IR 05000410/1979005
| ML17053B349 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/22/1979 |
| From: | Cerne A, Mcgaughy R, Narrow L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17053B340 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-410-79-05, 50-410-79-5, NUDOCS 8001240190 | |
| Download: ML17053B349 (18) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-410/79-05 Docket No. 50-410 License No.
CPPR-112 Priority:
Category:
A Licensee:
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard, West Syracuse, New York 13202 Facility Name:
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Inspection at:
Scriba, New York Inspection condu ed:
May 14-17, 1979 Inspectors:
L.
rrow; ea tor Inspector date signed A.
C. Cerne, Reactor I spector date ign d Approved by:
R.
W.
McGaugh ef Construction o ects Section RCBES Branch d te ig ed Ins ection Summar c'ns ection on Ma
. 14-17 1979.
Re ort No. 50-410/79-05}
Areas Ins ected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based inspectors, which commenced during the evening shift of May 14, 1979, of the gC programs for structural steel erection and for fabrication and erection of the containment liner.
The inspection also included review of the status of Bulletins and Circulars at the licensee's corporate office.
The inspection involved 28 inspector-hours on site and 14 inspectors-hours in the licensee's office by two regional based inspectors.
Results:
Of the three areas inspected, one apparent item of noncompli-ance was identified in one area (Infraction - Failure to promptly evaluate an identified welding inspection problem for reportability as a significant deficiency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e),
Paragraph 3).
8oors4o /Pd
DETAILS Persons Contacted Nia ara Mohawk Power Cor oration
"R. J. Aldrich, gA Engineer
"M. Brause, gA Technician
- W. M. Bryant, Manager, equality Assurance
- R. A.
Dowd, Supervisor, equality Assurance
"L. G. Fenton, Senior Site gA Represntative (Acting)
"P.
E. Francisco, Licensing Engineer C.
G.
Honors',
gA Engineer K. Nilsson, Consultant
- C.
D. Terry, Manager, Nuclear Projects Engineering K.
D. Ward, gA Engineer Stone and Webster En ineerin Cor oration S8W)
H.
P. Astle, gC Engineer T.
L.
Dean, gC Engineer P.
Fadden, Assistant Resident Engineer C.
Lee, Structural Design Squad Leader E. Magilley, Senior gC Engineer H. Masson, Staff Electrical H.
Reese, Project Manager (Cherry Hill)
J.
E.
Rogers, Chief Office Engineer L.
E.
Shea, Head, Site Engineering Ofice D. A. Smith, Structural Engineer T. Vaughn, Assistant Superintendent, Field gC K.
E. Worthington, gA NDT Engineer Chica o Brid e and Iron Com an CBI T. J.
Dougherty, Project Welding and gA Superintendent A. Spears, gC Supervisor
"Denotes those present at the exit interview.
The inspector also interviewed other licensee and contractor employees during the inspection.=
Plant Tour The inspectors made a tour of the site during the second shift to observe work activities in progress, completed work and the status of construction.
The inspectors examined work items for any
-3" obvious defects or noncompliances with regulatory requirements and observed gC activities and evidence of quality control of the work.
Specific activities and items observed by the inspectors included fit-up of containment liner insert plates and cadweld sleeves; and fit-up Of Str uCtural Steel framing and SuppOrtS.
3.
Evaluation of Possible Si nificant Deficiencies The inspector reviewed the Nonconformance and Disposition (N&D)
Reports listed below:
o N8D Report No. 1357, dated April 4, 1979, which states that documentation review of UT examination of containment liner base ring weld does not provide assurance of proper test'"
implementation and weld joint integrity.
The disposition requires reexamination of 100 percent of the base ring T-weld using approved procedures and techniques.
o N&D Report No. 1359, dated April 4, 1979, which states that the UT technique used to test the "K" Groove weld connecting the Knuckle Plate to the transitton was found to be inadequate.
The disposition requires surface preparation for MT examina-tion, MT examination using an approved procedure, UT examina-tion using approved procedures and. techniques, and repair and reexamination as necessary.
N&D'eport No.
1380, dated May 9, 1979, which states that review of UT technique and documentation for inspection of certain weld joints on 43 pentrations had determined that the technique used did not provide 100 percent volumetric inspec-tion.
The disposition had not been provided.
These nonconformances were identified as a result of an audit of Graver Tank and Manufacturing Company (Grayet-) by the S&W NDT Division during September, l978.
