IR 05000409/1980002
| ML19323C038 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/17/1980 |
| From: | Baker K, Ridgway K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19323C035 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-409-80-02, 50-409-80-2, NUDOCS 8005140568 | |
| Download: ML19323C038 (14) | |
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scos u o,(,9 r
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g U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
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Report No.
50-409/80-02 Docket No.
50-409 License No. DPR-45 Licensee:
Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue, South La Crosse, Wisconsin Facility Name:
La Cross Boiling Water Reactor Inspection At:
La Crosse Site, Genoa, WI Inspection Conducted: February 11-15, 1980 h
7/jtzed /9 /NT Inspectors:
.R g
f K. R. Baker (February 14 & 15, 1980)
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Approved By: K. R. Baker, Acting Chief, 3/
Projects Section 3-2 Inspection Summary Inspection on February 11-15, 1960 (Report no. 50-409/80-02)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of the licensee's training and retraining programs; surveillance activities; calibration program; procedure changes with regard to Small Break Loss of Coolant Accidents; and. followup actions relative to IE Bulletins, IE Circulars, Licensee Event Reports, and special reports. The inspection involved 45 hours5.208333e-4 days <br />0.0125 hours <br />7.440476e-5 weeks <br />1.71225e-5 months <br /> onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified in the ten areas inspected.
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O DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Shimshak, Plant Superintendent
- J. Parkyn, Assistant Plant Superintendent
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- G. Boyd, Operations Supervisor
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- L.
Kelley, Assistant to Operations Supervisor & Training Supervisor
- L. Goodman, Operations Engineer, Nuclear Engineering Services
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L. Krajewski, Paalth and Safety Supervisor H. Towsley, Quality Assurance Supervisor i
S. Rafferty, Reactor Engineer W. Angle, Process Engineer J. Gallaher, Shift Supervisor W. Nowicki, Supervisor, Instrument & Electrical R. Ganser, Shift Supervisor in Training R. Christians, Operator D. Croonguist, Operator J. Crothers, Operator R. Thorson, Auxillary Operator In addition, the inspector observed and held discussions with other engineers, plant equipment operators, reactor operators, assistants, and plant attendants.
- Denotes those present at the exit interviews.
2.
General a.
The facility experienced an unplanned three day outage on February 1, 1980 caused by undervoltage in the Turbine Building Motor Control Center. A through inspection of circuits failed to reveal the exact cause. Following the trip, the 1A 2400 V Reserve Feed Breaker (IARFB) closed to supply outside service but failed to stay closed. The 1A Emergency Diese? Generator started normally and supplied the 1A 480V Bus. The IARFB malfunction was attributed to a worn mechanical linkage which was repaired. Three other similar breakers were inspected and determined to be satisfactory.
b.
On February 4, 1980, License Amendment No. 18 was issued per-mitting the increase of fuel storage from 134 to 440 fuel assemblies. The new fuel racks, designed by Nuclear Engineering Services and fabricated by Metal Products Co., are scheduled for delivery early in March with installation in May.
c.
On February 2,1980, License Amendment No. 19 was issued per-mitting the maximum average fuel assembly exposure to be in-
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creased from 15,000 MWD /MTU to 15,300.
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d.
Since the last inspection, the licensee has hired an electrical /
instrument engineer, an operations engineer, two quality assur-ance technicians and an auxillary operator.
3.
Training
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Theinspectorreviewedthetrainingprogramforchangessinchthe last inspection in this area. Only minor changes have been made and these were found to be in conformance with Technical Specification and training program commitments.
Individual training records of a variety of esployees were examined to determine that the training program was functioning. Several employees were interviewed to verify that t he training was being carried out.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Requalification '; raining The inspector reviewed changes made in the requalification training program since the last inspection of this area. Only minor changes had been made in Issue 1 of Administrative Control Procedure (ACP-21.2),
LACBWR Operators - Senior Operators Requalification Program, and these conformed to Technical Specification commitments.
There had been no changes in the training manual. The requalification training consists of an annual review of all program areas including formal lectures and a quiz in each of the seven sections for Operators and eight sections for Senior Operators. At the end of the annual review, a comprehensive examination of all areas is conducted. The inspector noted that the last annual examination conducted in December, 1979 was orientated more toward emergency operations than former exams.
