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L ours:,inivarious: locations of the plant:to observe work operations and toi
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< ensure that the facility war being' operated safely!and-in conformancefwith
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j l i cense andl regul atory s requi rements ;
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i The Unit' 2 ain steam L(HS) system was inspected:to verify the ' operability <
and' status'of:the system. LThe safety-related portion.of MS, located in
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- the' isolation, valve cubicle (IVC) building, wascinspected.o-The inspection
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. included comparison.of arfound 'controlk switch, power ~ supply breaker, and'
valve positiun's;to those required byithe. operating. procedure. Al i
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comparison of the operation procedure =(2 POP 02-MS-0001, " Main Steam-
-System,"'RevisioiF2)-to design documentsf including piping:and::.instrumentJ diagrams'(P& ids), was also performed.
Items noted during a::technicalEreview-and walkdown'of the1MS. system-
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included:-
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- LStep 5.6 of?2 POP 02-MS-0001 directed I&C: technicians to'placeLin'
service instruments 1.isted in Instrumentation' Checklist (-6). -There were fourisafety-related level; switchthigh-high'(LSHH)-instruments not'
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-includedfin Checklist (-6).
The'licenseeistated:that onlyJTS-related n
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instruments were : included in Check 11st..(-6)land the LSHH instruments i i
were not TS related. However,:the licensee was currently!
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reconsidering that philosophy to perhaps ' include.allL safety-related
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dnstruments in1 instrument: check 11sts.
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Velve-2-MS-0518 was:a. drain valve,.but the-status symbol "D,,"-
representing." Drain;,".was missing from P&ID SS149F00024#2,JAuxiliary
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Feedwater,_Rovision'12. EValve 2-MS-0070,iPressure. Transmitter PT-7441.
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isolation valve, was missing itsLidentificationLtag in the plant'.
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Four valves-(2-MS-0049,-2-MSa0050, 2-MS-0051, and 2-MS-0052) were
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F incorrectly tagged in;the plant.
They were the instrument:1 solation
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valves for Tranrmitters PT-535 and PT-536.
Actual installation
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agreed with the P&ID, while.the. procedure valve lineup and localitags were-noted to be incorrect-In the valve lineup, PT-5.36 isolation
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valve's were ' incorrect 1.v reversed with-the PT~535 isolation valves.
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q Several feedwater system'~ valves were noted to be improperly locked.
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LThe valves =were. listed in administrative 1y locked Valve Program q
Checklist OPGP03-ZO-0027-0, Revision 7.
The valves were the
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feedwaterifsolation" valve pressure indicator and nitrogen isolation
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. valves. The valves included 2-FW-0663, 2-FW-0664,' and 2-FW-0668.
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The locking mechanisms were incorrectly installed, allowing uncontrolled access to the valve handwheels. This condition was reported to the licensee for corrective actions.
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The cleanliness of the IVC building was inspected. There was a heavy accumulation of dead insects in the IVC building aroer:d the auxiliary feedwater pumps. This area required cleaning.
The intake air duct was drawing in the insects because the intake line did not have filters. A previous inspection identified sand from sandblasting in the same areas of Unit 1.
The insects apparently entered the building in one of the same pathways (unfiltered air ducts) by which the sand entered the IVC building.
All valves, power supplies, and switches were found in the positions required to support plant operation.
Items noted by tha inspector did not appear to directly impact safe operation of the plant.
All procedural observations were referred to the licensee for inclusion in the licensee's long-term program for procedure upgrade No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspection.
8.
Refueling Activities (60710)
Selected Unit 1 refueling activities were observed to ascertain whether the activities were being controlled and conducted as required by the TS and approved procedures.
Items inspected included:
Fuel handling operations and other related activities Housekeeping and radiological controls inside the RCB
'
RCB containment HVAC system to verify operability of this support systen
Attendance at operations crew refueling briefing where lessons learned from the first refueling outage were discussed.
Direct
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observation of core reload activities was performed. The fuel handling operations observed were being performed in accordance with TS and approved, up-to-date procedures. The licensee's staff was adequate during refueling. Minimum shift coverage was 'oeing maintained by licensed operators in accordance with TS requirements.
Routine tours -af the Unit 1 RCB was performed during the inspection perind-Good housekeeping and loose object control was being maintained in the RCB, Radiological controls were being maintained overall.
However, severtl miscellaneous pieces of equipment (electrical cables, air hoses, ropes) were noted to be extending beyond contaminated area boundaries into clean areas.
The radiological condition (contaminated or uncontaminated)
=
of these components could not be determined.
