IR 05000438/1982005

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IE Insp Repts 50-438/82-05 & 50-439/82-05 on 820302-05.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Containment Penetrations,Observation of Work & Work Activities & safety-related Welding Structures
ML20054D686
Person / Time
Site: Bellefonte  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 03/25/1982
From: Girard E, Herdt A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20054D673 List:
References
50-438-82-05, 50-438-82-5, 50-439-82-05, 50-439-82-5, NUDOCS 8204230275
Download: ML20054D686 (7)


Text

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UNITED STATES !

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o ! g REGION 11 l o,

101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 Al LANTA, GEORGIA 30303 % ***** s Report Nos. 50-438/82-05 and 50-439/82-05 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility Name: Bellefonte ' Docket Nos. 50-438 and 50-439 License Nos. CPPR-122 and CPPR-123 Inspection at Bellefont site near Scottsboro, AL Inspector: [l[[ d // E. H. Girard D' ate Signed Approved by: / /#

A A. R'. Herdt, Section Chief Date' Signed Engineering Inspection Branch Division of Engineering and Technical Programs SUMMARY Inspection on March 2-5, 1982 Areas Inspected This rcutine, unannounced inspection involved 28 inspector-hours on site in the areas of licensee action on previous inspection findings, licensee identified items (10 CFR 50.55(e) items), IE Information Notice No 81-33 (Units 1 and 2), Containment (penetrations) - observation of work and work activities (Unit 1), and safety related structures (welding) - observation of work and review of quality records (Unit 1).

Results ' No violations or deviations were identified.

8204280 k Y

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REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees W. R. Dahnke, Project Manager

  • F. E. Gilbert, Construction Engineer F. L. Moses, Mechanical Engineering Unit (MEU) Supervisor
  • A. L. Richards, Electrical Engineering Unit Assistant Supervisor
  • H. C. Johnson, Welding Engineering Unit (WEU) Supervisor G. Adkins, Engineer, WEU K. Lawless, Engineer, WEU R. M. Norton, Engineering Associate, WEU J. South, QC Inspector, WEU P. Mann, Engineering Management Assistant S. Love, Nuclear Licensing Engineer NRC Resident Inspector
  • J. D. Wilcox
  • Attended exit interview 2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 5, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings listed below.

Unresolved Item 438,439/82-05-01: " Installation of Locking Devices" paragraph 6.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (438,439/81-25-30): "NDE of Pipe Where Lugs Removed".

This item involved the licensee's removal of permanent attachment lugs from ASME Section III Class 2 piping without performance of penetrant (PT) or magnetic particle (MT) examinations of the removal sites.

The NRC resident inspector observed this action and questioned why the examinations were not being performed, as they would be when temporary attachments were removed. The licensee contends that such examinations are not required for permanent attachment removal, only for temporary attachment removal.

This position was documented in the licensee's memorandum of November 10, 1981 to the NRC resident inspector.

The licensee's Welding Engineering Unit (WEU) personnel indicated that it was their practice to perform MT or PT examinations on permanent attachment ._.

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removal sites except when the removal attachments were to be rewelded in their original locations - in which case the final welds would receive code .' required permanent attachment examinations. The WEU supervisor informed the NRC inspectors that changes had been made to their procedure C.CP 10.6,

to assure that in the future, PT and MT examinations would be performed at ! locations where permanent attachments were removed and then not replaced in their original locations.

The inspector reviewed both the code (ASME , Section III) requirements and the change to QCP 10.6.

< Based on this review, the inspector does not agree with the licensee's contention that the examinations of the permanent attachment removal sites ' are not a code requirement. However, the NRC inspector considers the examinations previously missed to have little safety significance and in view of the licensee's actions to assure future performance of the examinations he is satisfied that this item may be closed, b.

(0 pen) Unresolved Item (438,439/81-18-02): " Welder Qualification Thickness Limits".