The inspector reviewed individual files to determine that the re-training program was functioning as described, that attendance at required lectures and control manipulations were documented.
Inter-views with employees verified that the records were valid.
No items of noe. compliance were identified.
5.
Surveillance The inspector selected and reviewed surveillance tests performed during the past year upon equipment in seven safety related systems.
The systems and survillance tests were:
a.
Reactivity Control and Power Distribution j
Data Sheet N-9, Monthly tests of Scram Controls.
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b.
Instrumentation
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Data Sheet N-6, Wide Range Power Channel & Automatic Gain Control.
c.
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(1) Special Procedure 76-01, Water Level Probe Test.
(2) Data Sheet S-1, Reactor Water Level Channel No. 1.
d.
Emergency Core Cooling System Data Sheet 17.5.1, Semi-annual Test of Alternate Core Spray Systems.
e.
Containment Systems Data Sheet 4.1, Containment Isolation Testing: Containment High radiation and High Pressure.
f.
Plant and Electrical Power Systems Data Sheet 23.4, Monthly Test of the IB Emergency Diesel Generator.
g.
Fire Protection / Prevention Systems (1) Data Sheet 7.4.3, Monthly Diesel Fire Pump Test.
(2) Data Sheet 8.4.7, Semi Annual Test of Fire Alarms.
The above surveillance tests were reviewed to determine that:
a.
The tests conformed to Technical Specification requirements.
b.
Tests results were reviewed, approved and corrective actions taken.
c.
Tests were performed on schedule by qualified personnel.
d.
Test procedures covered prerequisites and preparations, acceptance criteria, and instructions to insure that equipment is returned to operational status.
February 7,1980 the inspectors observed the performance of monthly tests of Scram Contacts on Safety Circuit No. 1.
These tests in-cluded the testing of high and low annunciators and safety circuit
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trip by the Reactor Water Level, Pressure, Flow-Power and Low Recirculation Flow.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
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6.
Calibration The inspector selected and reviewed various calibrations made on components and equipment associated with safety related systems. The systems and calibrations selected were:
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a.
Reactivity Control and Power Distribution (1) Data Sheet N-6, Wide Range Power Channel No. 6 Calibration.
(2) Data Sheet N10-A-2, Automatic Gain Control Pressure Transmitter - Channel 6 Calibration.
b.
Reactor Coolant System Data Sheet 5-7, Reactor Water Level Calibration.
c.
Emergency Core Cooling System Data Sheet 4.4, Containment Pressure Switch Calibration.
d.
Containment System Data Sheet 6.4-8, Vacuum Switch Calibration.
e.
Plant and Electrical Power Systems Data Sheet 13.6.2 Refueling test of 2400V 1A & IB Bus Undervoltage Relays.
The inspector also selected calibrations of equipment associated with safety related systems but not required by Technical Specifications. These were:
a.
Reactor Pressure Heise Gauge at the remote operations st'ation (also used for hydrostatic tests of the Pressure Vessel).
b.
Overhead Storage Tank Liquid Level and low level annunciation.
c.
Fuel Element Storage Well Temperature.
d.
Main Steam Flow.
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e.
Boron Tank Level Indication & Annunciation.
4-5-l J
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The above calibration procedures were reviewed to determine
that:
a.
Limiting Condition of Operation were observed during calibrations.
b.
The procedures included:
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(1) Stepwise instructions.
(2) Acceptance criteria.
(3) Review and approval.
c.
Equipment is returned to normal operating condition following calibration.
d.
The procedure would result in an acceptible calibration.
The inspector reviewed the calibrations listed above to determine that:
a.
Required frequencies were met.
b.
Qualified personnel performed the work.
c.
Calibration results were reviewed and approved.
d.
Gauges and instruments used in the procedures:
(1) Had been calibrated and the calibration accuracy was traceable to the National Bureau of Standards.
(2) Were stored and handled properly.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Followup on Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
j The inspector reviewed the following LER's to determine if the reports were correct and if the evaluations performed and corrective actions taken vere appropriate and complete as stated in the LER.
a.
(Closed) LER 50-409/79-18, A design review performed by the vendor determined that containment isolation valves might not close under the worst containment pressure conditions following a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). To resolve this problem the
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licensee has approved a Facility Change to modify the valves, restricting the open position to about 45', thereby, meeting the design basis.
