IR 05000483/1993007
| ML20045E517 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 06/25/1993 |
| From: | Markley A, Mccormickbarge, David Nelson, Ploski T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045E508 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-483-93-07, 50-483-93-7, NUDOCS 9307020170 | |
| Download: ML20045E517 (18) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-483/93007(DRSS)
Docket No. 50-483 License No. NPF-30-Licensee:
Union Electric Company Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400 St. Louis, MO 63166
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Facility Name:
Callaway Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At:
Callaway site, Steedman, MO
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Inspection Conducted: June 7-11, 1993 Inspectors:
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T. Ploski Date c5
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yg D. Nelson Date
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Accompanying Personnel:
B. Bartlett D. Calhoun J. Camerr-G. Stoe
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I3 Approved By:
J. W. McCormick-Barger, Chief Date
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Emergency Preparedness and Non-Power Reactor Section Inspection Summary Inspection on June 7-11. 1993 (Report No. 50-483/93007(DRSSU Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the Callaway Plant's emergency preparedness (EP) exercise involving review of the exercise scenario
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(IP 82302), observations by six NRC represeatatives of key functions and locations during the exercise (IP 82301), :.nd follow-up on licensee actions on previously identified items (IP 82301). Several aspects of the operational status of the EP program (IP 82701) were reviewed by two inspectors.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
Based on records 9307020170 930628 PDR ADOCK 05000483
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review and performance.during the 1993 exercise, corrective actions taken in
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response to'two performance weaknesses and five other concerns' identified during-the 1992 exercise were determined to be acceptable.
Overall performance during the 1993 exercise was very good.
One concern was identified regarding coordination problems associated with several inplant teams (Section 6.c).
Challenging aspects of the exercise included simulated failures to computer links between the control room, technical support center (TSC), and emergency operations facility (E0F), as well as a simulated failure affecting communications with offsite monitoring teams. The exercise also included assembling and accounting for all onsite personnel, collection of a reactor coolant sample,. operation of the E0F's emergency power supply,-and activation of the joint public information center.
Several aspects of the operational status of the EP-program were reviewed. ~ A control room evacuation procedure adequately addressed accomplishment of associated emergency planning requirements. The TSC's and EOF's emergency ventilation systems and emergency diesels were maintained.in a good state of operational readiness.
The 1991 and 1992 audits and surveillances of the program satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t), while 1993 audit i
activities were ongoing. Significant audit emphasis was placed on observing drills and exercises, compared to other aspects of the EP training program.
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DETAILS
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1.
NRC Observers and Areas Observed T. Ploski, Control Room Simulator (CRS), Technical Support-Center (TSC),
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Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
B. Bartlett, CRS, TSC D. Calhoun, CRS, Operational Support Center (OSC), inplant teams D. Nelson, offsite monitoring team G. Stoetzel, OSC, inplant teams J. Cameron, CRS,-TSC, EOF 2.
Persons Contacted
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G. Randolph, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
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11. Campbell, Manager, Callaway Plant
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J. Laux, Manager, Quality Assurance
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M._ Evans, Superintendent, Health Physics
G. Hamilton, Supervising Engineer, Quality Assurance M. Hicks, Operating Supervisor A. White, Supervisor, Emergency Planning The above and 15 other licensee staff attended the exit interview on June 11, 1993. The inspectors also contacted other_ licensee personnel during the inspection.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous 1v Identified Items (IP 82301)
(Closed) Inspectioq_ Followup Item No. 483/92010-01: During the 1992 exercise, a performance weakness _was identified when the TSC's staff made inadequate' efforts to assess available information so that the emergency coordinator (EC) could evaluate the needs for an emergency 1 reclassification and offsite protective actions.
