IR 05000413/2024004

Integrated Inspection Report 05000413/2024004 and 05000414/2024004

ML25042A431
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	02/12/2025
From:	Robert Williams NRC/RGN-II/DORS
To:	Flippin N Duke Energy Carolinas
References
IR 2024004
Download: ML25042A431 (1)

Text

SUBJECT:

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000413/2024004 AND 05000414/2024004

Dear Nicole Flippin:

On December 31, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Catawba Nuclear Station. On January 28, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Catawba Nuclear Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Catawba Nuclear Station.

February 12, 2025 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Robert E. Williams, Jr., Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000413 and 05000414 License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:

05000413 and 05000414

License Numbers:

NPF-35 and NPF-52

Report Numbers:

05000413/2024004 and 05000414/2024004

Enterprise Identifier:

I-2024-004-0019

Licensee:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

Facility:

Catawba Nuclear Station

Location:

York, South Carolina

Inspection Dates:

October 01, 2024, to December 31, 2024

Inspectors:

D. Rivard, Senior Resident Inspector

A. Wang, Resident Inspector

S. Downey, Senior Reactor Inspector

A. Hutto, Senior Project Engineer

J. Seat, Senior Project Engineer

J. Viera, Senior Operations Engineer

Approved By:

Robert E. Williams, Jr., Chief

Projects Branch 1

Division of Operating Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Catawba Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Survey and Post Locked High Radiation Area Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Occupational Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000413,05000414/2024004-01 Open/Closed

[P.5] -

Operating Experience 71152A A self-revealing, Green, non-cited violation of technical specification (TS) 5.7.2, was identified for the failure to control access to a locked high radiation area (LHRA). Specifically, the licensee did not identify and control access to the mixing and settling tank room following overflow from the waste resin batch tank which created dose rates exceeding the minimum requirements for a LHRA.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 started the inspection period at 33 percent rated thermal power (RTP) and was shut down to start a scheduled refueling outage (C1R28) on October 1, 2024. On October 28, 2024, Unit 1 was placed online and reached 100 percent RTP on October 31, 2024. On December 7, 2024, Unit 1 power was reduced to approximately 50 percent RTP for 1A main feed pump protection circuitry repair and main turbine control valve tuning. Unit 1 was returned to 100 percent RTP on December 8, 2024, where it remained through the end of the inspection period.

Unit 2 started the inspection period at 34 percent RTP. On October 5, 2024, power was raised to 100 percent RTP. On December 13, 2024, Unit 2 power was reduced to 18 percent RTP to facilitate radiological conditions for workers performing an oil addition to 2C reactor coolant pump. Unit 2 power was returned to 100 percent RTP on December 15, 2024, where it remained through the end of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal cold temperatures for the following systems:

Control room ventilation chill water and refueling water on November 26, 2024

Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather and entry to procedure TE-OP-CNS-0120, Severe Weather Preparations, upon National Weather Service declaration of a tornado watch and subsequent warning, and severe thunderstorm warning on December 29, 2024.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 1 spent fuel pool cooling system on October 18, 2024 (2)1B essential switchgear power alignment via Unit 2 and standby transformer SATB on October 30, 2024 (3)1B nuclear service water pump and strainer on November 29, 2024

(4) Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump following testing on December 6, 2024

(5) Unit 2 component cooling alignment while component cooling water pump 2B1 was out of service for maintenance on December 16, 2024

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 1 'A' train control area chilled water system on November 14, 2024.

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Fire area 18 (partial): auxiliary building, elevation 577, Unit 1 spent fuel pool cooling room (room 418) on October 18, 2024

(2) Fire area reactor building (RB) 1: Unit 1 lower containment on October 25, 2024

(3) Fire area safe shutdown facility (SSF) on October 29, 2024

(4) Fire area 6: Unit 1, elevation 560, electrical penetration room on November 6, 2024

(5) Fire area 15: Unit 1, auxiliary building, elevation 577, essential switchgear room (room 496) on November 13 and 14, 2024

(6) Fire area 7: Unit 2, auxiliary building, elevation 560, essential switchgear room (room 362) on November 14, 2024

Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill in Warehouse 2 on November 7, 2024.

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the Unit 1 and 2 auxiliary feedwater pump rooms on October 31 and November 1, 2024.

===71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities in Unit 1 during refueling outage C1R28 from October 7 to October 11, 2024.

PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities (IP Section 03.01)===

The inspectors verified that the following nondestructive examination and welding activities were performed appropriately:

(1) Radiographic Examination

1. 1CA115-4, pipe to pipe weld, ASME Class 2. This included a review of the

associated welding activities.

2. 1CA115-5, pipe to pipe weld, ASME Class 2. This included a review of the

associated welding activities.

