IR 05000440/2002006
| ML023030623 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/2002 |
| From: | Ring M NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB1 |
| To: | Kanda W FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR-02-006 | |
| Download: ML023030623 (36) | |
Text
October 30, 2002
SUBJECT:
PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT USNRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-440/02-06
Dear Mr. Kanda:
On September 30, 2002, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) completed an inspection at your Perry Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on October 10, 2002, with Mr. T. Rausch and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified two issues of very low safety significance (Green). The issues were determined to involve violations of USNRC requirements. However, because of their very low safety significance and because they have been entered into your corrective action program, the USNRC is treating these issues as Non-Cited Violations in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the USNRCs Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the subject or severity of these Non-Cited Violations, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III, 801 Warrenville Road, Lisle, IL 60532-4351; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the Resident Inspector Office at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant.
During this past year, in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the USNRC issued an Order and several threat advisories to commercial power reactors to strengthen licensees capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack. The USNRC established a deadline of September 1, 2002, for licensees to complete modifications and process upgrades required by the Order. In order to confirm compliance with this Order, the USNRC issued Temporary Instruction 2515/148 and over the next year, the USNRC will inspect each licensee in accordance with this Temporary Instruction. The USNRC continues to monitor overall security controls and may issue additional temporary instructions or require additional inspections should conditions warrant. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the USNRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the USNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of USNRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the USNRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Mark A. Ring, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-440 License No. NPF-58
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-440/02-06
REGION III==
Docket No:
50-440 License No:
NPF-58 Report No:
50-440/02-06 Licensee:
First Energy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC)
Facility:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Location:
P.O. Box 97 A200 Perry, OH 44081 Dates:
July 1, 2002 through September 30, 2002 Inspectors:
Ray Powell, Senior Resident Inspector Billy Dickson, Jr., Acting Senior Resident Inspector John Ellegood, Resident Inspector John E. House, Senior Radiation Specialist Approved by:
Mark A. Ring, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000440-02-06; First Energy Nuclear Operating Company; on 07/01-09/30/2002; Perry
Nuclear Power Plant. Maintenance Effectiveness, Surveillance Testing.
This report covers a 3-month period of baseline resident inspections and an announced baseline inspection on radiation protection. The inspections were conducted by resident inspectors and regional specialist inspectors. This inspection identified two Green findings which involved Non-Cited Violations. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after USNRC management review. The USNRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A.
Inspection Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green.
The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(2) for the licensees failure to demonstrate that the performance of the rod control and information system (RCIS) was being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate maintenance. The licensee's failure to consider the rod insertion function of the RCIS when evaluating system performance was determined to be the cause of the error.
The issue was evaluated as having very low risk significance (Green) since, although the mitigation system cornerstone was affected in that reactivity control was degraded by loss of a RCIS safety function, no actual loss of rod insertion ability occurred due to other methods being available. (Section 1R12)
- Green.
The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4 for the licensees failure to follow procedures regarding tagging of improperly reading equipment. The primary cause was the cross-cutting issue of human performance since the technicians and operators failed to recognize out-of-specification data in the partially completed surveillance indicated equipment degradation.
The finding was more than minor because an indication used by control room personnel for vessel level did not read correctly and under other circumstances a failure of a control function could have been overlooked. The finding was of low safety significance because no loss of automatic protective functions occurred and other indications of vessel level were available to operators. (Section 1R22)
Licensee-Identified Violations
A violation of very low significance which was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation is listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
The plant began the inspection period with Unit 1 at 100 percent power. On July 4, the licensee reduced power to 75 percent after declaring a main steam isolation valve (MSIV) inoperable following evaluation of surveillance practices. The same day, the licensee successfully tested the MSIV and began power ascension. On July 5, the plant reached 100 percent power. On July 30, the plant isolated the hydraulic power unit to recirculation flow control valve A to repair a leak on the hydraulics. While the hydraulics were isolated, the flow control valve slowly drifted in the closed direction lowering power to 97 percent. On September 11, 2002, the licensee isolated one train of circulating water due to a condenser tube leak. As a result, operators reduced power to about 97 percent in order to maintain a condenser vacuum. On September 16, the licensee reduced power to 65 percent to effect repairs on the condenser.
Following repairs, on September 18, 2002, the licensee returned to 100 percent power. On September 22, the plant scrammed during performance of routine turbine overspeed testing.
The plant remained shutdown for the rest of the reporting period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees hot weather preparations to verify the licensees implementation of procedures to ensure availability of mitigating systems when challenged by extreme weather. The inspectors reviewed applicable licensee procedures and condition reports, walked down portions of the turbine building chilled water system and discussed hot weather preparations with licensee personnel. During the week of July 1, 2002, the inspectors verified that the licensee was trending temperatures on several key plant parameters adversely affected by abnormally high ambient air temperature.
b. Findings
No finding of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Complete System Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a complete walkdown of accessible portions of the residual heat removal (RHR) system to verify system operability during the week ending August 10, 2002. The RHR system was selected due to its risk significance. The inspectors used RHR system valve lineup instructions (VLIs) and system drawings to accomplish the inspection.
The inspectors observed selected switch and valve positions, electrical power availability, component labeling, and general material condition. The inspectors also reviewed open system engineering issues as identified in the licensees quarterly system health reports, outstanding maintenance work requests, and a sampling of licensee condition reports (CRs) to verify that problems and issues were identified, and corrected, at an appropriate threshold. The documents used for the walkdown and issue review are listed in the attached List of Documents Reviewed.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Partial System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a partial walkdown of the fire protection system while the diesel driven fire pump was out of service for planned maintenance during the week ending August 10, 2002.
The inspectors used licensee VLIs and system drawings during the walkdowns. The walkdowns included selected switch and valve position checks and verification of electrical power to critical components. Finally, the inspectors evaluated other elements, such as material condition, housekeeping, and component labeling. The documents used for the walkdowns are listed in the attached List of Documents Reviewed.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors walked down the following areas to assess the overall readiness of fire protection equipment and barriers:
- Fire Area 1DG-1a, Diesel Generator Building 620, Division 1 Diesel Generator;
- Fire Area 1RB-1b, Unit 1 Reactor Building - El. 599'-9";
- Fire Area 1RB-1b, Unit 1 Reactor Building - El. 620'-6";
- Fire Area 1RB-1b, Unit 1 Reactor Building - El. 642'-6";
- Fire Area 1RB-1b, Unit 1 Reactor Building - El. 654'-0";
- Fire Area 1RB-1b, Unit 1 Reactor Building - El. 664'-7";
- Fire Area 1CC-6, Unit 1 Control Complex Floor 6;
- Fire Zone FH-3, Fuel Handling Building-El. 620"-6"; and
- Heater Bay.