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As indicated in Section 6.b of this inspection report,_TSC staff demonstrated their capabilities to accurately assess abnormal plant conditions with or without the aid of computerized displays of certain
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types of plant parameters.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Insoection Followuo Item No. 483/92010-02:
During the 1992
exercise, the placement of the air sampler associated with the service building's portion of the operational support center (OSC) was questionable. The relevant implementing procedure provided inadequate guidanco on the collection point for representative air samples for-this portion of the OSC.
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The 1993 revisions of procedures EIP-ZZ-00210, " Radiological Controls
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During Emergencies," and EIP-ZZ-00241, "0SC Operations," were reviewed.
Health Physics Department calculation HPCI-93-001, "Frisker Response to Noble Gases in an Accident Environment;" was also reviewed.
These documents indicated the licensee's revised. strategy for assessing.
radiological conditions in the service building's OSC due to airborne
contamination.
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Frisker stations would be established at several predesignated locations in or near portions of the service building which would serve as OSC workspace. These friskers would also be used to monitor airborne
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habitability.
The calculation indicated that the friskers would be set to alarm at 500 counts per minute. This count rate corresponded to an estimated whole body dose rate of 10 millirem per hour and an-estimated-thyroid. dose rate of 435 millirem per' hour.
EIP-ZZ-00210 indicated that, upon receiving a report of a frisker alarm in the service building's OSC, health physics staff would be dispatched from the other OSC workspace located at the power block's access control point. Health physics staff would then conduct a habitability survey of the service building's OSC in accordance with the plant's health. physics procedures.
These surveys could include air samples, if deemed
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appropriate by health physics staff. This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item No. 483/92010-03:
During the 1992 exercise, a number of inplant maintenance teams did not demonstrate good contamination control techniques when working in or leaving simulated contaminated areas.
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During the 1993 exercise, inspectors accompanied some inplant survey and'
maintenance teams. With one minor exception, these teams demonstrated good contamination control techniques and good practices for maintaining simulated radiation exposures as low as reasonably achievable..This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item No. 483/92010-04: During the 1992 exercise, the licensee's key staff did not demonstrate an adequate understanding of NRC's and other Federal agencies' responses during their preliminary, post-plume phase recovery discussions.
During the 1993 exercise, key staff demonstrated an adequate understanding of the NRC's onscene incident response' role during their-initial recovery planning discussions.
State and key licensee staff in the emergency operations facility (E0F) also adequately discussed their interfaces with Federal offsite radiological monitoring resources, which would be managed by the Department of Energy.
Reference was also made to the on-scene Federal disaster field office.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item No. 483/92010-05:
During the 1992 exercise, the need to reevaluate the adequacy of the procedurally specified, backup communications method used by offsite radiological monitoring teams (0MTs) became apparent.
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An April 1993 revision to procedure EIP-ZZ-00223, " Field Monitoring
Operations," was reviewed and was determined to include upgraded
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guidance regarding primary and backup communications methods. During i
I the 1993 exercise, both OMTs successfully demonstrated the capability to implement this revised guidance when the primary communications method
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was intentionally made unavailable for some time.
This item.is closed.
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(Closed) Inspection Followuo item No. 483/92010-06: During the 1992!
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exercise, a performance weakness was identified when an OMT demonstrated
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inadequate survey and contamination control techniques on multiple occasions.
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An inspector accompanied one OMT during the 1993. exercise.
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demonstrated very good survey and contamination control techniques, as well as good techniques for minimizing their simulated radiological
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exposures. This item is closed.
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item No. 483/92010-07: During the 1992
. exercise, an exercise controller accompanying an OMT repeatedly advised the team on how to perform various tasks.
No instances of improper controller performance were notei by the inspector who accompanied an OMT during the 1993 exercise.
9ther inspectors identified no significant instances of improper controller actions during the 1993 exercise. This item is closed.
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General (IP 82302)
An announced, daytime exercise of the licensee's emergency plan was conducted at the Callaway Plant on June 9,1993.
This plume phase exercise included the full scale participation of the State of Missouri
and Callaway, Montgomery, Osage, and Gasconade Counties. The exercise
tested the capabilities of the licensee and offsite agencies to respond to an accident scenario resulting in a simulated release of radioactive ef fluent.
