Text

IR 05000440-02-006; on 07/01/2002 - 09/30/2002, Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Maintenance Effectiveness, Surveillance Testing
	ML023030623
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	10/30/2002
From:	Ring M; NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB1
To:	Kanda W; FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
References
	IR-02-006
	Download: ML023030623 (36)
	v • d • e

ber 30, 2002

SUBJECT:

PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT USNRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-440/02-06

Dear Mr. Kanda:

On September 30, 2002, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) completed an inspection at your Perry Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on October 10, 2002, with Mr. T. Rausch and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified two issues of very low safety significance (Green). The issues were determined to involve violations of USNRC requirements. However, because of their very low safety significance and because they have been entered into your corrective action program, the USNRC is treating these issues as Non-Cited Violations in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the USNRCs Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the subject or severity of these Non-Cited Violations, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III, 801 Warrenville Road, Lisle, IL 60532-4351; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the Resident Inspector Office at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant.

During this past year, in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the USNRC issued an Order and several threat advisories to commercial power reactors to strengthen licensees capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack. The USNRC established a deadline of September 1, 2002, for licensees to complete modifications and process upgrades required by the Order. In order to confirm compliance with this Order, the USNRC issued Temporary Instruction 2515/148 and over the next year, the USNRC will inspect each licensee in accordance with this Temporary Instruction. The USNRC continues to monitor overall security controls and may issue additional temporary instructions or require additional inspections should conditions warrant. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the USNRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the USNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of USNRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the USNRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Mark A. Ring, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-440 License No. NPF-58

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 50-440/02-06

REGION III==

Docket No: 50-440 License No: NPF-58 Report No: 50-440/02-06 Licensee: First Energy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC)

Facility: Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Location: P.O. Box 97 A200 Perry, OH 44081 Dates: July 1, 2002 through September 30, 2002 Inspectors: Ray Powell, Senior Resident Inspector Billy Dickson, Jr., Acting Senior Resident Inspector John Ellegood, Resident Inspector John E. House, Senior Radiation Specialist Approved by: Mark A. Ring, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000440-02-06; First Energy Nuclear Operating Company; on 07/01-09/30/2002; Perry

Nuclear Power Plant. Maintenance Effectiveness, Surveillance Testing.

This report covers a 3-month period of baseline resident inspections and an announced baseline inspection on radiation protection. The inspections were conducted by resident inspectors and regional specialist inspectors. This inspection identified two Green findings which involved Non-Cited Violations. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after USNRC management review. The USNRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. Inspection Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(2) for the licensees failure to demonstrate that the performance of the rod control and information system (RCIS) was being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate maintenance. The licensee's failure to consider the rod insertion function of the RCIS when evaluating system performance was determined to be the cause of the error.

The issue was evaluated as having very low risk significance (Green) since, although the mitigation system cornerstone was affected in that reactivity control was degraded by loss of a RCIS safety function, no actual loss of rod insertion ability occurred due to other methods being available. (Section 1R12)

Green.

The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4 for the licensees failure to follow procedures regarding tagging of improperly reading equipment. The primary cause was the cross-cutting issue of human performance since the technicians and operators failed to recognize out-of-specification data in the partially completed surveillance indicated equipment degradation.

The finding was more than minor because an indication used by control room personnel for vessel level did not read correctly and under other circumstances a failure of a control function could have been overlooked. The finding was of low safety significance because no loss of automatic protective functions occurred and other indications of vessel level were available to operators. (Section 1R22)

Licensee-Identified Violations

A violation of very low significance which was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation is listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

The plant began the inspection period with Unit 1 at 100 percent power. On July 4, the licensee reduced power to 75 percent after declaring a main steam isolation valve (MSIV) inoperable following evaluation of surveillance practices. The same day, the licensee successfully tested the MSIV and began power ascension. On July 5, the plant reached 100 percent power. On July 30, the plant isolated the hydraulic power unit to recirculation flow control valve A to repair a leak on the hydraulics. While the hydraulics were isolated, the flow control valve slowly drifted in the closed direction lowering power to 97 percent. On September 11, 2002, the licensee isolated one train of circulating water due to a condenser tube leak. As a result, operators reduced power to about 97 percent in order to maintain a condenser vacuum. On September 16, the licensee reduced power to 65 percent to effect repairs on the condenser.

Following repairs, on September 18, 2002, the licensee returned to 100 percent power. On September 22, the plant scrammed during performance of routine turbine overspeed testing.

The plant remained shutdown for the rest of the reporting period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather

Main article: IP 71111.01

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees hot weather preparations to verify the licensees implementation of procedures to ensure availability of mitigating systems when challenged by extreme weather. The inspectors reviewed applicable licensee procedures and condition reports, walked down portions of the turbine building chilled water system and discussed hot weather preparations with licensee personnel. During the week of July 1, 2002, the inspectors verified that the licensee was trending temperatures on several key plant parameters adversely affected by abnormally high ambient air temperature.

b. Findings

No finding of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

Main article: IP 71111.04

.1 Complete System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a complete walkdown of accessible portions of the residual heat removal (RHR) system to verify system operability during the week ending August 10, 2002. The RHR system was selected due to its risk significance. The inspectors used RHR system valve lineup instructions (VLIs) and system drawings to accomplish the inspection.

The inspectors observed selected switch and valve positions, electrical power availability, component labeling, and general material condition. The inspectors also reviewed open system engineering issues as identified in the licensees quarterly system health reports, outstanding maintenance work requests, and a sampling of licensee condition reports (CRs) to verify that problems and issues were identified, and corrected, at an appropriate threshold. The documents used for the walkdown and issue review are listed in the attached List of Documents Reviewed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a partial walkdown of the fire protection system while the diesel driven fire pump was out of service for planned maintenance during the week ending August 10, 2002.