Emphasis was placed on the control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, the material condition of fire protection equipment, and the material condition and operational status of fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or propagation.
The inspectors looked at fire hoses, sprinklers, and portable fire extinguishers to verify that they were installed at their designated locations, were in satisfactory physical condition, and were unobstructed. The inspectors also evaluated the physical location and condition of fire detection devices. Additionally, passive features such as fire doors, fire dampers, and mechanical and electrical penetration seals were inspected to verify that they were in good physical condition. The documents listed at the end of the report were used by the inspectors during the assessment of this area.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R06 Flood Protection
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation of Jersey barrier placement in the swale that accepts emergency service water (ESW) discharge when the normal ESW discharge path is not available. The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation of the potential for flooding in the auxiliary building as a result of this placement. During the week ending August 10, the inspectors walked down the areas affected by the Jersey barrier placement.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R7 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07A)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees test data on the performance of diesel generator (DG) 1 and 2 water jackets. The inspection validated correlation between test conditions and actual service conditions, periodicity of testing frequency, test acceptance criteria, and trends in heat exchanger performance. In addition, the inspectors walked down portions of the system applicable to monitoring of heat exchanger performance.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
On August 6, 2002, the resident inspectors observed licensed operator performance in the plant simulator. The evaluated scenario included an unisolable leak in the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system and a stuck control rod.
The inspectors evaluated crew performance in the areas of:
- clarity and formality of communication;
- ability to take timely action in the safe direction;
- prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying of alarms;
- correct use and implementation of procedures, including alarm response procedures;
- timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; and
- group dynamics.
The inspectors also observed the licensees evaluation of crew performance to verify that the training staff had observed important performance deficiencies and specified appropriate remedial actions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the maintenance rule requirements to verify that component and equipment failures were identified and scoped within the maintenance rule and that select structures, systems, and components were properly categorized and classified as (a)(1) or (a)(2) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65. The inspectors reviewed station logs, maintenance work orders, selected surveillance test procedures, and a sample of CRs to verify that the licensee was identifying issues related to the maintenance rule at an appropriate threshold and that corrective actions were appropriate. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensees performance criteria to verify that the criteria adequately monitored equipment performance and to verify that licensee changes to performance criteria were reflected in the licensees probabilistic risk assessment. During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed:
- rod control and information system (RCIS); and
- Fire Protection System.
The problem identification and resolution CRs reviewed are listed in the attached List of Documents Reviewed.
b. Findings
The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) in that the licensee failed to adequately demonstrate the performance or condition of some functions of the rod control and information system. This was a Non-Cited Violation.
For over a year, the Perry plant has experienced rod control and information system lockups. During a lockup, the ability to manually move a control rod in or out is lost.
While the majority of the lockups were able to be reset from the control room, 10 hard lockups (defined as a lockup which could not be reset from the control room) were experienced in the past 15 months. The majority of the hard lockups were due to transponder card failures.
Despite this loss of movement capability, the system was not considered for (a)(1)monitoring under the maintenance rule. Further investigation revealed that the licensee did not consider the lockups to be a functional failure under the maintenance rule. The licensees maintenance rule program includes a function of the C11 (RCIS and rod control hydraulics) to manually insert control rods for reactor shutdown and alternate reactivity control using one nonsafety-related control rod drive (CRD) pump. When questioned, the licensee stated that this function can be met without RCIS by using Perry Emergency Instruction (PEI) 1.6, Increased Cooling Water Differential Pressure.
This procedure provides a method of control rod insertion during an anticipated transient without scram when the reactor protection system and alternate rod injection fail and RCIS is not available.
The inspectors concluded, however, that an RCIS lockup which prevented RCIS manual rod movement was a functional failure with respect to the maintenance rule.
Specifically, PEI-B13, Reactor Pressure Vessel Control and PEI-T23, Containment Control both invoke PEI 1.3, Manual Rod Insertion. PEI 1.3 stated that RCIS was needed to insert rods. Paragraph
- (b) of 10 CFR 50.65 stated, in part, that the scope of the monitoring program specified in paragraph (a)(1) shall include nonsafety-related structures, systems, or components that are relied upon to mitigate accidents or transients or are used in plant emergency operating procedures. Although the RCIS was scoped within the maintenance rule, the licensee failed to consider the rod insertion function of the RCIS when evaluating system performance.
10 CFR 50.65 (a)(2) stated, in part, that monitoring as specified in 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1)was not required where it had been demonstrated that the performance or condition of a structure, system, and component (SSC) is being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance, such that the SSC remains capable of performing its intended function. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to demonstrate that the performance of the RCIS was being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate maintenance.
The inspectors determined that the violation was more than minor using guidance in Appendix E of Inspection Manual Chapter 0612. Specifically, the violation was more than minor because equipment performance problems resulted in 10 hard lockups since May 2001. Thus, demonstration that the performance of the system was effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate maintenance such that the system remained capable of performing its intended function could not be justified.
Using the SDP, this issue was evaluated as having very low risk significance (Green)since, although the mitigation system cornerstone was affected in that reactivity control was degraded when a safety function of the RCIS was lost, no actual loss of rod insertion ability occurred due to other methods being available. This violation is being treated as a NCV (NCV 50-440/02-06-01) consistent with Section VI.A. of the USNRC Enforcement Policy. This violation was entered in the licensees corrective action system as CR 02-03555.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation of plant risk, scheduling, configuration control, and performance of maintenance associated with planned and emergent work activities, to verify that scheduled and emergent work activities were adequately managed. In particular, the inspectors reviewed the licensees program for conducting maintenance risk assessments to verify that the licensees planning, risk management tools, and the assessment and management of on-line and shutdown risk were adequate. The inspectors also reviewed licensee actions to address increased on-line and shutdown risk when equipment was out of service for maintenance, such as establishing compensatory actions, minimizing the duration of the activity, obtaining appropriate management approval, and informing appropriate plant staff, to verify that the actions were accomplished when on-line and shutdown risk was increased due to maintenance on risk-significant structures, systems, and components. The following specific assessments were reviewed:
- The maintenance risk assessment for work involving the inspection of the containment vessel cooling system air handling unit;
- The maintenance risk assessment for work involving the replacement and testing of the fire jockey pump and testing of the diesel and motor driven fire pumps;
- The maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week beginning July 22, 2002. The work week included switchyard work, control complex chiller activities, and instrumentation and control surveillances;
- The maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week beginning August 5, 2002. The work week included an increased risk profile due to switchyard work and planned maintenance on the diesel driven fire pump; and
- The shutdown risk assessment for the forced outage commenced September 22, 2002. Significant work activities included replacement of the recirculating pump A seal package, modification of the scram discharge volume vent and drain valves, and work on the division 2 DG.