The performances of State and local response organizations were evaluated by representatives of the Federal Emcrgency Management Agency
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(FEMA), which will document its findings in a separate report.
The licensee conducted preliminary critiques immediately following the
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exercise.
The inspectors presented their preliminary findings at an
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exit interview conducted on June 11, 1993.
NRC and FEMA representatives summarized their organizations' preliminary findings at a public critique hosted by FEMA at the Callaway County emergency operations center on June 11, 1993.
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The attachments to this inspection report describe the licensee's scope of participation and the exercise scenario.
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5.
General Observations (IP 82301)
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The licensee responded to the accident scenario in an orderly and timely manner in accordance with its emergency plan and related procedures.
If scenario events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to mitigate the accident and permit State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect public health and safety.
6.
Specific Observations (IP 82301)
a.
Control Room Simulator (CRS)
The shift supervisor (SS) demonstrated excellent concern for personnel safety by clearly deciding not to change reactor power level until after a repair team working on the containment's inner personnel hatch evacuated containment. The SS kept his crew well advised of his plan to commence an orderly reactor shutdown and declare an unusual event (UE) and how his plan was affected by revised estimates of the hatch repair time and later indications of abnormal reactor coolant activity levels.
Control room personnel demonstrated excellent teamwork and knowledge of technical specification requirements and off-normal procedures associated with reactor coolant system leakage, loss of containment integrity, and abnormal coolant activity levels.
The SS correctly declared an UE and an Alert in a timely manner and in accordance with the plant's emergency action levels (EALs).
State, county, and simulated NRC officials were initially notified of both declarations within the regulatory time limits.
The simulated NRC duty officer was also given additional information on the reactor shutdown rate; however, the duty officer was not also informed of the loss of containment integrity until later in the exercise.
The plant's public address (PA) system was used to inform all onsite personnel of the emergency declarations, their bases, and any onsite protective actions. Although the SS incorrectly announced that only onshift personnel should report to their emergency duty stations following the Alert declaration, members of the onsite emergency organization correctly began staffing the technical support center (TSC) and both portions of the operational support center (OSC) after that declaration.
The SS soon corrected this announcement.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
The TSC was fully staffed and operational about 40 minutes after e
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Incoming staff prepared to perform their
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duties in an orderly and efficient manner.. The technical
assessment coordinator provided a very good initial briefing.
- The emergency coordinator (EC) initially assigned high priority to having TSC staff monitor the unidentified reactor coolant system leak and assess the root cause and significance of the abnormal coolant activity. A low water level alarm in the spent fuel pool was received just before simulated failures of the computer terminals, associated with the safety parameter display system (SPDS) and radiological release information system (RRIS), began in the TSC and the emergency operations facility (E0F).
During the approximate 45 minute computer terminal outage, TSC staff successfully demonstrated their abilities to continue assessing the reactor coolant system problems while also investigating the spent fuel pool problem. Additional staff were deployed to the CRS as communicators to transmit updates of important plant data, while efforts to restore the computer terminals were simulated.
An inplant team was requested to investigate conditions near the spent fuel pool.
Engineering and health physics staffs correctly analyzed the root.
cause and radiological consequences associated with the water level drop in the spent fuel pool. The EC correctly accepted their recommendation to declare a site area emergency (SAE) in accordance with the plant's EALs.
This declaration and the associated notifications of State, county, and simulated NRC officials were timely.
Per procedures, the SAE declaration warranted the assembly and accounting of all onsite personnel.
Since no abnormal release was occurring, the EC conservatively chose the option of having-personnel be accounted for by leaving the protected area and then leaving the site. A controller then properly advised the EC to order persons to be accounted for at their predesignated assembly areas, rather than having them leave the site. All onsite
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personnel were accounted for within the 30 minute goal.
The EC effectively directed the TSC staff.
