IR 05000445/2025003
| ML25352A166 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 12/22/2025 |
| From: | Ami Agrawal NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/PBB |
| To: | Peters K Vistra Operations Company |
| References | |
| IR 2025003 | |
| Download: ML25352A166 (0) | |
Text
December 22, 2025
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -
INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000445/2025003 AND 05000446/2025003
Dear Ken Peters:
On September 30, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2. On December 10, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Christopher Jackson, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Due to the temporary cessation of government operations, which commenced on October 1, 2025, the NRC began operating under its Office of Management and Budget-approved plan for operations during a lapse in appropriations. Consistent with that plan, the NRC operated at reduced staffing levels throughout the duration of the shutdown. However, the NRC continued to perform critical health and safety functions and make progress on other high-priority activities associated with the ADVANCE Act and Executive Order 14300. On November 13, 2025, following the passage of a continuing resolution, the NRC resumed normal operations.
However, due to the 43-day lapse in normal operations, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation granted the Regional Offices an extension on the issuance of the calendar year 2025 inspection reports that should have been issued by November 13, 2025, to December 31, 2025. The NRC resumed the routine cycle of issuing inspection reports on November 13, 2025.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Ami N. Agrawal, Chief Reactor Projects Branch B Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000445 and 05000446 License Nos. NPF-87 and NPF-89
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000445 and 05000446
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000445/2025003 and 05000446/2025003
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-003-0012
Licensee:
Vistra Operations Company LLC
Facility:
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Glen Rose, TX 76043
Inspection Dates:
July 1, 2025 to September 30, 2025
Inspectors:
M. Bloodgood, Senior Project Engineer
J. Ellegood, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Freeman, Resident Inspector
S. Hamilton, Resident Inspector
C. Harrington, Senior Operations Engineer
S. Hedger, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
M. Mondou, Resident Inspector
L. Moore, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
Approved By:
Ami N. Agrawal, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch B
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant,
Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Inadvertent Loss of All Alert and Notification System Sirens Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Emergency Preparedness Green NCV 05000445,05000446/2025003-01 Open/Closed
[P.2] -
Evaluation 71152A A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and Part 50, appendix E.IV.D.3, was identified for an inadvertent loss of all alert and notification system (ANS) sirens. On May 2, 2025, Hood County notified Comanche Peak that no ANS sirens were functional. Subsequent investigation revealed power to the primary repeater had been lost.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On September 24, 2025, Unit 1 tripped on loss of both main feedwater pumps. The licensee replaced components in the main feedwater pump control system to correct the direct cause of the trip. On September 27 the licensee restarted the reactor and reached rated thermal power on September 28. Unit 1 remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On September 14, 2025, Unit 2 tripped on loss of control of the main turbine. The licensee corrected the condition. On September 17, the licensee restarted the reactor and reached rated thermal power on September 21. Unit 2 remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1, train B auxiliary feedwater on July 21 and 22, 2025
- (2) Unit 2, turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump on August 20 and 21, 2025
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 1, emergency core cooling system train A pump rooms on August 18, 2025
- (2) Unit 1, emergency core cooling system train B pump rooms on August 18, 2025
- (3) Unit 2, emergency core cooling system train B pump rooms on August 19, 2025
- (4) Unit 2, emergency core cooling system train A pump rooms on August 19, 2025
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill on August 12, 2025.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room as well as just-in-time training during a plant startup on September 17, 2025.
- (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a reactor startup on September 26 and 27, 2025.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated simulator training on a steam generator tube rupture on July 1, 2025.
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 2, elevated risk due to trip of safety chiller 2-06 on August 5, 2025
- (2) Unit 2, yellow risk for an inoperable safety chiller from August 24 through 26, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 2, turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump with a failed I/P converter
- (2) Unit 1, operability of centrifugal charging pumps with low oil level
- (3) Unit 1, containment due to failed containment temperature element
- (4) Unit 1, turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump following speed drifting below band during testing
- (5) Unit 2, emergency diesel generator 2-01 with a failed lockout relay
- (6) Unit 1, loss of bank C pressurizer backup heaters
- (7) Unit 1, steam generator #2 relief valve leak by per Condition Report 2025-5161
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)diesel generator 2-01 petcock replacement on July 2, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)boric acid inspection of containment on September 16, 2025
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1)safety injection pump 2-02 surveillance on July 8, 2025
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Additional Drill and/or Training Evolution (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) sitewide hostile action based drill on July 9, 2025
71114.07 - Exercise Evaluation - Hostile Action (HA) Event
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed the biennial hostile action event exercise and evaluated emergency plan performance on August 13, 2025. The exercise scenario involved simulated hostile action events. This resulted in emergency classifications up to a Site Area Emergency; activation of alternative response facilities; coordination to move plant staff into the plant, with law enforcement, for damage assessment; and response to loss of onsite power sources.