Finally, the inspectors reviewed CR 02-02614, Resident Inspector Question Regarding Method of Posting Protected Trains, which was generated as a result of inspection activities.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions
a. Inspection Scope
- The inspectors observed licensee activities to test and establish hydrogen water chemistry throughout the month of August 2002. The inspectors attended crew briefs, reviewed implementing procedures, and observed pre-startup testing.
Emphasis was placed on communications between project personnel and the control room as well as monitoring of plant response.
- The inspectors observed licensee response to a catastrophic failure of a diesel fire pump battery. During this failure, the battery ruptured and spilled acid in the diesel fire pump room. The inspectors observed licensee spill response, entry into off-normal instructions (ONIs), and establishment of protected trains. The inspectors reviewed the licensees logs, response procedures, CRs and immediate corrective actions.
- The inspectors observed mechanic and operator performance during adjustment of CRD speeds during the week ending September 7, 2002. The inspectors observed crew briefs, reviewed implementing procedures, and observed the speed adjustment process both at the hydraulic control units and in the control room.
- The inspectors reviewed licensee activities associated with the annual biocide treatment for zebra mussel control conducted in September 2002. The inspectors reviewed licensee heat exchanger flow verification data periodically throughout the monitoring period and reviewed the direct effect of the biocide treatment on the mussel population by observing monitoring boxes.
- The inspectors observed activities associated with the forced outage which began on September 22, 2002. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of operations activities during the plant cool down and the establishment of plant conditions for the replacement of the recirculating water pump A seal package. Additionally, the inspectors observed outage planning meetings, restart readiness meetings, other general outage activities, including shutdown safety assessments. Finally, the inspectors conducted a drywell closure tour.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected CRs related to potential operability issues for risk significant components and systems. These CRs were evaluated to determine whether the operability of the components and systems was justified. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TSs and Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) to the licensees evaluations to verify that the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors verified that the measures were in place, would work as intended, and were properly controlled. Additionally, the inspectors verified, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations. The inspectors reviewed:
- the licensees evaluation of the affect of an identified hole in a 3/8" post-accident sampling line on secondary containment operability;
- the licensees evaluation of the affect of improper testing of MSIV closure times on MSIV operability;
- the licensees evaluation of failure to perform complete inspections of ESW inlet and discharge tunnels;
- the licensees evaluation of the cause and effect of high oil level in the RCIC turbine;
- the licensees evaluation of the performance of the incorrect surveillance of the automatic depressurization system (ADS) manual inhibit function on ADS operability;
- the licensees evaluation of Division 2 DG jacking gear engaged alarm; and
- the licensees evaluation of high pressure core spray (HPCS) operability following HPCS flow anomaly and ESW water leg anomaly.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R16 Operator Workarounds (OWAs) (7111.16)
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors evaluated the overall effectiveness of the licensee operator workaround (OWA) program. The inspectors observed log readings and equipment manipulations made by selected operators to assess the overall effect of OWAs. The inspectors reviewed the licensee CRs in order to determine if issues identified in the corrective action program were also reviewed as part of and captured in the licensees OWA program. Any actions which indicated a potential problem that could increase initiating event frequencies, impact multiple mitigating systems, or affect the ability to respond to plant transients and accidents were considered as possible OWAs. Additionally, the inspectors discussed the effect of active OWAs with operators.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed selected OWAs to determine if the OWAs adversely affected the operators ability to respond to an initiating event. OWAs reviewed were:
- Loss of heat balance updates; and
- Incorrect readings on reactor pressure vessel (RPV) level channel C
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed portions of the design and installation of the hydrogen water chemistry modification. The inspectors reviewed associated safety evaluations and design criteria to evaluate impact of the modification on the design basis, licensing basis and interfacing systems. The inspection included physical observation of installed components and discussions with key project personnel.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities for risk significant systems to assess the following (as applicable): the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate; tests were performed as written; and equipment was returned to its operational status following testing. The inspectors evaluated the activities against TS, the USAR, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various USNRC generic communications. In addition, the inspectors reviewed CRs associated with post-maintenance testing to determine if the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action program. The specific procedures and CRs reviewed are listed in the attached List of Documents Reviewed. The following post-maintenance activities were reviewed:
- S-610 Generator Output Breaker;
- C71 Agastat Relay Replacement;
- Upper air lock outer door seal;
- Leak on Hydraulic Power Unit;
- Nuclear Closed Cooling Valve maintenance and testing;
- Standby Liquid Control Pump A;
- Diesel Fire Pump Battery Replacement; and
- 3D-Monicore Control Blade History Dynamic Arrays Update.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed surveillance testing or reviewed test data for risk-significant systems or components to assess compliance with TS, 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, and licensee procedure requirements. The testing was also evaluated for consistency with the USAR. The inspectors verified that the testing demonstrated that the systems were ready to perform their intended safety functions. The inspectors reviewed whether test control was properly coordinated with the control room and performed in the sequence specified in the surveillance instruction (SVI), and if test equipment was properly calibrated and installed to support the surveillance tests. The procedures reviewed are listed in the attached List of Documents Reviewed. The specific surveillance activities assessed included:
- Division 1 Emergency DG Monthly Surveillance Test;
- RCIC System Quarterly Surveillance/Trip Throttle Valve Operability Verification;
- RHR A Pump and Valve Operability Test; and
- RPV Low Level 1 and 2 Channel C Calibration for 1B21-N081C
b. Findings
The inspectors identified a Green finding after the licensee failed to identify improperly reading plant indications and inform operators of the deficiency following partial completion of a surveillance. This finding identifies a Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification 5.4 for failing to follow procedures for equipment control.
On August 29, the inspectors observed licensee performance of a biannual calibration of RPV low level 1 and 2 Channel C, conducted in accordance with procedure SVI-B21T0062C, RPV Low Level 1&2 Channel C Calibration for 1B21-N081C, as required by TS 3.3.6.1. During the performance of the surveillance, the technicians obtained unexpected results in the response of a programmable logic controller. The technicians suspected that the battery used in their test equipment lacked charge. After obtaining approval of the Unit Supervisor, the technicians replaced the battery and reperformed the steps with identical results. The technicians informed the Unit Supervisor that they still suspected a test equipment problem. The Unit Supervisor confirmed that TS-related data was satisfactory, then directed the technicians to restore the system per the procedure. The inspectors subsequently reviewed the data collected during performance of the SVI and observed that several data points related to the RPV level channel C digital display and chart recorder were outside the leave-as-is zone.
