IR 05000413/1989021
| ML19325D256 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1989 |
| From: | Lesser M, William Orders, Shymlock M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19325D255 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-89-21, 50-414-89-21, NUDOCS 8910200019 | |
| Download: ML19325D256 (15) | |
Text
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' Report Nos. 50-413/89-21 and 50-414/89-21 Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street Charlotte, N.C.
28242 l Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52 Facility Name: Catawba Units 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: July 1, 1989 - September 2, 1989 Inspector v* 7T/( ) AWb/[? W. T. Orders. Senior psident Inspector P6te'51gned j Inspectorjd <21.?/ / M r > /4 [9 , M. 5. Lesser, tesidyt Inspector AaV Signed Approved by: M Nod /C"3"8Y M.~ B. ShyraM6 Chief . Date Signed i Reactor Pro;ects Saction 3A ' Division of Reactor Projects ,
I SUMMARY , Scope: This routine, resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas l
of review of plant operations; surveillance observation and i procedures; maintenance observation; review of on site events and l .; licensee nonroutine event. reports; modifications and followup of ' previously identified items.
Results: In the areas inspected the licensee's programs were determined to be adequate.
The following non-cited violations were identified:
Failure to Identify and Implement Action Statement for - ^ Inoperable OTDT Channel . Inadequate Data Books.
! - Missed Fire Watches.
- t Inadequate Channel Checks On Containment Hydrogen Monitors.
- Failure to Promptly Retest MSIV.
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, REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted i t Licensee Employees
W. Beaver, Performance Engineer R. Casler, Operations Superintendent
- T. Crawford, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent J. Forbes, Technical Services Superintendent R. Glover, Compliance Engineer T. Harrall Design Engineering R. Jones Maintenance Engineering Services Engineer F. Mack, Project Services Engineer W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer W. McCollum, Maintenance Superintendent
- T. Owen, Station Manager J. Stackley, Instrumentation and Electrical Engineer B. Caldwell, Station Services Superintendent Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors , !
- W. Orders (
- M. Lesser Attended exit interview.
- 2.
Unresolved Iteas An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation. There was one unresolved item identified in paragraph 7c.
3.
Plant Operations Review (71707 and 71710) ! a.
The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting I period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements. Technical l Specifications (TS), and administrative controls.
Control room logs.
Technical Specification Action Item Log, and the removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed.
Shift turnovers were l observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures.
Daily plant status meetings were routinely attended.
The inspectors verified by observation and interviews, that the measures taken to assure physical protection of the facility met current requirements.
Areas inspected included the security organization; the establishment and maintenance of gates, doors, and
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! t isolation zones in the proper conditions; and that access control and
badging were proper and procedures followed.
l f In addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured were , observed for fire prevention, protection activities and radiological
centrol practices.
The inspectors reviewed Problem Investigation ! Reports to determine if the licensee was appropriately documenting i
problems and implementing corrective actions.
j i i l b.
Unit 1 Sumary t The unit started the reporting period at 100% power.
On August 24 [ the unit was manually tripped from 100% when the feedwater regulating ! valve on the 2A Steam Generator failed shut and water level
approached the low level trip setpoint. The valve failure was due to i f a blown gasket on the positioner supplying air pressure to the actuator.
The same failure occurred on June 26, 1989, and also ! resulted in a trip.
The licensee imediately inspected the ' positioners on other similar valves on both units. After restarting the unit on August 25, power was reduced to 13% on September 3. in
order to install different material gaskets which are ribbed and ! stiffer and to repair an oil leak on the turbine hydraulic oil l system.
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c.
Unit 2 Sumary
I r The unit started the period operating at 100% power.
Power was i reduced to 98% in the middle of July due to a magnetite plate-out obstruction of the main feed line flow orifice to the 20 steam
generator.
This has been a chronic problem on Catawba Unit 2.
On i July 31 power was reduced to 35% in order to repair a strainer leak
l in the Low Pressure Service Water System, and subsequently returned ! i to 98%. During testing of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater i pump on July 31, the turbine oversped due to corrosion buildup on the i governor valve stem.
Review of this event was documented in ! Inspection Report 413.414/89-25.
On August 24. the unit comenced i a shutdown required by Technical Specifications due to inoperaoility ! I of the 2A Hydrogen Skimer (YX) Fan circuit breaker (see paragraph l l 7c).
