IR 05000423/1985050
| ML20205E394 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 09/16/1985 |
| From: | Finkel A, Jerrica Johnson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205E391 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-423-85-50, NUDOCS 8510170288 | |
| Download: ML20205E394 (6) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
I Report No.
50-423/85-50 Docket No.
50-423 License No. CPPR-113 Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Post Office Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Facility Name: Millstone Nuclear Power St, Lion, Unit 3 Inspection At: Waterford, Connecticut Inspection Conducted: August 13-16, 1985 i
Inspectors:
A. E. Finkel, Lead Reactor Engineer date Approved by:
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J! R. Johnson, Chief, Operational Programs date Section, Operational Branch, DRS Inspection Summary:
Inspection on August 13-16, 1985 (Report No. 50-423/85-50).
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of activities pertaining to previous inspection findings and the follow-up of allegations made concerning electrical construction activities. The inspection involved 24 inspector-hours I
onsite by one region-based inspector.
l Results: No violations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted 1.1 Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
- M. Brown, I&C Supervisor
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Dietrick, Quality Assurance Consultant
- F. Comstock, Quality Assurance Specialist
- L. Nadeau, Assistant Project Engineer 1.2 _ Stone and Webster Engineering Company
- J. Capozzoli, Jr., Supervisor of Construction Services
- J. Kelly, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer
- C. Peterson, Senior Field Quality Control Engineer
- R. Rucks, Program Manager (EA)
- W. Vos, Senior Field Quality Control Engineer 1.3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- T. Rebelowski, Senior Resident Engineer i
- Denotes personnel present at exit meeting.
2.0 Facility Tour The inspector observed work activities in progress, completed work and construction status in the diesel rooms, main steam valve building and plant locations where 4160 volt switchgear and 480 volt motor control centers were located.
No violations were identified.
3.0 License Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (423/85-13-01): The temperature requirement for cable pull during cold weather had been deleted from the original inspec-tion attribute. This condition had existed for approximately one year and the licensee was to determine if any adverse impact on the installed cable
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occurred because of the deletion of this attribute.
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Cable manufacturer's specification 255 indicated that the lowest tempera-ture at which cable could be safely pulled was 11*F.
The site tempera-tures for the period of December 1981 to March 31, 1985 indicated that the temperature was at or below 10 F on 63 occasions.
From December 1982 to March 1985 construction cable installation records indicated that 151 l
Category 1 cables were pulled on the days that the temperature was 10 F l
or less. All but two of these cables were pulled within the building or through the electrical tunnels whose temperatures were well above the minimum 11 F requirement of specification 255. The two cables that were
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pulled outside through man-holes were control cables.
The lowest tempera-ture at which control cables can be safely pulled is -4*F (Specification 645). Cables 3SIHB-PC011 and 3SIHBPC031 were pulled from the Control
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Building to the ESF Building on December 20, 1983. The temperature on that day was 10 F which was within acceptable limits for these cables, i
The licensee has added a cable pulling temperature attribute to procedure QAD 10.18ML, Revision 0, Change Notice 1, dated May 10, 1985.
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The inspector verified that the data indicates that no cable has been pulled that exceeded the temperature requirements of. Specifications 255 and 645. The inspector also verified that'QAD 10.18ML has been revised to include a cable pulling temperature attribute.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (423/85-13-02): To closeout the computer gener-
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ated ticket for installed cables, the quality control inspector signature from the field generated ticket was being transferred to the computer
generated ticket by the administrative staff of the Quality Control Depart-
ment. Two Stone and Webster Field Quality Control (FQC) interoffice memoranda have provided interpretation and clarification for the transfer of signatures as delineated in S&W specification E-527.
The practice of the Site Engineering Group (SEG) providing FQC signatures on the Cable
,1 Pull Tickets was discontinued during the second quarter of 1985.
Engineering and Design Coordination Report (E&DCR) FE-40926, April 1985
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modifies specification E.527 to state the following in lines 3.25, 4.24, 8.45 and 11.53:
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"When computer generated tickets are received by the Engineering Ticket Office and the previous issued ticket (advanced or computer)
has a signed-off installed and/or inspected status, the new ticket
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.;ill be checked and verified for accuracy against the previous issued
ticket.
If found to be identical-(i.e.', no physical change), the new issued ticket can be signed by FQC, Construction (in the applicable signcture blocks), or the Principal engineer or his designee.
If signed by the Principal engineer or designee, his signature will be
'failowed Ui "for Construction or FQC" as applicable. All previous issued tick 0ts will be attached to the new ticket and refiled. At the time of-transfer of tickets to Permanent Plant File, FQC will
. verify all tickets for accuracy back to the original signed-off.
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ticket.
The latest tickets will be stamped " verified to original l
signed-off ticket" and signed by FQC."