3. 1CA115-6, pipe to pipe weld, ASME Class 2. This included a review of the

associated welding activities.

Ultrasonic Examination

3. 1NI165-8, tee to valve weld, ASME Class 1

Visual Examination

1. 1RPV-BMI-NOZZLE, reactor vessel bottom-mounted instrumentation nozzles,

ASME Class 1 PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection

Activities (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors verified that the licensee conducted the following vessel upper head penetration inspections and addressed any identified defects appropriately:

(1) Bare metal visual examination of 1RPV-HEAD-SURFACE, reactor pressure vessel upper head, ASME Class 1 PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors verified the licensee is managing the boric acid corrosion control program through a review of the following evaluations:

(1)

2. Review of the following boric acid evaluations (by condition report number):

a.

Nuclear condition report (NCR) 2481656 b.

NCR 2481687 c.

NCR 2507886 d.

NCR 2510878

3. Review of the following corrective actions performed for evidence of boric acid

leaks that were identified (by work request number):

a.

Work request (WR) 20252899 b.

WR 20264587 c.

WR 20273562

71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The licensee completed the annual requalification operating examinations and biennial written examinations required to be administered to all licensed operators in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 55.59(a)(2), "Requalification Requirements," of the NRC's "Operator's Licenses." The inspector performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating examinations, the crew simulator operating examinations, and the biennial written examinations in accordance with inspection procedure (IP) 71111.11, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance." These results were compared to the thresholds established in Section 3.03, "Requalification Examination Results," of IP 71111.11.

(1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating and the biennial written examinations completed on August 8, 2024.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a video recording of a crew performance evaluation, OP-CN-CPE-24-01, recorded on November 21, 2024.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Preventive maintenance change (PMCH) 0253887, Unit 1 and 2 emergency diesel generator (EDG) air start system (VG) soft seat check valve replacements extended to every eight years from every six years

(2) Unit 1 component cooling system (KC) 10CFR50.65(a)(1) action plan completion review prior to transition to (a)(2) monitoring

(3) NCR 02530230, loss of 2A offsite power (PCB 20/21 OPEN) on September 27, 2024

(4) NCR 02526388, 2A diesel battery charger card failure

(5) NCR 02530207, loss of main condenser vacuum required Unit 2 manual reactor trip

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Elevated risk and Unit 1 outage defense in depth due to 2A main power train out of service (OOS) on October 4, 2024

(2) Unit 1 entry into yellow risk condition for reduced reactor coolant system inventory for reactor vessel head removal on October 6, 2024

(3) Unit 1 spent fuel pool cooling (KF) protected equipment due to elevated heat loads due to spent fuel pool loaded with fuel during outage on October 18, 2024

(4) Protected equipment, PRS-0-24-B VC/YC OOS -0244, during maintenance of the 'B' train control room ventilation and cooling system, on November 25, 2024

(5) Elevated risk associated with Unit 2 down power to assess 2C reactor coolant pump upper bearing oil reservoir level and install oil addition temporary modification, on December 10, 2024

(6) Protected equipment clearance, PRT-2-24-2B1 KC PU -0256, for single component cooling water pump OOS for maintenance, on December 16, 2024

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) NCR 02530265, Unit 1 rod cluster control assembly (RCCA) movement preventive maintenance (PM) not performed by late date

(2) NCR 02530715, 1A essential switchgear degraded voltage timer failed acceptance criteria

(3) NCR 02530230, loss of Unit 2, train 'A' offsite power while supplying Unit 1 and Unit 2, train 'A' essential power buses

(4) NCR 02535942, 2B nuclear service water (NS) damaged piping restraint

(5) NCR 02530968, 1A reactor coolant charging pump suction impeller inspection visual indications

(6) NCR 02524468, 2B1 component cooling water pump outboard bearing oil leak

(7) NCR 02539324, 1B and 1C cold leg accumulator tank level increase

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Engineering change (EC) 424970, support 2-R-NS-0080 evaluated containment spray system pipe hangers for identified discrepancies, Revision 0 and 1, on November 19 and 20, 2024

(2) EC 420786, cross connect control room area chilled water system and computer room chilled water systems as allowed by technical specification change via license amendment

(3) EC 425071, Unit 2 'C' reactor coolant pump motor temporary oil fill line

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated Unit 1 refueling outage C1R28 activities from October 1 to October 29, 2024.

