IR 05000397/1998025
| ML17292B578 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 03/04/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17292B576 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-98-25, NUDOCS 9903110218 | |
| Download: ML17292B578 (19) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE 2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
License No.:
Report No.:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspector:
Reviewed By:
Approved By:
50-397 NPF-21 50-397/98-25 Washington Public Power Supply System Washington Nuclear Project-2 Richland, Washington December 27, 1998, through February 6, 1999 J. E. Spets, Resident Inspector J. Melfi, Project Engineer G. Pick, Senior Project Engineer Linda J. Smith Acting Chief, Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects ATTACHMENT:
Supplemental Information 9903ii02i8 990304 PDR ADQCK 05000397
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Washington Nuclear Project-2 NRC Inspection Report No. 50-397/98-25 This information covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
~Oeratione
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During the performance of a control rod exercise test, operators demonstrated good coordination, communications, and peer checks.
An operator, when presente'd with a procedural compliance problem, promptly notified the control room supervisor, appropriately requested authorization to use a different procedure, and initiated steps to change the subject procedure {Section 01.1).
The inspectors noted that operators did not initiallyrecognize a procedure step as being required.
Specifically, operators had become accustomed to performing a relatively simple repetitive procedure other than as written because of inattention to detail
{Section 01.1).
self-c Maintenance Operators demonstrated good system knowledge and an awareness of ongoing work by recognizing that a reactor scram, potentially required because of a stator cooling water high conductivity, could flood the work area where personnel performed work on the circulating water system because of swell following pump shutdown.
The Incident Review Board report for the deficiency identified underlying problems and was ritical (Section 01.2).
The first example of a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified because the licensee failed to perform an engineering evaluation for scaffolding that was supported by a nonload bearing member of a Class 1 component.
Because the licensee implemented appropriate corrective actions, no response was required (Section M1.1).
The second example of a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a and plant procedures occurred because personnel failed to followthe written procedures for adjusting the outlet scram valve limitswitch. Because the licensee implemented appropriate corrective actions, no response was required.
Maintenance personnel performance during control rod drive hydraulic control unit refurbishment demonstrated knowledge deficiencies in the proper use of, adherence to, and change of procedures.
In addition, mechanic's knowledge on the proper adjustment of limitswitches was insufficient and postmaintenance testing did not identify that the outlet scram valve limit switch was improperly adjusted (Section M1.2).
Personnel performing a surveillance test at the scram discharge volume limitswitches used good three-way communications, peer verification, procedure adherence and place-keeping, and ALARA(as low as reasonably achievable) practices (Section M4.1).
-2-
~En ineerin The evaluation of postmaintenance testing required for the repair of Circulating Water Pump C, including any impact on plant operations and Technical Specification requirements, identified the need for a Technical Specification change.
The licensee completed the repair and testing of Circulating Water Pump C without incident (Section E1.1.)
Plant Su ort
~
Material condition of and housekeeping in areas toured was generally good.
However, water was identified leaking from a flange below a control rod drive filter housing (Section M2.1).
A contaminated area was not completely marked.
Specifically, while adequately cordoned off, yellow and magenta tape was not used on a small section of floor to designate a contaminated area.
No other marking or posting discrepancies were noted during the inspection period (Section R1.1).
Re ort Details Summa of Plant Status At the beginning of the inspection period, the plant operated at 100 percent power. On December 28, 1998, operators reduced power to 85 percent for load following. On December 29, operators further reduced power to 65 percent for load following and returned to 100 percent on January 4, 1999. On January 25, power automatically decreased to 95 percent because Recirculating Pump B ran back to 51 hertz upon loss of a its 400-hertz power supply card. Operators reduced power to 70 percent for repair of the 400-hertz power supply. At the end of the inspection period, operators maintained power at 85 percent for load following.
I. OPERATIONS
Conduct of Operations 01.1 Performance of Control Rod Drive Exercise a.
Ins ection Sco e 71707 The inspectors observed reactor operators perform Procedure OSP-CRD-W701,
"Control Rod Exercise of Fully Withdrawn Rods (Mode 1), " Revision 4.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed Procedure 2.1.1, "Control Rod Drive System," Revision 25, and Procedure 4.1.1.3, "Stuck or Inoperable Control Rod," Revision 10, and discussed the procedures with the reactor operators, control room. supervisor, and operations manager.