The inspectors used licensee VLIs and system drawings during the walkdowns. The walkdowns included selected switch and valve position checks and verification of electrical power to critical components. Finally, the inspectors evaluated other elements, such as material condition, housekeeping, and component labeling. The documents used for the walkdowns are listed in the attached List of Documents Reviewed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

Main article: IP 71111.05Q

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors walked down the following areas to assess the overall readiness of fire protection equipment and barriers:

Fire Area 1DG-1a, Diesel Generator Building 620, Division 1 Diesel Generator;

Fire Area 1RB-1b, Unit 1 Reactor Building - El. 599'-9";

Fire Area 1RB-1b, Unit 1 Reactor Building - El. 620'-6";

Fire Area 1RB-1b, Unit 1 Reactor Building - El. 642'-6";

Fire Area 1RB-1b, Unit 1 Reactor Building - El. 654'-0";

Fire Area 1RB-1b, Unit 1 Reactor Building - El. 664'-7";

Fire Area 1CC-6, Unit 1 Control Complex Floor 6;

Fire Zone FH-3, Fuel Handling Building- El. 620"-6"; and

Heater Bay.

Emphasis was placed on the control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, the material condition of fire protection equipment, and the material condition and operational status of fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or propagation.

a. Inspection Scope

On August 6, 2002, the resident inspectors observed licensed operator performance in the plant simulator. The evaluated scenario included an unisolable leak in the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system and a stuck control rod.

The inspectors evaluated crew performance in the areas of:

clarity and formality of communication;

ability to take timely action in the safe direction;

prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying of alarms;

correct use and implementation of procedures, including alarm response procedures;

timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; and

group dynamics.

The inspectors also observed the licensees evaluation of crew performance to verify that the training staff had observed important performance deficiencies and specified appropriate remedial actions.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Main article: IP 71111.12Q

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the maintenance rule requirements to verify that component and equipment failures were identified and scoped within the maintenance rule and that select structures, systems, and components were properly categorized and classified as (a)(1) or (a)(2) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65. The inspectors reviewed station logs, maintenance work orders, selected surveillance test procedures, and a sample of CRs to verify that the licensee was identifying issues related to the maintenance rule at an appropriate threshold and that corrective actions were appropriate. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensees performance criteria to verify that the criteria adequately monitored equipment performance and to verify that licensee changes to performance criteria were reflected in the licensees probabilistic risk assessment. During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed:

rod control and information system (RCIS); and

Fire Protection System.

The problem identification and resolution CRs reviewed are listed in the attached List of Documents Reviewed.

b. Findings

The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) in that the licensee failed to adequately demonstrate the performance or condition of some functions of the rod control and information system. This was a Non-Cited Violation.

For over a year, the Perry plant has experienced rod control and information system lockups. During a lockup, the ability to manually move a control rod in or out is lost.

While the majority of the lockups were able to be reset from the control room, 10 hard lockups (defined as a lockup which could not be reset from the control room) were experienced in the past 15 months. The majority of the hard lockups were due to transponder card failures.

Despite this loss of movement capability, the system was not considered for (a)(1)monitoring under the maintenance rule. Further investigation revealed that the licensee did not consider the lockups to be a functional failure under the maintenance rule. The licensees maintenance rule program includes a function of the C11 (RCIS and rod control hydraulics) to manually insert control rods for reactor shutdown and alternate reactivity control using one nonsafety-related control rod drive (CRD) pump. When questioned, the licensee stated that this function can be met without RCIS by using Perry Emergency Instruction (PEI) 1.6, Increased Cooling Water Differential Pressure.

This procedure provides a method of control rod insertion during an anticipated transient without scram when the reactor protection system and alternate rod injection fail and RCIS is not available.

The inspectors concluded, however, that an RCIS lockup which prevented RCIS manual rod movement was a functional failure with respect to the maintenance rule.

Specifically, PEI-B13, Reactor Pressure Vessel Control and PEI-T23, Containment Control both invoke PEI 1.3, Manual Rod Insertion. PEI 1.3 stated that RCIS was needed to insert rods. Paragraph

(b) of 10 CFR 50.65 stated, in part, that the scope of the monitoring program specified in paragraph (a)(1) shall include nonsafety-related structures, systems, or components that are relied upon to mitigate accidents or transients or are used in plant emergency operating procedures. Although the RCIS was scoped within the maintenance rule, the licensee failed to consider the rod insertion function of the RCIS when evaluating system performance.

10 CFR 50.65 (a)(2) stated, in part, that monitoring as specified in 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1)was not required where it had been demonstrated that the performance or condition of a structure, system, and component (SSC) is being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance, such that the SSC remains capable of performing its intended function. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to demonstrate that the performance of the RCIS was being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate maintenance.

The inspectors determined that the violation was more than minor using guidance in Appendix E of Inspection Manual Chapter 0612. Specifically, the violation was more than minor because equipment performance problems resulted in 10 hard lockups since May 2001. Thus, demonstration that the performance of the system was effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate maintenance such that the system remained capable of performing its intended function could not be justified.

Using the SDP, this issue was evaluated as having very low risk significance (Green)since, although the mitigation system cornerstone was affected in that reactivity control was degraded when a safety function of the RCIS was lost, no actual loss of rod insertion ability occurred due to other methods being available. This violation is being treated as a NCV (NCV 50-440/02-06-01) consistent with Section VI.A. of the USNRC Enforcement Policy. This violation was entered in the licensees corrective action system as CR 02-03555.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Main article: IP 71111.13

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation of plant risk, scheduling, configuration control, and performance of maintenance associated with planned and emergent work activities, to verify that scheduled and emergent work activities were adequately managed. In particular, the inspectors reviewed the licensees program for conducting maintenance risk assessments to verify that the licensees planning, risk management tools, and the assessment and management of on-line and shutdown risk were adequate. The inspectors also reviewed licensee actions to address increased on-line and shutdown risk when equipment was out of service for maintenance, such as establishing compensatory actions, minimizing the duration of the activity, obtaining appropriate management approval, and informing appropriate plant staff, to verify that the actions were accomplished when on-line and shutdown risk was increased due to maintenance on risk-significant structures, systems, and components. The following specific assessments were reviewed:

The maintenance risk assessment for work involving the inspection of the containment vessel cooling system air handling unit;

The maintenance risk assessment for work involving the replacement and testing of the fire jockey pump and testing of the diesel and motor driven fire pumps;

The maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week beginning July 22, 2002. The work week included switchyard work, control complex chiller activities, and instrumentation and control surveillances;

The maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week beginning August 5, 2002. The work week included an increased risk profile due to switchyard work and planned maintenance on the diesel driven fire pump; and

The shutdown risk assessment for the forced outage commenced September 22, 2002. Significant work activities included replacement of the recirculating pump A seal package, modification of the scram discharge volume vent and drain valves, and work on the division 2 DG.