However, a radiological check of ali components and personnel was required when exiting the RCB area.
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-A walkdown~of the Unit l containment HVAC system was performed to.
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independently verify-the status of the system. ATheDinspection included!a!
- i review of
- the Operating Procedure IPOP02-HC-0001, " Containment HVAC f
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walkdown.of the systemc
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. Revision 55 a comparison ~ of the operating procedure to P& ids; and..a'
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The following1tems were noted during the technical review:-
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- One4&ID (5V149V25008#1).wasimissing from the referencesi Section:2.14. References Section 2.2 listed the-FSAR references,
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- but.Section 2;2 had incomplete and jncorrect FSAR' sections..-
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m Distribution Panel DPB-435 Breaker 27'wasL11sted twice in: Electrical!
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and Switch Lineup:IPOP02-HC-0001-1.
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-subsection:of IPOP02-HC-0001, however, notes were missin'g for J
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Subsect:ons'9.1 andL12.1.
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A walkdown of the containment HVAC syt. tem was performed. LThe-followin.gl d
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items-were observed:
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LIndicator NIHC-TISL-9765' was~ noted to be missing ;1tsiidentification
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-tag.
The grating was missing over thefsump:in Auxiliary-i
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o i Feedwater (AFW)' Pump: Room.1C (isolation valve cubicle buildingsHVAC;
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- components were included,in:the containment HVACLprocedure).^ '
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l Step 6.1 ofLIPOP02-HC-0001 provided instructionsito>stdrt one i
containment cubicle exhaust fan. from each train.
Each traini-
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consists (of two fans.
The Train "A"' fans. are powered by l Train "A'M power while Train' "B" fans? are powered by Train "B (Fan 'llB): and.
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Train "C" (Fan' 128) power., : The Linspector.noted that both Train "A" a
fans were running andLthat no : Train "B": fans were operating. - Stricti compliance with Step 6.1'of the procedure. required; Train "B" Fan 12B'
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to.be in' operation. A Train. "B" outage,was in progress, ~which would-j have rendered Fan 118 inoperable during a loss-of:offsite power event because the Train'B diesel. generator-was:out of~ service.
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Step 12.'1 of IP0P02-HC-0001 provided instructions to start the-.
l selected main steam.-isolation valve (MSIV)~ cubicle ventilation: fan-y and the. associated AFW.pumpiarea~ vent fan.
Fans'were observed
running. in all four MSIV cubicles, but no fans were' running.in the -
four AFW pump areas. The.AFW pump area fans were in: automatic i
operation And would have started on pumpLstartLor high temperature.
Step 12.1 should have been revised to place the AFW: pump area-fans 3 n-
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a AUTO,'not to start the fans.
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i All containment HVAC components were found in the' correct positions to
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support pla e and refueling operations. All items noted were reported to'
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< i the licensee :for operations corrective actions...Ths11nspectors determined
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that'nonelof the items-identified had a'significant effect.on plantL
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safety..
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No violations or deviations were' identified:in this area ;cf the inspection;
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L9.
Spent Fuel ~ Pool Activities (86700).
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SelectedUnit1?spentfuel, pool;and:spentifuelfhandling'. activities'we're
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observed to ascertain whether the-activitiesiwere in conformance with the'-
requirements of TScand. approved procedures; :This inspection. included the U
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review of. procedures relating to:-fuel handling operations?and' direct'
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lobsern on of spentifuelipool' activities.,
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' Observation = of: sper* fuel pool activities was conducted!to,vedifi'
. operator.conformanu ith-approved procedures,'..'The-fuel. handling; machine;
-l operator was noted to be following!the instructions'nrovided byL
Procedure OPOP08 " H.002i " Fuel Handling. Machine," J.evision.0.. The'. fuel
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transfer syster ce v C console operator'wal
- to=be;following the d
- instructions previoeo by Procedure'0 POP 08-FH-0003, M uel' Transfer System,"
Revision'0.
The procedures.used-during the' fuel transfer were:noted to'be approved, up-to-date: procedures.
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Spent fuel pool parameters were' monitored throughout the' inspection-j L
period.
Pool level was maintained above TS/3.9.11.~1 limits,3 boron:
'
concentration was maintained.above TS:3.9.10 limits, and: pools temperature-
was bel
' he-Final Safety ' Analysis Report- (FSAR): Table' 9.1-1 limitstoff L
'140 F-(e.e pent fuel pool temperature following full. core offload /was,
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approxo o.e * 100 F). The refueling bridge:over the-spent fuel pool was-
L noted w a clean' and free _ of unsecured sitems (miscellaneous,L oose. items; j
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were noted on the bridge'during aEprevious inspection). Housekeeping:was
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o noted to be maintained in the other areas of the'FHB. '
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the inspection.
