IR 05000461/1982015
| ML20028E335 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/1982 |
| From: | Love R, Williams C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028E334 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-461-82-15, NUDOCS 8301210233 | |
| Download: ML20028E335 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULARTORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-461/82-15(DETP)
Docket No. 50-461 License No. CP:R-137 Licensee:
1111aois Power Company 500 South 27th Street Decatur, IL 62525 Facility Name: Clinton Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Clinton Site, Clinton, IL Inspection Conducted: August 30 through September 3, November 1-5 and December 6-10, 1982 h (' Y $k m
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Inspector:
R. S. Love
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Approved By:
C. C. Williams, Chief
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Plant Systems Section
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Inspection Summary Inspection on August 30 through September 3, November 1-5 and December 6-10
1982 (Report No. 50-461/82-15(DETP))
Areas Inspected: Review of the licensee's progress in their recevery program in the electrical area (Reference:
Confirmation of Action Letter, January 27, 1982). This inspection involved a total of 106 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results: Of the areas inspected, no epparent items of nonccmpliance were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Illinois Power Company (IPCo)
W. J. Kelley, President
- W.
C. Gerstner, Executive Vice President D. P. Hall, Vice President
- J. O. McHood, Vice President
- A. J. Budnick, Director, Quality Assurance
- G.
W. Bell, Supervisor, Quality Assurance
- R.
W. Dillman, Quality Assurance Engineer
- J.
S. Spencer, Director, Design Engineering C. B. Sprouse, Construction Superintendent (SWEC)
- J.
R. Sprag, QA Specialist
- W.
L. Calhoun, Supervisor, Electrical Construction
- L.
S. Brodsky, Director, Nuclear Programs
- R.
E. Campbell, Supervisor, Quality Assurance J. H. MacKinnon, Project Manager (SWEC)
J. E. Loomis, Construction Manager (SWEC)
M. Stark, Quality Assurance Engineer Baldwin Associates (BA)
- J.
E. Findley, Manager, Quality and Technical Services
- W.
J. Harrington, Project Manager
- G. A. Chapman, Manager, Technical Services
- C.
E. Anderson, Manager, Quality Control
- J. W. Smart, Manager, Quality Assurance (Relieved 9/19/82)
D. Silva, Assistant Quality Assurance Manager
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D. R. Murphy, Senior Electrical Engineer l
R. W. Jones, Assistant Quality Assurance Manager
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D. L. Richtel, Quality Control D. R. Cordy, Quality Assurance Engineer M. E. Daniell, Assistant Manager, Technical Services E. P. Bryant, Assistant Manager, Quality and Technical Services l
The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during this reporting period.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview on September 3, 1982.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview on December 10, 1982.
2.
Functional or Program Areas Inspected As part of the electrical stop work recovery program, (Reference:
Confirmation of Action Letter dated January 27, 1982) Illinois Power l
Company committed to various actions to strengthen their Quality
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Assurance Program at the Clinton Power Station. During this inspection period, the Region III inspector reviewed certain of these commitments and verified IPCo actions. The following observations were made:
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IPCo committed to revise certain procedures or develop new procedures and train Quality Assurance, Quality Control, Technical
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Services, engineering, construction, management, and craft personnel to these new/ revised procedures.
During this reporting period, the inspector was supplied with a J
training schedule for the week. Two training sessions for craft
personnel were selected (Cable Protection and General Training for craft electricians) and the inspector attended the class.
The knowledge emparted appeared to be adequate for the type of trainees.
b.
IPCo quality assurance department committed to review and approve the first group of cable tray attachment travelers (147) and cable tray travelers (8) prior to releasing the travelers to the field-i for work and a final review of the travelers after the inspections
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and remedial action was complete.
i The inspector selected 16 of the travelers for review. During discassions with IPCo. Quality Assurance Engineers responsible for review and approval of the travelers, the inspector learned
that they were using Cable Pan Tabulation (CPT) drawings to assure that all nonconformance reports (NCR) and deviation reports (DR)
applicable to the subject traveler were in fact listed on the traveler. While attempting to verify that all applicable NCRs and DRs were listed on the traveler, the inspector learned that the only NCRs noted on the CPT drawings were those that required a change in design documents and that no DR's would be listed on CPT
drawings.
Interviews with BA quality assurance personnel revealed
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that they were also using the CPT drawings to verify that applic-able NCR's and DR's were listed on the travelers. The licensee was i
informed that the inspector considered the review of the travelers by IPCo and BA quality assurance personnel to be invalid based on the above facts.