Periodic briefings
were either held with key staff in a meeting room or were conducted in the TSC's main room.
All TSC staff were kept
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I informed of degraded plant conditions, current priorities, and action items' status.
Coordination between TSC staff and their
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E0F counterparts was very good after lead responsibilities were transferred to the E0F.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Operational Suonort Center (OSC) and Inplant Teams The OSC was a split facility consisting of adjacent rooms for maintenance supervisors and technicians in the service building l
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(SBOSC) and the health physics access control (HPAC) in the power block for her vth physics supervisors and technicians.
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locations were staffed and fully operational about 20 minutes after the Alert declaration. At the SBOSC, minor difficulties were encountered when a floor plan indicating frisker station and step-off pad locations was not found among the.other pages of the OSC activation procedure.
The SB0SC coordinator effectively used available personnel, engaged in good discussions on ways to close the outer containment personnel hatch and exhibited good concern for his staff's simulated exposures. Good communications between the SB0SC and deployed inplant teams were demonstrated.
lia radiological controls coordinator (RCC) in charge of the HPAC demonstrated good command and control. He delegated most communications and briefing tasks to his assistants so that he could oversee HPAC activities and become more involved in radiological protection lanning aspects of certain inplant missions. He provided frequent briefings to his staff and ensured that HPAC habitability was periodically determined.
Inspectors accompanied a number of inplant teams. - With one minor exception, the teams demonstrated good contamination control techniques and techniques to keep their simulated expo:dres as low as reasonably achievable. Team members were issued appropriate personal dosimetry.
Their simulated exposures were tracked.
Except as noted in the following paragraphs, inplant teams were adequately briefed on their assignments and any associated radiological hazards, received good support from accompanying health physics technicians (HPTs) and successfully performed their assignments.
A team was dispatched from the SBOSC to obtain equipment from one location within the radiation controlled area (RCA) in order to attempt to close the containment's outer personnel hatch.
The team was advised to obtain HPT support from the HPAC.
However, the team obtained the equipment from the RCA before they met their HPT support.
Onscene HPTs then took appropriate action to ensure that the maintenance technicians and their procured equipment did not spread contamination beyond the RCA.
Another team was formed and briefed at the SBOSC on an attempt to close the outer hatch. SBOSC staff indicated that the task could result in each team member receiving a simulated radiation exposure of about 10 rem per hour. When the team arrived at HPAC, one of its members seemed uncertain of his role on the team.
Once this clarification was obtained, health physics staff then asked
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whether he understood and accepted the simulated radiation
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exposure associated with the mission. The individual indicated that he would not voluntarily accept such an exposure.
He was correctly not allowed to continue on this team.
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SB0SC staff effec +ively used status ooards to track the assignments and stat e of deployed inplant teams.
However, a
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similar status board at the HPAC did not always contain complete information on diployed teams. SBOSC staff used consecutive letters of the elphabet to designate each inplant team.
At the HPAC, inplant teams were usually referred to by their destination, which could cause confusion if several teams were sent to the same location over a period of time.
The coordination problems described in the previous three paragraphs were partly due to the fact that the plant's OSC is a split facility (SBOSC and HPAC), rather than being a single location. Use of a single location as an OSC would allow multi-discipline inplant teams to be briefed on all aspects of their missions as a unit before being dispatched as a unit.
The need for the licensee to reevaluate the split OSC concept is an Inspection Followup Item (483/93007-01).
No violations or deviations were identified; however, one Inspection Followup Item was identified.
d.
Emeraency Operations Facility (EOF)
An initial group of plant and public information staff reported to the E0F following the Alert declaration, per procedures. They were augmented by the remainder of the E0F staff following the site area emergency (SAE) declaration. Once the recovery manager (RM) assured himself that all work groups were staffed and were initially briefed on scenario events, the facility was declared to be fully operational within an hour of the SAE declaration. The transfer nf lead responsibilities from TSC staff to their E0F counterparts was promptly communicated to State, cconty, and simulated NRC officials, as well as to the licenso s responders.