The fan was returned to operable ststus with the unit at 7% ! power and the shutdown was terminated.
The unit remained at low ! power for two days to perform some maintenance activities then ! returned to 98% where it operated for the remainder of the period.
j d.
Reactor Operator License Verification (RAI 89-34)
I ! ! The purpose of this inspection was to ascertain the ability of the ! I shift supervisor to independently, verify the current license status [ for all potential watch standers.
Interviews with selected shift ! supervisors and operations staff personnel were conducted to ! determine this.
Infomation such as license expiration dates, license conditions, medical status, and various disqualifying events
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Licensee programs currently do not provide ! for such information to be available to the shift supervisor.
l I The licensee's current method for ensuring only qualified operators ! perform licensed duties depends on the operators themselves.
If an i operator is disqualified, a form letter stating this is given to the j individual in addition to verbal counsel.
This information is not i passed on to the shift supervisors.
The program is not outlined in administrative procedures nor are procedures in place to provide in-depth defense against unintentional or willful assumption of licensed duties by an unqualified individual.
It should be noted that the licensee is aware of the need for such a i program as a result of an August 1989 management meeting with NRC:Rl! I concerning operator medical examinations and is currently l coordinating efforts with McGuire and Oconee to implement one.
The l inspector additionally reviewed control room records and determined
that there were no cases where recently disqualified operators i assumed licensed duties.
This is identified as Inspector Followup i Item 413/89-21 01: Implementation of Administrative Program to Allow
Verification of Operator License Status. Pending Licensee Development ! of The Program.
l No violations or deviations were identified, f
On Site Review of Operating Events (93702) a.
OTDT Technical Specification Violation Due To Inappropriate Actions ! and Unclear Acceptance Criteria.
k In a review of an event which occurred on July 3,1989, on Catawba
Unit 2 concerning an Overtemperature Delta Temperature Technical i Specification violation due to inappropriate licensee actions and ! unclear acceptance criteria, it was concluded that on that date at I approximately 9:00. p.m. with Unit 2 in Mode 1. Power Operation, at ! 100% power, the loop C Overtemperature Delta Temperature (OTOT) I computer alarm was received during performance of the Mode 1 Periodic { Surveillance Items procedure.
A manual OTOT calculation was
performed to determine if the channel was operable.
The acceptance i criteria of the surveillance procedure were incorrectly applied and ! the OTDT channel was determined to be operable. On July 4,1989, at l approximately 10:50 a.m., the next shift performed the same manual OTDT calculation, after observing the computer alarm, and determined .' the channel to be inoperable.
The channel was placed in the tripped. ! position, as required by Technical Specifications, and a work request i was issued to repair the channel.
The inappropriate action of not
declaring the channel inoperable during the first OTDT calculation is ! attributed to improperly following the acceptance criteria of the j ! !
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i ! i i procedure due to misinterpretation and unclear acceptance criteria in ! the procedure.
A procedure revision is planned to clarify the ! acceptance criteria. Unit 2 was in Mode 1 during this incident.
l ? This event is characterized as a licensee identified violation of , technical specification 3/4.3.1 for failing to place Channel 3, OTDT r in the tripped condition within 6 hours after the channel became inoperable on July 3,1989.
This licensee identified violation is ' not being cited because criteria specified in Section V.G.1 of the , NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
Non-Cited Violation (NCV) l 414/89-21-02.
Refer to LER 414/89-012 for more details, j b.
Inaccurate Data Book f ? In a review of an event which occurred on December 29, 1988 involving inaccurate data book curves it was concluded.that, on that date, ! operations personnel discovered an error in Technical Specifications i and the Boric Acid Tank (BAT) Volume curves in both Units' Data Book l Procedures.
The TS and the Data Book Volume curves did not ! incorporate the correct unusable volume in the BAT.
Due to this i error, the minimum contained volume required by TS 3.1.2.5 is below i the pump suction.
After discovery of this problem, accurate values [ of usable gallons of boric acid were calculated to satisfy TS 3.1.2.5 ' and 3.1.2.6.
Since fuel load on Unit 2 there was one violation of l the intent of TS 3.1.2.5, on March 25-26, 1986.
Unit 2 was in j Mode 5. Cold Shutdown, at the time.
There have been no violations on l > Unit 1.
This incident was attributed to a defective procedure due to L erroneous information.