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10. Balance of Plant Inspection (71500)
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p The TSC is the onsite technical support facility for emergency; response.
r The TSC enables response personnel.to monitor the course of an accident'
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and plan corrective and recovery actions. During ~ periods of activationi j
the TSC is staffed continuously to provide technical support to plant
operations-personnel.
The TSC also may serve as the Emergency-Operations l
Center (EOC) if E0C activation is delayed.
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During this inspection period, the'~1icensee con' ducted an. emergency--
preparedness exercise which tested the licensee's emergency response'
capabilities. The day before this 1990 Graded ~ Exercise, the Unit 1 TSC~
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HVAC system and chilled water. system were inspected to determine if the
two TSC support systems were in the positions n'eded to support TSC
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activation and operation. The two systems.are classified as
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nonsafety-related, n
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Theinspectionconsisted.ofoperatingprocedureandP&IDreview,LaswellI U
- as a system walkdown.
During the walkdown, the as-found-positions ofithe
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system componentsiwere' compared to positions-required by.the operating:
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procedures and P&IDsn The procedure reviewed included, 1 POP 02-HE-0002, 9,
'!TSC HVAC/ System,": Revision 1, Tand 1 POP 02-CH-0004',' "TSC. Chilled Water.
- System," Revision-2.
Items noted during the~ technical: review of:the TSC HVAC:
Procedare:1 POP 02-HE-0002.and associated P&ID included:--(1) Step 7.7'
n instructed operators: to' verify that Moisture Switch 11-HE-MSH-9780 was sett s
.
q at 75' percent relative. humidity, but the required instrument setpoint was
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70' percent per the instrument =setpoint index;;(2). Step 7.12 provided-instructions-to start Fan 1-HE-FN-019, but the checkoff for.the'
performance 'of?this step,was incorrectlyJ1ocated,after! Step 7 13;L f-(3) Step"8.6 instructed operators-.to verify'that' HVAC: filter unit airiflow?
.
- was.at' 6100 cubic feet per minute -(cfm)1and-tt adjust.a controller -as -
necessary;to; achieve that' flow rate, however, thensetpoint'of 6100 cfm mayi
's be too low because the heating coil needs!a minvnum air; flow.of at' least?
6100 cfm as a_ permissive-to energize;-(4): Step?lk.3Lreferred-o'perators to
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.an Addendum l'(Procedure Punch 11st) whichidid not nist;.
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(5)~ Damper'l-HE-FV-9746 wasiin. correctly! called FV-9476 in-Stepi7.3; j
~(6) Damper 1-HE-FV-9701'was incorrectly, called FV-9476.in Step 7.4;=
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a-(7) several P&ID 8V119V25006 No ' 1' (Revision 12) errors were, observed, for.-
example, Temperature Elements 21-HE-TE-9722 and -9724 were missing 1from;the
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P&ID and Room No. 508 was missing from the: room number;index; L
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(8) Checklist IPOP02-HE-0002-2 rlisted the-TSC'HVACielectrical breakerst and
their required positions, however, breaker numbers were-missing from the checklist for Space Heaters 1-HE-HT-145 through'-148; and (9)- two! drain-
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valves were noted on the:P&ID that-were not;11sted in'the procedure-
check 11sts(Valves 1-DR-0011 Land'1-DR-0010)..
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s Items noted during the TSC'HVAL system'walkd_own included:
(1)'Handswitch-j
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Lineup Checklist IPOP02-HE-0002-1 lists ~ incorrect device: locations for:
Temperature-Elements 1-HE-TE-9777,1-9776,-and:-9794;;-(2) TSC HVAC Supplyy
Air Damper-1-HE-FV-9701'was found: shut but'should-have been open per~
H procedure Step 7.4; and (3) TSC Filter Return Air Damper 1-HE-FV-9687 was found open but should have been shut per, procedure Step 7.5.
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- i Items noted during the technical review of the'TSC ' Chilled Water
.
