IR 05000416/2019003
| ML19310D791 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/2019 |
| From: | Christopher Newport NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-C |
| To: | Emily Larson Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| EPID I-2019-003-0008 IR 2019003 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML19310D791 (16) | |
Text
November 5, 2019
SUBJECT:
GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000416/2019003
Dear Mr. Larson:
On September 30, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. On October 3, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or significance of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Grand Gulf.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Grand Gulf. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Christopher W. Newport, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch C Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 05000416 License No. NPF-29
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000416
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-003-0008
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Location:
Port Gibson, MS
Inspection Dates:
July 1, 2019 to September 30, 2019
Inspectors:
K. Clayton, Senior Operations Engineer
N. Day, Resident Inspector
M. Doyle, Operations Engineer
N. Greene, Senior Health Physicist
T. Steadham, Senior Resident Inspector
C. Stott, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Christopher W. Newport, Acting Chief
Reactor Projects Branch C
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Control Transient Combustibles Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000416/2019003-01 Open/Closed
[H.2] - Field Presence 71111.05Q An NRC-identified, Green finding and associated non-cited violation of License Condition 2.c.(41) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-29 for the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, was identified when inspectors identified uncontrolled transient combustible materials in the plant. The licensee failed to ensure that combustibles were controlled in accordance with licensee procedures.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On July 26, 2019, power was reduced to 63 percent for a control rod sequence exchange. The unit was returned to rated thermal power on July 28, 2019. On September 4, 2019, power was reduced to 81 percent for maintenance on two radial well plant service water pumps. Power was further reduced to 64 percent for a control rod sequence exchange on September 14, 2019.
The unit returned to rated thermal power on September 16, 2019. On September 18, 2019, power was reduced to 71 percent for a rod sequence exchange, and the unit returned to rated thermal power. The unit remained at or near full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for impending adverse weather conditions for tropical storm Barry on July 12, 2019.
71111.04Q - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Division 2 standby diesel generator readiness for impending tropical storm Barry on July 11, 2019
- (2) Division 1 standby service water during maintenance on Division 2 standby service water cooling tower fans on August 14, 2019
- (3) Standby gas treatment B on September 24, 2019
71111.04S - Equipment Alignment
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Division 1 standby diesel generator following a maintenance outage on August 5, 2019.
- (2) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the high pressure core spray system on September 20, 2019.
71111.05Q - Fire Protection
Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:
- (1) Low pressure core spray pump room, Fire Zone 1A119, on July 2, 2019
- (2) Division 1 standby diesel generator room, Fire Zone 1D310, on July 12, 2019
- (3) Standby liquid control system, Fire Zone 1A512, on July 24, 2019
- (4) Standby diesel generator breezeway, Fire Zone 1D301, on July 24, 2019
- (5) Site yard external to the standby service water basins, auxiliary building, control building, and standby diesel generator building, Fire Zone YARD, on August 1, 2019 (6)119 feet elevation, auxiliary building hallway, Fire Zone 1A211, on August 14, 2019
- (7) Division 1 standby service water system pumphouse, Fire Zone 1M110, on August 15, 2019 (8)133 feet elevation, control building hallway, Fire Zone OC308, on August 18, 2019
71111.11B - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Requalification Program (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) Biennial Requalification Written Examinations
The inspectors evaluated the quality of the licensed operator biennial requalification written examination administered on August 12, 2019.
Annual Requalification Operating Tests
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees annual requalification operating test.
Administration of an Annual Requalification Operating Test
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's effectiveness in administering requalification operating tests required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2) and the licensee's effectiveness in evaluating their licensed operators for mastery of training objectives.
Requalification Examination Security
The inspectors evaluated the ability of the licensee to safeguard examination material, such that the examination was not compromised.
Remedial Training and Re-examinations
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of remedial training conducted by the licensee and reviewed the adequacy of re-examinations for licensed operators who did not pass a required requalification examination.
Operator License Conditions
The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for ensuring that licensed operators met the conditions of their licenses.
Control Room Simulator
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees control room simulator in modeling the actual plant and for meeting the requirements contained in 10 CFR 55.46.