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The inspector verified that all field generated tickets with the actual
inspector signature are considered quality records'and are being maintained.
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Specification E-527 has been revised to reflect the above statement.
I This item is closed.
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4.0 Electrical Equipment Allegations Allegations regarding improper construction practices were identified to the NRC in March 1985. Previous NRC review of several concerns is docu-mented in report No. 50-423/85-13. The following is an update for two issues.
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4.1 Allegation No. RI-85-0041 The substance of the issue is a concern that EA-180 limit switches on Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) valves in containment have missing hardware and there were no quality control records for this installation.
During the investigation of this allegation, it was determined that there are no air operated valves of this system (RHR) inside the reactor containmer t.
The inspector did verify that there were four pneumatic valves (3 RHR HCV606, 607 and 3RHR FCV618, 619) located outside the reactor containment. Observations of these valves veri-fied that.they did not have limit switches.
In addition to the above system the inspector inspected the Low Pressure Safety Injection System (LPSI) and the High Pressure Safety Injection System (HPSI).
The following valves were inspected:
3SILAV88898,D; 3SILCV8825; 3SILCV8890A; 3SILAV8872C; 3SIHAV8889A,C; 3SIHCV8823; 3SIHCV8824; and 3SIHCU8881.
The inspector verified that each of these valves contained 2 NAMCO limit switches (model EA 18031302) mounted on the valve actuator.
The licensee had identified that some NAMC0 model EA-180 limit switches had potential operating problems and reported this to the NRC in letters dated March 1, 1984, July 17, 1984 and October 23, 1984.
Licensee inspection of the EA180 limit switches did identify some missing parts such as screws and "0" rings. A re-inspection of all safety-related installed EA 180 limit switches is being planned by the licensee. The method and scope of inspection has yet to be determined by the licensee.
The problem of missing parts on EA-180 limit switches was not identified by the inspector becasue the ir.spection requirements for the valve installation did not include specific detailed steps to verify for the limit switch.
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The lack of inspection attributes for the EA-180 limit switch installation was an isolated case and not generic in nature.
Random inspection by the inspector of air operated valves in the air supply system and switches in the diesel generator system had inspection attributes of the various parts of a larger assembly and did not exhibit the condition that existed in the EA-180 limit switch installations.
This item is considered unresolved pending NRC review of the licen-see inspection plan and attribute inspection of the safety-related installed EA-180 limit switches (50-423/85-50-01).
4.2 Allegation No. RI-85-0042 This allegation includes concerns regarding improper classification of battery room walls and electrical materials attached to the diesel generator's electrical distribution buses.
Initial NRC review is documented in Report No. 50-423/85-13.
Review of the remaining issue regarding electrical bus material purchased as category 3 instead of category 1 is described below.
The licensee also identified this as a problem and their results indicated that the procurement require-ments for bus bar extension materials were not adequately documented on the E&DCR by the responsible engineering group providing the problem solution.
By not doing so, the E-350 specification was not identified as a change affected document resulting in incomplete approval of the E&DCR.
The electrical engineering group has been reinformed of the require-ments associated with the procurement of the QA Category 1 non-engineered items and Project Manual Tab No. 77 titled " Spare and Replacement Parts Procurement," Revision 6, has been issued.
PM No. 77 has specific instructions in section 8 for the method, coding and approvals required to process this type of item.
In investi-gating the reason for this problem it was determined that an error was made when coding the purchase of this part. The documentation changes made by the licensee should correct this problem in the future for procurement of these types of piece part materials.
This type of design modification would not require the diesel vendor approval as stated in the allegation.
The retraining of the engineering personnel in the coding of the E&DCR and the revision of the Project Manual No. 77 titled, " Spare and Replacement Parts Procurement," Revision 6, are adequate to t
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prevent this problem from occurring in category 1 material procure-
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ment, t
This item is considered closed.
5.0 Diesel Generator Brush Holder Failure-Colt-Pielstick, 4 Cylinder, PC2 Engine During testing of the "B" Diesel Generator on August 13, 1985 the brush holder broke at the brush rigging assembly bolt connection.
The diesel generator was stopped and an inspection made to determine the amount of
damage and the reason for the failure of the brush holder assembly.
During this inspection period the reason for the failure and the method.
of correcting the. problem had not been established.
This item is considered unresolved pending NRC review of.the licensee's analysis of the failure and the corrective action taken (50-423/85-50-02).
6.0 Unresolved Item
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Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, or violations. Two unresolved items are detailed in paragraphs 4.and 5'above.
7.0 Exit Meeting r
i The inspector met with licensee and contractor representatives (denoted in
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paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection of August 16, 1985. The j
inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as described
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in this report.
l At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the
licensee by the inspector.
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