IR 05000416/1980020
| ML19290G605 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 10/08/1980 |
| From: | Blake J, Economos N, Herdt A, Kleinsorge W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19290G597 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-80-20, 50-417-80-13, NUDOCS 8012180118 | |
| Download: ML19290G605 (13) | |
Text
'o, UNITED STATES Ey s.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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Report Nos. 50-416/80-20 and 50-417/80-13 Licensee: Mississippi Power and Light Company
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Jackson, MS Facility Name: Grand Gulf Docket Nos. 50-416 and 50-417 Licensee Nos. CPPR-118 and CPPR-119 Inspection at Grand Gulf site near Port Gisbon, MS.
Inspectors:
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Approved by:
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. Herdt, Section Chief, RCES Branch Dat'e Signed SUMMARY Inspection on August 18-22, 1980 Artes Inspected This routine unannounced inspection involved 114 inspector-hours on site in the areas of In-depth QA inspection of performance in piping installation, welding and inspection; storage of materials (Unit 2) structural welding; and licensee identified items (50.55(e)).
Results Of the 4 are s inspected, no items of nonccapliance or deviations were.dentified in 3 areas; 3 items of noncompliance were found in I area (Deficiency - Inadequate audit preparation and review Paragraph 6; Infraction - failure to establish adequate measure; to control visual inspection Paragraph 5; Deficiency - Issue of Materials without authorization - Paragraph 5).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
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- J P. McGaugby, Assistant V.P. Nuclear Production
- G. B. Rogers, Manager of Construction
- J.
W. selverton, Field QA Supervisor
- H. Morgan, Constructior, Supervisor
- S. F. Tanner, QA Representative
- D. D. Little, QA Representative A. T. Ramey,QA Representative W. E. Edge, Quality Program & Audit Coordinator Other personnel contacted included several construction craf tsmen, QC technicians, and office personnel.
Otner Organizations BECHTEL
- D. l.. Lake, Field Construction Manager
- M. L. Rayfield, Resident Engineer
- R. L. Scott, Project QA Manager
- J. K. Conw y, Project Field QC Engineer
- J. R. Valdez, QA Engineer M. R. Linsey, LeadQA Engineer A. Bettencourt, QA M. Pitre, Supervisor Welding /NDE Documentation S. Lewis, WeldingQC Engineer PEAB05i TESTING R. E. Green, Project Manager NRC Resident Inspector
- L. W. Garne
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 22, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph I above. The items of noncompliance and the unresolved items were discussed in detail.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
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4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable o: may involve noncompliance or deviations.
New unresolved items identified during this inspection are
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discussed in paragraph 5.
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5.
Independent Inspection Effort a.
Construction Act ivities The inspectors conducted a general inspection of the fuel, auxiliary and reactor buildings to observe construction progress and construction activities such as welding, nondestructive examination, material handling and control, housekeeping and storage.
b.
Butt Weld Configuration (1) On August 20, 1980, the inspectors, accompanied by a representa-tive of the licensee, made a generai inspection of the Unit I auxiliary building. The inspectors noted the following condition on cast valve no. F-051B abutting Field Weld - 35 (FW-35), in the residual heat removal system, depicted on drawing 9645-M1347A Rev. 21.
The transition surface angle, on valve F-051B nozzle, with respect to the piping center line was 45 degrees at the toe of FW-35.
Grand Gulf drawing 9645-MS-06 Rev.
6.
sheet 2 of 3 limits the nozzle transition surface angle with respect to the piping center line at the toe of an a butting weld to 30 degrees maximum. Apparently, the licensee inspectors were not visually examining in this area.
Failure to establish adequate measures to assure that special processes including nondestructive testing are ccatrolled and accomplished in accordance with applicable criteria is in noncompliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion IX. This is an infraction and is assigned item No. 416/80-20-23 and 417/80-13-23:
Failure to establish adequate measures to control visual inspection.