Finally, the inspectors reviewed CR 02-02614, Resident Inspector Question Regarding Method of Posting Protected Trains, which was generated as a result of inspection activities.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions

Main article: IP 71111.14

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed licensee activities to test and establish hydrogen water chemistry throughout the month of August 2002. The inspectors attended crew briefs, reviewed implementing procedures, and observed pre-startup testing.

Emphasis was placed on communications between project personnel and the control room as well as monitoring of plant response.

The inspectors observed licensee response to a catastrophic failure of a diesel fire pump battery. During this failure, the battery ruptured and spilled acid in the diesel fire pump room. The inspectors observed licensee spill response, entry into off-normal instructions (ONIs), and establishment of protected trains. The inspectors reviewed the licensees logs, response procedures, CRs and immediate corrective actions.

The inspectors observed mechanic and operator performance during adjustment of CRD speeds during the week ending September 7, 2002. The inspectors observed crew briefs, reviewed implementing procedures, and observed the speed adjustment process both at the hydraulic control units and in the control room.

The inspectors reviewed licensee activities associated with the annual biocide treatment for zebra mussel control conducted in September 2002. The inspectors reviewed licensee heat exchanger flow verification data periodically throughout the monitoring period and reviewed the direct effect of the biocide treatment on the mussel population by observing monitoring boxes.

The inspectors observed activities associated with the forced outage which began on September 22, 2002. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of operations activities during the plant cool down and the establishment of plant conditions for the replacement of the recirculating water pump A seal package. Additionally, the inspectors observed outage planning meetings, restart readiness meetings, other general outage activities, including shutdown safety assessments. Finally, the inspectors conducted a drywell closure tour.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

Main article: IP 71111.15

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected CRs related to potential operability issues for risk significant components and systems. These CRs were evaluated to determine whether the operability of the components and systems was justified. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TSs and Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) to the licensees evaluations to verify that the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors verified that the measures were in place, would work as intended, and were properly controlled. Additionally, the inspectors verified, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations. The inspectors reviewed:

the licensees evaluation of the affect of an identified hole in a 3/8" post- accident sampling line on secondary containment operability;

the licensees evaluation of the affect of improper testing of MSIV closure times on MSIV operability;

the licensees evaluation of failure to perform complete inspections of ESW inlet and discharge tunnels;

the licensees evaluation of the cause and effect of high oil level in the RCIC turbine;

the licensees evaluation of the performance of the incorrect surveillance of the automatic depressurization system (ADS) manual inhibit function on ADS operability;

the licensees evaluation of Division 2 DG jacking gear engaged alarm; and

the licensees evaluation of high pressure core spray (HPCS) operability following HPCS flow anomaly and ESW water leg anomaly.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds (OWAs) (7111.16)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the overall effectiveness of the licensee operator workaround (OWA) program. The inspectors observed log readings and equipment manipulations made by selected operators to assess the overall effect of OWAs. The inspectors reviewed the licensee CRs in order to determine if issues identified in the corrective action program were also reviewed as part of and captured in the licensees OWA program. Any actions which indicated a potential problem that could increase initiating event frequencies, impact multiple mitigating systems, or affect the ability to respond to plant transients and accidents were considered as possible OWAs. Additionally, the inspectors discussed the effect of active OWAs with operators.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed selected OWAs to determine if the OWAs adversely affected the operators ability to respond to an initiating event. OWAs reviewed were:

Loss of heat balance updates; and

Incorrect readings on reactor pressure vessel (RPV) level channel C

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed portions of the design and installation of the hydrogen water chemistry modification. The inspectors reviewed associated safety evaluations and design criteria to evaluate impact of the modification on the design basis, licensing basis and interfacing systems. The inspection included physical observation of installed components and discussions with key project personnel.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Main article: IP 71111.19

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities for risk significant systems to assess the following (as applicable): the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate; tests were performed as written; and equipment was returned to its operational status following testing. The inspectors evaluated the activities against TS, the USAR, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various USNRC generic communications. In addition, the inspectors reviewed CRs associated with post-maintenance testing to determine if the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action program. The specific procedures and CRs reviewed are listed in the attached List of Documents Reviewed. The following post-maintenance activities were reviewed:

S-610 Generator Output Breaker;

C71 Agastat Relay Replacement;

Upper air lock outer door seal;

Leak on Hydraulic Power Unit;

Nuclear Closed Cooling Valve maintenance and testing;

Standby Liquid Control Pump A;

Diesel Fire Pump Battery Replacement; and

3D-Monicore Control Blade History Dynamic Arrays Update.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

Main article: IP 71111.22

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed surveillance testing or reviewed test data for risk-significant systems or components to assess compliance with TS, 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, and licensee procedure requirements. The testing was also evaluated for consistency with the USAR. The inspectors verified that the testing demonstrated that the systems were ready to perform their intended safety functions. The inspectors reviewed whether test control was properly coordinated with the control room and performed in the sequence specified in the surveillance instruction (SVI), and if test equipment was properly calibrated and installed to support the surveillance tests. The procedures reviewed are listed in the attached List of Documents Reviewed. The specific surveillance activities assessed included:

Division 1 Emergency DG Monthly Surveillance Test;

RCIC System Quarterly Surveillance/Trip Throttle Valve Operability Verification;

RHR A Pump and Valve Operability Test; and

RPV Low Level 1 and 2 Channel C Calibration for 1B21-N081C

b. Findings

The inspectors identified a Green finding after the licensee failed to identify improperly reading plant indications and inform operators of the deficiency following partial completion of a surveillance. This finding identifies a Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification 5.4 for failing to follow procedures for equipment control.