Operations personnel issued Technical
Memorandums and revised the surveillance procedures to reflect more l conservative values for BAT level to ensure compliance with the TS.
t Further evaluation is currently under way to provide the final data l I needed to justify a change to TS and the BAT volume curves.
! The licensee's investigation was subsequently enlarged to encompass l all safety related tanks. No other examples were identified.
l The above example is characterized as a licensee identified violation i of TS 6.8.1, Procedures and Programs, and is identified as NCY ! 413/89-21-03: Inadequate Data Books.
This licensee identified j violation is not being cited because the criteria specified in , Section V.G.1 of the Enforcement Policy were satisfied. Refer to LER t 414/89-09.
i c.
Missed Fire Watches ' i On May 9-10, 1989, an auxiliary building penetration was inoperable i due to a temporarily installed hose being removed without resealing , the penetration and hourly fire watches were not performed resulting
in a Technical Specification violation.
The incident was caused by removal of the hose without adequate controls.
The event was i reported in LER 414/89-08 and licensee corrective action included
sealing the penetration and counseling the individuals involved, i ! t l .
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! I ! This licensee identified violation is not being cited because the l criteria specified in Section V.G.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy ? were satisfied and is identifled as NCY 414/89-21-04: Missed Fire
Watches.
! i Three Noncited violations were identified in paragraph 4.
' 5.
SurveillanceObservation(61726) P a.
During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations ! were in compliance with various TS requirements.
Typical of these l requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor
coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power systems.
i safety injection, energency safeguards systems, control room i ventilation, and direct current electrical power sources.
The i inspector verified that surveillance testing was perfonned in t accordance with the approved written procedures, test instrumentation ! was calibrated. limiting conditions for operation were met.
! appropriate removal and restoration of the affected equipment wac , accomplished, test results met acceptance criteria and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed l ' and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
l r b.
The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the following surveillances: . PT/2/A/4200/26 2NS-1 Inservice Test [ 3814 SWR RTD Dypass Manifold Low Flow Alarm
Calibration . PT/2/A/4400/06E 2A KD HX Capacity Test l PT/2/A/4350/02A 2A DG Operability Test i PT/2/A/4250/06 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater ! Pump Test c.
Inadequate Channel Checks For Conteinment Hydrogen Monitors I The licensee determined on April 12, 1989, that semi-daily channel checks required by Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 for the Hydrogen i Monitors had not been adequate to verify standby readiness of the ! instruments.
The method of performing the channel check had
previously been to verify the absence of an instrument trouble alarm i with the Hydrogen Monitor in its normal position of Standby / Power , Off.
The licensee has since determined that the. alarm circuitry is ! such that when the monitor is in Standby / Power Off no alarm can be obtained, therefore, the channel check was inadequate. The event was reported in LER 413/89-13.
Corrective action includes the revision
of the surveillance procedure, and revision of vendor manuals. This
licensee identified violation is not being cited because the criteria ! specified in Section V.G.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy were ] i
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} satisfied and is identified as NCY 413/89-21-05: Inadequate Channel
Checks On Containment Hydrogen Monitors.
l ! - One Noncited Violation was identified in paragraph Sc.
6.
Surveillance Procedures and Records (61700)
' ' a.
Selected surveillances were reviewed to ascertain whether they were ' being conducted in accordance with approved procedures.
The , procedures were reviewed to determine that prerequisites and j acceptance criteria were specified, that instructions for removing i and restoring equipment to service were adequate and that technical content of the test was adequate to ensure the requirements of the Technical Specifications here met.
The following surveillances were
reviewed: MP/0/A/2001/05 Westinghouse DS-416 Air Circuit Breaker i Inspection and Maintenance . ! PT/0/B/4971/17T Westinghouse Type CO-5 Relays MP/0/A/2001/04 Air Circuit Breaker Inspection and ! Maintenance PT/1/A/4450/10B D/G CO2 Weekly Test l
' PT/1/A/4150/05 Core Power Distributton .
IP/0/B/3220/01 Control Rod Drop Timing Test f PT/2/A/4200/04 Containment Spray Pump Performance Test PT/2/A/4600/02A Mode 1 Periodic Surveillance items PT/1/A/4450/03C Annulus Ventilation System Performance Test j b.
The licensee identified a concern relative to the surveillance test ' method on the Hydrogen Skimer Fans (VX) using PT/1,2/4450/05, i Technical Specification 4.6.5.6.1.f requires quarterly verification i that the motor operated suction valve opens and the fan starts on a e permissive signal.