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (12 Samples)

(1) SM/0/A/8510/006, "Ice Condenser Intermediate Deck Doors Inspection and Corrective Maintenance," following outage maintenance on Unit 1 ice condenser intermediate deck doors, on October 17, 2024

(2) Work order (WO) 20649554, 1A charging pump rebuild mechanical seals, on October 19, 2024

(3) Visual examination following corrective maintenance for the train 'B' containment spray piping supports as identified in NCR 02531738 (1-R-NS-0037), NCR 02531897 (1-R-NS-0036) and NCR 02532430 (1-R-NS-0041)

(4) WO 20689808, 1ETA degraded voltage timer relay calibration and replacement

(5) MP/0/A/7150/072, "Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Test," following valve refurbishment, under WO 20649667

(6) PT/1/A/4250/003 C, "Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump #1 Performance Test," on October 27, 2024, following overspeed trip testing performed using WO

===20649885, on October 24, 2024

(7) PT/1/A/4350/002 A, "Diesel Generator A Operability Test," following replacement of control relay R1A, under WO 20671063

(8) PT/1/A/4200/013 L, "RN (Nuclear Service Water) Valve Inservice Test," following motor operator testing, under WO 20650325

(9) Restoration of 2A offsite power train using OP/2/A/6350/001, Enclosure 4.13, "Train A Power Isolation and Return to Service and Functional Test," as developed in WO 20688831, task 07

(10) PT/1/A/4250/002 C, "Turbine Control Valve Movement," following tuning of valve controller to alleviate conditions noted in NCR 02533745

(11) WO 20682514, for replacement and retest of 2A diesel battery charger control card following failure documented in NCR 02526388

(12) OP/2/A/6400/005, "Component Cooling System," for operational testing of 2B1 component cooling pump following maintenance, on December 16, 2024 Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01)===

(1) PT/1/A/4200/001 I, "As Found Leak Rate Test," during Unit 1 refueling outage, C1R28, for containment penetration CNIP-1NS10, on October 7, 2024

(2) WO 20649264, C1R28 ice condenser ice basket weight determination

(3) PT/1/A/4200/009, "Unit 1 A Train Engineered Safety Features Actuation Periodic Test," on October 7,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===

(1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2023, to September 30, 2024)

(2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2023, to September 30, 2024)

MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2023, to September 30, 2024)

(2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2023, to September 30, 2024)

BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2023, to September 30, 2024)

(2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2023, to September 30, 2024)

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Fire protection impairments

(2) Component cooling water pump and auxiliary feedwater pump performance curves and testing criteria

(3) Preventive maintenance application strategies for the emergency diesel control relays

(4) SSF diesel performance

(5) Potential trends in access control of radiation areas that might be indicative of a more significant issue

71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)

(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends in degraded bus undervoltage relay timer setpoint drift that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Follow up (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors evaluated a Unit 2 manual reactor trip due to loss of condenser vacuum and the licensees response on September 27,

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Survey and Post Locked High Radiation Area Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Occupational Radiation Safety Green NCV 05000413,05000414/2024004-01 Open/Closed

[P.5] -

Operating Experience 71152A A self-revealing, Green, non-cited violation of technical specification (TS) 5.7.2, was identified for the failure to control access to a locked high radiation area (LHRA). Specifically, the licensee did not identify and control access to the mixing and settling tank room following overflow from the waste resin batch tank which created dose rates exceeding the minimum requirements for a LHRA.

Description:

While performing rounds on September 20, 2024, an operator received an unanticipated dose rate alarm at the entry point to room 221. The operator immediately exited the area and contacted radiation protection (RP) shift personnel. A follow-up survey indicated dose rates of 17 rem/hr on contact on the mixing and settling tank (MST) and 11 rem/hr at 30 cm. It was determined that during resin movement activities the previous day, September 19, 2024, the resin batching tank (RBT) had overflowed into the MST in room 221.

As part of the general resin transfer process, the spent resin storage tank (SRST) is isolated and pressurized with bulk nitrogen to force resin from the SRST to the RBT. The resin is then transferred from the RBT to the high integrity container (HIC) at the waste solidification pad (WSP) for ultimate disposal off site.

The resin movement activities on September 19 consisted of a resin transfer of the previously loaded RBT to the HIC, followed by resin transfers from the SRST to the RBT and finally to the HIC. During the resin transfer from the SRST to the RBT, operators observing the HIC camera field of view noticed a small amount of water in the floor of the RBT room and informed the RP technician. None of the team members recognized that the water could have been caused by the resin movement activities and did not note it as an immediate issue due to the location being in an inaccessible area. After the resin transfer activities, an operator noticed that the MST level had risen while they were monitoring SRST tank levels. The rise in MST levels is not a normal response during resin transfer though this can be attributed to overflow from the RBT into the MST. This increase in MST level was discussed, however it was not conveyed to RP because of reports that there were no issues identified in the follow-up surveys performed for each resin movement and ultimately not perceived to be noteworthy. However, room 221 was not included in the RP checklist for the follow-up surveys for the resin transfer activities and was never identified as meeting the classification for a LHRA.