71114.08 - Exercise Evaluation - Scenario Review
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preliminary exercise scenario (Adams Accession ML25167A241) that was submitted to the NRC on June 16, 2025, for the exercise scheduled on August 13, 2025. The inspectors discussed the preliminary scenario comments with Jay Webster, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, and other members of the emergency preparedness staff on July 7, 2025. The inspectors' review does not constitute NRC approval of the scenario.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05)===
- (1) Unit 1 (September 1, 2024, through August 31, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (September 1, 2024, through August 31, 2025)
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (September 1, 2024, through August 31, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (September 1, 2024, through August 31, 2025)
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (September 1, 2024, through August 31, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (September 1, 2024, through August 31, 2025)
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Sample (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2024, through June 30, 2025 EP02: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2024, through June 30, 2025 EP04: Emergency Response Facility and Equipment Readiness (ERFER) (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2024, through June 30, 2025
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
(1)current operator work arounds and other deficiencies impacting operations
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends in human performance that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
The inspectors noted a trend in non-licensed operator proficiency with respect to component manipulations. The inspectors observed operators on rounds and no performance issues were identified.
71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Follow-up (IP Section 03.01)
The inspectors conducted the following event follow-ups:
- (1) On September 24, 2025, the inspectors observed licensee actions and plant parameters following a manual trip of Unit 1 in response to a loss of both main feedwater pumps.
- (2) On September 14, 2025, the inspectors observed licensee actions and plant parameters following a manual trip of Unit 2 in response to an inability to control the turbine generator.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Very Low Safety Significance Issue Resolution Process: Inoperability of the Remote Shutdown Panel 71151 This issue involves ambiguity in the licensing basis and inspection effort is being discontinued in accordance with the Very Low Safety Significance Issue Resolution (VLSSIR) process. No further evaluation is required.
Description:
In Condition Report CR-2024-002119, the licensee identified that following a loss of power and transition from the main control room to the remote shutdown panel, the Gamma Metrics neutron monitoring system would not function. However, Gamma Metrics could be recovered by cycling the power supply to the system. The licensee determined that the remote shutdown panel was inoperable from on or about June 11, 2011, through April 18, 2024. The licensee determined that a design error created this condition and it was reported in Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000445/2024-002 as a condition prohibited by technical specifications. The residents closed this LER in Inspection Report 05000445/2025001 and documented a licensee-identified finding in that report (Adams Accession Number ML25125A085). During review of performance indicators, the inspectors noted that inoperability of the remote shutdown panel had not been reported as a loss of safety function nor as a safety system functional failure.
The reporting guidance contained in NUREG-1022 states "SSCs within scope include only safety-related SSCs required by the technical specifications to be operable that are intended to mitigate the consequences of an accident as discussed in Chapters 6 and 15 of the Final Safety Analysis Report." Chapter 6 refers to remote shutdown capability as follows: "Control Room evacuation is not considered a necessity; however, remote shutdown capability is available as described in Section 7.4." Because of the phrasing, the inspectors concluded ambiguity exists regarding the inclusion in Chapters 6 or 15 of the UFSAR. The inspectors determined that the inadequacy of reporting would only impact the ability to regulate as a traditional enforcement finding. In this instance there was negligible impact on the ability to regulate since an LER had been submitted as a condition prohibited by technical specifications, the residents were aware of the issue from condition report reviews, the ROP aspects were addressed in a prior inspection report, and inclusion as a safety features functional failure would not have altered NRC response. Therefore, this is being treated as a resolved without adjudicating reportability issue.
Licensing Basis: Title 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) states, in part, to report within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition."