One finding of this audit stated that the UT procedures used were not capable
'of detecting defects perpendicular to the plate surface for double bevel weld joints and recommended development of adequate procedures
'and review of all reports of UT examinations performed on this type of weld joint.
Engineering Assurance Procedure EAP 16.2, Rev.
2 establishes the responsibility for the Engineering Department, Construction Depart-ment, or guality Assurance Department; dependent upon the type of deficiency, to review deficiencies in order to determine if they meet the criteria of 50.55(e).
Paragraph 4.8 of EAP 16.2 states, in part, "If the Engineering Department, Construction Department, or guality Assurance Department determines that a deficiency
ma the be re ortable, the Project Manager shall immediately notify client...."
The inspector asked for and was unable to obtain any evidence that these deficiencies had been reviewed for reportability as a signi-ficant deficiency in accordance with ID CFR 50.55(e).
Failure to perform this review is considered to be not in conformance with EAP 16.2 and is in noncompliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (79-,05-01).
4.
Structural Steel - Observation of Work Control Room Buildin The inspector witnessed the erection of some of the Control Room Building structural steel, observed the welding of one beam end to a wall embedment and examined the finished condi-tion of various bolted and welded joints.
One field drawing (Gives Drawing E718) in use was checked to verify its current-ness.
The inspector also verified the calibration record of a Skidmore Wilhelm wrench calibrator (No.
08287)
and spot-checked high-strength bolting records to determine the cali-bration frequency of two torque wrenches (Nos.
08286 and 08287) utilized in the final torquing operation.
Mhile the inspector noted a deviation, from the current calibration requirements of one wrench during its use in February 1979, the licensee produced evidence that.this had already been documented in a Niagara Mohawk gA Surveillance Report 016479 and closed with proper reinspection of the affected areas (S8W Inspection Report Nos.
S9021189 and S9024717).
The above items were evaluated against criteria established in S8W Specification S204A (Revision 3) and its reference to AWS, RCRBSJ, and AISC code requirements.
The qualifications of two S8W Level II gC engineers were also examined to verify compliance with the requirements of ANSI standard N45.2.6.
No items of noncompliance were identif'ied, however, one item remains unresolved as discussed below.
The inspector noted that the welding of a mark A3230 clip angle, used as a Control Room Building beam seat. at elevation 237 feet, did not appear to fully conform to the applicable
'etail in Cives Drawing E351 (Revision F).
While 3< inches of the proper sized fillet weld had been deposited on each side of the clip angle, part of the weld length on one side had been deposited on the underside of the clip to avoid,a small wire hole in the embedment to which welding was being
accomplished.
Interviews with licensee gA/gC personnel indicated that the existence of the wire holes stemmed from the approved method of attaching the embedments to the forms prior to concrete placement and that this situation most probably existed at other areas where welding to the embed-ments was accomplished.
The licensee, however, could not produce any evidence that engineering approval of this weld variation had been obtained.
Pending a reinspection of all areas where variations in the required weld design were used to bypass existing embedment holes and a review by engineering as to the acceptability of each variation, this item is unresolved (410/79-05~02}..
Auxiliar Buildin Steel Su orts The inspector examined the overall condition of structural steel, to be used as major equipment supports, within the Auxiliary Building.
This structural steel had been fitted-up using A325 high-strength bolts as erection bolts, but torquing operations had not yet commenced.
The inspector questioned the wording of a S8W Specification S204A and Construction Methods Procedure CMP 4.1-5.78 requirement regarding the placement of washers on the fit-up bolts.
Since the washers serve their purpose during the torquing operation, their presence during the fit-up process is not required if instal-lation of the fit-up bolts is treated as a temporary opera-tion.
Interviews with S&W engineering personnel confirmed the temporary nature of the fit-up bolt installation.
S&W Engineering and Design Coordination Report (E&DCR) F00100 was issued on May 16, 1979 to clarify the wording in the specifi-cation regarding the use of these washers.
The inspector evaluated the erection of this structural steel with regard to the requirements of the governing S8W Specifi-cation S204X with Addenda A and B, and pertinent E8DCR's C00752 and F00078.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Structural Steel Material and Stora e
The inspector walked through the structural steel lay-down area observing the steel's general condition, storage status, and marking.
He verified the material conformance of struc-tural steel and high-strength bolts and nuts to specification requirements by examining a random sample of certificates of
conformance and test reports included in the Material Receiv-ing Report packages.