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b.
(Closed) LER 50-409/79-19, Failure of the Containment Building
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emergency airlock to pass a Type B leak rate test.. The leak was traced to a mechanical seal at the exterior airlock wall, therefore, the inner airlock door maintained containment integ-rity. The worn seal was replaced and added to the preventive maintenance schedule of the emergency airlock. A subsqquent Type B leak test was satisfactorily passed.
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8.
Followup of IE Bulletins a.
(0 pen) IE Bulletin 79-23, Potential Failure of Emergency Diesel Generator Field Exciter Transformer. The licensee had deter-mined that there were no interconnections between the low KVA rated transformers and high KVA roted Emergency Diesel Generators.
The 1A Diesel Generator had been test'ed with a 225 KW load for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, however, records for the 1B Generator review had not been located.
b.
(Closed) IE Bulletin 79-26, Boron Loss from BWR Control Blades.
LACBWR Control Blades are fabricated of different materials than General Electric BWR's.
Boron Carbide is in the form of pellets and the tubing containing the pellets is Inconel vs stainless steel. There has been 9g evidence of cracking in the Inconel tubing and the greatest B depletion has been calculaced to be 29.7 percent. The licensee has had in force a program of rotating blades, which have experienced sigrificant exposure to core positions where they are withdrawn during operation and receive little further exposure. The lice nsee plans to examine a control blade during the 1981 refueling.
9.
Followup on IE Circulars (IEC)
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The inspector reviewed the Licnesee's evaluation of the following IEC's to determine that any necessary actions had been taken:
IEC 79-23, Motor Starters and Contactors Failed to Operate.
a.
b.
IEC 79-24, Proper Installation and Calibration of Core Spray Pipe Break Detection Equipment on BWR's.
c.
IEC 79-25, Shock Arrestor Strut Assembly Interference.
d.
IEC 60-01, Service Advice for GE Induction Disc Relays.
10.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports
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The inspector reviewed the following reports for timeliness of sub-mittal and adequacy of information submitted:
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a.
Monthly Operating Data Reports for September 1979 through
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January, 1980.
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b.
Special Report No. 79-03, August 28, 1979.
c.
Special Report No. 79-04, January 15, 1980.
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d.
Special Report No. 80-01,' February 15, 1980.
11.
Follovup on Previous Noncompliance and Open Inspection Items (OII)
(Closed) Infraction (011 79-11).1I Failure to provide timely a.
f.ormal reviews and documentation of incident reports. By a review of records and interviews with personnel the inspector verified that the licensee has promptly reviewed, documented and publicized subsequent incident reports.
b.
(Closed) (OII 79-10).2/ The licensee has developed and imple -
mented a shutdown checklist as recommended in ANSI Standard 18.7 (1972).
(Closed) (011 78-10).3/ The licensee has replaced barriers c.
that were flammable with inflammable barriers in Allis Chalmers circuit breakers, LA 600-480V.
12.
Review of TMI Lessons Learned Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Considerations
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a.
Procedure Review (1) The following procedures were reviewed:
3.3.3 Primary System Leak dated December, 1979 2.3.3.2 Major Primary Leak Procedure dated December,1979 (2) ProccJures have been reviewed and approved as required by Technical Specification 3.8.
(3) The procedures conform to the guidelines contained in the Licensee's letters dated December 6, 1979, December 20, 1979 and January 31, 1980.
(4) The procedures appear to be concise and do not require numerous cross references which could lead to operator confusion.
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IE Inspection Report No. 50-409/79-18.
2/' Ibid.
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IE Inspection Report No. 50-409/78-03.
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(5) Proper precautions are provided in'the procedure. Where
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appropriate they are repeated in the procedure.
(6) The procedure does not prohibit the use of loop isolation valves to isolate the break.
11,1979.gyistantwithli-This is co censee's letter dated December
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(7) Table 1 lists the instrumentation / equipment / valves / systems the licensee uses in the procedures. The table also identifies the licensee's evaluation of environmental qualifications and redundancy.
(8) The inspector discussed improvements that could be made in the procedures to simplify the procedure and to provide direct guidance on detecting the failure of 1 inch HPCS line. The licensee at the exit interview stated the comments would be considered in revision to the procedure.