This item was opened to document and identify for

further investigation and evaluation an NRC inspector's finding that some of the licensee's welders were not properly tested to qualify them for the unlimited thickness maximum limits they had been given for combination GTAW/SMAW welding. The code applicable to the subject qualifications, ASME Section IX (74S75), paragraph QW-351, specifies that the limits of thickness for which a welder is qualified are dependent upon the thickness of weld metal he deposits with each welding process in preparing his qualification test coupons. The code permits a welder with acceptable test coupons to quality for unlimited maximum thickness when his groove weld test coupon deposits are at least 3/4 inch thick. This was confirmed in ASME Code interpretation IX-78-15. The licensee qualified some welders for combination GTAW/SMAW process welding with 3/4 inch thick test coupons, granting those with acceptable test results unlimited maximum thickness limits for their welding.

Licensee engineering (EnDes) personnel responsible for disposition of this item initially stated that they did not agree that the 3/4 inch requirement was applicable for their code revision.

_ The NRC inspector discussed this with the EnDes personnel and does not agree with them.

The NRC inspector and the licensee both believe that there may be data in the licensee's records to provide additional justification for welders unlimited thickness qualifications, and the licensee has agreed to check for and provide an evaluation of this data.

This item will remain open pending Region II's review of the data evaluation in subsequent inspections.

4.

Unresolved Items , Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations. A new unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 6.

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. 5.

Licensee Identified Items , a.

(Closed) Item (438 CDR 81-40): " Internal Lack of Fusion on NAVC0 Spool Piece" (Item also identified 438/81-25-39). The licensee submitted a final report on this item to Region II in a letter dated February 12,1982, which stated that they had determined that it was not reportable. This item initially appeared to be similar to the problem identified in NRC IE Bulletin No. 79-03A. However, the licensee's investigation found that this item did not, in fact, involve a lack of fusion as originally reported. The indication originally thought to be lack of fusion was determined by the licensee to be acceptable undercut. The NRC inspector reviewed this item with cognizant WEU personnel and has no further questions on the matter.

b.

(Closed) Item (439 CDR 81-064): " Lap Indications on NAVC0 Spool 1CA28".

(Item also identified 439/81-31-02) The licensee submitted a final report on this item to Region II in a letter dated November 3,1981. The licensee subsequently submitted a revised final report to Region II in a letter dated December 2, 1981.

The licensee indicated that it considers the condition found to be an isolated occurrence. The inspector reviewed this item, including the corrective actions, with cognizant WEU personnel and examined the unacceptable pipe. The inspector is satisfied that the action taken by the licensee is adequate and considers the item closed.

! c.

(Closed) Item (438 CDR 81-058, 439 CDR 81-072): " Deficient Welds on l Penetrations Supplied by Sargent" (Item also identified 438,439/81-25-40).

The licensee submitted a final report to Region II on this item in a letter l dated February 2,1982.

This item involved undersize vendor welds on weldolet type connections to containment penetrations.

The inspector discussed this item with WEU personnel, reviewed the licensee's documenta-tion of their evaluation and of required repairs, and examined the repaired , welds. The licensee reported that it believes the condition found is an isolated occurrence, based on its inspection of other items supplied by the ' licensee's corrective action and considers this item closed, d.

(0 pen) Item (438 CDR 81-061): " Reactor Coolant Pump Impellar to Shaft Mismatch" (Item also identified 438/81-25-42).

The NRC inspector discussed this item with the licensee's Mechanical Engineering Unit (MEU) personnel and informed them of the results of an NRC inspection of the vendor of the subject pump (documented in IE Report 99900031/81-02). The MEU personnel indicated that the findings of the NRC inspection would be considered in determining their corrective action for this item. Region II will review the licensee's report and actions on this item in subsequent inspections.

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e.

(0 pen) Item (438 CDR 81-052, 439 CDR 81-054): "ASME Class 1 Hanger Material Has Linear Indications" (Item also identified 438,439/81-25-20).

The licensee submitted a final report to Region II on this item in a letter dated October 27, 1981.

The licensee subsequently submitted a revised final report to Region II in a letter dated November 23, 1981. The NRC inspector asked to review the vendor's evaluation report on the questioned hanger materials, which had been referenced on the licensee's final report.

Bellefonte site personnel could not furnish a copy of the subject evaluation report but indicated that a copy would be obtained for review by Region II in subsequent inspections. This item will remain open pending Region II's satisfactory review of the information contained in the evaluation report described above.