The RM correctly declared a general emergency (GE) in a timely manner after he received updated information on a further degrade to the reactor coolant system and increased reactor coolant activity. A procedurally correct protective action recommendation (PAR) was briefly discussed with a senior State official in the E0F.
State and the four counties' officials were formally notified of the GE declaration and the associated PAR within 10 minutes of the declaration.
- e RM demonstrated excellent command and control.
Communications with the EC were frequent.
Meetings with key staff were held periodically to discuss action items and current concerns.
Priorities were established and updated as necessary.
State representatives in the EOF were invited to these meetings.
Their and key staff's inputs were solicited and taken into consideration. All E0F staff were kept well informed of the results of these meetings by updates given on the EOF's PA system.
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The initial offsite PAR was updated on a number of occasions due to the failure of the pressurizer relief tank and a gradual wind
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direction shift. Revised PARS and their bases were briefly discussed with State representatives in the E0F before these revisions were promptly communicated to State and county officials over a dedicated communications circuit. Offsite officials also were promptly notified of the initiation of the abnormal radioactive release.
The RH and several key aides remained well aware of the status of protective actions being implemented by county officials.
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aides were effectively used to display offsite areas associated with PARS in both sector and geographic subarea nomenclature.
Offsite dose assessment calculations were frequently performed and were communicated to State and county officials.
A four hour estimated release duration was chosen, based on the estimated time to cool down the reactor coolant system and depressurize the containment.
Exercise controllers failed the normal power supply to the EOF
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shortly after noon.
The facility's emergency diesel generator was started and successfully used to power EOF equipment for about 30 minutes until normal power was restored.
Later, the RM confirmed a report that the containment's outer personnel hatch had been shut much sooner than anticipated.
Although this blocked the release path to the environment, it was-recognized that the radioactive atmosphere within the auxiliary building would require additional time to be processed through the building's filtration system. The RM conservatively decided not to declare the release as being terminated once the outer hatch was closed.
Initial recovery planning discussions began late in the exercise.
The incident response roles of NRC and the Department of Energy were discussed, as well as the establishment of an onscene disaster field office. A comprehensive list of onsite action items was developed.
Correct decisions were made not to
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reclassify the GE and not to relax offsite protective actions.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
e.
Offsite Radioloaical Monitorina Teams Two offsite monitoring teams (OMTs) were formed and briefed following the Alert declaration, per procedurer..
The teams proceeded to the E0F, where they thoroughly aad efficiently checked their equipment kits.
Corrective actions were properly taken following the identification of several defective items.
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An inspector accompanied one OMT consisting of a health physics technician (HPT) and a driver. The technician properly took
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direct radiation level readings and several air samples. _ Survey results were adequately documented and reported. Although the team located the simulated plume, their procedures lacked guidance on a reasonable driving speed when performing this; task.
The team demonstrated good techniques for minimizing their simulated exposures and maintaining good contamination control.
Team members monitored their exposures and kept EOF staff informed.
E0F staff directing the licensee's OMTs kept the teams
well informed of the emergency classification, release status, and simulated wind direction changes.
Although all assignments were performed at the proper locations, the OMT exhibited occasional difficulty in locating predesignated sampling points using descriptive information in their procedures.
Prior to the GE declaration, exercise controllers caused a loss of the primary communications channel between TSC staff and both OMTs.
TSC staff and the teams quickly recognized the loss of communications capability and soon implemented revised procedural guidance for reestablishing communications.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Exercise Ob.iectives and Scenario Review (IP 82302)
The exercise's scope and objectives and complete scenario manuals were submitted for NRC review within the proper timeframes. The licensee was responsive to NRC's scenario comments.