The inspectors also reviewed Problem Evaluation Request (PER) 299-0210, which was initiated because two procedures provided different guidance for moving a stuck control rod.
Observations and Findin s The inspectors observed, for several control rods, reactor operators perform Procedure OSP-CRD-W701.
The inspectors noted that the operators were confident in their actions, that the communications and coordination among the operators were good, and that peer checks were evident.
However, the inspectors noted that operators did not initiallyrecognize a procedu're step as being required.
A reactor operator informed the inspectors of his proposed actions for an upcoming control rod that was known to be "stubborn." The operator stated that he was going to incrementally increase drive water pressure to free the stubborn rod and that he was not going to use the "double clutching method" on the rod in accordance with Procedure 2.1.1, Section 5.26.3.
However, the inspectors noted, that Section 5:26.3, step c, stated, in part, "Ifthe normal withdrawal attempt is unsuccessful, repeat Steps 2.a and 2.b of the Double Clutching Method...."
The inspectors questioned the operator as to why he was not going to perform the step.
The operator responded that: (1) with the current plant conditions, they did not want to use the double clutching method because it would require the continuous insertion of the rod; and (2) he thought there was an allowance in the procedure not to do the ste When presented with the inspectors'bservation, the reactor operator informed the control room supervisor of the problem and requested authorization to use Procedure 4.1.1.3, which did not have the double clutching step. The control room supervisor gave the operator authorization to use Procedure 4.1.1.3. The reactor operator informed the inspectors that Procedure 2.1.1 would be. revised to clarify that the step is intended to be performed during startup.
The inspectors questioned another operator, on a different shift, who was making preparations to perform
'rocedure OSP-CRD-W701.
The operator stated that he was not aware of the step in question and that he would have most likely missed it during the performance of Procedure 2.1.1.
The operations manager independently verified, by interviewing another reactor operator, that reactor operators did not recognize that the step in question was required by Procedure 2.1.1. The operations manager stated that the reactor operators are trained to move a stuck rod in accordance with the guidance of Procedure 4.1.1.3.
The operations manager additionally stated that the operators had read the steps of Procedure 2.1.1 to say what they thought the procedure should say based on training and previous performance of Procedure 4.1.1.3.
The operations manager also expressed concern that there were two procedures that performed the same task differently. The licensee initiated PER 299-0210 and night orders to address the issues.
The inspectors expressed concern that: (1) operators had become accustomed to performing a relatively simple repetitive procedure other than as written because of inattention to detail, (2) two procedures performed the same task differently, and (3) the potential existed to carry over such practices to more complex safety-significant procedures.
Conclusion During the performance of a control rod exercise test, operators demonstrated good coordination, communications, and peer checks.
An operator, when presented with a procedural compliance problem, promptly notified the control room supervisor, appropriately requested authorization to use a different procedure, and initiated steps to change the subject procedure.
The inspectors noted that operators did not initiallyrecognize a procedure step as being required.
Specifically, operators had become accustomed to performing a relatively simple repetitive procedure other than as written because of inattention to detail.
Stator Coolin Water Hi h Conductivit Ins ection Sco e 71707 While performing a general control room tour, the inspectors observed control room personnel respond to a stator cooling water high conductivity alarm that could have resulted in a reactor scram.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed the results of an Incident Review Board that the licensee convened to address the high conductivity and potential reactor scra Obseivations and Findin s The inspectors observed an operating crew respond to a "STATOR COIL WATER INLETCONDUCTIVITYVERY HIGH"alarm. The corresponding alarm response procedure requires that the reactor be scrammed if conductivity is verjfied greater than 9.5 pmhos/cm with reactor power greater than 25 percent.
The inspectors noted that reactor operators appropriately had Procedure 3.3.1, "Reactor Scram," out ahd that they had performed an initial review of the procedure.
In addition, the reactor operators demonstrated good system knowledge and an awareness of ongoing work. The operators recognized that a reactor scram would impact personnel performing work on the circulating water system, in that possible flooding of the work area could occur because of swell following pump shutdown.
The inspectors also noted that the control room supervisor performed adequate briefs to keep control room personnel appraised of current information and planned actions.
The inspectors reviewed the report issued by the Incident Review Board and found that the self-critical report had sufficient detail to identify underlying problems.
The report also identified similar events and determined a generic implication of the event.