On August 29, the inspectors observed licensee performance of a biannual calibration of RPV low level 1 and 2 Channel C, conducted in accordance with procedure SVI-B21T0062C, RPV Low Level 1&2 Channel C Calibration for 1B21-N081C, as required by TS 3.3.6.1. During the performance of the surveillance, the technicians obtained unexpected results in the response of a programmable logic controller. The technicians suspected that the battery used in their test equipment lacked charge. After obtaining approval of the Unit Supervisor, the technicians replaced the battery and reperformed the steps with identical results. The technicians informed the Unit Supervisor that they still suspected a test equipment problem. The Unit Supervisor confirmed that TS-related data was satisfactory, then directed the technicians to restore the system per the procedure. The inspectors subsequently reviewed the data collected during performance of the SVI and observed that several data points related to the RPV level channel C digital display and chart recorder were outside the leave-as-is zone.

The inspectors provided the results to the responsible system engineer (RSE) who, after review, stated that the system likely had a problem with an optical isolator or power supply. The RSE also stated the hypothesized problems would not affect the Technical Specifications required functions of the system. Instrumentation and control supervision agreed that measuring and test equipment problems did not fully explain the results.

The inspectors also spoke with the Shift Manager regarding treatment of the indicators that were outside the leave-as-is zone and the Shift Manager agreed to investigate. The following day, the Shift Manager applied tags to the chart recorder and digital display to alert operators that the readings were not correct. Subsequent troubleshooting identified that a power supply for the loop had failed.

The performance deficiency associated with this finding is failure to follow procedures for informing operators of instrumentation in the control room which may not read correctly. TS 5.4 requires implementation of procedures required by Regulatory Guide 1.33. Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires procedures for equipment control. One of the procedures governing equipment control, PAP-1404, Miscellaneous Tagging, requires that Not-In-Service Stickers be used to inform operators when instrumentation in the control room may not read correctly. Contrary to this requirement, the operators did not label this equipment until the inspectors inquired about control of the indications outside the leave-as-is zone. This issue is more than minor because the inspectors concluded, that if left uncorrected, it would become a more significant safety concern.

In this instance, surveillance revealed an equipment fault existed, licensee personnel failed to recognize the fault, and the affected indications were not identified to operators until the inspectors questioned the surveillance data. The operators failed to recognize that the partially completed surveillance contained discrepant data and under other circumstances, the discrepant data could have indicated inoperability of mitigating systems. Further, the indication in question could have been used for control of RPV level despite its improper indication. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) since the indicators in question have no direct control functions and redundant indicators were available.

The licensee entered this finding into the corrective action program (CR 02-03355).

Because of the very low safety significance and because the issue has been entered into the licensees corrective action program, it is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the USNRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-440/02-06-02).

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

Main article: IP 71111.23

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the control of a temporary modification to jumper around a low level switch to permit manual operation of the drywell equipment drain sump. The inspection included review of the temporary modification package, interviews with operators and walkdown of the radiological waste control room. The inspectors verified completion of a 50.59 screen and compared the temporary configuration with USAR requirements.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

Main article: IP 71114.06

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the technical support center and the operations support center during an emergency preparedness drill conducted on September 12, 2002. The inspection focused on the ability of the licensee to appropriately classify emergency conditions, complete timely notifications, and implement appropriate protective action recommendations in accordance with approved procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

2OS1 Access Control (71121.01)

.1 Plant Walkdowns, Radiological Boundary Verifications, and Radiation Work Permit

Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the radiologically restricted area to verify the adequacy of radiological boundaries and postings. Specifically, the inspectors walked down several high and locked high radiation area boundaries in the Auxiliary, Radwaste, and Containment Buildings. Confirmatory radiation measurements were taken to verify that these areas and selected radiation areas were properly posted and controlled in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20, licensee procedures and Technical Specifications.

Radiation Work Permit 020053 was reviewed and the pre-job briefing was attended to verify that protective clothing requirements, electronic dosimetry alarm set points for both dose rate and accumulated dose were adequate based on radiological conditions.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

The Office of Homeland Security developed a Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist attacks. The HSAS implements five color-coded threat conditions with a description of corresponding actions at each level. USNRC Regulatory Information Summary (RIS) 2002-12a, dated August 19, 2002, "USNRC Threat Advisory and Protective Measures System,"

discusses the HSAS and provides additional information on protective measures to licensees.

a. Inspection Scope

On September 10, 2002, the USNRC issued a Safeguards Advisory to reactor licensees to implement the protective measures described in RIS 2002-12a in response to the Federal government declaration of threat level "Orange."

The inspector interviewed licensee personnel and security staff, observed the conduct of security operations, and assessed licensee implementation of the protective measures.

Inspection results were communicated to the region and headquarters security staff for further evaluation.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

Main article: IP 71151

Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems

.1 Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems PI Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed reported second quarter 2002 data for Unplanned Power Changes and Heat Removal System Unavailability PIs using the definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Revision 2. The inspectors reviewed station logs, CRs, TS logs, and surveillance procedures to verify the accuracy of the licensees data submission.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Safety System Unavailability Issue

(Closed) URI 50-440/02-02-01: Safety System Unavailability Hours During Surveillance Testing.

The inspectors determined that the licensees use of managed restoration instructions during safety system surveillance testing was not consistent with the guidance provided in NEI 99-02. The licensee entered the issue in their corrective action program as CR 02-0946. The licensee reviewed affected testing procedures, recalculated, and resubmitted data to the USNRC. 10 CFR Part 50.9 requires, in part, that information provided to the Commission by a licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Although the submitted PI data for safety system unavailability was inaccurate, the inspectors concluded that the Green to White PI threshold was not crossed and thus the USNRCs regulatory response was not affected. As such, the issue was determined to be a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the USNRCs Enforcement Policy.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Main article: IP 71152

.1 Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

As discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensees corrective action system at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. Minor issues entered into the licensees corrective action system as a result of inspectors observations are generally denoted in the report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Corrective Action Following a Fire in Containment

a. Inspection Scope

In January of 2002, a temporary power cable in containment caught fire. During the subsequent investigations, the inspectors identified inadequate separation between power cables as well as inadequate requirements for testing of heat detectors. This inspection reviewed the licensees corrective actions for these issues. The inspectors reviewed the fire protection program to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions to capture applicable requirements for surveillances on fire protection systems. In addition, the inspectors performed walk downs of the facility to evaluate effectiveness of corrective actions related to maintenance of electrical separation requirements for temporary power cords.