The inspectors provided the results to the responsible system engineer (RSE) who, after review, stated that the system likely had a problem with an optical isolator or power supply. The RSE also stated the hypothesized problems would not affect the Technical Specifications required functions of the system. Instrumentation and control supervision agreed that measuring and test equipment problems did not fully explain the results.
The inspectors also spoke with the Shift Manager regarding treatment of the indicators that were outside the leave-as-is zone and the Shift Manager agreed to investigate. The following day, the Shift Manager applied tags to the chart recorder and digital display to alert operators that the readings were not correct. Subsequent troubleshooting identified that a power supply for the loop had failed.
The performance deficiency associated with this finding is failure to follow procedures for informing operators of instrumentation in the control room which may not read correctly. TS 5.4 requires implementation of procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33. Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires procedures for equipment control. One of the procedures governing equipment control, PAP-1404, Miscellaneous Tagging, requires that Not-In-Service Stickers be used to inform operators when instrumentation in the control room may not read correctly. Contrary to this requirement, the operators did not label this equipment until the inspectors inquired about control of the indications outside the leave-as-is zone. This issue is more than minor because the inspectors concluded, that if left uncorrected, it would become a more significant safety concern.
In this instance, surveillance revealed an equipment fault existed, licensee personnel failed to recognize the fault, and the affected indications were not identified to operators until the inspectors questioned the surveillance data. The operators failed to recognize that the partially completed surveillance contained discrepant data and under other circumstances, the discrepant data could have indicated inoperability of mitigating systems. Further, the indication in question could have been used for control of RPV level despite its improper indication. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) since the indicators in question have no direct control functions and redundant indicators were available.
The licensee entered this finding into the corrective action program (CR 02-03355).
Because of the very low safety significance and because the issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program, it is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the USNRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-440/02-06-02).
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the control of a temporary modification to jumper around a low level switch to permit manual operation of the drywell equipment drain sump. The inspection included review of the temporary modification package, interviews with operators and walkdown of the radiological waste control room. The inspectors verified completion of a 50.59 screen and compared the temporary configuration with USAR requirements.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the technical support center and the operations support center during an emergency preparedness drill conducted on September 12, 2002. The inspection focused on the ability of the licensee to appropriately classify emergency conditions, complete timely notifications, and implement appropriate protective action recommendations in accordance with approved procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
2OS1 Access Control (71121.01)
.1 Plant Walkdowns, Radiological Boundary Verifications, and Radiation Work Permit
Reviews
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the radiologically restricted area to verify the adequacy of radiological boundaries and postings. Specifically, the inspectors walked down several high and locked high radiation area boundaries in the Auxiliary, Radwaste, and Containment Buildings. Confirmatory radiation measurements were taken to verify that these areas and selected radiation areas were properly posted and controlled in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20, licensee procedures and Technical Specifications.
Radiation Work Permit 020053 was reviewed and the pre-job briefing was attended to verify that protective clothing requirements, electronic dosimetry alarm set points for both dose rate and accumulated dose were adequate based on radiological conditions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety
2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems (71122.01)
.1 Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Annual Environmental and Effluent Release Report for the year 2001 to verify that the radiological effluent program was implemented as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), and to ensure that any anomalies in the release data were adequately understood by the licensee. The inspectors reviewed changes made by the licensee to the ODCM as well as to the liquid and gaseous radioactive waste processing system design, procedures, or operation since the last inspection to verify that changes were documented in accordance with the requirements of the ODCM and the Technical Specifications.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Gaseous and Liquid Release Systems Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed walkdowns of the major components of the gaseous and liquid release systems to verify that the current system configuration was as described in the USAR and the ODCM, and to observe ongoing activities and equipment material condition. This included radiation and flow monitors, demineralizers and filtration systems, compressors, tanks, and vessels. The inspectors also discussed the waste processing system operations and components with the cognizant system engineer to assess its overall operation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Releases
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed liquid and gaseous radioactive waste release records including radiochemical measurements to verify that appropriate treatment equipment was used, that the radwaste effluents were processed and released in accordance with the ODCM, and that releases met the 10 CFR Part 20 requirements. The inspectors also observed the collection and preparation for analysis of a liquid radwaste sample to verify that the sampling and analysis processes were in compliance with station procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Dose Calculations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed selected individual batch release records for the years 2001 and 2002, along with the Annual Environmental and Effluent Release Report for the year 2001, to ensure that the licensee had properly determined the offsite dose to the public from radiological effluent releases, and to determine if any annual Technical Specification or ODCM (i.e., Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 values) limits were exceeded.
Additionally, the licensees current dose assessment software verification test was reviewed.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Air Cleaning Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed air cleaning system surveillance test results for the annulus exhaust gas treatment systems including activated carbon testing by a vendor laboratory to ensure that test results were within the licensee's acceptance criteria. The inspectors reviewed surveillance test results for the gaseous release systems to verify that the flow rates were consistent with USAR values.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.6 Effluent Monitor Calibrations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed calibration records of liquid and gaseous point of discharge effluent radiation monitors to verify that instrument calibrations were within the required calibration frequency. The inspectors also reviewed the current effluent radiation monitor alarm setpoint values for agreement with station requirements.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.7 Counting Room Instrument Calibrations and Quality Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the quality control records for radiochemistry instrumentation used to identify and quantitate radioisotopes in effluents, in order to verify that the instrumentation was calibrated and maintained as required by station procedures. This review included calibrations of gamma spectroscopy/spectrometry systems, liquid scintillation instruments, and associated instrument control charts.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.8 Interlaboratory Comparison Program
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed selected data from the Interlaboratory Comparison Program along with the radiochemistry quality control program (Section
.7 ) in order to evaluate
the licensees capability to perform radiochemical measurements, and to assess the quality of radioactive effluent sample analyses performed by the licensee. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's quality assurance evaluation of the Interlaboratory Comparison Program and associated corrective actions for any deficiencies identified.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.9 Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed audits, self-assessments, and condition reports generated in 2001 and 2002 to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensees self-assessment process in the identification, characterization, and prioritization of problems, and to verify that previous radiological instrumentation and effluent related issues were adequately addressed. Condition reports that addressed radioactive treatment and monitoring program deficiencies were also reviewed to verify that the licensee had effectively implemented the corrective action program.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
SAFEGUARDS
Cornerstone: Physical Protection
3PP1 Response to Contingency Events (71130.03)
The Office of Homeland Security developed a Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist attacks. The HSAS implements five color-coded threat conditions with a description of corresponding actions at each level. USNRC Regulatory Information Summary (RIS) 2002-12a, dated August 19, 2002, "USNRC Threat Advisory and Protective Measures System,"
discusses the HSAS and provides additional information on protective measures to licensees.
a. Inspection Scope
On September 10, 2002, the USNRC issued a Safeguards Advisory to reactor licensees to implement the protective measures described in RIS 2002-12a in response to the Federal government declaration of threat level "Orange."
