IR 05000454/1993016

Insp Repts 50-454/93-16 & 50-455/93-16 on 931101-1201.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Matl Condition, Houskeeping & Plant Cleanliness,Radiological Controls, Security & Surveillance & Maint Activities

ML20058M552
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	12/15/1993
From:	Farber M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058M547	List: IR 05000454/1993016 ML20058M544
References
50-454-93-16, 50-455-93-16, NUDOCS 9312210026
Download: ML20058M552 (11)

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I U.S. I4VCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS10fl REGION 111

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Reports No. 50-454/93016(DRP); 50-455/93016(DRP)

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Dockets No. 50-454; 50-455 Licenses No. NPF-37; hPF-66

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Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Executive Towers West 111 1400 Opus Place Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility Name: Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Byron Site, Byron, Illinois j Inspection Conducted: November 1 - December 1, 1993

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Inspectors: H. Peterson C. H. Brown i H. Simons ,

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Martin J. fp'fber', Chief D' ate - ,

Reactor Pitdjects Section lA l Inspection Summar_y inspection from November I through December 1. 1993 (Reports No. 50- j

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454/93016(DRPl: 50-455/93016(DRP)). '

Areas inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspectors of operational safety verification, material _ condition, housekeeping and plant cleanliness, radiological controls, security, saf ety assessment / quality verification, maintenance and surveillance activities, and I engineering & technical suppor ;

Results: No violations or deviations were identifie The following is a j summary of performance during this inspection period: j Plant Operations

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Performance in this area was considered goo During this inspection period, j the licensee experienced several challenges and satisfactorily solved ea:h '

problem. These challenges included a Unit 2 trip due to an apparent circuit card problem in the solid state protection system; a potential steam generator tube leak indication; an isolated incident of poor work follow up resulting ir, degradation to the 1A emergency diesel generator; and overfilling of a 1:a pressure feedwater heater (paragraph 2a).

9312210026 931215 PDR ADOCK 05000454'

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Safety Assessment /0uality Verification ,

,i Performance in this area was considered good. The inspectors. reviewed the Corporate Comparative Quality Verification Audit. Overall, comments by the audit team were positive. One weakness was identified associated with ,

measuring and test equipment calibration. This item was considered a generic

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concern among the nuclear stations (paragraph 3). ,

Maintenance and surveillance ,

Performance in this area was considered goo A summary of major work items ;

observed are noted in paragraph ,

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Enaineerina and Technical Support Performance in this area was considered good. The inspectors observed the .

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pilot meeting of the new Systems Readiness Review Board. It appears that this program, although in its infancy, shows significant potential to be an excellent plant performance too i

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DETAILS Persons contacted

Commonwealth Edison Company (Ceco)

K. Schwartz, Station Manager

• T. Tulon, Operations Manager D. St. Clair, Site Engineering Construction Manager  :

P. Johnson, Technical Service Superintendent

• E. Campbell, Support Services Director

• Snow, Work Control Superintendent ,

D. Brindle, Regulato'ry Assurance Supervisor '

• T. Gierich, Maintenance Superintendent

• T. Schuster, On-Site Quality Verification Director W. Grundman, On-Site Quality Verification Superintendent ,

A. Javorik, Technical Staff Supervisor ,

E. Zittle, Security Administrator

• R. Wegner, Shift Operations Supervisor W. Dijstelbergen, Site Engineering Modification Supervisor ,

• K. Passmore, Site Engineering Support Supervisor _

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W. Kouba, Long Range Work Control Superintendent -l E. Bendis, Admin Operating Engineer i

• B. Gossman, Chemistry Supervisor

• J. Langan, Licensing Group Leader

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• J. Bauer, Nuclear Licensing Administrator  !

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• P. Enge, NRC Coordinator

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• Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on December 1, 199 The inspectors 'also had discussions with' other. licensee employees as necessary, including members of the technical and engineering staffs; reactor and auxiliary operators; shift engineers and foremen; and _

electrical, mechanical and instrument maintenance personnel; and contract security personne . Plant Operations ,

Unit 1 operated at power levels up to 100% in the load following mode I throughout the report perio !