Procedure IPOP02-CH-0004cincluded: '(1) 5-of 11'page numbers on the~ Table
of Contents page were incorrect', ~(2) two P& ids listed.in'.the. References -
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Section 2.0-(5V119V250004#1 and 6V119V25007#1) appeared to.have no t
conrection with the TSC chilled water procedure /and should have been
deleted; (3) the chiller; vendor manual should-have' been: included in the-
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reference section', (4) the prerequisites ?Section ;3.0 should have included
.d support systems required for ? system operation, including :the instrument'
l air and demineralized water systems, (5) Step 6.3.6 provided instructions
to place 10 loads in service per Procedure IPOP02-HE-0002,'"TSC HVAC,"
,
however, at least five ~of the loads listed in. Step 6.3.61were not.
l associated with Procedure 1 POP 02-HE-0002;'(6)LStep 6.'4.1.2 provided
instructions to stop a pump by placing the handswitch in AUTO,' but the
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step should had sta'.ed to place'the~ switch to STOP.then AUTO:rositions;-
. (7) vent and drain valves are designated es such on P& ids with "V" and "D'!'
respectively adjacent to the valvest however, several' valves had missing
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t orcincorrect designations, including Valves 1-CH-I630,i-1342,- and--1587;
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and (8)~.allibutterfly valves are drawn the' same on P& ids ~ andzrequi red -
positions are identified ~ with status symbols for-each ' valve'on the' P&ID,=
however, most1 status symbols were missing from-the TSC chilled water.
p
- system P&ID 6V119V25007; No'.11,; Revision 10.
Items:noted during: the walkdowns of; the TSC. chilled water system' included::
j (1) TSC Chiller No.=.1 had five circuit breakers' that were missing from_
j
' procedure Step 6.'1.1L(this step provided;' instructions'to close fivet r
f circ'uit breakers, butieach chillerlhas : ten breakers)U(2).~ TSC Chiller?.
'No' 2 alsoihad five circuit'breakersimissingfroml procedure Step 16.2.1=,u however, all-missing, Chiller 1 and 2 'cir6uit. breakers Lwere found ini the'
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a correct positions to support chiller' operation, (3): Valve 1-CH-1630:.wasL
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the chemical addition line. drain but was' tagged Test Connection Isolation; l
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Valve in the plant,.(4)-Valvec1-CH-1394 and. Instruments TI-9640 and q
TI-9640A were~.mi.ssing identification = tags in?thetplanti (5) Computer Roomi
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Air Handling Unit No. - 2 Motorc 0perated-Inlet Isolation Valve l1-CH-M0V-9772:
was required to be open per Valve' Lineup'1 POP 02-CH-0004-1,-but-the valve:
j was(foundishut, and.(6) Valve 1-CH-1587:was.found.in0ablocation'different" n
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from the.one listed in the valveilineup'.:
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F Several errors ~ associated with locked valves.'were' identified. TSC.
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Computer Room' Air.. Handling! Unit No. 4 Discharge" Throttle: Valve a-CH-1354.
was supposed to be locked in-place per the P&ID.: Howe ~ver,
Valve 1-CH-1354:wasi not-11sted in the locked valve' program check 11st,;
j t.herefore, no lock was required. The: valve checklist required'thelvalve
~
to bei full open, but 1-CH-1354 was. found throttled and: unlocked. TSC-
.
computer room Air Handling Unit-No. 411nlet! Isolation Valve 1-CH-1434'was'
supposed to be full open per the P&ID.
Valve 1-CH-1434^was;11stedlin the-
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locked valve program and procedure valve lineup 'as allocked.in place'
'
valve, but.the valve-was. found; full open, not throttledJ :The valve's lock g
i-could not-be located (piping insulation:was locatediaround the valve).-
i The valve checklist and the locked valv'e ' program should.have a' greed with <
the P&ID requirements for 1-CH-1354-and -1434. :The licensee was currently-
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,
reviewing the locked valve program to ensure its accuracy'with P&ID i
requirements.
,
r In conclusion, all TSC chilled water system components were found in the 2.
correct positions to support olant operations, except 1-CH-MOV-9772 which
had no effect on plant safety. All TSC HVAC components-were found in'the j
correct positions except two dampen 1-HE-FV-9701 and FV-9687. 'These two-o dampers-were out of position for normal operations but were-in the-fail-S safe positions for emergency operations. All observations were' reported..
l to the licensee for inclusion into.the licensee's'long-term procedure-F upgrade program.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the
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inspection.
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111f Exit Interview.
t-The-inspectors met with1.11censee' representatives (de'noted.in' paragraph:1):-
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.on.May'1, 1990..~The inspectors: summarized;the scop'e and findings of=the.
inspection.. The-licensee. did not' ident"y as proprietary any of the;
.
Linformation-provided-to, Tor. reviewed by, the ' inspectors,
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