The inspector interviewed licensee personnel and security staff, observed the conduct of security operations, and assessed licensee implementation of the protective measures.
Inspection results were communicated to the region and headquarters security staff for further evaluation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems
.1 Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems PI Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed reported second quarter 2002 data for Unplanned Power Changes and Heat Removal System Unavailability PIs using the definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Revision 2. The inspectors reviewed station logs, CRs, TS logs, and surveillance procedures to verify the accuracy of the licensees data submission.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
(Closed) URI 50-440/02-02-01: Safety System Unavailability Hours During Surveillance Testing.
The inspectors determined that the licensees use of managed restoration instructions during safety system surveillance testing was not consistent with the guidance provided in NEI 99-02. The licensee entered the issue in their corrective action program as CR 02-0946. The licensee reviewed affected testing procedures, recalculated, and resubmitted data to the USNRC. 10 CFR Part 50.9 requires, in part, that information provided to the Commission by a licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Although the submitted PI data for safety system unavailability was inaccurate, the inspectors concluded that the Green to White PI threshold was not crossed and thus the USNRCs regulatory response was not affected. As such, the issue was determined to be a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the USNRCs Enforcement Policy.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
As discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensees corrective action system at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. Minor issues entered into the licensees corrective action system as a result of inspectors observations are generally denoted in the report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Corrective Action Following a Fire in Containment
a. Inspection Scope
In January of 2002, a temporary power cable in containment caught fire. During the subsequent investigations, the inspectors identified inadequate separation between power cables as well as inadequate requirements for testing of heat detectors. This inspection reviewed the licensees corrective actions for these issues. The inspectors reviewed the fire protection program to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions to capture applicable requirements for surveillances on fire protection systems. In addition, the inspectors performed walk downs of the facility to evaluate effectiveness of corrective actions related to maintenance of electrical separation requirements for temporary power cords.
The inspectors reviewed the license for the facility to determine applicable codes of records for the fire protection program. After obtaining the applicable codes, the inspectors compared code requirements to the programmatic requirements of the licensees fire protection program.
b.
Issues During comparison of code requirements with the licensees program, the inspectors identified that the licensee had not included lubrication of outside stem and yoke valves in their inspection program. The licensee has entered this condition into their corrective action program (CR 02-02633). Similar observations were documented in other condition reports; therefore, the licensee initiated a separate condition report to review compliance with National Fire Protection Association testing requirements. The inspectors concluded that each of these conditions was minor in nature.
4OA3 Event Followup
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors responded to the site to observe operator actions and plant conditions following an automatic scram from 90 percent power early in the morning of September 22, 2002. The scram occurred during a routine weekly test of the turbine overspeed protection trip devices. The inspectors followed up on the event by interviewing licensee personnel, reviewing plant logs, chart recorders, sequence of event recorders, and other documents. The inspectors also walked down the control panels and discussed the timeline of the event with licensee personnel.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. T. Rausch, General Manager and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 10, 2002. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
.2 Interim Exit Meetings
An interim exit was conducted for:
- Radiological Effluents and Access Control inspection with Mr. K. Ostrowski on July 11, 2002.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and was a violation of USNRC requirements which met the criteria of Section VI of the USNRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as NCVs.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
Surveillance requirement of TS 3.6.1.3.7 requires verification of MSIV isolation time at a frequency in accordance with the inservice testing program. The procedure used to fulfill this surveillance requirement was not adequate since it failed to measure full closure time. Instead, the surveillance measured closure time from control switch actuation to closed indication, which occurs with the valve 10 percent open. The licensee documented the improper testing methodology in CR-02-02176. Because the closure times of all MSIVs met surveillance requirements following analysis or retest, thus establishing operability, this violation was of very low safety significance.