The licensee questioned whether its test method
of simultaneously opening the valve and starting the fan violates the
design basis assumption of a maximum allowed area for ice condenser . bypass flow. Opening the valve alone is not a concern, however, this i combined with fan operation might base the effect of increasing the
, L bypass flow area.
The licensee imediately revised the test ! ' procedure to minimize the time that the system is left in this ! configuration, however, the underlying concern remains.
Problem ! Identification Report 0-C89-0228 was written on June 15, 1989 to
, I document the concern and obtain assistance from Westinghouse to ' determine if the method represents an unanalyzed condition. This is L r
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i identified as Inspector Followup Item 413/89-21-06: Hydrogen Skimmer l Fan Test Effects on Ice Condenser Bypass Flow, pending resolution by j the licensee.
! l t l No violations or deviations were identif'ed.
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t 7.
MaintenanceObservations(62703)
a.
Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components ! ' were observed / reviewed to ascertair, that they were conducted in accordance with the requirements.
The inspector verified licensee i conformance to the requirements in the following areas of inspection: ! l the activities were accomplished using approved procedures, and i i functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records , were maintained; activities performed were accomplished by qualified i personnel; and materials used were properly certified. Work requests i were reviewed to detemine status of outstanding jobs and to assure i that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance i which may effect system performance.
! !' b.
The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the following maintenance l activities: l 50912 OPS Repair ICF-28 Positioner Air Leak l l 50914 OPS Repair Failure of CA Start Reset ! 50915 OPS Repair Failure of Bank 1 Steam Dumps l to Function on Plant Trip
c.
2A Hydrogen Skimmer Fan Motor Breaker ! ! On June 19. 1989 the circuit breaker for the Hydrogen Skimmer (VX) Fan Motor 2A was replaced under work request 7118PRF when the i installed breater (BKR A) tripped on cvercurrent upon starting the t fan.
The replacement breaker (BKR B) was a molded-case Westinghouse HFB 3125A breaker, with ratings of 600Y and 125A.
The breaker did not have documentation traceable to the manufacturer, however, it had
been tested by Multiamp in accordance with hRC Bulletin 88-10.
I Nonconforming Molded-Case Circuit Breakers.
When Bulletin 88-10 Supplement I was issued, the licensee determined that' the non ! traceable breaker was inappropriate for use ano scheduled replacement-i with a tracr:able breaker (BKR C) on August 21. After installation on ' August 21, the fan was started and the. traceable breaker (BKR C)
tripped on overcurrent.
The licensee noted through test . instrumentation a phase imbalance of approximately 60A.
The motor ! contactors were replaced and the fan motor was replaced.
With the applicable 72 hour Technical Specification Action Statement expiring,
Unit 2 initiated a shutdown on August 24 The fan was tested again ' after motor replacement and the breaker again tripped.
It was then .; decided to install the previous non traceable breaker (BKR B) which subsequently operated correctly with no phase imbalances.
The unit I T
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i i shutdown was halted at 6% power and the 2A YX Fan was declared , operable.
! i The licensee prepared an operability statement for BKR e which was ! reviewed by the inspectors.
The licensee then received another
traceable breaker (BKR D) from McGuire Nuclear Station. BKR C and D . were sent to Multiamp to obtain an independent assessment of i operability and were found to be operating within the manufactu.'ers , curve of trip time versus percent of rated current.
The curve t displays an acceptabic band of time versus current for the thermal l overload settings.
The magnetic (instantaneous) overcurrent trip is
essentially a vertical line at 550% of rated current, the acceptable
region to the right of the line.
- , Further research by the licensee was conducted to explain why BKR C l was determined acceptable by Multiamp when it had tripped on r instantaneous overcurrent after being actually installed and operated. The licensee determined there were two contributing i factors: 1) actual line voltage is typically higher than the design
value of 600V and was recently observed at about 639V.
2) Motors i obtained from the vender, Reliance, were National Electrical , Manufacturers Assn. (NEMA) Type A motors due to equipment quali-
fication requirements as opposed to the traditionally procured NEMA Type B motors.
The NEMA Type A motors typica'ily display higher inrush currents.
