IR 05000458/2003007
| ML033520017 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/2003 |
| From: | Gody A Operations Branch IV |
| To: | Hinnenkamp P Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR-03-007 | |
| Download: ML033520017 (22) | |
Text
December 17, 2003
SUBJECT:
RIVER BEND STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2003-007
Dear Mr. Hinnenkamp:
On November 7, 2003, the NRC completed an inspection at your River Bend Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on November 7, 2003, with you and other members of your staff.
This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved selected examination of procedures, representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
On the basis of the sample selected for review, which included 207 condition reports, 22 audit reports, and 27 security incident reports, the team concluded that problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. There was one green finding identified during this inspection associated with the failure to identify conditions that would have caused unexpected entry into Technical Specification Action Statements and had the potential to cause secondary containment to be inoperable. This finding was determined to be a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of its very low safety significance and because it has been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a noncited violation, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you deny this noncited violation, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the resident Inspector at the River Bend Station facility. In addition, several examples of human performance errors were identified that were not entered into the corrective action program.
Entergy Operations, Inc.
-2-In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web-site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/Adams/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Anthony T. Gody, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket: 50-458 License: NPF-47
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 50-458/03-07
REGION IV==
Dockets:
50-458 Licenses:
NPF-47 Report No.:
05000458/2003-007 Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
River Bend Station Location:
5485 U.S. Highway 61 St. Francisville, Louisiana Dates:
October 27 through November 7, 2003 Inspectors:
M. Murphy, Senior Operations Engineer, Operations Branch R. Azua, Project Engineer, Project Branch C B. Nicholas, Senior Health Physicist, Plant Support Branch P. Alter, Senior Resident Inspector, Projects Branch B Approved By:
Anthony T. Gody, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety
-2-
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000458-2003-007, Entergy Operations, Inc.; on 10/27-11/07/2003, River Bend Station;
Baseline inspection of the identification and resolution of problems. A violation was identified in the area of effectiveness of problem identification.
The inspection was conducted by one senior operations engineer, one senior resident inspector, one project engineer, and one senior health physicist. One green finding of very low safety significance was identified during this inspection and was classified as a noncited violation. The finding was evaluated using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.
Identification and Resolution of Problems The team concluded that the licensee was effective at identifying problems and putting them into the corrective action program. The licensees effectiveness at problem identification was evidenced by the relatively few deficiencies identified by external organizations (including the NRC) that had not been previously identified by the licensee, during the review period.
However, the team identified a repetitive failure on the part of the licensee to properly identify the inability of secondary containment doors to close and potential failures of secondary containment. The licensee effectively used risk in prioritizing the extent to which individual problems would be evaluated and in establishing schedules for implementing corrective actions.
Corrective actions, when specified, were generally implemented in a timely manner. Licensee audits and assessments were found to be effective. On the basis of interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site felt free to input safety findings into the problem identification and resolution program (4OA2).
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
Green:
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion XVI, for failure to identify conditions that would have caused unexpected entry into Technical Specification Action Statements and had the potential to cause secondary containment to be inoperable.
The issue was more than minor because it affects the reactor safety/barrier integrity cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide release caused by accidents or events. The results of the phase one evaluation of the significance determination process was that the issue was of very low safety significance because the finding only represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided by the auxiliary building and the duration of each of the 9 incidents was less than 10 minutes.
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
Effectiveness of Problem Identification
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed items selected across the seven cornerstones of safety to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. Specifically, the team selected 207 condition reports and 3 maintenance action items that had been issued between November 27, 2001 and September 29, 2003. The team also reviewed 22 licensee audit, surveillance and self-assessment reports, including several addressing various aspects of the problem identification and resolution program. The effectiveness of the audits and assessments was evaluated by comparing the audit and assessment results against self-revealing and NRC-identified findings. In addition, the team reviewed the licensees response to 1 noncited violation, 1 licensee event report, 11 NRC information notices, 8 industry operating events, and 7 vendor 10 CFR Part 21 reports.
The team evaluated the condition reports and NRC findings to determine the licensees threshold for identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program.
Also, the licensees efforts in establishing the scope of problems were evaluated by reviewing pertinent control room logs, work requests, self-assessment results, system health reports, trending reports, and action plans. The industry experience information was reviewed to assess if issues applicable to River Bend Station were appropriately addressed. The condition reports and other documents listed in the attachment were used to facilitate the review.