Problem Identification and Resolution
The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve problems associated with licensed operator performance.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during surveillance testing and power changes on September 13, 2019.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
- (1) Appendix R emergency lights on September 9, 2019
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:
- (1) Protected system lineup during Division 2 standby diesel generator and Division 2 standby service water maintenance outages on August 14, 2019
- (2) Work controls for main generator hydrogen leakage into turbine building closed cooling water on September 6, 2019
- (3) Protected system lineup during plant service water pump replacement on September 6, 2019
- (4) Control of painting activities prior to initiation of standby gas treatment on September 27, 2019
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 02.02) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Operability of residual heat removal A due to jockey pump leak on July 4, 2019
- (2) Secondary containment operability due to door 1A401B failure as described in Condition Report CR-GGN-2019-06295 on August 5, 2019
- (3) High vibrations on standby diesel generator as described in Condition Report CR-GGN-2019-06978 on September 6, 2019
- (4) Operability of high pressure core spray standby service water pump discharge pressure indicator with reduced sized mounting bolts as described in Condition Report CR-GGN-2019-05547 on September 6, 2019
- (5) ASME material nonconformance as discussed in Condition Report CR-GGN-2019-07497 on September 13, 2019
- (6) Operability of gagged open secondary containment isolation valves as described in Condition Report CR-GGN-2019-01263 on September 27, 2019
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Revisions to Procedure EN-DC-161, "Control of Combustible Materials," on September 6, 2019
- (2) Engineering Change 0026, Permanently Gagging Open Misc. Valves, on September 27, 2019
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:
- (1) Work Order 526829, replace hinges on secondary containment personnel door 1T101A401 on September 6, 2019
- (2) Work Order 530545, replace high pressure core spray control power inverter 1E22K701 on September 6, 2019
- (3) Work Order 481558, replace high pressure core spray standby service water pump discharge pressure gauge 1E22R003 on September 6, 2019
- (4) Work Order 531649, change charcoal on standby gas treatment B filter unit 1T48D001B on September 27, 2019
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) Work Order 52770598, Division 2 standby diesel generator 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> endurance run on September 13, 2019
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Work Order 52883665, low pressure core spray pump quarterly surveillance on August 26, 2019
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Yellow team emergency preparedness drill on August 28, 2019
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) Training evolution for B shift operating crew on July 29,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05)===
- (1) October 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) October 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (1 Sample)
- (1) October 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Routine Review (IP Section 02.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) Reactor core isolation cooling delayed injection Apparent Cause Evaluation CR-GGN-2018-13050, on July 4, 2019
- (2) Appendix R emergency lights on September 11,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Control Transient Combustibles Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events
Green NCV 05000416/2019003-01 Open/Closed
[H.2] - Field Presence 71111.05Q An NRC-identified, Green finding and associated non-cited violation of License Condition 2.c.(41) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-29 for the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, was identified when inspectors identified uncontrolled transient combustible materials in the plant. The licensee failed to ensure that combustibles were controlled in accordance with licensee procedures.
Description:
On July 24, 2019, the inspectors identified transient combustibles in the standby diesel generator breezeway, which was designated as Fire Zone 60. This fire zone contained multiple redundant safe shutdown components separated by at least 20.5 feet with no intervening combustibles, except for an approved fire hose, as described in Section 9A.5.60 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. The licensee installed temporary lighting consisting of multiple drop lights to support the upgrade of existing lights in the breezeway to LED lights. This temporary lighting included multiple extension cords bundled together, which were hung from one end of the breezeway to the other, thus spanning areas containing both sets of redundant safe shutdown components. The extension cord bundle was routed within 18 inches of both the Division 1 and Division 2 standby diesel generator service water outlet valves. Both of these components were classified as safe shutdown components.
In addition to the extension cords, the inspectors identified other miscellaneous transient combustibles in this area, such as an electrical power pack used to power the temporary lights as well as numerous cardboard boxes containing items being used to support the lighting modification. The inspectors estimated the weight of the extension cords alone to exceed 100 pounds.
In accordance with licensee Calculation MC-QSP64-86058, "Combustible Heat Load Calculation," Revision 64, this weight of extension cords amounted to a heat load of 1,000,000 BTU. Because this calculation evaluated a transient combustible loading in this area of 908,880 BTU, the inspectors concluded that the transient combustible loading from the extension cords alone exceeded the analyzed transient combustible loading for this area.