Together these contributing factors would tend to - shift the motor starting characteristics to the right of the time vs.
current curve, approaching the vertical line of instantaneous
overcurrent trip at 550%. The magnetic overloads are set by the
i manufacturer with some allowcble tolerance and this appears to be an i example of where the sizing criteria for the circuit breaker as i specified by Duke Power did not consider higher inrush currents due
to high line voltage and NEMA A motors which in some cases eliminated - the margin.
Given this new information the licensee reviewed all motors / breakers which have non adjustable trips (600V and less). to determine I operability.
The licensee concluded that only the Hydrogen Skimmer Fans would present a potential problem primarily due to the fact that
they are relatively large motors (75 HP) within their circuit breaker rating (125A).
The licensee has initiated a Problem Investigation Report to ' determine the overall effects of higher than rated voltage, an-acceptable operating band of line voltage, and to document findings ? to date. The licensee has justified operability of the four Hydrogen > l Skimmer fans (two per unit) on the basis of numerous successful
I demonstrated starts with the currently installed breakers and has imposed weekly starts until the issue is resolved.
At the end of the inspection period it was learned that BKR A had been installed on May 12, 1989 as a replacement for a non-ambient temperature compensated circuit breaker and the fan was not started
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i as part of the post maintenance retest.
On June 16, when the . licensee attempted to start the fan for the first time since the i breaker had been installed, the breaker tripped and had to be
replaced. This raised questions as to the adequacy of the retest and , the operability of the fan between May 12 and June 16.
This is
f identified as Unresolved Item 414/89-21-07: Overcurrent Trips of Hydrogen Skimer Fan Motors, pending completion of the licensee's
review and assessment of post maintenance retests by NRC.
d.
Failure To Promptly Retest a Main Steam 1 solation Valve.
On June 3. 1989, work was performed on a Unit 2 Main Steam Isolation ! Valve. 2SM-7.
Following the work an appropriate retest was not j performed due to inadequate communication.
After Unit 2 had entered
a mode in which the valve was required to be operable _the error was i discovered and the valve successfully retested.
The Technic 61 l Specification violation was reported in Licensee Event Report (LER) - 414/89-14 and corrective actions include plans to establish
additional criteria for retest decision making.
This licensee identified violation is not being cited because the criteria specified in Section V.G.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy were < satisfied and is identified as NCY 414/89-21-08: Failure to Promptly
Ratest MSIV.
[ One Noncited Violation was identified in paragraph 7d.
.i 8.
Installation and Testing of Modifications (37828) (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 414/87-30-04: Model D5 Steam Generator ! , Level Control Upgrade.
The licensee'had experienced significant problems ' regarding steam generator level transients on Unit 2 with the Westinghouse Model D5 steam generators.
The problems stemmed from the small operating r water level band in that the lower taps for the narrow range level j the model D3 where the lower tap is below the transition cone)(. The shrink ' instruments were above the steam generator transition cone.
Unit I has r and swell characteristics of the 05 were observed to be much more ' pronounced at low powers compared to the D3 and appear to have contributed to a large number of unit trips.
The licensee performed modification CN-20535 to move the lower taps to a
position below the transition cone.
The modification required changes to
the Technical Specifications which were approved in Amendment 55 to Unit 2 . dated April 14, 1989.
The licensee's safety evaluation stated that i locating the narrow range instrumentation lower sensing tap on the D5 to
the same elevation as the model D3 would provide the following safety [ enhancements: > (1) The effects of level shrink and swell at low power levels will be 'j greatly reduced, thus reducing the potential. for reactor trips.
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Il (2) The time necessary to recover indicated level following a reactor } trip will be greatly reduced, thus reducing the potential for an
overcooling event due to excessive auxiliary feedwater.
l t (3) The margin to low level trip will be. increased thus reducing the ! potential for reactor trips at power.
The modification expands the narrow range from 438.4-566.5 inches to i 333-566.5 inches. The new location of the lower tap introduces a velocity ! head error of 23 inches in that actual level will be 23 inches higher than ! indicated level.
This error was considered in detemining the new high i high and low low level setpoints.
< The instrumentation was initially calibrated to the new setpoints and was i tuned during power escalation. A Unit Load Transient Test. TT/2/A/9200/58 was performed at 40% and 100% power and consisted of a 10% step load decrease.
Steam generator levels were then monitored to ensure sustained or divergent oscillations did not result.
Based on completion of the
! modification this item is closed.
9.
Review of Licensee Non Routine Event Reports (92700) l a.