The team reviewed 280 incident reports written by a contractor department during the period from November 1, 2002, to October 31, 2003, to assess the departments evaluation of and the scope of problems identified with equipment and personnel errors which resulted in the incidents. In addition, the team reviewed the departments multi-step corrective action program designed to reduce the number of violations caused by plant personnel. The team interviewed the superintendent and other members of the department to determine the effectiveness of the program.
b.
Assessment The team determined that the licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action system. This was evidenced by the relatively few deficiencies identified by external organizations (including the NRC) that had not been previously identified by the licensee during the review period. Licensee audits and assessments were of good depth and identified issues similar to those that were self-revealing or raised during previous NRC inspections.
However, the team determined that although the contractor departments multi-step corrective action program was designed to reduce the number of violations caused by plant personnel, it failed to follow other licensee guidance and policies for the identification and correction of human performance errors. Program records did not sufficiently document the cause of the human errors, human performance traps encountered and human performance tools that could have been used to avoid repetition of the same error. Additionally, no condition reports were written for any of these human errors. Based on interviews with the site human performance coordinator, the team determined that this program was not monitored by the site human performance team and that the human errors identified met licensee guidance for documentation in the corrective action program.
Introduction The team identified a repetitive failure on the part of the contractor department to properly identify the inability of secondary containment doors to close and potential failures of secondary containment. From January 30 through March 16, 2003, 9 such events occurred and were not reported to the main control room for evaluation against technical specification requirements. The team determined that the risk associated with this noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, was of very low safety significance (Green) because the duration of each failed open secondary containment door was less than 10 minutes.
Description Based on a review of the incident reports written between January 30 and March 16, 2003, the inspectors determined that comtractor department personnel responded to door alarms 10 times when the doors in question were secondary containment doors between the turbine building and the auxiliary building. On 9 of those occasions, the doors were found in a condition where the doors locking mechanism latches were extended so that the door could not close if required. On 2 occasions there was no one present at the door. Although the person causing the alarm was present on each of the other 7 occasions, that person was not capable of correcting the problem to close the door. In each case, the secondary containment door was not capable of closing against its sealing surface, until the locking mechanism was released and the door closed by the responding department personnel.
On each occasion, contractor department personnel initiated an incident report, in accordance with Plant Security Procedure PSP-4-104, Administration (Reporting Events), Revision 19, or after March 3, 2003, the Department's Instruction SDI-005, Reporting Requirements and Matrix, Revision 0. Additionally, the person causing the problem was given a Violation Notification in accordance with the departments Multi-Step Corrective Action Program. In none of these cases, did the department personnel or their shift supervision inform the main control room of the failed open secondary containment doors. Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 required that the auxiliary building shall be Operable in MODE 1. One requirement for Operable as stated in Technical Specification Basis 3.6.4.1. was that At least one door in each access to the Auxiliary Building and Shield Building Annulus is closed, except for routine entry and exit of personnel and equipment. In each case, the door was incapable of closing against its sealing surface until the condition was corrected by the responding department peraonnel 2 to 8 minutes after the alarm.
Although the contractor personnel routinely respond to door alarms there was no guidance given to their on-shift supervisors, who receive the alarms and dispatch personnel to unsecured doors, for reporting failed open secondary containment doors to the main control room. However, the licensees corrective action program, as described in Policy LI-102, Corrective Action Process, Revision 2, in effect at the time, listed in 9.2, any unplanned entry or failure to enter a[n] LCO as an example of an adverse condition required to be documented in a condition report. The inspectors determined that incident reports were reviewed each working day by the licensee security staff and that this incident report data was rolled up into a monthly report and quarterly memo that was sent to senior licensee management. The licensees quality assurance department regularly performed a quarterly audit of the program. When interviewed, the licensee contractor superintendent and the quality assurance supervisor stated that they only evaluate the information based on the requirements, not in relation to other station requirements.
Analysis The team determined that the 9 failures on the part of plant personnel to properly secure the secondary containment doors were potential failures of secondary containment.
The issue was more than minor because it affects the reactor safety/barrier integrity cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide release caused by accidents or events. The results of the phase one evaluation of the significance determination process was that the issue was of very low safety significance because the finding only represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided by the auxiliary building and the duration of each of the 9 incidents was less than 10 minutes.