Unit 2 operated at power levels up to 100% in the load following mode r from November 1 through 23, 1993. On November 23, 1993, a reactor tri occurred during the performance of a solid state protection system (SSPS) surveillance. On November 24, 1993, the Unit 2 generator was  ;

synchronized to the grid, Doerational Safety Verification (71707. 93702) j The inspectors verified that the facility was being operated i I conformance with applicable licenses and regulatory requirement _ , , - , . _ _ _ , _ - - ,_ , _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ ,

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t Additionally, the licensee's management control system continues to effectively carry out its responsibilities for safe operatio During this inspection period, the following items relating' to operational events and issues were evaluated:

Unit 2 Reactor Trio On November 23, 1993, the Unit 2 reactor tripped from 99% power-from an apparent cause of a turbine trip above 30% reactor powe Prior to the scram, Instrument Maintenance (IM) personnel were -

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performing a surveillance test on the steam generator 2D narrow '

range water level protection channel. While performing the adjustment of the steam generator level bistable, the 2A Auxiliary- r Feedwater (AFW) pump automatically started for no apparent reaso The reactor operator secured the pump and placed. it in the pull-to-lock (PTL) position. Approximately' four minutes later, while investigating the start of the 2A AFW pump and verifying the ,

proper performance of the IM surveillance, the reactor trippe Following the trip, the inspectors verified that control room operators took proper mitigating actions. The operators took the 2A AFW pump out of PTL and verified that it started automaticall All other safety systems also functioned as expected. The licensee called in two technical staff engineers and 'a training ,

department instructor to determine the cause of the trip. Two .

other investigation teams, consisting of engineers and IM personnel, were additionally organized to perform parallel and independent root cause evaluations. All three investigation teams utilized the three predominant symptoms of the trip. The major symptoms of the transient, in order of occurrence, were the.2A AFW pump start, opening of the 2A reactor trip breaker,_and the turbine trip / reactor tri <

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Each team independently identified that the probable cause ef the trip was one of three logic circuit cards associated with the  ;

steam generator low-low water level coincidence logic, within the SSPS. The three logic circuit cards were replaced. Following the card replacement, the licensee made preparations for reactor restart, including completion of the SSPS surveillanc The licensee continued to investigate .the card problem in parallel with reactor startup preparation The-licensee's root cause investigation was able to identify a faulty logic card prior to reactor startup; but was unable to specifically pinpoint the actual logic card problem. Therefore, for reactor restart i purposes, the licensee appropriately noted that the cause of the J trip was indeterminat ,

The inspectors reviewed the performance of the steam generator level surveillance procedure to determine whether it caused or contributed to the transient. The appropriate protection system was-in the test positio It appears that an erroneous )

coincidence signal was generated.by the faulty logic card. This ,

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unanticipated signal and the simultaneous test signal, applied during the performance of the surveillance, was believed to have '

caused the transient, The inspectors concluded that the licensee took proper '

investigative actions. The IM department continues to aggressively test the logic cards to identify the root caus :

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Good cooperation between operations, technical support engineering, IM, and training departments was noted. The reactor was restarted on November 23 and synchronized to the grid on November 24, 1993. This issue will be monitored under the required submittal of the licensee event report (LER 455/93008).

lA Emeroency Diesel Generator (EDG) Air Start Accumulator

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On November 29, 1993, the licensee identified that both air compressors fcr the 1A EDG air start accumulators were out-of- ,

service for approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. A vibration dampening i modification maintenance was being performed.on the 1A EDG air 1 compressors. This activity was being followed up by the equipment :

operator (EO) to monitor and assure proper air . start accumulator .l pressure at or above 240 psig. Several hours following shift l'

change the E0 proceeded to verify accumulator pressures and found that both air compressors were turned off.due to the maintenance, j and that both accumulators were down to 180 psig. The Shift i Engineer declared the 1A EDG ir. operable and entered the limiting )

condition for operation action requirement (LC0AR). The air star l accumulators were recharged to 240 psi j

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The air start accumulator low pressure -alarms are set. at 175. psig, and there are no specific technical specification addressing the air compressors. However, the air compressors and accumulators are subsystems of the EDG and do affect operability. The inspectors concluded that the Shift Engineer's actions, to declare the EDG inoperable and entering the LC0AR before exceeding the low pressure alarm set point, were appropriate and proactive'. The shift's mitigating actions were satisfactory; however, the inspectors concluded that the follow up' by the E0 associated with the EDG maintenance was poor. This isolated incident of poor work follow up was not considered a weakness, but was considered an j area that needs to be assessed for effectivenes i

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Overfillina of a Unit 2 Low Pressure Feedwater Heater On November 30, 1993, while performing turbine building rounds, the equipment attendant (EA)- identified that the 24B low pressure feedwater heater local sightglass water level indication was high and out of sight without a high level alarm initiated. The EA immediately took action to drain down the feedwater heater before any damage or complications could occur. If the water level was allowed to continue to increase, the potential consequence would have been water reaching and subsequently damaging the main

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l turbine. After further investigation, it was identified that the .;

Magnetrol level instrument had deteriorated affecting the high_

level alarm and giving erroneous level inaication. The inspectors l concluded that the EA was alert and took quick and appropriate  !