The Licensee Event Reports (LER) listed below were reviewed to . determine if the information provided met NRC requirements.
The j detemination included: adequacy of description, verification of > compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements, i corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, i reporting requirements satisfied, and tre relative safety ' significance of each event.
Additional inplant reviews and discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated by an (*). The following LERs are closed:
- 413/88-15. Rev. 1 Degraded Performance of Unit 2 f
Auxiliary Feedwater System and Shutdown i of Both Units due to Asiatic Clam Infestation
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- 413/89-01, Rev. 1 Train A Blackout Due to an l
Inappropriately Installed Protective t Relay
- 413/89-13 Improper Channel Checks of the l
Containment Hydrogen Monitor
413/89-15 Alignment of Nuclear Service Water to i Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond Due to Unknown Cause
- 414/88-19 Reactor Trip Due to Operator and Computer Training Deficiencies j
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- 414/89-03. Rev. 1 Reactor Trip on Steam Generator Low
Level Due to Management Error
- 414/89-05 Radiation Monitor Compensatory Sample
! Not Obtained in a Timely Manner f i 414/89-08 Missed Hourly Fire Watches l
- 414/89-09 Intent of Technical Specification Was Violated Due to Inadequate Technical Specifications and a
Defective , Procedure
- 414/89-11 Safety Injection Pump 2A Damaged Due to
! Scrap Metal in Suction Piping l
- 414/89-12 Overtemperature Delta Temperature i
Technical Specification Violation Due
to Inappropriate Actions and Unclear . Acceptance Criteria 414/89-13 Feedwater Isolation on High Steam ' Generator Level Due to Inadequate Procedural Precautions
- 414/89-14 Missed Retest on Main. Steam i
Isolation Yalve Due to Inadequate i Attention to Detail l
No violations or deviations were identified.
' 10.
FollowuponPreviousInspectionFindings(92701and92702) , i i l a.
(Closed) Violation 413.414/88-38-05: Failure to Perform a Safety i Evaluation Required by 10 CFR 50.59 Prior to Removing 1RN-244 From > Service.
The licensee responded to the violation in correspondence ! dated March 31, 1989.
Design Engineering additionally addressed.
Control Room Ventilation Chiller operability concerns in a revised < evaluation to Problem Investigation Report (PIR) 0-C89-0046.
The chiller was determined to have been operable with 1RN-244 failed open and the hot gas bypass valve closed based upon the following- ! , A flow path for gravity return of liquid refrigerant to the - evaporator via the flash economizer would tend to offset the effects of refrigerant collecting in the condenser while idle and preclude tripping.
l l Verification that the chiller would adequately operate by - l running the chiller with low condenser head pressure.
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i ! ! Design Engineering has also initiated a program to more effectively evaluate operability concerns and to specify conditions of
operability for implementation by the station.
Based on these > corrective actions this violation is clot,ed.
! , , b.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-414/89-14-01: Evaluation of
ARIS Data.
During Ultrasonic examinations on the inside radius of ! the Unit 2 reactor vessel hot leg nozzles, indications were ' discovered which were apparently located in the nozzle's stainless steel weld cladding.
To ensure that these indications were not
cracks but slag which had been entrapped during fabrication of the ! vessel, the inspector asked the licensee to consider the following
concerns in their ongoing evaluations: l '
Clad welding process data should be reviewed to determine if the i - data supported the type of indications the licensee felt the
examinations were revealing.
l ! The test block used for comparison should ba polished, etched.
- and examined with magnification on a side edge to determine the ' type of inclusions in the test block and whether these - inclusions had any associated cracks.
The sizing capabilities of the ARIS system should be
- demonstrated on real underclad cracks using the same type of angle beam transducers.
The licensee subsequently notified the inspector that the process h used to weld the cladding was a slag producing process and that ! I metallographic specimens taken fret the test block revealed that , these inclusions were also slag with no associated cracking.
In
addition, on August 8,1983, the licensee had Babcock and Wilcox
demonstrate their underclad detection and sizing capabilities at ! their office in Ly.Thburg, Virginia.
The inspector attended this i demur.:+eth and has ic further quesMons concerning the detection i and sizing capabilities of 0 & ock.nd Wilcox's Automated Ultrasonic System on under clad cracking.
c.
(Closed)' Unresolved Item 413/85-35-01: Review of Electrical ' Interfaces Between Units.