The inspectors reviewed the license for the facility to determine applicable codes of records for the fire protection program. After obtaining the applicable codes, the inspectors compared code requirements to the programmatic requirements of the licensees fire protection program.

b. Issues During comparison of code requirements with the licensees program, the inspectors identified that the licensee had not included lubrication of outside stem and yoke valves in their inspection program. The licensee has entered this condition into their corrective action program (CR 02-02633). Similar observations were documented in other condition reports; therefore, the licensee initiated a separate condition report to review compliance with National Fire Protection Association testing requirements. The inspectors concluded that each of these conditions was minor in nature.

4OA3 Event Followup

Main article: IP 71153

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors responded to the site to observe operator actions and plant conditions following an automatic scram from 90 percent power early in the morning of September 22, 2002. The scram occurred during a routine weekly test of the turbine overspeed protection trip devices. The inspectors followed up on the event by interviewing licensee personnel, reviewing plant logs, chart recorders, sequence of event recorders, and other documents. The inspectors also walked down the control panels and discussed the timeline of the event with licensee personnel.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. T. Rausch, General Manager and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 10, 2002. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

.2 Interim Exit Meetings

An interim exit was conducted for:

Radiological Effluents and Access Control inspection with Mr. K. Ostrowski on July 11, 2002.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and was a violation of USNRC requirements which met the criteria of Section VI of the USNRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as NCVs.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Surveillance requirement of TS 3.6.1.3.7 requires verification of MSIV isolation time at a frequency in accordance with the inservice testing program. The procedure used to fulfill this surveillance requirement was not adequate since it failed to measure full closure time. Instead, the surveillance measured closure time from control switch actuation to closed indication, which occurs with the valve 10 percent open. The licensee documented the improper testing methodology in CR-02-02176. Because the closure times of all MSIVs met surveillance requirements following analysis or retest, thus establishing operability, this violation was of very low safety significance.

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee W. Kanda, Vice President-Nuclear D. Bowen, Licensing G. Dunn, Manager, Regulatory Affairs R. Coad, Radiation Protection Manager R. Hayes, Chemistry Manager T. Lentz, Acting Director Nuclear Engineering L. Lindrose, Supervisor Nuclear Security Operations B. Luthanen, Compliance Engineer T. Mahon, Site Protection Section Manager K. Meade, Supervisor, Compliance K. Ostrowski, Director, Nuclear Maintenance J. Palinkas, Supervisor, Security Systems and Administration D. Phillips, Manager, Plant Engineering T. Rausch, General Manager, Nuclear Power Plant Department S. Sovizal, Supervisor, Security Training R. Strohl, Superintendent, Plant Operations LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-440/02-06-01 NCV Failure to Demonstrate Effective Maintenance for the Rod Control and Information System 50-440/02-06-02 NCV Failure to Follow Procedures for Improperly Functioning Control Room Indications Closed 50-440/02-02-01 URI Safety System Unavailability Hours During Surveillance Testing 50-440/02-06-01 NCV Failure to Demonstrate Effective Maintenance for the Rod Control and Information System 50-440/02-06-02 NCV Failure to Follow Procedures for Improperly Functioning Control Room Indications LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ADS Automatic Depressurization System CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR Condition Report CRD Control Rod Drive DG Diesel Generator ESW Emergency Service Water FENOC FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company HSAS Homeland Security Advisory System HPCS High Pressure Core Spray M&TE Measuring and Test Equipment MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve NCV Non-Cited Violation NEI Nuclear Energy Institute USNRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OA Other Activities ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual OHS Office of Homeland Security ONI Off-Normal Instruction OWA Operator Workaround PEI Perry Emergency Instruction PI Performance Indicator RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RCIS Rod Control Indicating System RHR Residual Heat Removal RIS Regulatory Issue Summary RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel RSE Responsible System Engineer SDP Significance Determination Process SSC Structure, System & Component SVI Surveillance Instruction TS Technical Specifications URI Unresolved Item USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report VLI Valve Lineup Instruction LIST OF

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

1R01 Adverse Weather

IOI-15 Seasonal Variation November 10, 1995

OAI-0201 Operations Standing Instruction July 2, 2002

Desk Guide 09 Seasonal Work Scheduling Desk Guide Undated

1R04 Equipment Alignment

PTI-P54-P0033 Fire Suppression Systems Valve Position Revision 5

Drawing D-914-001 Fire Service Yard Area Revision LL

VLI-E12 Residual Heat Removal System Revision 4

Drawing D-302-641 Residual Heat Removal System Revision S

Drawing D-302-642 Residual Heat Removal System Revision N

Drawing D-302-643 Residual Heat Removal System Revision S

Perry Nuclear Engineering Department System Undated

Health Report, Second Quarter 2002

CR 01-2880 SVI-E12-T2002 July 25, 2001

CR 01-2916 RHR A Pump Seal Leakage Has Increased July 29, 2001

Significantly Since RF08

CR 01-3296 A RHR Pump Seal Replacement Exceeds September 12, 2001

Dose Estimate

CR 01-3300 Evaluate RHR A Seal Replacement September 12, 2001

CR 01-3648 As Found MOV Test Results for 1E12F0048B October 15, 2001

Did Not Meet FTI-F0016 Criteria

CR 02-00863 Accumulation of Trash and Debris Under March 24, 2002

Grating in RHR A Pump Room

CR 02-01568 Broken Pin on Limitorque Actuator May 20, 2002

CR 02-01721 Low Margin of RHR A Motor Operated Valve May 23, 2002

CR 02-01956 RHR System Venting June 20, 2002

SOI-E12 System Operating Instruction Residual Heat July 18, 2002

Removal System

1R05 Fire Protection

Drawing E-023-005 Fire Protection Evaluation - Unit 1 Auxiliary and March, 1991

Reactor Buildings Plan - El. 599'-9"

Drawing E-023-010 Fire Protection Evaluation - Unit 1 Auxiliary and September, 2001

Reactor Buildings Plan - El. 620'-6"

Drawing E-023-014 Fire Protection Evaluation - Unit 1 Reactor March, 1991

Building and Auxiliary Roof Plan - El. 642-6"

Drawing E-023-018 Fire Protection Evaluation - Unit 1 Reactor March, 1991

Building Plan - El. 654-0"