The licensee did not make the report.
Significance: The significance of the ROP aspect was Green and documented in report 05000445/2025001. The traditional enforcement aspect would not be greater than severity level IV.
Technical Assistance Request: The residents did not request technical assistance.
Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report CR-2024-002119 Inadvertent Loss of All Alert and Notification System Sirens Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Emergency Preparedness Green NCV 05000445,05000446/2025003-01 Open/Closed
[P.2] -
Evaluation 71152A A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and Part 50, appendix E.IV.D.3, was identified for an inadvertent loss of all alert and notification system (ANS) sirens. On May 2, 2025, Hood County notified Comanche Peak that no ANS sirens were functional. Subsequent investigation revealed power to the primary repeater had been lost.
Description:
The licensees primary ANS method is a network of sirens combined with an emergency alert system (EAS) via AM radio. In an emergency, the siren sounding tells the public to tune in to a specific radio station for information and instructions. The backup ANS method is route alerting and an emergency telephone notification system (e.g. Reverse 911, Code Red, etc.).
Under normal (as designed) circumstances, the ANS repeater receives power from XEC2-7 which is protected by an automatic bus transfer switch. During a planned plant radio modification, the licensee plugged the repeater into a wall plug which was powered from the train A 6.9 kV vital bus. At 3:30 a.m., on May 2, 2025, the licensee deenergized the bus for cleaning and maintenance. Although the licensee evaluated the impact of the bus work, available documentation did not identify the repeater as powered from the bus.
EP staff were initially notified of the loss at 7:00 a.m. by Hood County and further confirmed the situation by contacting Somervell County dispatch. Assessment by the licensee staff identified the repeater was connected to the deenergized bus. Licensee staff energized the backup repeater at approximately 10:30 a.m., thus restoring power to the ANS system.
During this time, the backup ANS method remained available. The emergency planning zone population enrolled for reverse 911 is approximately 77 percent and the system can notify all enrollees within about 15 minutes.
Corrective Actions: The licensee restored power to the backup repeater and entered the condition into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-2025-2340.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR-2025-2340
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: Failing to identify that the temporary power source for the repeater would lose power during planned work was a performance deficiency. The licensee expects that work control documents correctly and clearly identify the components to be worked and evaluate the impact of that work on the site.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Facilities and Equipment attribute of the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness SDP. Specifically, inspectors used Table 5.5-1, Significance Examples 50.47(b)(5) and Attachment 2, Failure to Comply Significance Logic. Considering the relatively short duration of the siren outage, the time to restore the ANS capability, and the large coverage and speed of the prearranged backup capability with reverse 911, the inspectors determined that the risk significant planning standard function was not degraded and, therefore, represented very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Licensee analysis was not comprehensive enough to develop actions to preclude inadvertent loss of the ANS as a result of maintenance activities.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) requires in part that licensees follow and maintain an emergency plan that meets the requirements of appendix E and 50.47(b). Title 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and appendix E.IV.D.3 require, in part, that the licensees ANS shall have the capability to essentially complete the initial alerting and initiate notification of the public within about 15 minutes. Contrary to the above, on May 2, 2025, for approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />, the licensees primary ANS method did not have the capability to complete the initial alerting and initiate notification of the public within about 15 minutes.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On December 10, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Christopher Jackson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On July 7, 2025, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness exercise scenario review inspection results to Jay Webster, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On September 23, 2025, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness exercise inspection results to Christopher Jackson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