The licensee determined that a transient combustible permit was not obtained for these materials and removed them from the breezeway.
Licensee Procedure EN-DC-161, Control of Combustibles, Revision 20, step 5.6.4.a, required that either a combustible permit, compensatory measures, or continuous controls be established for the quantity of transient combustibles located in the breezeway. Through discussions with the licensee, the inspectors determined that it was unlikely that a combustible permit would have been approved for the extension cords to be hung in the manner that they were without at least compensatory measures, such as a fire watch.
As a result of this discovery, the inspectors reviewed other areas of the plant for conformance to Procedure EN-DC-161 and discovered that the licensee was routinely not following the procedure with respect to controlling combustibles within 50 feet of the exterior of some buildings. Because the exterior walls of buildings containing safe shutdown components are generally not 3-hour fire rated, Procedure EN-DC-161 required the same controls over transient combustibles within 50 feet of the exterior of those buildings as it does within the buildings. The inspectors identified uncontrolled transient combustibles within the 50-foot buffer zones surrounding the auxiliary building, control building, and both standby service water pump houses. Additionally, the inspectors also identified transient combustibles within transient combustible exclusion zones in the control building, as well as uncontrolled transient combustibles in excess of the pre-evaluated transient loading in a control building hallway.
Corrective Actions: Licensee corrective actions included removing all the transient combustibles in the affected areas, providing training to site personnel on the requirements of Procedure EN-DC-161, adding transient combustible observation requirements to operator rounds, and performing transient combustible walkdowns by the site fire marshal.
Additionally, the licensee committed to painting lines on the ground to identify the 50-foot external buffer area.
Corrective Action References: The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-GGN-2019-06019 and CR-GGN-2019-06159.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to control transient combustibles in accordance with Procedure EN-DC-161 was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the inspectors informed this conclusion with Example 4.k of Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, in that the performance deficiency potentially affected both trains of redundant safe shutdown equipment, and the fire loading exceeded the values assumed in the existing fire loading calculation.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). Specifically, all of the identified instances either adversely affected an area with adequate automatic detection and suppression (as was the case with the diesel generator breezeway) or were assigned a low degradation rating (as was the case with all other instances).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.2 - Field Presence: Leaders are commonly seen in the work areas of the plant observing, coaching, and reinforcing standards and expectations. Deviations from standards and expectations are corrected promptly. Senior managers ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors and supplemental personnel. Specifically, station management was not enforcing the standards as described in Procedure EN-DC-161 through direct oversight of work activities.
Enforcement:
Violation: As required by License Condition 2.c.(41) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-29 for the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, the licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program." Licensee Procedure EN-DC-161, Control of Combustibles, Revision 20, was a procedure that the licensee used to maintain their approved Fire Protection Program. Step 5.6.3 of Procedure EN-DC-161 required that a transient combustible permit shall be processed prior to the introduction of any combustible materials into plant areas designated as a Level 1 area and/or compensatory actions shall be established. Step 5.6.4 of Procedure EN-DC-161 required that a transient combustible permit shall be processed, or compensatory actions shall be established, or constant attendance of the combustible materials shall be provided for ordinary combustibles in any Level 2 area in excess of 25 pounds.
Contrary to the above, on July 24, 2019, the licensee failed to maintain in effect all provisions of their approved Fire Protection Program. The licensee failed to control transient combustibles in the standby diesel generator breezeway, control building, and in the combustible control buffer zones exterior to the auxiliary building, control building, and standby service water pump houses in accordance with the Fire Protection Program procedure requirements. Specifically:
- Transient combustibles in excess of 25 pounds of ordinary combustibles were located in the following Level 2 areas without a permit, compensatory actions, or constant attendance: standby diesel generator breezeway and control building hallway; in addition to the exterior 50 feet buffer zone of the control building, auxiliary building, and standby service water pumphouses.
- Transient combustibles were introduced into the following Level 1 areas prior to either a permit being processed or compensatory actions being taken: Division 1 control building HVAC room; and the Unit 2, Division 1, switchgear room.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On September 3, 2019, the inspectors presented the telephonic exit for the biennial requalification inspection results to Mr. G. Hawkins, Director of Projects (acting General Manager for Plant Operations), and other members of the licensee staff.