Drawing E-023-022 Fire Protection Evaluation - Units 1 and 2 March, 1991

Reactor Building Plan - El. 664-7"

Drawing E-023-019 Fire Protection Evaluation - Units 1 and 2 March, 1992

Control Complex Plan - Elevations 654-6",

679-6"

Drawing E-023-011 Fire Protection Evaluation - Units 1 and 2 September, 2001

Control Complex and Diesel Generator

Building Plan -

El. 620-6"

USAR Section Fire Area 1RB-1b

9A.4.1.1.2

USAR Section Fire Areas, Floor 6

9A.4.4.6

USAR Section Fire Area 1DG-1a

9A.4.5.1.1

USAR Section Fire Zone FH-3

9A.4.7.4

USAR Section Heater Bay

9A.4.12

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

Memo Jim Staffiera to Ken Russell Subj: August 1, 2002

Potential Reportability Issue Review Inadvertent

Placement of Jersey Barriers in Swale Area

CR 02-02332 Jersey Barrier Installation Without Proper July 16, 2002

Design Consideration

USAR 2.4 Hydrologic Engineering

CR 02-0586 Latent Issues, ESW Flow Out to the Swale February 26, 2002

1R07 Heat Sink Performance

R46-22 Div-1 DG Heat Exchanger performance Test October 13, 1999

Evaluation

PTI-R46-P0001-A Div. 1 Diesel Generator Jacket Water Heat November 29, 1994

Exchanger Performance

Div. 1 DG JWHX U and UcorrTrend vs Months

Div. 2 DG JWHX U and UcorrTrend vs Months

Div. 3 DG JWHX U and UcorrTrend vs Months

SDM R46 Standby Diesel Generator Jacket Water Cooling September 6, 1994

System

SDM P45 Emergency Service Water October 18, 2002

Perry Nuclear Power Plant System Health Report Second Quarter

2002

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

USNRC 2002 Exam Due Dates for August 5, 2002

Crew/Staff/Certs

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

CR 02-02461 Maintenance Rule Classification of Rod Control July 25, 2002

and Information System

Operations Logs 1 January 2002-31

March 2002

PEI-SPI 1.3 Manual Rod Insertion Rev. 0

PEI-SPI-1.6 Increased Cooling Water DP Rev. 0

RCI&IS Transponder Card Failures Chart

Terry Husted e-mail subj: Re: BWR6 RC&IS July 30, 2002

Users Meeting

Maintenance Rule: Maintenance Rule Functions August 7, 2002

River Bend

Maintenance Rule Functions, Performance Rev. 5.04

Criteria and Classifications- Perry

PNPP System Health Report First Quarter 2002

PNPP System Health Report Second Quarter

2002

PEI-B13 Reactor Pressure Vessel Control Rev. H

PEI-T23 Containment Control Rev. F

CR 02-03232 RFA on Maintenance Rule For Fire Protection September 12,

2002

CR 02-03555 Maintenance Rule Violation on Monitoring Rod September 19,

Control & Information System 2002

USAR Chapter 15, Accident Analysis

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Week 11, Period 6 Forecast Risk Profile July 22, 2002

Week 1, Period 7 Forecast Risk Profile August 5, 2002

Shutdown Safety Assessment September 26,

2002

CR 02-02614 Resident Inspector Question Regarding Method August 5, 2002

of Posting Protected Trains

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions

CR 02-02466 Incorrect Breaker Operated During F1A Ground

Isolation

WO 02-008007-00 480V Load Center Unit Substation F-1-A July 24, 2002

SDM R23/24/25 480V AC Distribution

TXI-0289 Hydrogen Water Chemistry System - System Revision 1

Startup and Tuning

CR 02-02875 Diesel Fire Pump Battery Failure August 22, 2002

CR 02-02888 Jockey Fire Pump Local Disconnect Found in Off August 22, 2002

Control Room Logs August 22, 2002

ONI-ZZZ-5 Spills and Unauthorized Discharges September 17, 2001

PAP-1910 Fire Protection Program June 3, 2002

IOI-4 Shutdown Rev. 6

IOI-5 Maintaining Hot Standby or Hot Shutdown Rev. 4

IOI-7 Cooldown Following a Reactor Scram Main Rev. 5

Condenser Available

IOI-12 Maintain Cold Shutdown Rev. 3

PTI-GEN-P0023 Zebra Mussel Monitoring Rev. 1

PTI-GEN-P0024 Zebra Mussel Treatment Rev. 3

PTI-C11-P0010 Control Rod Speed Adjustment Rev. 2

1R15 Operability Evaluations

CR 02-01687 Hole in P87 Sample Line Discovered During May 30, 2002

Heat Trace Work

USAR Section Secondary Containment Functional Design

6.2.3

TS 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment

CR-02-01985 Intake/Discharge Tunnel Inspection Frequency June 20, 2002

Concerns

USAR Section Other Seismic Category 1 Structures

3.8.4

TS 3.7.1 Emergency Service Water System-Divisions 1

and 2

TS 3.7.2 Emergency Service Water System-Division 3

CR 02-02176 OE14030 Review Identifies Potential Non- July 2, 2002

conservative MSIV Testing for USAR Data

USAR 15.6.4 Steam System Piping Break Outside

Containment

USAR 15.2.4 MSIV Closure

TS 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves

CR 02-02294 RCIC Turbine Oil Level is Increasing July 10, 2002

CR 02-02347 SVI-B21-T5379A Does Not Have the Latest July 17, 2002

Version of This Document in Curator

SVI-B21-T5379A ECCS/ADS Division 1 Manual Inhibit Functional Revision 1

Test

CR-02404 Division 2 D/G Jacking Device Engaged Alarm July 21, 2002

LCO 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating

SDM R43 Standby Diesel Generator System Rev. 11

SDM R44 Standby Diesel Generator Starting Air Rev. 6

LCO 3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS)-

Operating

LCO 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System

Instrumentation

CR 02-02572 HPCS Pump Flow Indication Trending Up With August 2, 2002

HPCS Not Running With SPCU in SER

CR-01903 HPCS Flow Instrument Reading Incorrectly June 16, 2002

SDM-E22A High Pressure Core Spray Rev. 7

1R16 Operator Workarounds (OWAs)