(9) The licensee's letter of December 6, 1979 stated the pro-cedures would address the instrumentation to be used to detect inadequate core cooling - the procedures only discuss detection of adequate core cooling.
Possible methods to detect inadequate cooling was discussed with the licensee. The January 31, 1980 letter discusses the use of vessel water level as presently described in the procedures.
b.
Operator Training and Operator Interviews During December,1979, the licensee had provided formal train-ing with control room walk through to all operators on actions to be taken following a SBLOCA.
In addition the annual requal-ification examination given in December had been slanted more toward emergency conditions than in the past and included questions on SBLOCA reactions.
c.
Operator Interviews
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The inspectors interviewed five licensed operators. The operators interviewed were one staff SRO, one shift supervisor, one SRO who stands shift work and two shift R0's.
The operators interviewed:
(1) Knowledgeably discussed the symptons and transient response characteristics of the plant with respect to a SBLOCA.
(2) Demonstrated a knowledge of the procedures to be used for
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a SBLOCA, including the immediate actions required.
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LAC-6688, Frank Linder, General Manager to D. L. Ziemann, Chief OR Branch dtd 12/11/79.
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(5) Proper precautions are provided in the procedure. Where
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appropriate they are repeated in the procedure.
(6) The procedure does not prohibit the use of loop isolation valves to isolate the break.
This is co 11,1979.gyistantwithli-censee's letter dated December
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(7) Table 1 lists the instrumentation / equipment / valves / systems the licensee uses in the procedures. The table also identifies the licensee's evaluation of environmental qualifications and redundancy.
(8) The inspector discussed improvements that could be made in the procedures to simplify the procedure and to provide direct guidance on detecting the failure of 1 inch HPCS line. The licensee at the exit interview stated the comments would be considered in revision to the procedure.
(9) The licensee's letter of December 6, 1979 stated the pro-cedures would address the instrumentation to be used to detect inadequate core cooling - the procedures only discuss detection of adequate core cooling.
Possible methods to detect inadequate cooling was discussed with the licensee. The January 31, 1980 letter discusses the use of vessel water level as presently described in the procedures.
b.
Operator Training and Operator Interviews During December, 1979, the licensee had provided formal train-ing with control room walk through to all operators on actions to be taken following a SBLOCA.
In addition the annual requal-ification examination given in December had been slanted more toward emergency conditions than in the past and included questions on SBLOCA reactions.
c.
Operator Interviews The inspectors interviewed five, licensed operators. The operators interviewed were one staff SRO, one shift supervisor, one SRO who stands shift work and two shift R0's.
The operators interviewed:
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Knowledgeably discussed the symptons and transient response characteristics of the plant with respect to a SBLOCA.
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2.
Demonstrated a knowledge of the procedures to be used for a SBLOCA, including the immediate actions required.
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LAC-6688, Frank Linder, General Manager to D. L. Ziemann, Chief OR Branch dtd 12/11/79.
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(3) Were knowledgeable in the importance of heat sink, recog-
nition of adequate subcooling and core voiding, indica-tions of inadequate core cooling, and implementation of natural circulation.
d.
Miscellaneous Considerations
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(1) Emergency diesels do not sequence loads at this plant. On undervoltage the diesels start and pick up all loads
connected to the bus.
(2) High pressure core spray can not be stopped by automatic resetting. It can only be stopped manuall when the initi-ating signal is cleared or by locking out she equipment.
(3) Facility design does not require a switchover from injec-tion to recirculation.
(4) Containment isolation and reset features require modifi-catiogygpicharescheduledtobeinstalledatalater date (5) The licensee has no procedure for loss of coolant acci/.ent outside the containment. He does have an alarm response procedure D3-1, " Main Steam isolation valve not full open." This procedure covers the break that results in automatic closure of the valves.
It does not cover required
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actions in great detail. Technical Specifications 3.8.1 requires the facility to have procedures recommended in USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.33 which in section F.6.a requires procedures for combating emergencies such as loss of coolant outside containment. The ability of alarm pro-cedure D3-1 to fulfill this requirement will be reviewed during subsequent inspectioas. This is considered an unresolved item (80-01).
13. Exit Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
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Denton NRC to Linder DPC dtd 2/1/80.