(2) With regard to the above inspection, the NRt. inspectors determined that FW-35 was over-welded.
This determination was based on a comparison of the actual and drawing dimensions of the OD of FW-35. Over welding a butt weld of the FW-35 configuration would significantly increase the width of the welds on the OD scrface.
Since the OD of FW-35 was ground flush, the actual width of FW-35 could not be dett c,ined by visual inspection.
The inspecters reviewed the radiographs of FW-35 and the width of W-35 could not be determined from the radiographs. Thus, at the time of this inspection, it could net determined whether the entire volume of FW-35 had been subjected to the required radiographic examine-tion. The licensee indicated that they would evaluate the matter.
The inspectors stated that the question of radiographic coverage would be an unresolved item and identified as 416/80-20-26:
"Radic;;raph Coverage oi FW-35".
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Marking Control On August 19, 1980 the inspectors, accompanied by a representative of the licensee, made a general inspection of Unit I reactor, fuel and auxiliary buildings.
The inspectors noted several examples where craft personnel were marking safety related stainless steel components
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wi th Sanford No. 1501 black markers.
Grand Gulf specification No.
9645-M-204.0, Revision 26 " Design Specification for Field Fabrication and Installation of Nuclear Service Piping and inst rumentation for MP&L GGSS" paragraph 5.2.1.g, requires temporary field marking to be accomplished with authorized products certified to meet given chemical analysis acceptance criteria.
Ine licensee stated that there was no authorization for issue or use of Sanford No. 1501 black markers.
Therefore, controlled item (markers) were issued and used without proper authorization. Failure to follow procedure is in noncompliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V. The licensee was able to show the controlled items (Sanford No.1501 markers) were properly certified (Chemical analysis within a cceptance criteria) but, not properly authorized for use. In view of the above, this item is being categorized as a deficiency and was assigned item No. 416/80-20-24, 417/80-13-24:
" Issue of Materials without Authorization".
d.
Structural Welding During a walk-through inspection of the Unit 2 containment, the inspectors observed apparently excessive wide weld beads, ranging from 1 1/4" to 2", on several of the welds on the reactor vessel shield wall.
In addition, the visual appearance of these welds did not seem to be acceptable for the necessary nondestructive examination. In addition one weld in the Unit I reactor vessel shield wal? appeared wider than normal. The licensee agreed that the appearance of the welds torther with the weave width needed to be evahated in the areas of wuding procedure and qualification including essential and nonessential variables, inspection requirements, QC records etc.
This item is identified as an Unresolved Item 416/80-20-25, 417/80-13-25: " Reactor vessel shield wall weld weave."
6.
QA Inspection of Performance This inspection was performed to determine whether site work is being performed in accordance with NRC requirements and SAR commitments, the QA/QC program is functioning in a manner to assure requirements and commitments are met, and that prompt and effective action is taken to achieve permanent corrective action on significant discrepancies.
'Ine following areas were examined to verify the inspection objectives:
Field Drawings and Work Procedures.
a.
(1) The inspectors reviewed the below listed documents to determin whether the most recent revisions of field drawings, construction
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-4-specifications and work procedures are in agreement with the SAR and system drawings.
Number / Revision Title (No Number)
" Project Design Criteria Manual
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Rev. 9 for GGNS"
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9645-M-204.0
" Design Specification For Field Rev. 26 Fabrication and Installation of Nuclear Service Piping and Instrumentation for MP&L GGNS" 9645-M-205.0
" Technical Specification for Piping 2-inch and Smaller Nuclear Service for MP&L GGNS" 9645-MS-02
" Piping Class Summary Sheets Rev. 24 Unit 1 and 2" 9645-M-1083B
" Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Rev. 12 System Unit 1 (P and ID Diagram)
9645-M-1086
"High Pressure Core Spray System Rev. 13 Unit 1" (P and ID Diagram)
FSK-S-1083B-044B
" Leak Detection Connection from Rev. 5 OBB-57" FSK-5-1086-034C
"DRW Vent from DBA-5" Rev. 5 9645-M-1349B
"HPCS CTMT To RPV" Rev. 13 FSK-S-1086-025C
"DRW Drain From DBA-5" Rev. 9 (2) The inspc-tors reviewed drawing change Notice Nos, 79, & 10 to 9645-M-1083B to determine whether the design change has been properly provided, reviewed, approved and processed.