SOP-304A-AF-
V02
Train B MDAFW Pump Lineup
Procedures
SOP-304B-AF-
V03
TDAFW Pump Lineup
Miscellaneous
Fire Drill Package for CAS HVAC Room TB-1-043G
08/11/2025
FPI-101A
Unit 1 Safeguards Building Elevation 773'-0" Train "A"
& "B" -RHR, SI & CS Pump Rooms
Procedures
FPI-101B
Unit 2 Safeguards Building Elevation 773'-0" Train "A"
& "B" - RHR, SI & Cont. Spray Pump Rooms
LO44.BBS.023
Steam Generator Tube Rupture
Miscellaneous
LO44.BBS.025
Procedures
IPO-002B
Plant Startup from Hot Standby
Revision 15
Condition Reports
CR-YYYY-NNNN
25-001336, 2025-000564, 2025-000824
Corrective Action
Documents
Tracking Reports
TR-YYYY-NNNN
25-001519
Miscellaneous
Guarded Equipment Log for Safety Chiller 2-06 Outage
08/24/2025
25-005161, 2025-005103
Condition Reports
CR-YYYY-NNNN
25-004168, 2025-003595, 2025-004012, 2025-004168,
25-003595, 2025-004012
Corrective Action
Documents
Tracking Reports
TR-YYYY-NNNN
25-003251
2-SY-2452
TDAFW Pump Speed Controller I/P Converter
06/30/2025
Procedures
INC-4253B
Channel Calibration Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
Pump Speed Control Channel 2452B
Post Work Test Guide (PWTG)
ETP-204B
Safety Injection System Radiation Leakage Inspection Test
OPT-204B
Train B Safety Injection Pump 2-02 Operability Test
07/08/2025
OPT-204B
SI System
OPT-204B-11
Procedures
Online Testing and Thermography
07/08/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
SOP-201B
Safety Injection System
Work Orders
25-632909, 25-236111
Drill Notification Message Forms 1 thru 9
07/09/2025
Miscellaneous
CPNPP Green Team Dress Rehearsal Exercise
07/09/2025
Condition Reports
CR-YYYY-NNNN
2005-002793, 2006-002426, 2015-005680, 2023-002190,
23-005016, 2023-006014, 2023-006946, 2024-005920,
24-007067, 2025-001662, 2025-001732, 2025-003016,
25-004328, 2025-004354, 2025-004400, 2025-004545
Corrective Action
Documents
Tracking Reports
TR-YYYY-NNNN
25-004404
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Reports
CR-YYYY-NNNN
25-005084
Exercise TSC Controller/Evaluator Logs
Exercise TSC Player Logs
Annex V
Terrorist Incident Response, Hood County
5/1/2015
Annex V
Terrorist Incident Response, Somervell County
Miscellaneous
CPSES-
200501686/TXX-
05150
Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), Docket
Nos. 50-445 and 50-446; 30-Day Response to NRC
Bulletin 2005-02, "Emergency Preparedness and Response
to Actions for Security-Based Events"
8/17/2005
Position Assistance Document for TSC Manager
Position Assistance Document for TSC ENS Communicator
Position Assistance Document for TSC Communications
Coordinator
Position Assistance Document for TSC OPS Coordinator
EPP-100
Maintaining Emergency Preparedness
EPP-109
Duties and Responsibilities of the Emergency
Coordinator/Recovery Manager
EPP-116
Emergency Repair & Damage Control and Immediate
Entries
Procedures
EPP-206
Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations
Facility (EOF)
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
EPP-207
Activation and Operation of the Joint Information Center
(JIC)
EPP-303
Operation of Computer Based, Emergency Dose
Assessment System
LFE-2.0
Control Room Response to Armed Assault
CP-201500423,
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Docket Nos. 50-445,
50-446, and 72-74; Transmittal of the Comanche Peak
Nuclear Power Plant Biennial Emergency Preparedness
Exercise Scenario
4/10/2015
CP-202500169,
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP), Docket
Nos. 50-445 and 50-446; Transmittal of the CPNPP 2025
Biennial Emergency Preparedness Scenario
6/16/2025
Miscellaneous
EPP-201, EAL
Tech Bases
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Emergency Action
Level Technical Bases Document
EPP-201
Assessment of Emergency Action Levels, Emergency
Classification and Plan Activation
Procedures
EPP-304
Protective Action Recommendations
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
CR-YYYY-NNNN
24-005964, 2025-001523
Monthly ERO Rosters: July 2024 - June 2025
SG-020,
LORT Cycle 25-4 LO44BBS 023
06/24/2025
SG-020,
BLUE Team Exercise
03/19/2025
SG-020,
LORT Cycle 25-2 LO44BBS001
2/19/2025
SG-020,
LORT Cycle 24-6 LO44BBSO27
09/23/2024
SG-020,
LORT Cycle 24-6 LO44BBSO27
10/07/2024
71151
Miscellaneous
SG-020,
NRC Performance Indicators Monthly Summaries:
July 2024 - June 2025
28