actions to prevent significant damage to the plan '

r Potential Indication of a Steam Generator Tube Leak on Unit 1 1 On November 13, 1993, the licensee, while performing routine steam .

generator chemistry samples, identified slight activity in one of the generators. This was a potential indication of a primary to .

secondary leak in the D steam generator of Unit 1. The chemistry *

department qui kly initiated the steam generator tube leak rate  ;

determination procedure. The licensee also shifted one of the 3 portable Nitrogen-16 radiation monitors to the D steam line. No Nitrogen-16 activity was identified. The inspectors reviewed the ,

leak rate determination data on the D steam generator. The~ -!

apparent tube leak indication was just marginally above the i minimal detectable range. Utilizing the leak rate determination procedure, the licensee calculated the potential leak rate was in the range of 5 to 10 gallons per day. However, the lea ,

indication was only intermittently detectable. After the ,

licensee's chemistry department performed aggressive monitoring  !

for approximately one day, the leak indications reduced to near .

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undetectable. The licensee continues to monitor the steam generators for signs of tube leakage on a' routine basi Material Condition .

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The inspectors performed general plant walkdowns, as well as, selected system and component walkdowns to assess the general. and .l specific material condition of the plant, j The licensee has initiated systematic efforts to decontaminate l areas in the plant, and some corroded valves have been repaire Following the Unit 2 refueling outage, new leaks in the secondary ,

side have developed. -The licensee has initiated aggressive  !

actions to identify and initiate repair In general, material condition within the plant continues to improv t Housekeepino and Plant Cleanliness The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plant cleanliness for fire protection and protection of safety-related equipment from intrusion of foreign matter. The licensee has j initiated an aggressive clean up and painting program within the >

auxiliary building. In general, housekeeping and plant- '

cleanliness continue to improv '

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Radioloaical Controls 1 The inspectors verified that personnel were following health physics procedures for dosimetry, protective clothing, frisking,

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l posting, and randomly examined radiation protection  ;

instrumentation for operability and calibratio Radiation :

protection personnel continue to be very responsive to the needs r of the plant. Actions toward decontaminating.' areas within the i plant should result in easier access for shift personne j Security Each week during routine activities or tours,'the inspectors f monitored the licensee's activities to ensure that observed !

actions were being implemented according to the approved security ,

plan. The inspectors noted that persons within the protected area- '

displayed proper photo-identification badges and those individuals'

requiring escorts wre properly escorted. The inspectors also verified that vital areas were locked and alarmed. Additionally, >

the inspectors also observed that personnel and packages entering i the protected area were properly searched, j t

No violations or deviations were identifie . Safety Assessment /0uality Verification (40500. 90712. 92700)  ;

The inspectors evaluated the scope and effectiveness of the station self !

assessment and quality assurance program The inspectors focused on i determining if the licensee's self assessment programs contributed to -

prevention of problems by assessing the licensee's audit program. In particular, the Corporate Comparative Quality Verifir at ion Audit was reviewed. Additionally, the inspectors were informeo of the future re-assignments within the On-Site Quality Verification grou _;

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I Corocrate Comparative Ouality Verification Audit'

l During the period of November 8 - 18, 1993, the Commonw- P h-Edison 1 Corporate organization performed a Comparative Qualt . 4 .'ication .

Audit at.the Byron station. This audit is schedule te N performed-at all of the nuclear station Byron station was the P site to be audited. The inspectors reviewed the findings and t -.nded the i corporate audit exit on November 18, 1943. .The specific areas covered' 4 by the audit were measuring and test equipment certification, quality coi rol, Integrated Nuclear Data Exchange System, suitchyard activities,;

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and System Engineering / Site Engineering, j

In ' general, the auditing team relayed positive feedback associated with' l Byron performance. Of the five areas evaluated there were several noted '

good practices within the Byron organization. For example, under the .

system and site engineering evaluation: i l

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• In-house design activities have matured to the point when a design is completed, the DCR is stamped " Drafting Services Only" prior to submittal to the Architect Engineer. This practice helps to minimize duplication of design activitie Byron was the first station observed to be performing this activit i

• Drawings are being approved by Commonwealth Edison engineers, who i are certified as Professional Engineers. Byron station was again ;

the first station observad to be performing this activit The audit was generally rositive, but there were few items of concern i and improvement recomme'idations. One item of particular concern was a generic finding associr.ted with the five evaluated stations due to the potential inadequacy 4ithin the Measuring and Test Equipment Certification program. An audit finding was generated for inadequate procedure adhererze in the area of Pressure Gauge and Micrometer Certificatio The other generic issues associated with the five ,

audited staticas were:

• Environmental conditions (temperature and humidity) were not monitored during certification of test equipmen ;

• Procedures for certification appear to be inadequate for micrometers and pressure gauge ,

• Training in metrology techniques requires improvement for personnel performing the certification of micrometers and pressure ,

gauge On-Site Ouality Verification (SOV) Reoraanization During the latter part of October, the licensee's SQV department underwent a significant reorganization. A corporate wide shift in the !