(3) The inspectors reviewed 9645-M-204.0 to determine whether work procedures adequately describe critical points and methods of installation as well as inspectian and test hold points - to properly reflect design intent.
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Field Inspection (1) The inspectors made a detailed inspection, including physical ceasurements, of a portion of the reactor core isolation cooling and high pressure core spray systems as indicated below to determine
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whether equipment or systems are installed / erected as described by field drawings and construction specifications.
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From (Weld No.)
To (Weld No.)
Drawing No.
FW-1 FW-4 FSK-S-1083B-044B FW-9 FW-4 FKS-S-1086-034C FW-5 FW-7 9645-M-1349B FW-8 FW-13 FKS-1086-025C (2) The inspectors interviewed craftsmen associated with safety related piping fabrication and installation to determine whether their level of knowledge is adequate to provide the required quality of workmanship.
c.
Observation of NDE Activities (1) Liquid Penetrant Examinations.
At the time of this inspection Peabody was performing liquid penetrant examination on certain welded 3/4 inch diam. stainless steel couplings as part of an inhouse investigation to ascertain whether linear indications identified on some others produced from the same material was an isolated or generic condition.
This matter was identified by the licensee as NCR # 4966 8/5/80 and it appears in paragraph 7 item no. 416/80-20-21, 417/80-13-21 of this report. The couplings we.:e made of SA-182, 304-L stainless steel material produced from heat number A17130 coded QE. The procurement specification was Bechtel h-205.2.
Bechtel records showed that of the 930 couplings received, 121 had been installed of which 69 had been liquid penetrant tested. Of those tested, seven were found to contain linear indications. Discussions with cognizant Bechtel personnel disclosed that preliminary reports from their metallurgical investigation showed the indications to be forging laps. The inspector observed liquid penetrant examina-tion of the following items:
Weld #
Size Drawing #
Comment W-4 socket 3/4" FSK-I-1077A-302B NRI W-4 socket 3/4" FSK-I-1077A-301B NRI W-11RI Butt 2"
FSK-I-1077A-025C Repair, NRI Coupling 3/4" FSK-I-1078A-095C NRI between welds Il and 16
-6-Coupling 3/4" between FSK-I-1078A-126C welds 18 linear indi-and 20 cations
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(2) Radiographic Examination pipe welds isSection V (74S74) of the ASME
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safety related observed the listed below in order to ascertain whether this a The inspector
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welds was being performed in accordance with procedural and C d vitiy ments.
o e require-Weld No.
ISO /Dwg. No.
System Size W-74 M-1352B W-75 Offgas 4" X.337" M-1332B W-7,-8 Offgas 4" X.337" FSK-S-1097-013B MSIV Leakage 2 X.344 W-A (reshot)
Spool #
Control Main Stream Q1B21G001-G010B1 W-7 FSK-5-1097-007B MSIV-Leakage 2 X.344 Control For these welds the inspector observed film storage and d facilities, radiographic technique, film quality, evaluation of eveloping indications, documentation.
personnel qualification records.In addition the inspector reviewed Radiographic technicians and supervisors contacted appeared to be qualified to perform their assigned tasks. knowledgeable and well Within the areas inspected no items of noncomplia were identified.
nce or deviation d.
Qualification of Inspection and NDE Personnel Bechtel Quality Control Procedure 10.2, establishes the requirements for certifying and traini" Personnel Certification."
personnel.