Various S8W QA Inspection Reports on high-strength bolting and structural steel in general were reviewed to determine if the applicable attributes specified in S&M Quality Assurance Directive QAD 10.5 (Revision B) had been utili'zed and documented in the inspection process.
One Control Room Building structural member was traced from its field marking (E 3216) through the shipping records to its specific material certification document.
The inspector cross-checked certain data from the material test reports against the applicable ASTN A36, A325, and A490 requirements to verify completeness and acceptability.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Containment'Meldin and Meldin Control A visual inspection was made of the randomly selected weld joints listed below for conformance to the applicable specifications, codes and work performance procedures:
o 2-B-7 - s/s overlay; Knuckle to suppression pool o
9-B-7 s/s overlay; Knuckle to suppression pool o
32087-2 - Fit-up and tack weld; Access Hatch to suppression pool o
23-A - Replacement of insert plate in Knuckle o
Fit-up and welding of cadweld sleeves to Knuckle.
The inspection included observation of conformance of the attri-butes listed below:
o Meld identification and location o
Joint preparation o
Use of specified weld procedures and welding electrodes o
Qualification of welders for work in progress o
Preheat where required o
Visual observation of weld surface conditio "7-The inspection also included observation of storage and issue of welding material, including segregation, identification, tempera-ture control, issue records and handling of returned electrodes.
The inspector interviewed the contractors welding inspector con-cerning the extent and frequency of his inspections and reviewed his records of work in progress.
The inspector also examined certifications and qualifications of CBI NDE inspectors,,
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Containment Meldin Records The inspector discussed control and documentation of welding and NDE with the CBI gA superintendent and examined CBI Record Drawings No. R-l, Rev.
1 and R-3, Rev.
2 and the Record Drawing Table.
These documents provide the permanent records of weld number, location, welder identification, welding procedure, inspections and NDE performed, including NDE report numbers, nonconformance report numbers and dates of correction.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s (Open) Unresolved Item (79-02-01):
Review of Grayer records by S8W and turnover to CB1.
The Gravep Erection Control Drawings (ECD)
have been turned over to S8M but are proprietary for S8W use and not to be released to CBI.
S8M is continuing preparation of
"Status Reports" and checking them against ECD's as well as NDE reports.
The inspector compared a random selection of "Status Reports" with the corresponding ECD's.
One discrepancy was iden-tified.
This was carried on the
"Status Report" as not complete since the required UT report was not available.
The licensee representative stated that any cases where the work performance shown on either ECD or the NDE report was not confirmed by the other was carried on the "Status Report" as not complete.
(Open) Unresolved Item (79-02-03):
Specification for exposure of electrodes.
The status of this item was reviewed and the inspector was informed by the licensee the additional testing was in progress by S&M and the results would be available on site by June 1, 1979.
Licensee Action on IE Bulletins Circulars and Information Notices The inspector examined records and interviewed licensee representa-tives to verify that corrective action had been taken with respect to IE Bulletins, Circulars and Information Notices.
For each
of the Bulletins and Circulars shown below, the inspector verified that the identified problem had been resolved as shown.
a.
Factored into design and test program:
Emergency Locking System Circular 78-15.
Tilting Disk Check Valves Circular 77-09.: Improper Fuse Coordination in BMR Standby Liquid Control System Control Circuits Circular 78-02., 'Proper Lubricating Oi1 for Terry Turbines Circular 78-13.,'noperability of Multip1e, Service-Water Pumps b.
Not purchased or installed to date and added to "Excluded Equipment List for Future Purposes":
GE CR 120A RelaysBulletin 78-10.
Bergen-Paterson Hydraulic Snubbers Information Notice 79-01.
Bergen-Paterson Shock Suppressors c.
Not applicable to this plant:
Circular 78-07.
Damaged Components on a Bergen-Paterson Series 25000 Hydraulic Test Stand Circular 78-09.
Arcing of General Electric Company NEMA Size 2 Contractors
.Circular 78-11.
Recirculation M-G Overspeed Stops Circular 78-12.
HPCI Turbine Control Valve Lift Rod Bending Circular 78-14.
HPCI Turbine Bolting.
9.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items or items of noncompliance.
An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph.
Exit Interview At the conclusion of the inspection on Nay 17, 1979, a meeting was held with representatives of the licensee.
The inspectors summarized the results of the inspection as described in this repor k,
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