6.

IE Information Notice No. 81-13: " Locking Devices Improperly Installed on Main Steam Isolation Valves (Units 1 and 2) The NRC inspector examined the licensee's main steam isolation valves (MSIV'S) to determine whether locking devices were improperly installed as described in the subject IE Information Notice. The inspector found that some of the metal tab type devices, used to prevent loosening of valve stem guide nuts were not bent up against the nuts to prevent their turning. The licensee agreed to check the installation of the locking devices on the MSIV's, determine the safety significance o.' the improperly installed devices and take any necessary corrective actions. The licensee stated it would document this on its Quality Control Investigation Report 13,146.

The NRC inspector identified this as unresolved item 438,439/82-05-01, " Installation of Locking Devices".

7.

Containment (Penetrations) - Observation of Work and Work Activities (Unit 1) The inspector selectively observed completed work and reviewed documentation for two containment electrical penetrations to verify that work on the penetrations had been performed in accordance with NRC requirements and FSAR commitments (including the applicable code) implemented through the licensee's specifications, procedures and drawings.

The code applicable to welding for installation of the penetrations is ASME Section III (74S74). The containment penetration and records examined by the inspector and the licensee requirement documents utilized by the inspector in his checks of the work and records are as follows: a.

Electrical Penetration: 1-NI-EPEN-008 Records: (1) Electrical penetration verification card (2) Electrical penetration checklist (3) Inspection storage and periodic maintenance form (4) APC cards (welding inspection checklists) for weld 1NI00114 , ' i l l - -.

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Requirement Documents: (1) Specification 629M i (2) location drawing SRWO216-NI-01R5 (3) QC procedures 3.13R4,1.2R9A1,1.3R2A3 ' (4) Penetration drawing 7881-09000-1R0 (5) Comax penetration (vendor) manual b.

Electrical Penetration: i Records: (1) Same as records (1)-(3) in a. above (2) APC records (welding inspection checklists) for weld INI00109 Requirement Documents: (1) Same as requirement documents (1)-(3) in a. above (2) Penetration drawing E40819-2 (3) Westinghouse penetration (vendor) manual The completed electrical penetrations and their records were examined by the inspector to verify, to the extent practical, that requirements specified in the above listed documents were met for: a.

Method of assembly ' b.

Protection of the installed penetrations c.

Performance of installation and other activities such as testing d.

Nondestructive examination e.

Inspection Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.

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8.

Safety Related-Structures (Welding) - Observation of Work and Review of Quality

Records (Unit 1) The NRC inspector selectively examined welding work and records for safety related structures located outside the containment to verify compliance with NRC requirements and FSAR commitments as implemented by the licensee's

I specification, procedures and drawings. The areas examined, applicable codes and specifications, and the findings are described below:

a.

Welding Work ' The piping support welds identified below were examined by the inspector after joint preparation and alignment but before welding had started: ) Weld No.__ OKCMPHG0824-201B OKCMPHG0824-201C

1KCMPHG1012-0R01A , e.

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1 l The code applicable to the above welds is ASME Section III (74S74), as implemented by specification G-29M.

The above joints were observed for proper identification / location, preparation and alignment, and evidence of QC verification. The inspector observed welding material control in the areas where the above welds were being performed and at the issue station.

Welding material control was observed for proper storage, temperature control, issue records, and handling of returned materials and to verify , that no uncontrolled material was present in' the work areas.

There appeared to be sufficient QC inspectors present commensurate with the welding work in progress, b.

Review of Quality Records The inspector reviewed the quality records for and observed the completed support welds identified below: Weld No.

1A600807 1A600817 1A600819 The applicable code to the above welds is AWS D1.1-77, as, implemented by specifciation G-29C. The completed welds were examined for workmanship and size as determined from drawings 4AWO805-X2-1R11 and -5R8.

The quality records were reviewed by the inspector to verify that they reflected proper work accomplishment in the following areas: (1) Visual and dimensional inspections (2) Weld history (3) Preheat and interpass temperature (4) Controls, on pre-issue storage and identification and issue of welding materials , Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified. }}