Corrective Actions: Areas that could be affected by an overflow from the RBT to the MST were surveyed to evaluate radiological conditions. A procedure change was initiated in the resin movement procedure for operations to notify RP of any resin associated tank level increases. The RP checklist for resin transfer from the SRST to the RBT was revised to include monitoring for room 221. Training was developed to provide guidance on monitoring and evaluating available indications for overflow from the RBT to the MST.

Corrective Action References: NCR 02529635

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to control access to a high radiation area with radiation levels >1000 mrem/hr at 30 cm from the source, as required by TS 5.7.2, was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Specifically, it resulted in the loss of exposure control to an area exhibiting elevated radiation dose rates. The inspectors used IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, dated November 1, 2023, to inform answers to the more than minor screening questions and found this condition consistent with more than minor example 6.f for having an area that was failed to be posted as a LHRA, which resulted in an accessible dose rate that exceeded 1000 mrem/hr at 30 cm.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not related to ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable), did not result in an overexposure, did not present a substantial potential for overexposure, and the licensees ability to assess dose was not compromised.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.5 - Operating Experience: The organization systematically and effectively collects, evaluates, and implements relevant internal and external operating experience in a timely manner. The event stemmed from a failure to adequately implement internal operating experience with overflowing the RBT into the MST in 2010. Corrective actions to revise the resin transfer procedure to implement monitoring of the MST during resin transfers were identified, but never actually implemented.

Enforcement:

Violation: Technical specification 5.7.2, High Radiation Area, states, in part, that areas with radiation levels >1000 mrem/hr at 30 cm from the radiation source or from any surface which the radiation penetrates shall be provided with locked or continuously guarded doors to prevent unauthorized entry. Contrary to the above, from September 19, 2024, to September 20, 2024, room 221 was not posted nor controlled as a locked high radiation area.

Specifically, on September 19, 2024, the failure to identify liquid transfer to the MST during resin transfer activities created dose rates of 17 rem/hr on contact on the mixing and settling tank and 11 rem/hr at 30cm that were not identified until an unanticipated dose rate alarm was received on September 20, 2024.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On October 10, 2024, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to Nicole Flippin and other members of the licensee staff.

• On January 28, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Nicole Flippin and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71111.04

Drawings

CN-1578-02.00,

CN-1578-02.04,

CN-1578-02.1

Flow Diagram of Control Area Chilled Water System (YC)

71111.05

Corrective Action

Documents

278583, 02534605

CNC-1206.03-00-

0001

Flood Level for Structures Outside the Reactor Building

CNC-1223.42-00-

0080

Determination of CATDP Operating Duration before

Flooding from Normal Sump Inputs Leads to Pump Failure

as Result of an ELAP

CNC-1223.42-00-

0089

Evaluation of Doghouse Flood on Motor Driven CA Pump

Operability

Miscellaneous

CNS-1465.00-00-

20

Design Basis Specification for the Flooding from Internal

Sources

71111.06

Procedures

EP/2/A/5000/ECA-

0.0

Loss of All AC Power

UT-24-010

Ultrasonic Examination of 1NI162-14

10/10/2024

UT-24-014

Ultrasonic Examination of 1NI163-15

10/11/2024

UT-24-016

Ultrasonic Examination of 1NI165-8

10/13/2024

VT-24-006

Visual Examination of 1RPV-BMI-NOZZLE

10/5/2024

NDE Reports

VT-24-056

Visual examination of 1RPV-HEAD-SURFACE

10/13/2024

71111.08P

Work Orders

Work Orders (by

number)

20531983-01

Corrective Action

Documents

2495515

Miscellaneous

EVAL-2023-CN-KC-00002268

Procedures

PT/1/A/4200/077

71111.12

Work Orders

20092558

71111.15

Corrective Action

Documents

208969

71111.18

Calculations

CNC-1144.03-30-

0001

Reactor Building Operating Floor Pressure Hatches

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

CNC-1223.03-00-

0002

Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Oil Fill Tank Data Sheet

Drawings

CN-2553-01.03

Engineering

Changes

25071

Procedures

OP/2/A/6150/002B

NC Pump Motor Oil Fill and Drain System

71111.24

Corrective Action

Documents

2532601, 02530715

Corrective Action

Documents

2476801, 02497222, 2499589, 02192722, 02208969,

253071501

Engineering

Changes

411844

Miscellaneous

CNC-1435.00-00-

0035

Penetration Seal Data Base and 86-10 Evaluations

71152S

Work Orders

20640901