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee W. Kanda, Vice President-Nuclear D. Bowen, Licensing G. Dunn, Manager, Regulatory Affairs R. Coad, Radiation Protection Manager R. Hayes, Chemistry Manager T. Lentz, Acting Director Nuclear Engineering L. Lindrose, Supervisor Nuclear Security Operations B. Luthanen, Compliance Engineer T. Mahon, Site Protection Section Manager K. Meade, Supervisor, Compliance K. Ostrowski, Director, Nuclear Maintenance J. Palinkas, Supervisor, Security Systems and Administration D. Phillips, Manager, Plant Engineering T. Rausch, General Manager, Nuclear Power Plant Department S. Sovizal, Supervisor, Security Training R. Strohl, Superintendent, Plant Operations LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-440/02-06-01 NCV Failure to Demonstrate Effective Maintenance for the Rod Control and Information System 50-440/02-06-02 NCV Failure to Follow Procedures for Improperly Functioning Control Room Indications Closed 50-440/02-02-01 URI Safety System Unavailability Hours During Surveillance Testing 50-440/02-06-01 NCV Failure to Demonstrate Effective Maintenance for the Rod Control and Information System 50-440/02-06-02 NCV Failure to Follow Procedures for Improperly Functioning Control Room Indications LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ADS Automatic Depressurization System CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR Condition Report CRD Control Rod Drive DG Diesel Generator ESW Emergency Service Water FENOC FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company HSAS Homeland Security Advisory System HPCS High Pressure Core Spray M&TE Measuring and Test Equipment MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve NCV Non-Cited Violation NEI Nuclear Energy Institute USNRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OA Other Activities ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual OHS Office of Homeland Security ONI Off-Normal Instruction OWA Operator Workaround PEI Perry Emergency Instruction PI Performance Indicator RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RCIS Rod Control Indicating System RHR Residual Heat Removal RIS Regulatory Issue Summary RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel RSE Responsible System Engineer SDP Significance Determination Process SSC Structure, System & Component SVI Surveillance Instruction TS Technical Specifications URI Unresolved Item USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report VLI Valve Lineup Instruction LIST OF
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
1R01
Adverse Weather
IOI-15
Seasonal Variation
November 10, 1995
OAI-0201
Operations Standing Instruction
July 2, 2002
Desk Guide 09
Seasonal Work Scheduling Desk Guide
Undated
1R04
Equipment Alignment
PTI-P54-P0033
Fire Suppression Systems Valve Position
Revision 5
Drawing D-914-001
Fire Service Yard Area
Revision LL
VLI-E12
Residual Heat Removal System
Revision 4
Drawing D-302-641
Residual Heat Removal System
Revision S
Drawing D-302-642
Residual Heat Removal System
Revision N
Drawing D-302-643
Residual Heat Removal System
Revision S
Perry Nuclear Engineering Department System
Health Report, Second Quarter 2002
Undated
CR 01-2880
SVI-E12-T2002
July 25, 2001
CR 01-2916
RHR A Pump Seal Leakage Has Increased
Significantly Since RF08
July 29, 2001
CR 01-3296
A RHR Pump Seal Replacement Exceeds
Dose Estimate
September 12, 2001
CR 01-3300
Evaluate RHR A Seal Replacement
September 12, 2001
CR 01-3648
As Found MOV Test Results for 1E12F0048B
Did Not Meet FTI-F0016 Criteria
October 15, 2001
CR 02-00863
Accumulation of Trash and Debris Under
Grating in RHR A Pump Room
March 24, 2002
CR 02-01568
Broken Pin on Limitorque Actuator
May 20, 2002
CR 02-01721
Low Margin of RHR A Motor Operated Valve
May 23, 2002
CR 02-01956
RHR System Venting
June 20, 2002
SOI-E12
System Operating Instruction Residual Heat
Removal System
July 18, 2002
1R05
Fire Protection
Drawing E-023-005
Fire Protection Evaluation - Unit 1 Auxiliary and
Reactor Buildings Plan - El. 599'-9"
March, 1991
Drawing E-023-010
Fire Protection Evaluation - Unit 1 Auxiliary and
Reactor Buildings Plan - El. 620'-6"
September, 2001
Drawing E-023-014
Fire Protection Evaluation - Unit 1 Reactor
Building and Auxiliary Roof Plan - El. 642-6"
March, 1991
Drawing E-023-018
Fire Protection Evaluation - Unit 1 Reactor
Building Plan - El. 654-0"
March, 1991
Drawing E-023-022
Fire Protection Evaluation - Units 1 and 2
Reactor Building Plan - El. 664-7"
March, 1991
Drawing E-023-019
Fire Protection Evaluation - Units 1 and 2
Control Complex Plan - Elevations 654-6",
679-6"
March, 1992
Drawing E-023-011
Fire Protection Evaluation - Units 1 and 2
Control Complex and Diesel Generator
Building Plan -
El. 620-6"
September, 2001
USAR Section
9A.4.1.1.2
Fire Area 1RB-1b
USAR Section
9A.4.4.6
Fire Areas, Floor 6
USAR Section
9A.4.5.1.1
Fire Area 1DG-1a
USAR Section
9A.4.7.4
Fire Zone FH-3
USAR Section
9A.4.12
Heater Bay
1R06
Flood Protection Measures
Memo Jim Staffiera to Ken Russell Subj:
Potential Reportability Issue Review Inadvertent
Placement of Jersey Barriers in Swale Area
August 1, 2002
CR 02-02332
Jersey Barrier Installation Without Proper
Design Consideration
July 16, 2002
USAR 2.4
Hydrologic Engineering
CR 02-0586
Latent Issues, ESW Flow Out to the Swale
February 26, 2002
1R07
Heat Sink Performance
R46-22
Div-1 DG Heat Exchanger performance Test
Evaluation
October 13, 1999
PTI-R46-P0001-A
Div. 1 Diesel Generator Jacket Water Heat
Exchanger Performance
November 29, 1994
Div. 1 DG JWHX U and UcorrTrend vs Months
Div. 2 DG JWHX U and UcorrTrend vs Months
Div. 3 DG JWHX U and UcorrTrend vs Months
SDM R46
Standby Diesel Generator Jacket Water Cooling
System
September 6, 1994
SDM P45
Emergency Service Water
October 18, 2002
Perry Nuclear Power Plant System Health Report
Second Quarter
2002
1R11
Licensed Operator Requalification
USNRC 2002 Exam Due Dates for
Crew/Staff/Certs
August 5, 2002
1R12
Maintenance Effectiveness
CR 02-02461
Maintenance Rule Classification of Rod Control
and Information System
July 25, 2002
Operations Logs
January 2002-31
March 2002
PEI-SPI 1.3
Manual Rod Insertion
Rev. 0
PEI-SPI-1.6
Increased Cooling Water DP
Rev. 0
RCI&IS Transponder Card Failures Chart
Terry Husted e-mail subj: Re: BWR6 RC&IS
Users Meeting
July 30, 2002
Maintenance Rule: Maintenance Rule Functions
River Bend
August 7, 2002