M&C.-14 Work Around Policy February 15, 2000

WO 01-10786 Troubleshoot Low Flow Condition Perform Flow August 21, 2000

Balance

ECP 01-5033 Site Storm/Runoff Drain System August 21, 2000

WO 01-16444 Drywell Equipment Drain Sump Low Level Cutoff November 11, 2001

Switch

CR 02-02257 Division 1 DG Jacket Water Heater did not Turn July 9, 2002

Off Prior to High Alarm

LCO 3.2 Power Distribution Limits

PAP-1404 Miscellaneous Tagging Rev. 3

CR 02-03000 Heat Balance Stopped Updating August 30, 2002

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

DCP 98-0003A PNPP Hydrogen Water Chemistry March 24, 1999

PNPP 100076 Reinstate Wires Inadvertently Removed in the August 26, 1999

Original 98003A Design Change Package

EPRI NP-5283-SR Guidelines for Permanent BWR Hydrogen Water 1987

Chemistry Installations

SER Safety Evaluation Report Guidelines for July 1987

Permanent BWR Hydrogen Water Chemistry

Installations

USAR 2.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation and Military

Facilities

USAR 6.1.1 Metallic Materials

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

WO 02-004736- Replace Normally Energized Agastat Relays June 22, 2002

000 1C71A-k015D and 1C71A-K043D

SVI-C71-T0051 Reactor Protection System Manual Scram April 27, 1988

Channel Functional

SDM R10 System Description Manual, Plant Electrical July 7, 1995

System

USAR 3.6.1.2 Primary Containment Airlocks

SDM T23/P53 Reactor Containment System Rev. 8

WO 01-015735- Upper Containment Airlock Pneumatic System August 1, 2002

000 Leak Test

SVI-P53-T6312 Upper Primary Containment Air Lock August 1, 2002

(Penetration P312), In Between The Seals Test

USAR 3.4.2 Flow Control Valves

SDM B33 Reactor Recirculation and Recirculation Flow

Control System

WO 02-008237- Hydraulic Power Unit, Reactor Recirc Valve Flow July 31, 2002

000 Control

SVI-C41-T2001A Standby Liquid Control A Pump and Valve Revision 0

Operability Test

WO 01-016528 Rework Loose Coupling Bearings November 20, 2001

WO 02-006899 Diesel Fire Pump Battery August 25, 2002

WO 02-006272 Diesel Fire Pump Battery August 25, 2002

PTI-P54-P0027 Diesel Fire Pump Battery Specific Gravity Check August 25, 2002

CR 02-02888 Jockey Fire Pump Local Disconnect Found In August 22, 2002

Off

CR 02-02875 Diesel Fire Pump Battery Failure August 22, 2002

PAP 1910 Fire Protection Program Rev. 5

USAR 9.5.1 Fire Protection System

USAR App 9A Fire Hazards Analysis

1R22 Surveillance Testing

SVI-E51-T2001 RCIC Pump Quarterly Operability Test July 18, 2002

CR 02-01789 Request for Assistance on RCIC Trip Valve June 06, 2002

Operation

CR 02-01363 Cumulative Significance Evaluation of RCIC July 13, 2002

Performance

CR 02-02368 Small Steam Leak at 1E51F0514 July 20, 2002

CR 02-01359 Sludge Found in RCIC Return Line Behind May 19, 2002

Cover Plate

WO 02-007016 Verify Operation of the RCIC Turbine Overspeed July 17, 2002

Linkage

SVI-E12-T2001 RHR A Pump and Valve Operability Test Revision 10

CR 02-02730 Questionable Pump Suction Pressure Reading August 13, 2002

During SVI-E12-T2001

CR 02-02725 Valves 1E12R008A-D and 1E12R008A-E Were August 13, 2002

Mispositioned During SVI-E12-T2001

CR 02-03021 SVI-B21-T0062C Terminated Due to Suspected August 29, 2002

Problems with M&TE

LCO 3.10 Special Operations

LCO 3.3.6 Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation

Instrumentation

SVI-B21T0062C RPV Low Level 1&2 Channel C Calibration for August 29, 2002

1B21-N081C

PAP-0205 Operability of Plant Systems Rev. 10

TMP-2005 Instrumentation and Control Technician Training, Rev. 6

Qualification, and Certification Programs

TMG-1007 Implementation of Training Rev. 5

Online Training/Tracking Qualification Matrix September 5, 2002

PAP-1404 Miscellaneous Tagging Rev. 3

OJT-5000 Indoctrination Rev. 2

PY20021095 3DMonicore Software Test September 11, 2002

LRC02.055 Ltr Global Nuclear Fuel to Patrick Curran Perry September 12, 2002

Cycle 9 3DMonicore Control Blade History (CBH)

Dynamic Arrays update

1R23 Temporary Modification Control

USAR 11.2 Liquid Waste Management Systems

TM 1-01-008 TM Tag Order November 11, 2001

2OS1 Access Control To Radiological Areas

20053 Radiation Work Permit: Valve 1G33F0503 Revision 0

ALARA Briefing Checklist for RWP 020053 July 9, 2002

2PS2 Radiological Effluents

01-004394-000 LRW To ESW Radiation Monitor Channel April 22, 2002

Functional For D17-K606 Surveillance

99-010218-000 Unit 2 Vent Noble Gas Rad Monitor Calibration October 29, 2001

D17-T8037

01-004146-000 Unit 1 Vent Noble Gas Rad Monitor Calibration March 5, 2002

D17-T8031

01-004391-000 Unit 2 Plant Vent Effluent System and Sampler April 24, 2002

Flow Rate Monitor Calibration

01-004539-000 Unit 1 Plant Vent Effluent System and Sampler June 24, 2002

Flow Rate Monitor Calibration

2-003062-000 Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System (B) July 3, 2002

Charcoal Adsorber Operability Test and Plenum

Inspection

Nucon Certificate of Compliance: Iodine-131 June 24, 2002

Removal Efficiency Determination of Adsorbent

Sample

2-003064-000 Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System (A) June 27, 2002

Charcoal Adsorber Operability Test and Plenum

Inspection

Nucon Certificate of Compliance: Iodine-131 May 31, 2002

Removal Efficiency Determination of Adsorbent

Sample

SVI-M15-T1240-B Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System Train B June 27, 2002