The procedure ng QC department for Nuclearreferences ANSI N45.2, " Quality Assurance Program Requirements Power Plants";
Proj ect Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual, Policies Bechtel Thermal Power Organization's Nondestructive EQGG-2.3,QGG-9.1, QG for Performance Qualifications xamination Standards y
The procedures address responsibilities, certificatifor Certification of NPE Pe ments training and certification records, recertificatio on and training, require-certifications for Level I, II and III personnel.
n upgrading By reference these policies invoke portions of the ASME C d
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and standards and supplements as applicable.the Recommended Practice No.o e, AWS code SNT-TC-1A, 1975 and Bechtel specification M183.0 Appendix.
070 is the governing engineering document for welding and NDE.Section III of the ASMI Code (74S74) as referenced in Bechtel Design Specifica-tion M204.0 Rev.
26, controls these activities.
Peabody Testing Services (Peabody), under contract to Bechtel is responsible for all NDE of field fabricated welds with the exception of visual inspection which is performed by Bechtel personnel. The following procedures
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were reviewed for technical content and compliance with applicable
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code requirements:
Bechtel (1) NEPQ-2 Level I & II Personnel Qualification and Certification (2) VE-BPC-1 Visual Examination Peabody (1) Quality Assurance Program (2) Quality Assurance Plan for Grand Guld Nuclear Station 1.
(3) Qualifi. ation and Certification of NDE Personnel.
(4) Magnetic Particle Examination Dry Method, No. 3.21.A.1 with Ammendment 2 and 3.
(5) Radiographic Examination of Welds, No. 3.20. A.1 with Ammendement 2.
In addition the inspector reviewed qualification records of ten (10)
Peabody and six (6) Bechtel NDE personnel covering capability Levels I, Il and III of multiple disciplines.
Within the areas inspected no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Nonconforming Items Reports (NCR)
e.
The inspectors reviewed selected reports of construction discrepancies in the form of nonconformance reports (NCR's). The NCR's were reviewed for completeness in the description of the problem and recommended corrective action. Corrective actions were examined to verify that:
(1) The action taken corrected the problem or justified the acceptance of the condition.
(2) Determined the cause of the deficiency.
(3) Considered Reportability The completed NCR's reviewed were as follows:
No.
Title 4731 WR-5 for FWO88, 6" HCC 12, Not Retreivable 4734 6" HBB-102 & 6 "HBD-753 Downstream of Penetration
- 50 not installed per dimensions on Dwg M1356D.
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4749 FSKS1077Co28C, FW-6 Weld Procedure PI-T used in lieu of PI-AT-LH or IJI-A-IH.
4785 Valve Q1E51 F076-B installed backwards 4197 Shop Weld sockets 2 and 6 on FSKS-1079-013B undersize
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4815
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Linear Indications on FW-11 NCR's which were still open pending completion of project engineering disposition or completion of corrective action were reviewed for clarity and evidence of review for reportability under 10 CFR 50.55(e).
No.
Title 4816 G009 R03 Not installed per Design Drawing.
4828 G001-C14 off location.
4840 M1328K FW70 PWHT Chart.
4641 No. 2T Hole FW-64 M1348G 4844 G002-C0 2 Design angle violation 4864 Procedure Violations.
4868 QlB21G026-05-11 Minimum Wall Violation.
4872 Cables burned in tray 4873 Q1B21G026-8-11 Minimum wall violation.
There were no items of noncompliance or deviations in this area of the inspection.
f.
Materials and Equipment The inspectors examined / reviewed the items and certification documentation for the below listed components to determine whether meaningful inspections were made to verify that material meets specifications and to what degree the licensee / contractor had inspected or verified performance by the vendor; items meets design and purchase order requirements; and the documentation is adequate; and the items meets design intent.
Component Heat or Control No.