SQV organization led to the concentration of activities to the local ,

site departments. This reorganization plans the addition of five extra ,

inspectors, increasing the anticipated number of the SQV organization to i 13. The reorganization includes the creation of a SQV Director and a

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separate SQV audit leader and an Independent Safety Evaluation Group leader. The SQV department has initiated active solicitation for the additional positions within the statio In particular, the SQV l department has noted interest in personnel with varied backgrounds to '

further enhance the organizatio .

In conclusion, the SQV department continues to identify areas of concern

. and forwards the findings to the respective staff and management in a timely manner. It appears that this reorganization will significantly enhance the SQV activities. Furthermore,_ station management continues

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i to give high regard to the findings and recommendations identified by the SQV organization, and has taken a supportive approach to the_SQV reorganization and recruitmen No violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance / Surveillance (62703. 61726) Maintenance Activities (62703)

Routinely, station maintenance activii.ies were observed and/or :

reviewed to ascertain whether they were conducted in accordance '

with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with technical specification Portions of the following maintenancc activities were observed and reviewed:

• 2B Main Feedwater Pump High Pressure Governor Repairs, l

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+ 1A Diesel Generator left Bank Air Compressor Bracket Work - !

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Vibration Dampening, and

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• Temporary Liquid Sealant Compound Repair of the 24B Low ,

Pressure Feedwater Heater Drain Lin ! Surveillance Activities (61726)  :

During the inspection period, the inspectors observed technical ,

specification required surveillance testing and verified that ,

testing was performed in accordance with applicable procedures, i that test instrumentation was calibrated, that results conformed i with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were . l reviewed, and that any deficiencies identified during the tasting !

were properly resolved, 4 The inspectors witnessed and/or reviewed portions of the following

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surveillances:

• 1A Diesel Generator Preventive Maintenance and Operability !

Surveillance, l

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• 1rradiated Reactor Vessel Sample Coupon Cask Radiologica Material Shipment, -

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• Train A Solid State Protection System Bimonthly, )

• Functional Test for Steam Generator 2D Level Loop Channel 1 (Narrow Range),

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• Shutdown Margin Calculation Following Reactor Scram, and

• Steam Generator Tube Leak Rate Determinatio No violations or deviations were identifie *

5. Enaineerina & Technical Support (37700) [

The inspectors evaluated the extent to which engineering principles and '

evaluations were integrated into daily plant activitie This was accomplished by assessing the technical staff involvement in non-routine :

events, outage-related activities, and assigned technical specification surveillances. Further evaluation was conducted, as necessary, by observing technical staff involvement associated with on-going ,

maintenance work and troubleshooting, and reviewing deviation i investigations and root cause analysi Syst_em Readiness Review Board

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The licensee's technical support group initiated a new program designed to consolidate system information and status, called the System ;

Readiness Review Board (SRRB). This program was established to promote ,

increased awareness and informaticr exchange between all department It was also designed to place more focus and responsibility on to the i system engineer The system engineers are the initiators of the review board and are responsible for presenting the system status report. The system status report consists of, but not limited to, the following system information: operability and/or availability, maintenance, i ALARA, regulatory issues, material condition, system enhancements, and financia >

On November 9, 1993, the pilot meeting of the SRRB was conducted on the Chemical & Volume Control system. The inspector attended the meeting and observed good exchange of information. Management displayed strong support for the program, and asked good questions on how to continue to implement and improve the process. Although only in its infancy, this program shows the potential to be a significant tool in promoting and ;

enhancing system readines No violations or deviations were identifie . Meetinas and Other Activities (30703) Region III Reaional Administrator Site Visit

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During November 4 - 5, 1993, Messrs. Jack Martin, Region Ill Regional Administrator; Martin Farber, Section Chief; and two others of the regional staff met with Byron station management and toured the facility. At the end of his visit, Mr. Martin held an exit'with licensee management and staff to communicate some of his ;

insights on Byron performanc :

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b. Exit Interview i The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph I during the. inspection period and at the conclusion of :

the inspection on December 1, 1993. The inspectors summarized the i scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely '}

content of this-inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the ;

information and did not indicate that any of the information !

disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in natur !

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