Enforcement The team determined that the repetitive failure of the contractor personnel to report failed open secondary containment doors to the main control room was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for failure to identify conditions adverse to quality. In addition, the incident reports written to track these incidents were reviewed by licensee contractor supervision and the quality assurance department, yet no condition reports were issued identifying the missed entry into a required technical specification action statement. Because this problem identification and resolution problem was of very low safety significance and has been entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2003-3515, this violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
2. Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed approximately 218 condition reports and supporting documentation, including root cause evaluations, to ascertain whether the licensee identified and considered the full extent of conditions, generic implications, common causes, and previous occurrences. The team also reviewed the other documents cited in Section 4OA2.1.a to evaluate whether issues applicable to River Bend Station were properly prioritized and evaluated.
The team attended corrective action review board meetings, which reviewed the root-cause analyses for two significant condition reports. The team evaluated the corrective action review board input into the root-cause analyses and suggestions for improvement of the corrective actions recommended by the root-cause analyses teams.
The team also evaluated the revised root-cause analyses and final corrective actions presented to the corrective action review board chairman for his approval. Finally, the team ensured that the revised corrective actions were included in the condition report program for resolution.
b.
Assessment Based on a review of the licensees records, the team concluded that it effectively prioritized and evaluated issues.
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the condition reports, audits, assessments, and trending reports described in Section 4OA2.1.a above to verify that corrective actions related to the issues were identified and implemented in a timely manner commensurate with safety, including corrective actions to address common cause or generic concerns. A listing of specific documents reviewed during the inspection is included in the attachment to this report.
The team evaluated the timeliness and adequacy of operability determinations and evaluations. The team reviewed corrective actions planned and implemented by the licensee and sampled specific technical issues to determine whether adequate decisions related to structure, system, and component operability were made.
b.
Assessment The team concluded that implemented corrective actions for those conditions reviewed were effective.
4. Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment
a. Inspection Scope
The team interviewed 28 individuals from the licensees staff, which represented a cross-section of functional organizations and supervisory and non-supervisory personnel. These interviews assessed whether conditions existed that would challenge the establishment of a safety-conscience work environment. The team also sampled safety-related concerns placed into the licensees employee concerns program to ascertain that the licensee had provided appropriate responses. The employee concerns program provided an alternate method to the corrective action program for employees to raise safety concerns, with the option of remaining anonymous.
b.
Assessment The team identified no findings related to the safety-conscience work environment at the facility. The team concluded, based on information collected and reviewed from the interviews, that employees were willing to identify safety issues and enter them into a corrective action system.
4OA6 Exit Meeting
The team discussed the findings with Mr. Paul Hinnenkamp and other members of the licensees staff on November 7, 2003. Licensee management acknowledged that proprietary materials examined during the inspection had been returned. No proprietary information is discussed in this report.