Maintenance Rule Functions, Performance
Criteria and Classifications-Perry
Rev. 5.04
PNPP System Health Report
First Quarter 2002
PNPP System Health Report
Second Quarter
2002
PEI-B13
Reactor Pressure Vessel Control
Rev. H
PEI-T23
Containment Control
Rev. F
CR 02-03232
RFA on Maintenance Rule For Fire Protection
September 12,
2002
CR 02-03555
Maintenance Rule Violation on Monitoring Rod
Control & Information System
September 19,
2002
Chapter 15, Accident Analysis
1R13
Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Week 11, Period 6 Forecast Risk Profile
July 22, 2002
Week 1, Period 7 Forecast Risk Profile
August 5, 2002
Shutdown Safety Assessment
September 26,
2002
CR 02-02614
Resident Inspector Question Regarding Method
of Posting Protected Trains
August 5, 2002
1R14
Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions
CR 02-02466
Incorrect Breaker Operated During F1A Ground
Isolation
WO 02-008007-00
480V Load Center Unit Substation F-1-A
July 24, 2002
SDM R23/24/25
480V AC Distribution
TXI-0289
Hydrogen Water Chemistry System - System
Startup and Tuning
Revision 1
CR 02-02875
Diesel Fire Pump Battery Failure
August 22, 2002
CR 02-02888
Jockey Fire Pump Local Disconnect Found in Off
August 22, 2002
Control Room Logs
August 22, 2002
ONI-ZZZ-5
Spills and Unauthorized Discharges
September 17, 2001
PAP-1910
June 3, 2002
IOI-4
Shutdown
Rev. 6
IOI-5
Maintaining Hot Standby or Hot Shutdown
Rev. 4
IOI-7
Cooldown Following a Reactor Scram Main
Condenser Available
Rev. 5
IOI-12
Maintain Cold Shutdown
Rev. 3
PTI-GEN-P0023
Zebra Mussel Monitoring
Rev. 1
PTI-GEN-P0024
Zebra Mussel Treatment
Rev. 3
PTI-C11-P0010
Control Rod Speed Adjustment
Rev. 2
1R15
Operability Evaluations
CR 02-01687
Hole in P87 Sample Line Discovered During
Heat Trace Work
May 30, 2002
USAR Section
6.2.3
Secondary Containment Functional Design
CR-02-01985
Intake/Discharge Tunnel Inspection Frequency
Concerns
June 20, 2002
USAR Section
3.8.4
Other Seismic Category 1 Structures
Emergency Service Water System-Divisions 1
and 2
Emergency Service Water System-Division 3
CR 02-02176
OE14030 Review Identifies Potential Non-
conservative MSIV Testing for USAR Data
July 2, 2002
USAR 15.6.4
Steam System Piping Break Outside
Containment
USAR 15.2.4
MSIV Closure
Primary Containment Isolation Valves
CR 02-02294
RCIC Turbine Oil Level is Increasing
July 10, 2002
CR 02-02347
SVI-B21-T5379A Does Not Have the Latest
Version of This Document in Curator
July 17, 2002
SVI-B21-T5379A
ECCS/ADS Division 1 Manual Inhibit Functional
Test
Revision 1
CR-02404
Division 2 D/G Jacking Device Engaged Alarm
July 21, 2002
AC Sources-Operating
SDM R43
Standby Diesel Generator System
Rev. 11
SDM R44
Standby Diesel Generator Starting Air
Rev. 6
Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS)-
Operating
Instrumentation
CR 02-02572
HPCS Pump Flow Indication Trending Up With
HPCS Not Running With SPCU in SER
August 2, 2002
CR-01903
HPCS Flow Instrument Reading Incorrectly
June 16, 2002
SDM-E22A
Rev. 7
1R16 Operator Workarounds (OWAs)
M&C.-14
Work Around Policy
February 15, 2000
Troubleshoot Low Flow Condition Perform Flow
Balance
August 21, 2000
ECP 01-5033
Site Storm/Runoff Drain System
August 21, 2000
Drywell Equipment Drain Sump Low Level Cutoff
Switch
November 11, 2001
CR 02-02257
Division 1 DG Jacket Water Heater did not Turn
Off Prior to High Alarm
July 9, 2002
Power Distribution Limits
PAP-1404
Miscellaneous Tagging
Rev. 3
CR 02-03000
Heat Balance Stopped Updating
August 30, 2002
1R17
Permanent Plant Modifications
DCP 98-0003A
March 24, 1999
PNPP 100076
Reinstate Wires Inadvertently Removed in the
Original 98003A Design Change Package
August 26, 1999
EPRI NP-5283-SR
Guidelines for Permanent BWR Hydrogen Water
Chemistry Installations
1987
Safety Evaluation Report Guidelines for
Permanent BWR Hydrogen Water Chemistry
Installations
July 1987
USAR 2.2
Nearby Industrial, Transportation and Military
Facilities
USAR 6.1.1
Metallic Materials
1R19
Post-Maintenance Testing
WO 02-004736-
000
Replace Normally Energized Agastat Relays
June 22, 2002
SVI-C71-T0051
Reactor Protection System Manual Scram
Channel Functional
April 27, 1988
SDM R10
System Description Manual, Plant Electrical
System
July 7, 1995
USAR 3.6.1.2
Primary Containment Airlocks
SDM T23/P53
Reactor Containment System
Rev. 8
WO 01-015735-
000
Upper Containment Airlock Pneumatic System
Leak Test
August 1, 2002
SVI-P53-T6312
Upper Primary Containment Air Lock
(Penetration P312), In Between The Seals Test
August 1, 2002
USAR 3.4.2
Flow Control Valves
SDM B33
Reactor Recirculation and Recirculation Flow
Control System
WO 02-008237-
000
Hydraulic Power Unit, Reactor Recirc Valve Flow
Control
July 31, 2002
SVI-C41-T2001A
Standby Liquid Control A Pump and Valve
Operability Test
Revision 0
Rework Loose Coupling Bearings
November 20, 2001
Diesel Fire Pump Battery
August 25, 2002
Diesel Fire Pump Battery
August 25, 2002
PTI-P54-P0027
Diesel Fire Pump Battery Specific Gravity Check
August 25, 2002
CR 02-02888
Jockey Fire Pump Local Disconnect Found In
Off
August 22, 2002
CR 02-02875
Diesel Fire Pump Battery Failure
August 22, 2002
PAP 1910
Rev. 5
USAR 9.5.1
Fire Protection System
USAR App 9A
Fire Hazards Analysis
1R22
Surveillance Testing
SVI-E51-T2001
RCIC Pump Quarterly Operability Test
July 18, 2002
CR 02-01789
Request for Assistance on RCIC Trip Valve
Operation
June 06, 2002
CR 02-01363
Cumulative Significance Evaluation of RCIC
Performance
July 13, 2002
CR 02-02368
Small Steam Leak at 1E51F0514
July 20, 2002
CR 02-01359
Sludge Found in RCIC Return Line Behind
Cover Plate
May 19, 2002
Verify Operation of the RCIC Turbine Overspeed
Linkage
July 17, 2002
SVI-E12-T2001
RHR A Pump and Valve Operability Test
Revision 10
CR 02-02730
Questionable Pump Suction Pressure Reading
During SVI-E12-T2001
August 13, 2002
CR 02-02725
Valves 1E12R008A-D and 1E12R008A-E Were
Mispositioned During SVI-E12-T2001
August 13, 2002
CR 02-03021
SVI-B21-T0062C Terminated Due to Suspected
Problems with M&TE
August 29, 2002
Special Operations
Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation
Instrumentation