It should be noted that none of the 155 travelers had been released to the field because the NRC had established a Hold Point so that they could review the travelers before any work activities were performed.
After additional interviews with engineering and quality personnel, the inspector learned that NCR's and DR's were entered in two computer systems on site and could be recalled by item number.
It was also
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learned that BA engineering was using one of the computer systems i
in the preparation of the travelers. The inspector informed the
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licensee that the use of the second computer system was an accept-
able method for verifying that the applicable NCR's and DR's were being noted on the traveler. Prior to the inspectors departure
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from the site, IPCo and BA quality assurance reverified all the travelers they had previously accepted.
In that this was the only
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problem observed with the travelers, the inspector gave verbal l
approval for the licensee to release 147 (by number) cable tray
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attachment travelers and 8 (by number) cable tray travelers to the field for inspection and remedial action. This verbal approval was followed up with a formal approval letter from the Region III Office.
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c.
During this reporting period, the inspector reviewed the action taken by the licensee with regard to a violation of Stop Work Order (SWO) 017. On November 24, 1982, a BA Electrical Super-Intendent removed some electrical components from safety related instrument rack 1H22-P027. The licensee's contractor, BA, prepared DR4163, dated December 3, 1982, to document the fact that SWO 017, Electrical Installation Procedure BAP 2.10, and Cannibalization Procedure BAP 2.28 had been violated. The Electrical Superintendent was made aware of the seriousness of performing work without traveler addendums and other required paper work.
d.
During this reporting period, the inspector reviewed Construc-tion Work Request (CWR) 1243 which required the determination
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and retermination of non-safety related cables in Panel 1H13-P732E.
Although the cables were non-safety-related, BA Procedure BAP 3.3.7 requires Quality Control to perform a pre-installation inspection of plugs, and a post-installation verification of installation for all General Electric plug-in cables.
BA Quality Assurance prepared Audit Response Requests (AAR) 728 and 729 as a followup on the inspectors concerns.
It would appear that the root cause was that the BA personnel performing the work and the IPCo Start-Up personnel requesting / directing the work were unfamiliar with the requirements
of BA Procedure BAP 3.3.7.
As of December 10, 1982, both AARs are still open.
e.
During tours of the power block, man-holes, and the screen house in conjunction with the work activities discussed in Paragraph 2.b.
above, the inspector made the following observations:
(1) Cable tray 183C-K2E was not resting on the horizontal hanger member at hangers E28-1000-06A-H1 and E28-1000-06A-H2 in the Fuel Building at columns AK and 104. The tray was being supported by two bolts through the sheet metal tray using connection detail DV-8A, Type A.
The licensee prepared NCR's 8167 and 8168 to document the two instances identified by the inspector. The licensee also prepared NCR 8109 to t
document additional instances where the cable tray was not
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resting on the horizontal hanger member. The approved dis-position is to slot the existing two holes in the tray for connection of the Y204 bracing clip so that the tray rests on the horizontal member of the hanger. Drill another 9/16" hole through the Y204 clip and cable tray, bolting the Y204 clip to the tray in all 3 places using washers as required to cover slotted holes in the tray. This appears to be a satisfactory disposition to the problem.
(2) The inspector checked the following hangers, hanger to tray attachments, and the cable tray on each side of the hanger.
No discrepancies were observed except as noted:
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Hanger Number Location NCR/DR No.
-E05-1038 H1 Man Hole 2 E05-1038 H2 Man Hole 2
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E05-1038 H3 Man Hole 2 E05-1038 H4 Man Hole 2 E05-1038 H5 Man Hole 2 E05-1038 H6 Man Hole 2 E05-1038 H7-Man Hole 2 E05-1038 H8 Man Hole 2 i
E05-1038 H25 Man Hole 3 DR 3526 E05-1038 H26 Man Hole 3 E05-1038 H27 Man Hole 3
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E05-1038 H28 Man Hole 3 DR 3529 E05-1038 H37 Man Hole 4
E05-1038 H38 Man Hole 4 i
E05-1038 H39 Man Hole 4 E05-1038 H40 Man Hole 4 E26-1003-03A H52 Auxiliary Building NCR7569 i
E26-1003-03A H51 Auxiliary Building E26-1003-03A H50 Auxiliary Bu".lding DR3765 E26-1003-04A H2 Auxiliary Building E26-1003-04A H1 Auxiliary Building E28-1000-03A H13 Fuel Building NCR 8109 E28-1000-06A H1 Fuel Building NCR 8109 NCR 8167
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i E28-1000-06A H2 Fuel Building NCR 8168 E28-1000-06A H9 Fuel Building NCR 8109 DR 3522 i
E28-1000-06A H28 Fuel Building NCR 8109 l
E30-1003-01B H6 Control Building DR 3638 i
E30-1003-02A H29 Control Building
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E30-1003-02A H16 Control Building l
E30-1003-02A H17 Control Building l
E26-1003-02B H2O Auxiliary Building NCR 7847 E26-1003-02B H21 Auxiliary Building NCR 7848-E27-1004-01A H3 Containment E27-1004-01A H10 Containment E29-1000-02C CC116 Diesel Generator Bldg.