FSK-1086-025C PC 9 M01901 PC 10 M01901 PC 11 K378 PC 12 K376 FSK-S-1086-034c PC 7 HB0356 PC 9 HB0356 PC 10 M715 PC 11 M715 FSK-S-1083B-044B PC 2 463867 PC 15 M2965 PC 18 PV PC 21 PV
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Liquid Penetrant Materials Remover Developer Penetrant Double Check 4D021 6L-906 1H-917, IF 926 Magnaflux 5F071 SE052 SF086
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SE003 GH114 In addition the inspector reviewed MP&L's audit MAR 80-26 perform to verify that penetrameters in use met applicable ASTM standard and the Bechtel specification.
There were no items of noncompliance or deviations in this area of the inspection.
g.
Audits The inspectors reviewed the licensee's and its contractor's Audit Program in the area of piping install 1ation, special processes, and personnel certification. Included in this review was the training and certification program for the audit personnel.
Licensee audits reviewed were the following QA monitoring Audit Reports (MAR's)
No.
80/63 Pittsburgh Testing Lab 80/59 Field Welding and NDE of Plant Service Water Pipe 80/53 Drywell Structural Integrity Test.
80/42 Implementation Bechtel Audits 80/40 Tempsticks (Bechtel Construction)
80/26 Radiographic Penetrameters 80/4 Piping WP & IR's 80/1 Vendor Radiographs 79/37 Pipe Welding Activities 79/36 Personnel Certifications Contractor (Bechtel (Bechtel) Audits selected for review were:
(1) Project Audit Report No. J-19-01, Special Proecesses.
(2) Project Audit Report No. J-31-01, Fabrication Shop Activities.
Project Audit Report No. J-19-01 contained a note stating that " Detail T of Drawing C-1051B Rev. 6 has undersize weld requirement, QAR F-148 is tracking this concern". A review of QAR F-148 showed that it had been closed on 5/30/80 while the audit in question (No. J-19-01) was conducted 6/27/80.
The auditor was questioned about this apparent discrepancy - his defense was that he was aware of the problem of design drawings specifying fillet weld sizes smaller than the fabrication code allowable, and that this problem was being tracked as a generic problem by QAR F-148. He was not aware that the QAR had been close.
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The inspectors reviewed the drawing aetail referenced in the audit and the QAR to determine whether the QAR resolution applied. After re"iewing the drawing in question and other drawings referenced, it could not be readily determined whether the structure in question was designed for fabrication under ASME NE or AWS D 1.1 requirements. The auditor indicated that he had the same problem so had assumed that the structure
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(Part of the drywell wall) was designed to ASME NE requirements. This meant that the 1/2-inch fillet welds specified to hold the 3/4-inch thick materials together were undersize in that NE requires fillet welds to be 1.09 times the thickness of the thinner member.
(1.09 x 3/4 inch).
A review of the FSAR by the inspectors revealed that the structure in question was desi,aned for fabrication in accordance with AWS D 1.1.
This standard only requires 5/16-inch fillet welds for the 3/4-inch thick materials involved. This meant that the welds specified were in actuality larger than required by the standard.
The audit report in question had been reviewed, approved, and issued by the Bechtel QA Group.
The inspectore uformed the licensee and the contractor that this audit showed a problem in the areas of preparation (the auditor did not determine the fabrication requirements prior to the audit) and review (The QA supervisors failed to question why an apparent finding was being written off as being tracked by a document which had been closed prior to the audit). The licensee was informed that this would be an item of noncompliance against Criterion XVIII of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B and would be identified as item No. 50-416/80-20-22, 50-417/80-13-22 " Inadequate Audit Preparation and Review". This is an infraction.
There were no other items of noncompliance or deviations in this area of the inspection.
7.
Licensee Ide.'tified Items (50.55(e))
The licensee's list of quality related open items contained a number of items which had been called in to the Region II office but had not been identified in an inspection report and therefore had not been assigned a Region II item Number. These items are listed below:
a.
Item 50-416/80-20-01; 50-417/80-13-01 - RPV Cables - Damage in two pinching and cutting of insulation.
(MP&L No. 80-05, systems
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identified 2/28/80).
b.