ATTACHMENT PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee L. Ballard, Supervisor, Quality R. Biggs, Coordinator, Nuclear Safety Assurance M. Boyles, Manager, Radiation Protection J. Clark, Admin. Support, Operations J. Fowler, Manager, Quality Assurance R. Godwin, Manager, Training J. Heckenberger, Manager, P. Hinnenkamp, Vice President, River Bend Station K. Huffstatler, Technical Specialist, Licensing A. James, Superintendent, Security R. King, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance D. Lorfing, Acting Manager, Licensing T. Lynch, Manager, Operations J. McGhee, Manager, Maintenance P. Page, ALARA Supervisor, Radiation Protection K. Talbot, Supervisor, Instuments and Controls W. Trudell, Manager, Corrective Actions and Assessment
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
PLANT PROCEDURES
PL-162
Human Performance Program
R01
Administration (Reporting Security Events)
R19
RBNP-006
Plant Security Requirements and Responsibilities
R13
RBNP-078
R07
SDI-005
Security Reporting Requirements and Matrix
R00
API-06
Alarm Station Supervisor
R40
CFR 50.54(q) Review Program
R00
Public Use of Emergency Preparedness Owner
R00
Controlled Area
EIP-2-002
Classification Actions
R22
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EIP-2-026
Evacuation, Personnel, Accountability, Search
R15
and Rescue
EPP-2-201
River Bend Station Emergency Preparedness
R18
Organization and Responsibilities
SOP-0113
Liquid Radwaste Processing/Recovery Sample
R10
Tank System (SYS #603)
Fire Fighting Procedure
R10
ADM-0009
Station Fire Protection Program
R08
RBNP-052
RBS Trending System
R08
LI-102
Corrective Action Process
R03
OE-100
Operating Experience Program
R01
EDG-AA-115 Engineering Request-Response Development
R04
ADM-0009
Station Fire Protection Program
R08
SOP-0071
Rod Control and Information System
R12
MAINTENANCE ACTION ITEM
MAI 350059 - Seal Internal Conduit Seal for 1CX958NA on Elevation 137 - 10"
MAI 350060 - Seal Internal Conduit Seal for 1CX958NB on Elevation 137 - 10"
MAI 350061 - Seal Internal Conduit Seal for 1CK600NE2 on Elevation 137 - 10"
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-RBS-2003-00685
CR-RBS-2002-00366
CR-RBS-2002-00114
CR-RBS-2002-00012
CR-RBS-2001-01523
CR-RBS-2001-00438
CR-RBS-2001-02177
CR-RBS-1999-01634
CR-RBS-2003-03248
CR-RBS-2003-01328
CR-RBS-2003-00523
CR-RBS-2002-00183
CR-RBS-2002-00372
CR-RBS-2002-00542
CR-RBS-2002-00603
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CR-RBS-2002-00653
CR-RBS-2003-00044
CR-RBS-2003-00571
CR-RBS-2003-00577
CR-RBS-2003-00652
CR-RBS-2003-00947
CR-RBS-2003-01950
CR-RBS-2003-01993
CR-RBS-2003-02095
CR-RBS-2002-00351
CR-RBS-2003-00730
CR-RBS-2003-00850
CR-RBS-2003-00868
CR-RBS-2003-01729
CR-RBS-2003-02529
CR-RBS-2003-03094
CR-RBS-2002-00199
CR-RBS-2002-00352
CR-RBS-2002-00924
CR-RBS-2002-01079
CR-RBS-2002-01081
CR-RBS-2002-01113
CR-RBS-2002-01193
CR-RBS-2002-01331
CR-RBS-2002-01714
CR-RBS-2002-01814
CR-RBS-2002-01871
CR-RBS-2002-01896
CR-RBS-2003-00110
CR-RBS-2003-00229
CR-RBS-2003-00234
CR-RBS-2003-00433
CR-RBS-2003-00508
CR-RBS-2003-00566
CR-RBS-2003-01016
CR-RBS-2003-01099
CR-RBS-2003-01115
CR-RBS-2003-011780
CR-RBS-2003-01205
CR-RBS-2003-01391
CR-RBS-2003-01507
CR-RBS-2003-01602
CR-RBS-2003-01982
CR-RBS-2003-02685
CR-RBS-2003-02804
CR-RBS-2003-02811
CR-RBS-2003-02881
CR-RBS-2003-03005
CR-RBS-2003-03007
CR-RBS-2002-00159
CR-RBS-2002-00531
CR-RBS-2003-00055
CR-RBS-2003-00321
CR-RBS-2003-02804
CR-RBS-2003-02621
CR-RBS-2003-03073
CR-RBS-2003-03075
CR-RBS-2003-03078
CR-RBS-2003-03080
CR-RBS-2003-03082
CR-RBS-2003-03084
CR-RBS-2003-03086
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CR-RBS-2003-03088
CR-RBS-2003-03090
CR-RBS-2003-03092
CR-RBS-2003-03094
CR-RBS-2003-03096
CR-RBS-2003-03098
CR-RBS-2003-03100
CR-RBS-2003-030101
CR-RBS-2002-00761
CR-RBS-2002-02275
CR-RBS-2003-01438
CR-RBS-2002-02000
CR-RBS-2002-01547
CR-RBS-2003-02685
Security Incident Reports
SIR-2003-018
SIR-2003-019
SIR-2003-039
SIR-2003-043
SIR-2003-045
SIR-2003-048
SIR-2003-052
SIR-2003-053
SIR-2003-054
SIR-2003-056
SIR-2003-057
SIR-2003-058
SIR-2003-059
SIR-2003-061
SIR-2003-062
SIR-2003-065
SIR-2003-067
SIR-2003-069
SIR-2003-072
SIR-2003-076
SIR-2003-082
SIR-2003-084
SIR-2003-090
SIR-2003-092
SIR-2003-093
SIR-2003-185
SIR-2003-210
AUDITS AND ASSESSMENTS
QA-16-2001-W3-1-Multi-Site, Multi-Site Security Audit Report, November 5 - 29, 2001