Challenging aspects of the scenario included: use of the CRS, which was electronically linked to SPDS and RRIS computer terminals in the TSC and E0F to provide greater realism to the licensee's protective measures and reactor safety staffs; assembly and accounting of all onsite personnel; collection and analysis of an actual reactor coolant sample; deployment of offsite monitoring teams; use of the joint public information center;.
operation of the E0F's diesel generator; simulated failures to computer data links between the CRS and the TSC; and a simulated failure to a communications link between the TSC and the OMTs.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Exercise Control and Critioues (IP 82301)
There were sufficient numbers of personnel to control the exercise.
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significant examples of controllers prompting participants to initiate actions, which might not otherwise have been taken, were identified.
The licensee's controllers held initial critiques in each facility with participants following the exercise. The licensee provided a summary of
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its strengths and weaknesses, which were in.overall agreement with the inspectors' findings, following the exit interview.
9.
Operational Status of the Emeraency Preparedness (EP) Proaram (IP 82701)
a.
Emeraency Plan and Implementina Procedures Off-normal operating procedure OT0-ZZ-00001, " Control Room Inaccessibility," was reviewed and discussed.
This procedure adequately addressed how on-shift personnel would fulfill the following emergency plan requirements in.the event that the control room was evacuated for any of a number of circumstances:
emergency classification; initial notification of State, county,
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and NRC officials; activation of the licensee's onsite emergency
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organization; and notification of all onsite personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Emeraency Response Facilities. Eauipment. and Supplies The TSC and E0F were as described in the plan and implementing procedures.
Each response facility was equipped with an emergency ventilation system and an emergency diesel generator.
Records indicated that these diesels were maintained in a good state of operational readiness.
Records also indicated that both
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facilities' emergency ventilation systems successfully passed their most recent periodic performance tests.
No violations or deviations were identified.
c.
Trainina Records of drills and exercises since December 1991 were. reviewed and compared. Accident scenarios used in the December 1991 casualty control drill, the 1992 and 1993 " practice exercises,"
and an April 1993 unannounced drill were significantly different from the scenarios used in the subsequent exercises evaluated by:
NRC.
Records indicated that these drills and exercises were critiqued.
No violations or deviations were identified.
d.
Audits Aspects of the audit and surveillance program were discussed with the lead auditor for the EP functional area.
Records of audits and surveillances conducted since the February 1991 inspection were also reviewed and discussed with this auditor, who was the lead EP auditor since 1991.
The November 1992 revision of the " Quality Assurance (QA) Planning Guide for the functional Area of EP" divided the functional area
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r into four subfunctions: emergency measures (EM); emergency organization (EO); emergency equipment and facilities (EE); and program management (PM). An " external organizational interfaces" functional area was also defined.
This area addressed the interfaces between the EP and Training' Departments with respect to verification of initial and requalification EP training.
The planning guide referred to " critical attributes" associated with each of the four subfunctions. The December 1992 " Critical.
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Attribute Definition Report" for EP listed 12 attributes for EM;
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six for E0; six for EE; and 10 for the PM subfunction.
Records indicated that auditors could address the critical attributes during an audit or a surveillance. More than one critical attribute could be associated with an audit checklist item.
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The planning guide indicated that technical specialists could be
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used to assist in audits and surveillances.
Such personnel could be EP training supervisors; former EP staff; EP or QA staff from another licensee's organization; and consultants.
Records indicated that another licensee's EP coordinator assisted during one of the two 1992 audits. The lead EP auditor indicated that auditors, who were former members of the licensee's emergency response organization (ERO), assisted during another audit by observing drill or exercise activities associated with their former ERO assignments.
The 1991 and 1992 audits and surveillances of the EP program satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t) with respect to their scope.
Records also indicated that the EP staff. fulfilled the requirement to make relevant audit and surveillance results available to State and county officials by including such results as a topic during periodic meetings with these officials.
The overall quality of the 1991 and-1992 audits and surveillances was good.
Heavy emphasis was placed on performance based auditor activities, such as observing drills and exercises, or ongoing periodic equipment inventories and operability tests.