Flow and Filter Operability Test

Annual Environmental and Effluent Release March 2002

Report

Liquid Radwaste Discharge 01-010L March 10, 2001

Liquid Radwaste Discharge 01-028L May 13, 2001

Liquid Radwaste Discharge 01-030L May 15, 2001

Liquid Radwaste Discharge 02-010L July 7, 2002

Liquid Radwaste Discharge 01-056L July 26, 2001

Liquid Radwaste Discharge 01-039L June 30, 2001

Liquid Radwaste Discharge 01-012L March 20, 2001

Liquid Radwaste Discharge 01-043L June 21, 2001

Liquid Radwaste Discharge 01-013L March 21, 2001

Gaseous Effluent Dose Data May 29, 2002

Gaseous Effluent Dose Data May 1, 2002

Gaseous Effluent Dose Data June 24, 2002

Analytics Cross Check Data: First Quarter 2001

Analytics Cross Check Data: Third Quarter 2001

Analytics Cross Check Data: Third Quarter 2000

Gamma Spectroscopy Analysis Data: Floor July 8, 2002

Drain Sample Tank A

PA 01-09 Audit Report: Radiation Monitoring November 20, 2001

2-01469 ESW Total Flow Monitor Operability May 13, 2002

2-00579 0D17-K606 and 0D17-R170 ODCM Testing February 26, 2002

Requirements

2-00590 RFA Deficiencies Identified on 1D17C5019 February 25, 2002

During Quarterly Lube and Belt Check

2-00047 Off-Gas Post Treatment Radiation Monitors December 23, 2001

Hi/Low Flow Alarm

2-02134 Increased Dose Rates Around Septa Tube Box June 28, 2002

Area on T647

2-00246 Increase in Xe-138 Value in Off Gas Sample January 23, 2002

2-00263 Vendor Supplied Computer Software Error January 24, 2002

2-00421 Xe-133 Increased on Off-Gas Pretreatment February 9, 2002

Sample

2-00975 OM31A Carbon Sample Shipment Limitation Not April 1, 2002

Met Due to Delay in Sample Count

2-01810 An Error Precursor Noticed During The June 8, 2002

Performance of a LRW Discharge

2-01982 RFA Under plant Drain Radiation Monitors June 21, 2002

Above High Alarm Setpoint

2-02211 Incorrect Geometry Used For HP Gas Counting July 4, 2002

2-02170 Request For Assistance For Engineering To July 2, 2002

Evaluate Setpoint Adjustment Met

2-01409 Tritium Values In Condensate have Exceeded May 6, 2002

Limit in REC-0104

2-00694 Drywell D17 Gas Channel Alert Still Locked In March 9, 2002

CHI-0003 MIDAS Routine Release Calculation Verification Revision 1

SVI-G50 T5266 Liquid Radwaste Release Permit Revision 8

Germanium Detectors #1 and #3 Calibration January/February

Data 2002

Lower Limit of Detection Data for Liquid Effluents

3PP1 Response to Contingency Events (71130.03)

RIS-2002-12a USNRC Threat Advisory and Protective August 19, 2002

Measures System

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator November 2001

Guideline, Rev. 2

Logs Plant Narrative Logs October 1, 2001 -

June 30, 2002

Logs Monthly Safety System Unavailability Logs January, 2002-

June, 2002

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

NFPA 13A Inspection and Maintenance of Sprinkler 1981

Systems

NFPA 25 Standard for Inspection, Testing and 1992

Maintenance of Water Based Fire Protection

Systems

PAP-1910 Fire Protection Program June 3, 2002

PY-NRR/CEI- Fire Protection Program FSAR/Technical November 29, 1985

272L Specification Changes for the Perry Nuclear

Power Plant

PY-CEI/NRR- Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Nos. 50-440; November 15, 1985

0393L 50-441 Fire Protection Program FSAR and

Technical Specification Changes

CR 02-00240 Sensitivity Check of Smoke Detectors in January 23, 2002

Containment

CR 02-00243 RFA to Evaluate Duct Mounted Smoke Detector January 17, 2002

Testing Methodology

CR 02-00280 Procedural Guidance Required for Heat Detector January 29, 2002

Testing

CR 02-00288 RWCU H

T. EXCHGR Room Fire Detection January 24, 2002

Capability

USAR 9.5.1 Fire Protection System

CR-02-00069 Temporary Power Cable Separation Violation January 8, 2002

CR-02-00057 Extension Cord Overheats Causing Smoke in January 7, 2002

Containment

4OA3 Event response

Scram No. 1-02- Post Scram Restart Report September 26, 2002

Problem Solving Plan Summary: Determine the September 23, 2002

Cause of the Main Turbine Trip Resulting in a

Reactor Scram on 9/22/02- CR 02-3378

Data Plant Computer Data September 22, 2002

Logs Plant Narrative Logs September 22, 2002

34

v t e Inspection Report - Perry - 2002006
80 \| 81 \| 82 \| 83 \| 84 \| 85 \| 86 \| 87 \| 88 \| 89 \| 90 \| 91 \| 92 \| 93 \| 94 \| 95 \| 96 \| 97 \| 98 \| 99 00 \| 01 \| 02 \| 03 \| 04 \| 05 \| 06 \| 07 \| 08 \| 09 \| 10 \| 11 \| 12 \| 13 \| 14 \| 15 \| 16 \| 17 \| 18 \| 19 \| 20 \| 21 \| 22 \| 23 \| 24 \|
2002 Quarterly Integrated 1Q (0) 2Q (0) 3Q (0) 4Q (0) Assessments Mid Cycle End of Cycle 7(0) 8(0) Security Operator Exams 301(0) Emergency Planning Other

IR 05000440/2002006

Text

SUBJECT:

Dear Mr. Kanda:

Enclosure:

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Licensee-Identified Violations

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

REACTOR SAFETY

1R01 Adverse Weather

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Complete System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.2 Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R06 Flood Protection

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R16 Operator Workarounds (OWAs) (7111.16)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

.1 Plant Walkdowns, Radiological Boundary Verifications, and Radiation Work Permit

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

.1 Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.2 Gaseous and Liquid Release Systems Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.3 Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Releases

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.4 Dose Calculations

a. Inspection Scope