E29-1001-05A CC4A Diesel Generator Bldg.
E29-1002-01A CC196 Diesel Generator Bldg.
E29-1002-01A CC194 Diesel Generator Bldg.
f.
The inspector selected 21 of 89 cable tray attachment travelers that were completed and placed in the' records storage vault. Of the 21 travelers selected, a traveler supplement had been issued for 4 of them because of outstanding NCR's.
The remainder of the documentation appears to be adequate.
g.
The inspector selected 16 rejected travelers to verify that an NCR/DR had been prepared to document the discrepancy. All travelers reviewed had one or more NCR/DR prepared to document the discrepancies. The NCR's and DR's appeared to have been used in accordance with the applicable procedures.
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h.
As part of IPCo recovery program, they committed to review all IPCo and BA Audits and Surveillances and verify that all applic-able discrepancies were documented on NCR's or DR's.
The inspector selected 10 IPCo QA Surveillance Reports and 2 IPCo Audit Report and 11 BA Audit Reports for review. All reports were satis-factory except as noted below:
(1) Audit Report No. Q35-82-4, dated October 4-8, 1982, was performed on Sargent and Lundy (S&L) Electrical Department.
As part of the audit, calculation 19-AX-1, Revision 0, dated December 4, 1981, was reviewed in response to NRC FSAR question 430.110.
The auditors determined that when the calculation was prepared, an incorrect assumption was used by the Engineer, thus making the response to the question invalid. The response in the FSAR, based on the original calculation, states that for the described condi-tions, the operator had 14 seconds to respond before any circuit breaker would trip. The calculations performed during the audit indicates that the operator would have inadequate time to respond. The auditors identified this incorrect calculation as Audit Finding No. Q35-82-4-1.
In review of the audit report, it appeared that the auditors did not pursue this matter to determine if any more cal-culations performed by S&L were incorrect.
In discussions with the NRC Senior Resident Inspector (SRI) for the Clinton Station, the inspector learned that the licensee had issued a 50.55(e) for incorrect small bore piping hanger calculations performed by S&L and that during an audit of S&L by IPCo Station Nuclear Engineering Department (SNED), it was learned that there were calculation discrepancies for 57 of 125 conduit hanger calculations reviewed. The audit by SNED was performed mid-October 1982. The SRI agreed to followup on calculation 19-AX-1 in conjunction with his investigation of the discrepancies in conduit hanger calculations. To date, December 10, 1982, the licensee has not taken any action to review S&L calculations on cable tray hangers. The inspector informed the licensee that he thought it would be prudent to review cable tray hanger calculations prior to pulling Class 1E cable.
(2) The inspector requested to see an Audit or Surveillance Report where IPCo Quality Assurance had verified that BA was in fact documenting discrepancies noted during audits and surveillances onto NCR's or DR's, as applicable. The inspector was informed by the IPCo QA Engineer responsible for tracking audits and surveillances that he did not believe any audits had been reviewed in this area.
The inspector could not puruse this matter at this time.
Pending an indepth review of IPCo Audit and Surveillance Program, this matter is unresolved (50-461/82-15-01).
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(3) The inspector accompanied Messrs. J. H. Williams and H. Abelson, NRR, on a tour of the Clinton facilities.
Mr. Abelson is the new Licensing Project Manager for the Clinton Power Station. The primary purpose of their visit was to introduce Mr. Abelson to IPCo personnel. An informal
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meeting was conducted in the NRC site office to introduce Mr. Abelson to Mr. L. J. Kock, IPCo Vice President, and members of his staff.
3.
Unresolved Matters Unresolved matters are items about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable, items of noncompliance or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph 2.(h).(2).
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) on September 3, 1982 and at the conclusion of the inspection on December 10, 1982. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the information.
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