Specifically, the report stated that procedures must be capable of being performed verbatim.
If a procedure can not be performed verbatim, then it must be changed, even on less than frequently used procedures.
Conclusion Operators demonstrated good system knowledge and an awareness of ongoing work by recognizing that a reactor scram, potentially required because of a stator cooling water high conductivity, could flood the work area where personnel performed work on the circulating water system because of swell following pump shutdown.
The Incident Review Board report for the deficiency identified underlying problems and was self-critical.
II. MAINTENANCE Conduct of Maintenance Scaffoldin on the Standb Gas Treatment S stem Ins ection Sco e 62707 The inspectors performed a routine tour of work sites and observed work conditions.. In addition, the inspectors reviewed Procedure 10.2.53, "Seismic Requirements for Scaffolding, Ladders, Man-Lifts, Tool Gang Boxes, Hoists, and Metal Storage Cabinets,"
Revision 16; Calculation CE-02-87-29, "Seismic Requirements for Scaffolding,"
'evision 1; and PER 298-2144.
The inspectors also interviewed personnel responsible for erecting and inspecting scaffoldin Observations and Findin s The inspectors observed woik conditions associated with maintenance on Train B of the standby gas treatment system.
The inspectors noted that scaffolding was erected for the maintenance activity and that two legs of the scaffolding were resting on the standby gas treatment unit. In addition, the inspectors noted that on January 1, 1999, after maintenance activities were completed, operators declared the Train B standby gas treatment system operable.
The scaffolding was removed on January 4.
The inspectors found that Procedure 10.2.53, paragraph 7.1.3.d, required personnel to obtain engineering approval if scaffolding deviated from the procedure specifications.
The individual responsible for erecting the scaffolding informed the inspectors that the subject scaffolding deviated from the procedure, in that it was required to sit on top of the standby gas treatment unit and not on the reactor building floor. Procedure 10,2.53, paragraph 7.1.5. i, specifically required personnel to keep all scaffolding items (i.e.,
clamps, tubes, etc.) greater than or equal to 2 inches away from Class 1 equipment.
In addition, paragraph 7.1.4.a stated to, "Inspect scaffold and sign off Scaffold Tag (Attachment 9.1) by Scaffold Craft/Supervisor or designee based on:... An approved Engineering evaluation and 50.59.
Engineering to note on the Scaffold Tag any minor anomalies with the guidelines of this procedure that are found acceptable and bounded by existing Safety Analysis. Reference bounding Safety Analysis on the Scaffold Tag."
The inspectors found that personnel had not performed an engineering evaluation nor a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation.
In addition, the associated scaffold tag did not have a bounding safety analysis referenced.
The licensee initiallyconcluded in PER 298-2144 that a previous engineering evaluation did exist for the subject scaffolding. The engineering evaluation assumed that the two legs sat on 2-inch standby gas treatment steel framing members.
However, the inspectors informed the licensee that PER 298-2144 was not accurate because one leg actually sat on the carbon bed protective cover, not on a 2-irich steel framing member.
The licensee performed an additional engineering evaluation that demonstrated that a leg on the carbon bed protective cover was acceptable.
The licensee took corrective action and discussed procedure requirements with the scaffold erection craft foreman. The failure to implement Procedure 10.2.53 was identified as the first example of a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to properly implement a written procedure.
Because the licensee implemented appropriate corrective actions, no response was required (50-397/98025-01).
Conclusions The first example of a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified because the licensee failed to perform an engineering evaluation for scaffolding that was supported by a nonload bearing member of a Class 1 component.
Because the licensee implemented appropriate corrective actions, no response was require M1.2 Control Rod Drive S stem H draulic Control Unit Refurbishment Ins ection Sco e 62707 The inspectors reviewed Procedure 10.5.9, "Hydraulic Control Unit Refurbishment,"
Revision 0. On January 21 and 22, 1999, the inspectors observed personnel perform maintenance on control rod drive Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) 0235.
In addition, the inspectors observed the condition of HCU 0235 after the maintenance personnel completed the maintenance and postmaintenance testing. The inspectors interviewed mechanics, craft supervisors, and the HCU system engineer involved with the maintenance activities. Furthermore, the inspectors reviewed PERs 299-0195 (scram valve limitswitch adjustment) and 299-0173 (poor work practices).