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Linder, DPC to Denton NRC dtd 1/31/80.
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TABLE 1 SBLOCA Equipment ID NO.
LOC 1#
REDUNDANT A#
Env. Qual.2#
NOTES Generic Name
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Dec:iy Heat Blowdown 56-25-001 C
N Y
Not submersible Valves f
Re:ctor Vessel 50-42-302 C
C Y
W;.ter Level 50-42-303 C
50-42-306 C
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Re:ctor Pressure C
C Y
Containment Building 37-35-301
C Y
Pressure 37-35-302
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S. D. Condenser 62-25-001 C
C Y
Steam Inlet Valves 62-25-006 62-25-011 C
C Y
62-25-009 S. D. Condenser 62-25-002 C
C Y
Not submersible C::ndensate Return 62-25-010 Velve HP Core Spray Pumps 53-06-001 C
C Y
53-06-002 LP Core Spray Valve 53-25-001 C
No Y
53-25-005
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Alt. Core Spray 53-37-701 C
No Y
Ficw Alarm
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Containment Bldg.
73-25-001 C
C Y
Air operated, fail closed Vent Inlet Dampers 73-25-002
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TABLE 1 SBLOCA Equipment
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1#
2#
REDUNDANT Env. Qual.A#
NOTES Generic Name ID NO.
LOC
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4 Inch Vent 55-25-004
C Y
Fail Closed 55-25-014 He: der Valves 55-25-003 C
C Y
55-25-013 Containment b1dg.
73-25-005 C
C Y
Air operated, failed closed cutlet vent dampers 73-25-006 Liquid waste ISO 54-25-006 C
No Y
Not submersible Rerctor Vessel 50-42-305 C
No Y
Wide Range Level Containment Vessel 37-42-302
C N
Liquid Level 37-42-310
C N
Re ctor Feedwater 65-22-001
P Y
Flow Control Valve Component Cooling C
No Y
All manual valves Water Humidity Detectors 6. Detectors C
E N
220 F 100 % Humidity 52 psi Radiation Detectors 4 Detectors C
E N
160 F Ecreed Cire. Pump 50-301-001 C
C Y
Not tubmersible Suction & Dis-50-30-002 charge Valves 50-30-003 50-30-004
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TABLE 1 SBLOCA Equipment E
REDUNDANT Env. Qual.8 N(YTES Generic Name ID NO.
LOC
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OHST Level lo lo C
No N
MI table Alarm 150 F
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50 psi
Building Spray 69-24-003 C
No Y
Manual System HPSW to Core Spray 53-25-004 C
P Y
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Pump Valve 53-25-006 Altsrnate Core C
C Y
Series check valves Spray Demineralized Water Pump 1A
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System 67-11-001
C Y
Pump 1B 67-11-002
C Y
Iso Valves C
P 67-25-001 67-25-002 H.P. Service Water
P Y
Shutdown Condenser 62-01-001 C
No Y
MSIV 64-30-001 C
P Y
Automatic operation 61-22-003 redundant w'ith TBMSSV Turbine Building 64-25-003
P Y
Manual operation redundant Main Steam Shutbff with MSIV Velves Ovsrhead Storage 69-19-001 C
P Y
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TABLE 1 SBLOCA Equipment
. Generic Name ID NO.
LOC d#
REDUNDANT d#
Env. Qual.d#
NOTES
A Re:ctor to Regenera-51-25-001 C
No Y
tion Cooler Isola-51-25-002 tion Valve Re:ctor Emergency 62-25-013 C
C Y
Flood Vent (MDS)
62-25-015 62-25-014 62-25-016 Demineralized Water-62-25-004 C
C Y
header Isolation
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Valve to SD Con-denser Alt. Core Cpray 38-30-001
C Y
AC Valve Alt. Core Spray 38-30-002
C Y
DC Valve Dicsel H.P. Service 75-11-002
C Y
Water Pump 1A and IB
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LOC - location, inside containment (C); outside containment (0).
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REDUNDANCY - Alternate method provided in procedure (P), redur.:.at equipment provided (E), redundan't equipment provided which licensee states will meet loss of ofi tite power and single failure criteria. (C)
3]
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION - Not (N); licensee believes to be environmentally qualified (Y).
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