Review of this item was conducted in t inspection Report 413/85-55.
Licensee corrective action to the
incident which occurred in 1985 was reviewed and resolved.
No ! violations were identified.
The safety related interface involving valves on Unit 2 was eliminated by modification.
Modification
CN-10858 has been initiated to revise to Volume Control Tank low l level swapover logic on Unit 1 to eliminate cross unit interface.
! l The modification is scheduled to be completed during the Unit 1
l fourth refueling outage.
The inspectors reviewed the scope of the modification and interim measures (procedural) to ensure control . ' power can be maintained to the swapover valves in question.
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! i ! Corrective action appears to be acceptable and further followup is ! not required, therefore, this item is closed.
! I d.
(closed) Violation 413,414/87-30-03: Failure To Ensure Procedures i Are Adhered To Concerning Locked Yahes.
The licensee responded to
the violation in the following correspondence: November 13, 1987 and
June 1, 1988.
Corrective action to ensure valves are correctly , locked included training, procedural upgrades, and modifications to valve handles to allow for easier locking.
Licensee corrective r action to date is acceptable.
Additional modifications to improve
the ability to lock plug valves remain outstanding under i modifications CE-2116 and CE-2115. Continued followup was determined ' to not be required and this item is, therefore, closed.
[ ! e.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 413.414/88-22-03: Potential Inadequate Yenting of ECCS Systems: Followup of this item was performed in ! inspection report 413.414/88 30.
The inspectors reviewed licensee l procedural changes to improve system fill and vent methods using the
Removal and Restoration program.
Operations Management Procedure i 2-18. Tagout Removal and Restoration Procedure, was revised. to ! include a Venting Restoration Sheet to be used by Operations to vent l equipment and systems prior to returning to service. The sheet will ! additionally ensure administrative controls are accomplished properly ! and document independent verification of applicable valves.
The ! inspectors sampled some applications of the Venting Restoration Sheet i
following complete system drain down.
The process appears to be ! l acceptable and this item is considered closed.
! ' ! No violations or deviations were identified.
< , ! 11. Operator Requalification Examinations During an operator licensing requalification simulator scenario being [ conducted by Rll examiners, it was detected that in procedure EP/1A/5000/1E, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, a CAUTION just prior to step ! 4 states: "Feedwater Flow Should Not Be Established To Any S/G That is ' Both Ruptured and Faulted." Step 4 instructs the operator how to feed the t S/G using CA flow, directing the operator to throttle CA flow to l " maintain" ruptured S/G N/R level between 5% and 15%. Step 5 of the procedure requires the transition to procedure EP/1/A/5000/1E3, Steam ~ Generator Tube Rupture With Continuous NC Leakage Subcooled Recovery.
? Step 10 of that procedure requires the operator to " maintain" 5% to 15% i level.
However there is no CAUTION concerning the case of a ruptured, l faulted S/G.
This CAUTION should be added to-prior to step 10.
This ! issue will be carried as an Inspector Followup Item pending the completion ! of the procedure change.
IFI 50-413/89-21-09: Inadequate Emergency l Procedure.
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i ! ! I
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12.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were sumarized on September 8.1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed , below.
No dissenting coments were received from the licensee.
The ' licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to i or reviewed by the inspectors during this. inspection.
Item Number Description and Reference . IFI 413/89-21-01 Implementation of Administrative Program to l Allow Verification of Operator License l Status.
P:ragraph 3d.
E ! NCV 414/89-21-02 Failure to Identify andsImplement Action ' Statement for Inoperable OTDT Channel.
Paragraph 4a.
NCY 413/89-21-03 Inadequate Data Books.
Paragrdph 4b.
NCV 414/89-21-04 Missed Fire Watches.
Paragraph 4c.
, NCV 413/89-21-05 Inadequate Channel Checks On Containment Hydrogen Monitors.
Paragraph Sc.
IFI 413/89-21-06 Hydrogen Skimer Fan Test Effects on Ice Condenser Bypass Flow. Paragraph 6d.
UNR 414/89-21-07 Overcurrent Trips of Hydrogen Skimer Fan Motors.
Paragraph 7c.
l NCV 414/89-21-08 Failure to Promptly Retest MSIV.
! l Paragraph 7d.
- l IFI 413/89-21-09 Inadequate Emergency Procedure, j Paragraph-11.
L i l l ' a ' , . I i s }}