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In contrast, evaluation of the EP training program was somewhat limited. The EP auditors' evaluations of EP training program activities was limited to observing drills and exercises, verifying that only currently trained personnel were on the ERO
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callout roster, and determining whether all ERO members were sufficiently rotated in drills and exercises.
No apparent emphasis was placed on evaluating the quality of EP training in ways such as the following: determining whether EP training materials were being kept up-to-date with changes in the plan, procedures, or regulatory requirements; determining whether training requirements were appropriate for the responsibilities of specific ERO positions; and assessing.the adequacy of the EP instructors' subject knowledge and responsiveness to trainees'
feedback.
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The lead EP auditor indicated that another auditor was assigned lead responsibility for auditing the licensee's overall training program. However, the lead EP auditor was unsure whether EP training was specifically addressed in any. training program audits performed since early 1991.
The lead EP auditor indicated that he observed an EP training session during 1992,-but that he did not document this experience in an EP audit or surveillance report.
Records of training program audits will be reviewed during the next inspection.to determine if they addressed EP training.
The 1993 QA evaluations of the EP program were in' progress. The final report for audit AP93-005 indicated.that it met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t), which include an assessment of the effectiveness of the licensee's interfaces with State and local emergency response agencies.
However, with the exception of reviews of several revised procedures, the audit only addressed the ER0's performance during the May 1993 pre-exercise drill.
The interfaces with offsite support agencies were evaluated only with respect to interactions observed during this drill. This was adequate when compared to the regulatory requirement, but significantly less than either the 1991 or 1992 efforts to assess the quality of the licensee's interfaces with offsite support agencies.
The lead EP auditor indicated that three surveillances of the EP program were in progress. These addressed performance during the June exercise, media orientation training, and an ongoing review
of the plan and its implementing procedures for consistency.
The auditor also indicated that other audit and surveillance-activities not directly related to observing drills and the annual exercise were postponed until after the June 1993 exercise per the request of the EP Department, so that EP staff could focus on exercise preparations.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview on June 11, 1993, with those licensee representatives identified in Section 2 to present and discuss the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee indicated that none of the matters discussed were proprietary in nature.
Attachments:
1.
Exercise Scope and Objectives 2.
Exercise Scenario Summary
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OBJECTIVES CALLAWAY PLANT ANNUAL EXERCISE - JUNE 9,1993 1.
Demonstrate the ability to perform accident detection and assessment.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to classify an emergency.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to notify on-site and off-site emergency response personnel.
4.
Demonstrate primary communications between the plant, its various facilities and other emergency response organizations.
5.
Demonstrate emergency radiological controls.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to make protective action reccmmendations to off-site authorities.
7.
Demonstrate the ability to augment emergency response organizations.
8.
Demonstrate the ability to staff the On-Shift Emergency Response Organization.
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Demonstrate the activation of the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
and dissemination of information to the public.
10.
Demonstrate the use of EOF personnel to support emergency response.
11.
Demonstrate the ability to perform field monitoring, including soil, vegetation, and water samples.
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Demonstrate the ability to determine the magnitude and impact of a radiological release.
13.
Demonstrate the capability for post accident coolant sampling and analysis.
14.
Demonstrate the ability to transition into a plant recovery and plant re-entry.
15.
Demonstrate the ability to account for site personnel.
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Demonstrate the ability to use emergency power systems in the EOF (where not a part of plant safety systems).
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Demonstrate the availability of backup communication capabilities.
..m-1-Drill 93-3.
02/17/93-
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EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY The plant is operating at 100% power and has been on line for 137 days. Total Core 6 EFPD is 370. OSP-BB-00009 was completed on the Owl shift, with a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) unidentified leak of 1.2 gpm. Tech Spec 3.4.6.2 requires reducing the unidentified leak to less than 1.0 gpm in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in Hot Standby in tne next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The leak is a pressurizer safety leaking to the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT), but the crew will not be aware of the source. The
'B' Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) has been out-of-service for 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> for pump bearing replacement. A mini-purge was performed per OTN-GT-00001 on the Owl shift.