Item 50-416/80-20-02; 50-417/80-13-02 - Pulling rope damage - Rope cut through cable jacket and insulation.
(MP&L No. 80-06, Identified 3/13/80).
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c.
Item 50-416/80-20-03; 50-417/80-13-03, Dragon Valves - Modification of valve manifolds without Project Eng.
Approval.
(MP&L No. 80-07 Identified 3/13/80).
d.
Item 50-416/80-20-04; 50-417/80-13-04, Fisher controls - lack of QA Program; Nonpressure parts (MP&L No. 80-11, Identified 3/6/80).
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e.
Item 50-416/80-20-05; 50-417/80-13-05; Parker hannifan tee; fitting
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faked during hydro. (MP&L No. 80-35, Identified 5/23/80).
f.
Item 50-416/80-20-06; 50-417/80-13-06; control of rebar cuts - rebar cut without project engineering Approval.
(MP&L No. 80-36; Identified 6/12/80).
g.
Item 50-416/80-20-07; 50-417/80-13-07, HPCS Switchgear - Failure to coreply with seismic requirements. (MP&L No. 80-37, Identified 6/12/80).
h.
Item 50-416/80-20-08; 50-417/80-13-08, SSW Pumps - Debris Entered Basin Not considered in design. (MP&L NO. 50-38, Identified 6/13/80).
i.
Item 50-416/80-20-09; 50-417/80-13-09, DeLaval Diesel Generator - Damaged stator coil. (MP&L No. 80-39, Identified 6/23/80).
j.
Item 50-416/80-20-10; 50-417/80-13-10, Fillet Welds - Inproper Transla-tion - Desing Drawing To Field Sketches. (MP&L No. 80-40 Identified 6/24/80).
k.
Item 50-416/80-20-11; 50-417/80-13-11, Delaval Diesel Generator -
fractured valve body on Jacket Water Thermostat Control (MP&L No.
80-41, Identified 6/2o/89).
1.
Item 50-416/80-20-12; 50-417/80-13-12, Klockner Moeller "42" Relay -
Use of long screw causes failure of motor to start. (MP&L No. 80-42, Identified 7/2/80).
m.
Item 50-416/80-20-13; 50-417/80-13-13, Electro-Switch - Contact malfunc-tion causes incorrect indication on control panel.
(MP&L No. 80-43, Identified 7/2/80).
n.
Item 50-416/80-20-14; 50-417/80-20-14; ITE imperial 4.16 KV termination Lugs not crimped. (MP&L No. 80-44, Identified 7/3/80).
o.
Item 50-416/80-20-15; 50-417/80-13-15, Feedwater Pipe bend wall Thickness below design requirements. (MP&L No. 80-45, Identified 7/10-80).
p.
Item 50-416/80-20-16; 50-417/80-13-16, Defective control transformer for HPCS Valve. (MP&L No. 80-46, Identified 7/11/80).
q.
Item 50-416/80-20-17; 50-417/80-413-17, Fractured coupling - actuator to damper coupling - diesel generator building ventilation system.
(MP&L No. 80-49, Identified 7/30/80).
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Item 50-416/80-20-18; 50-417/80-13-18, Expansion Anchors -Installation r.
without project engineering Approval.
(MP&L No. 80-50, Identified 8/4/80).
Item 50-416/80-20-19; 50-417/80-13-19, Bechtel Supplier Drawing Revision s.
Notice Program Inadequate.
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(MP&L No. 80-51, Identified 8/6/80).
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Item 50-416/80-20-20; 50-417/80-13-20, RPV Sensing lines - Possible Shearing by Reflective insulation.
(MP&L No. 80-52 Identified 8/8/80).
Item 50-416/80-20-21; 50-417/80-13-21, Guyon Coupling linear Indications u.
(MP&L No. 80-53, Identified 8/11/80).
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This was not an inspection of the licensee's 50.55(e) reporting system items are only enumerated to provide a vehicle for entering licensee identi
, the fied items into the NRC open item tracking system.
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