- On October 3, 2019, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. E. Larson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
EN-FAP-EP-010
Severe Weather Response
EN-FAP-EP-010
GGNS Severe Weather Response Checklist, Attachment 7.5
07/08/2019
71111.04Q Drawings
M-1061A
P&I Diagram Standby Service Water System
M-1070A
P&I Diagram Standby Diesel Generator System
Miscellaneous
1C22-1/P41-072-
1P41C003C
Tagout SSW B Cooling Tower Fan C
Procedures
04-1-01-P41-1
Standby Service Water System
149
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-GGN-
2018-01936
Procedures
04-1-01-E22-1
High Pressure Core Spray System
27
04-1-01-P75-1
Division 1 Diesel SOI
2
06-OP-1E22-M-
0001
HPCS Monthly Functional Test
110
71111.05Q Calculations
MC-QSP64-
86058
Combustible Heat Load Calculation
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-GGN-
2019-06019, 2019-06159
Fire Plans
Fire Pre-Plan
Standby Liquid Control System Area - Containment
Section A-10
Fire Pre-Plan
Miscellaneous
Section 9A.5.3
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
2016-00
Procedures
Control of Combustibles
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-GGN-
2019-01836, 2019-02387, 2018-12838
Miscellaneous
Several Remediation Packages
07/18/2019
Cycle 22 Core Reload Test (Simulator)
05/04/2018
Steady State Test (Simulator) for 2019
06/19/2019
Week 3 Exams and Operating Tests
08/29/2019
OP Test and Written Exam Overlap Tool
07/18/2019
Post Event Simulator Test (PEST) for Scram result package
on 09/14/2018
07/18/2019
Transient Test 2
Simultaneous Trip of all Feedwater Pumps
08/07/2018
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
ANSI 3.5 required
test
Transient Test 5
ANSI 3.5 required
test
Trip of Single Recirculation Pump
08/07/2018
Procedures
Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program
Description
EN-TQ-201-04
SAT - Implementation Phase
Simulator Configuration Control
Conduct of Simulator Training
Conduct of Training and Qualification
Examination Security
Miscellaneous
1C22-1/P41-072-
1P41C003C,
Tagout SSW B Cooling Tower Fan C
Engineering
Response
1999-0216
Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) in the Containment,
Auxiliary Building, and Control Building
Procedures
01-S-07-37
Control of Work for Penetrations, Painting, Snubbers,
Insulation, and Control Room Envelope Breaches
109
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-GGN-
2019-01263, 2019-05329, 2019-06295, 2019-07497
Miscellaneous
Oil Analysis Report Sample
01/22/2019
10566080
Purchase Order to Bergen Power Pipe Supports
11/28/2018
58115
QC Receiving Inspection Report for 1" Diameter Load Pin
2/06/2019
Engineering
Response 2003-
261-000
Remove Automatic Isolations from Selected Valves
Engineering
Response 2003-
261-001
Deletion of Automatic Aux. Bldg. Isolation Signals for Selected
Drawings
A-0630
Control Building Fire Protection Plan
2
Unit 1 Auxiliary Bldg Fire Protection Plan at El. 93' & 103'
A-0633
Unit 1 Auxiliary Bldg Fire Protection Plan at El. 119'
A-0634
Unit 1 Aux & Diesel Gen Bldg and SSW Pump House - Fire
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Protection Plan at El. 133' & 139'
A-0635
Unit 1 Aux. and Diesel Gen Bldg Fire Protection Plan at El.
166'
Engineering
Changes
Permanently Gagging Open Misc. Valves,
Procedures
Control of Combustibles
Calculations
9645-A-022.4-
QS-7.0-1-3
Seismic Analysis of Rysdon Door
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-GGN-
2019-07766
Work Orders
WO 458585, 481558, 526829, 531649
Procedures
06-OP-1E21-Q-
0006
LPCS Quarterly Functional Test
130
Work Orders
WO 2770598, 52883665
Miscellaneous
GDRL-EP-
2019Q3Yellow
Emergency Preparedness Drill/Exercise Manual
08/26/2019
GSES-LOR-
AEX50
Simulator Exam
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-GGN-
2018-07592, 2018-08137, 2019-01275
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-GGN-
2019-07418
Procedures
07-S-12-143
Big Beam Emergency Light Inspection, Battery Capacity
Verification, and Functional Test
8