SVI-B21T0062C
RPV Low Level 1&2 Channel C Calibration for
August 29, 2002
PAP-0205
Operability of Plant Systems
Rev. 10
TMP-2005
Instrumentation and Control Technician Training,
Qualification, and Certification Programs
Rev. 6
TMG-1007
Implementation of Training
Rev. 5
Online Training/Tracking Qualification Matrix
September 5, 2002
PAP-1404
Miscellaneous Tagging
Rev. 3
OJT-5000
Indoctrination
Rev. 2
PY20021095
3DMonicore Software Test
September 11, 2002
LRC02.055
Ltr Global Nuclear Fuel to Patrick Curran Perry
Cycle 9 3DMonicore Control Blade History (CBH)
Dynamic Arrays update
September 12, 2002
1R23 Temporary Modification Control
USAR 11.2
Liquid Waste Management Systems
TM 1-01-008
TM Tag Order
November 11, 2001
2OS1 Access Control To Radiological Areas
20053
Radiation Work Permit: Valve 1G33F0503
Revision 0
ALARA Briefing Checklist for RWP 020053
July 9, 2002
2PS2 Radiological Effluents
01-004394-000
LRW To ESW Radiation Monitor Channel
Functional For D17-K606 Surveillance
April 22, 2002
99-010218-000
Unit 2 Vent Noble Gas Rad Monitor Calibration
D17-T8037
October 29, 2001
01-004146-000
Unit 1 Vent Noble Gas Rad Monitor Calibration
D17-T8031
March 5, 2002
01-004391-000
Unit 2 Plant Vent Effluent System and Sampler
Flow Rate Monitor Calibration
April 24, 2002
01-004539-000
Unit 1 Plant Vent Effluent System and Sampler
Flow Rate Monitor Calibration
June 24, 2002
2-003062-000
Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System (B)
Charcoal Adsorber Operability Test and Plenum
Inspection
July 3, 2002
Nucon Certificate of Compliance: Iodine-131
Removal Efficiency Determination of Adsorbent
Sample
June 24, 2002
2-003064-000
Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System (A)
Charcoal Adsorber Operability Test and Plenum
Inspection
June 27, 2002
Nucon Certificate of Compliance: Iodine-131
Removal Efficiency Determination of Adsorbent
Sample
May 31, 2002
SVI-M15-T1240-B
Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System Train B
Flow and Filter Operability Test
June 27, 2002
Annual Environmental and Effluent Release
Report
March 2002
Liquid Radwaste Discharge 01-010L
March 10, 2001
Liquid Radwaste Discharge 01-028L
May 13, 2001
Liquid Radwaste Discharge 01-030L
May 15, 2001
Liquid Radwaste Discharge 02-010L
July 7, 2002
Liquid Radwaste Discharge 01-056L
July 26, 2001
Liquid Radwaste Discharge 01-039L
June 30, 2001
Liquid Radwaste Discharge 01-012L
March 20, 2001
Liquid Radwaste Discharge 01-043L
June 21, 2001
Liquid Radwaste Discharge 01-013L
March 21, 2001
Gaseous Effluent Dose Data
May 29, 2002
Gaseous Effluent Dose Data
May 1, 2002
Gaseous Effluent Dose Data
June 24, 2002
Analytics Cross Check Data: First Quarter 2001
Analytics Cross Check Data: Third Quarter 2001
Analytics Cross Check Data: Third Quarter 2000
Gamma Spectroscopy Analysis Data: Floor
Drain Sample Tank A
July 8, 2002
PA 01-09
Audit Report: Radiation Monitoring
November 20, 2001
2-01469
ESW Total Flow Monitor Operability
May 13, 2002
2-00579
0D17-K606 and 0D17-R170 ODCM Testing
Requirements
February 26, 2002
2-00590
RFA Deficiencies Identified on 1D17C5019
During Quarterly Lube and Belt Check
February 25, 2002
2-00047
Off-Gas Post Treatment Radiation Monitors
Hi/Low Flow Alarm
December 23, 2001
2-02134
Increased Dose Rates Around Septa Tube Box
Area on T647
June 28, 2002
2-00246
Increase in Xe-138 Value in Off Gas Sample
January 23, 2002
2-00263
Vendor Supplied Computer Software Error
January 24, 2002
2-00421
Xe-133 Increased on Off-Gas Pretreatment
Sample
February 9, 2002
2-00975
OM31A Carbon Sample Shipment Limitation Not
Met Due to Delay in Sample Count
April 1, 2002
2-01810
An Error Precursor Noticed During The
Performance of a LRW Discharge
June 8, 2002
2-01982
RFA Under plant Drain Radiation Monitors
Above High Alarm Setpoint
June 21, 2002
2-02211
Incorrect Geometry Used For HP Gas Counting
July 4, 2002
2-02170
Request For Assistance For Engineering To
Evaluate Setpoint Adjustment Met
July 2, 2002
2-01409
Tritium Values In Condensate have Exceeded
Limit in REC-0104
May 6, 2002
2-00694
Drywell D17 Gas Channel Alert Still Locked In
March 9, 2002
CHI-0003
MIDAS Routine Release Calculation Verification
Revision 1
SVI-G50 T5266
Liquid Radwaste Release Permit
Revision 8
Germanium Detectors #1 and #3 Calibration
Data
January/February
2002
Lower Limit of Detection Data for Liquid Effluents
3PP1
Response to Contingency Events (71130.03)
RIS-2002-12a
USNRC Threat Advisory and Protective
Measures System
August 19, 2002
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator
Guideline, Rev. 2
November 2001
Logs
Plant Narrative Logs
October 1, 2001 -
June 30, 2002
Logs
Monthly Safety System Unavailability Logs
January, 2002-
June, 2002
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
NFPA 13A
Inspection and Maintenance of Sprinkler
Systems
1981
Standard for Inspection, Testing and
Maintenance of Water Based Fire Protection
Systems
1992
PAP-1910
June 3, 2002
PY-NRR/CEI-
272L
Fire Protection Program FSAR/Technical
Specification Changes for the Perry Nuclear
Power Plant
November 29, 1985
PY-CEI/NRR-
0393L
Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Nos. 50-440;
50-441 Fire Protection Program FSAR and
Technical Specification Changes
November 15, 1985
CR 02-00240
Sensitivity Check of Smoke Detectors in
Containment
January 23, 2002
CR 02-00243
RFA to Evaluate Duct Mounted Smoke Detector
Testing Methodology
January 17, 2002
CR 02-00280
Procedural Guidance Required for Heat Detector
Testing
January 29, 2002
CR 02-00288
RWCU HT. EXCHGR Room Fire Detection
Capability
January 24, 2002
USAR 9.5.1
Fire Protection System
CR-02-00069
Temporary Power Cable Separation Violation
January 8, 2002
CR-02-00057
Extension Cord Overheats Causing Smoke in
Containment
January 7, 2002
4OA3 Event response
Scram No. 1-02-
Post Scram Restart Report
September 26, 2002
Problem Solving Plan Summary: Determine the
Cause of the Main Turbine Trip Resulting in a
Reactor Scram on 9/22/02-CR 02-3378
September 23, 2002
Data
Plant Computer Data
September 22, 2002
Logs
Plant Narrative Logs
September 22, 2002