A containment entry was made on the Owl shift to attempt to identify the location of the leak. When an EO and HP Tech entered containment via the normal containment personnel hatch, the inner door stuck open. Tech Spec 3.6.1.3 requires restoring the door to an operable status or lock closed the remaining door. About 0500 the EO became overheated and had to leave containment via the emergency hatch. The MERT team was not needed.
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Two mechanics with an HP Tech have entered via the emergency hatch to repair the door. Preparations for a second EO and HP Tech to enter and search for the leak should be considered by the Shift Supervis: 1.
Drill Starts Shortly after the drill starts, the allowed four hours to locate the leak have elapsed. The crew should use OTO-BB-00003, and commence an orderly plant shutdown. The Shift Supervisor should declare an UNUSUAL EVENT, based on EAL 2A, RCS Leak Rate > Allowed By Tech Specs.
About 60 minutes later Chemistry confirms RCS high activity from a sample drawn as a result of an alarm on the CVCS letdown monitor, SJRE0001. The Emergency Coordinator should declare an ALERT, based on EAL 1D, Very High Coolant Activity Sample.
l About 30 minutes later a plant helper supervisor calls the Control Room to inform them that a fork truck with its transmission locked up, is in front of the plant emergency equipment vehicle (fire truck).
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Drill 93-3 05/26/93
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At about 0910, the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) lo-level alarm is received. The Primary EO is dispatched to investigate. He reports back that the gate seals between the SFP and transfer canal are leaking, with zero air pressure on the seals. A few minutes later the area rad monitors (SD-37/38) alarm in the control room. The spent fuel cooling pumps trip as a result of the low SFP level. SFP temperature begins to increase. Radiation levels increase as a result of the lost shielding of the water, but no release occurs. The Emergency Coordinator should declare a SITE EMERGENCY, based on EAL 61, Major Damage to Spent Fuel in Containment or the Fuel Building. Upon hearing the alarm and announcement, the maintenance personnel become excited and leave via the normal hatch. The outer door is opened by defeating the interlock. After opening the door, it becomes jammed and cannot be closed.
If the personnel are contacted earlier in the scenario to leave containment, they will leave via the normal hatch, as they are reluctant to go down to the emergency hatch. In both cases the outer door cannot be closed.
About 40 minutes later the TDAFWP trips due to a failure of the shaft driven oil pump.
At 1030, the turbine inadvertently trips, causing a steam leak in the turbine building from the MSR 'A' and 'C' steam supply valve. The plant will trip and a safety injection will occur.
l Also at about 1030 the 'B' pressurizer safety slightly opens and a report from Chemistry confirms RCS activity >1200 ci/gm Dose Equivalent lodine 131. The Emergency Coordinator should declare a GENERAL EMERGENCY, based on EAL 1G, Loss of 2 Out of 3 Fission Product Barriers with a Potential of Losing the 3rd. The automatic protective action guidelines of sheltering for 2 miles around and 5 miles downwind of the affected sectors are recommended to the State and County. Around 1100, the wind shifts from Montgomery County to Fulton.
i About one hour after the General Emergency, the 'B' pressurizer safety fully opens and the PRT ruptures causing the release to start. Subsequent protective action guidelines of evacuating the 5 miles around and 10 miles downwind affected sectors should be made to the County and State.
About 30 minutes after the release, an offsite injury occurs on Highway O. A few minutes after the initial dose assessment at the EOF is made, the EOF loses power from the normal supply. The EOF diesel should be started to supply the EOF.
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-2-Drill 93-3 05/26/93
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After the crew depressurizes and cools down the RCS, the radiation levels decrease to the point that the outer hatch can be closed. The Recovery
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Manager and Emergency Coordinator initiate actions to transition to a recovery
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-3-Drill 93-3 05/26/93