QA-16-2002-GGNS-1-Multi-Site, Multi-Site Security Audit Report, November 2 - December 10,
2002
QA-7-2002-RBS-1, Emergency Plan, April 8 - May 6, 2002
QA-7-2003-RBS-1, Emergency Plan, April 21 - May 9, 2003
QS-2002-RBS-001, Emergency Preparedness Owner Controlled Area Evacuations,
January 16-24, 2002
QS-2002-RBS-006, Emergency Plan Team A Training Drill, February 4-6, 2002
QS-2002-RBS-027, Followup to Corrective Actions Associated with Emergency Preparedness
White Finding, October 15 - November 4, 2002
QA-14-2003-RBS-1, Radiation Protection, January 13 - February 28, 2003
QS-2002-RBS-015, ALARA Planning and Controls, June 24 - July 3, 2002
QS-2002-RBS-018, ALARA Program, August 2-6, 2002
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QS-2002-RBS-021, Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas, August 19 -
September 11, 2002
QS-2003-RBS-004, Evaluation of Radiation Work Permit Justification for Dose Estimate
Revision, February 10-14, 2003
QS-2003-RBS-012, Radiation Work Permit Dose Extensions, July 28-30, 2003
ALARA Planning and Controls Focus Area Self-Assessment, January 7-24, 2002
QA-2-2002-RBS-1, Chemistry Program, September 23 - October 21, 2002
QS-2003-RBS-013, Followup to Corrective Actions Associated with 2002 Quality Assurance
Chemistry Audit, July 7-28, 2003
QA-15-2001-RBS-1, "Radwaste"
QA-4-2002-RBS-1, "Design Control (Engineering)"
QA-9-2002-RBS-1, "Fire Protection"
QA-1-2002-RBS-1, "FFD/AA"
QA-18-2002-RBS-1. "Tech. Specs."
OPERATING EXPERIENCE REPORTS
Industry Operational Event OE17170, Turbine Lube Oil Interface Valve Oil Leak,
dated October 28, 2003
Industry Operational Event OE17169, Defective Vendor Equipment Releases Oil into
River, dated October 28, 2003
Industry Operational Event OE17107, Control Rod Movement Not Recognized During
Plant Startup Rod Withdrawal, dated October 16, 2003
Industry Operational Event OE12866, Automatic Scram During Turbine Testing, Dated
October 26, 2003
Industry Operational Event OE17169, Defective Vendor Equipment Releases Oil into
River, dated August 5, 2003
Industry Operational Event OE17173, Grid Instabilities Cause Turbine Generator Trip
with Reactor Scram, dated August 14, 2003
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Industry Operational Event OE17171, Auxiliary Feedwater Train 1 Inoperability Due to
Response Time, dated September 23, 2003
Industry Operational Event OE17172, Ineffective Implementation of the Procedure
Governing Oversight of Contractors, dated August 2, 2003
IN 03018 - General Electric Type SBM Control Switches With Defective Cam Followers
IN 03014 - Potential Vulnerability of Plant Computer Network to Worm Infection
IN 03008 - Potential Flooding Through Unsealed Concrete Floor Cracks
IN 03003 - Part 21: Inadequate Staked Capscrew Renders RHR Pump Inoperable
IN 03001 - Failure of a Boiling Water Reactor Target Rock Main Steam Safety/Relief
Valve
IN 02036 - Incomplete or Inaccurate Information Provided to Licensee and/or NRC by
Any Contractor or Subcontractor Employee
IN 02006 - Design Vulnerability in BWR Reactor Vessel
IN 01013 - Inadequate Standby Liquid Control System Relief Valve Margin
IN 01012 - (er) Hydrogen Fire at a Nuclear Power Station
Part 21s:
2002-18: Air Start System Pressure Reducing Valve, Norgen R18 Relieving
2002-23: Failures of Capacitors in Damping Circuits of Certain Models 1153 and 1154
2002-35: Broken Solder joints (Crack in Solder Joint) on Some Pins on the Tap Blocks
of Power Shield Trip Devices
2003-36: Premature Gellation or Significant Thickening Prior to the End of the 12-Month
Shelf Life Expiration Date of Carbonize 11 SG
2003-01: Unstaked Capscrews Renders Residual Heat Removal Pump Inoperable
2003-05: Main Steam Isolation Valve Disc Separated from its Stem Allowing the
Disc/Piston Assembly to Drop into the Valve Seat
2003-17: Condition Reported with an EMD Electric Start Motor at Oyster Creek
Generating Station
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OTHER
OSRC Meeting RBS-2001-042 Minutes, August 30, 2001
OSRC Meeting RBS-2001-061 Minutes, November 15, 2001
SEC-2003-012, Security Monthly Report - June 2003, July 24, 2003
River Bend Station RF-11 Reactor Reassembly Radiological Work Plan, 4/04/03
River Bend Station RF-11 Reactor Vessel Reassembly Cavity Decontamination Job Guide,
4/04/03
Significant Event Response Team (SERT) Root Cause Analysis Report, Containment
Contamination During Reactor Disassembly, 5/22/03
Root Cause Analysis Report, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Locked High Radiation
Entry, 12/12/02
Root Cause Analysis Report, Refuel Floor Commenced Core Alterations Prior to Required
Postings Being Established, 4/29/03
Technical Requirements Manual, Revision 83
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Revision 12
RBS Quarterly Trend Report, 3rd Quarter 2003
Entergy Operations, Inc., Problem Trending Guide, Revision 2
Nuclear Management Manual OE-100, Operating Experience Program, Revision 1
Engineering Department Guide EDG-AA-115, Engineering Request-Response Development,
Revision 4
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Information Request 1 - July 2003
River Bend PIR Inspection (IP 71152; Inspection Report 50-458/03-07)
The inspection will cover the period of November 27, 2001 to September 29, 2003. All
requested information should be limited to this period unless otherwise specified. The
information may be provided in either electronic or paper media or a combination of these.
Information provided in electronic media may be in the form of e-mail attachment(s), CDs, or 3
1/2 inch floppy disks.
Please provide the following information to Michael Murphy in the NRC Region IV Arlington
office by October 6, 2003:
1.
Summary list of all condition reports of significant conditions adverse to quality opened
or closed during the period
2.
Summary list of all open condition reports which were generated during the period
3.
Summary list of all open condition reports which were generated prior to the latest
refueling outage
4.
Summary list of all condition reports closed during the specified period
5.
A list of all corrective action documents that subsume or "roll-up" one or more smaller
issues for the period
6.
List of all root cause analyses completed during the period
7.
List of root cause analyses planned, but not complete at end of the period
8.
List of plant safety issues raised or addressed by the employee concerns program
during the period
9.
List of action items generated or addressed by the plant safety review committees
during the period
10.
All quality assurance audits and surveillances of corrective action activities completed
during the period
11.
A list of all quality assurance audits and surveillances scheduled for completion during
the period, but which were not completed
2.
All corrective action activity reports, functional area self-assessments, and non-NRC
third party assessments completed during the period
13.
Corrective action performance trending/tracking information generated during the period
and broken down by functional organization
14.
Current revision of the following procedures:
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ADM-022, "Conduct of Operations"
ADM-0023, "Conduct of Maintenance"
CPN LI-102, "Corrective Action Process"
EDG-PR-001, "Maintenance Rule Program"
EDG-PE-002, "Guidline for Performing 10 CFR Part 21 Applicability Reviews"
ENG-3-033, "Modification Design Control Plan"
ENG-3-037, "Engineering Request Process"
LI-102, "Corrective Action Process"
OE-100, "Operating Experience Program"
PEP-0219, "Reliability Monitoring Program"
RBNP-002, "Root Cause Determination Guidance"
RBNP-010, "Configuration Management"
RBNP-030, "Initiation and Processing of Condition Reports"
RBNP-062, "River Bend Industry Events and Analysis Program"
RBNP-069, "Significant Event Evaluation"
RBNP-078, "Operability Determinations"
15.
Any additional governing procedures/policies/guidelines for:
a.
Condition Reporting
b.
Corrective Action Program
c.
Root Cause Evaluation/Determination
16.
A listing of all external events evaluated for applicability at River Bend during the period
17.
Condition Reports or other actions generated for each of the items below:
a.
All LERs issued by River Bend during the period
b.
NCVs and Violations issued to River Bend during the period
c.
Part 21s reviewed during the period.
18.
Safeguards event logs for the period (will review onsite)
19.
Radiation protection event logs
20.
Current system health reports or similar information
21.
Current predictive performance summary reports or similar information
2.
Corrective action effectiveness review reports generated during the period