The inspectors also reviewed several other PERs generated for specific issues regarding HCU maintenance activities. On January 29, the inspectors identified several issues regarding procedure adequacy and implementation of procedure requirements.
Observations and Findin s The inspectors identified several issues as discussed below related to procedure adequacy and personnel performance, while reviewing the work performed on HCUs.
b.1 Limitswitch adjustment
. The inspectors identified that, after completing the maintenance on HCU 0235 and declaring the HCU operable, the outlet scram had a '/s-inch gap between the valve limit switch actuator and the limit switch with the valve closed.
This was not consistent with other HCUs since no gap existed when the actuator engaged the limitswitch. The inspectors questioned the HCU system engineer as to whether this condition was acceptable.
The HCU system engineer evaluated the condition and determined that the limit switch was not properly adjusted.
Consequently, the HCU system engineer:
(1)
notified the control room supervisor and shift manager who listed the switch in the Inoperable Log, (2) initiated a work request to have the limitswitch properly adjusted, and (3) initiated PER 299-01 95.
Procedure 10.5.9, steps 6.16.2 and 6.16.3, addressed the adjustment of scram valve limitswitches when the valves are open and stated, in part, "Adjust the switch actuator to the point where it just loses contact with the switch.".The inspectors noted that the procedure gave no quantitative acceptance criteria for adjusting the limit switch and left it up to the mechanics to-decide what "just loses contact" implied. The electricians responsible for installing the limitswitch stated that they could not adjust the limit as required by the procedure and that they had informed their supervisor of the problem.
The supervisor stated that he did not recall being informed. However, the two electricians signed off step 6.16.3 as being complete and assumed that the limitswitch would be adjusted later during postmaintenance testing.
A contributing factor was identified in that the attachment used to sign off procedure steps, in many cases, only paraphrased actual procedure ste'ps (i.e., switch installed vs. switch installed and adjusted).
Furthermore, the inspectors determined that the electrician who attempted to
-6-adjust the limitswitch was not familiar with the task.
Specifically, the electrician attempted to adjust the limitswitch when the correct method was to adjust the actuator of the limitswitch.
Procedure TSP-CRD-C101, "CRD Scram Timing with Auto Scram Timer System," used to perform postmaintenance testing, failed to identify the improperly adjusted limit switch. Proper indication was given in the control room even though a limitswitch did not operate as intended.
The licensee indicated that previous postmaintenance testing of replaced HCU limitswitches was performed differently and that the problem would have probably been identified with the old method.
The inspectors expressed concern because the licensee did not capture and carry forward the knowledge and lessons learned from past successful performances of postmaintenance testing.
The inspectors noted that Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 7.5.1.2, states, in part:
"The following information is provided to the control room operator to monitor reactor shutdown... Control rod scram pilot valve position status lamps indicating open valves."
The inspectors also noted that Procedures 3.3.1, "Reactor Scram" and TSP-CRD-C101 use the indications provided by the HCU limitswitches (blue scram lights) that indicate that both inlet and outlet scram valves are open; The inspectors also found that licensee training materials address using the blue scram lights to rapidly determine whether a rod that failed to scram failed electrically or hydraulically.
The licensee initiated PER 299-0195 to address the problem and identified the following corrective actions:
(1) stopped all work on HCUs, (2) counseled personnel on procedure compliance, (3) revised the procedure to address identified problems, (4) initiated actions to perform a root cause analysis on all aspects of HCU work (i.e., procedure compliance, procedure adequacy, maintenance and ALARA,and procedure validation adequacy), and (5) placed a hold on all HCU maintenance work until Maintenance and Radiation Protection Management were satisfied with corrective action results.
The failure to properly adjust the outlet scram limitswitch and perform postmaintenance testing adequate to identify the improperly adjusted limitswitch of refurbished control rod drive HCU 0235 was identified as the second example of a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, in that personnel failed to followthe procedure as written.
Because the licensee implemented appropriate corrective actions, no response was required (50-397/98025-01).
b.2 Install and lubricate packing The inspectors observed maintenance personnel lubricate and install new packing in a valve in accordance with Procedure 10.5.9, step 6:9.19. The inspectors questioned the mechanics as to what lubricant was used on the packing because Procedure 10.5.9, Attachment 8.3, did not address lubricants for packing. The mechanics agreed that the attachment did not specify a required lubricant. Upon questioning how the lubricant was chosen, the mechanics stated that the lubricant was chosen based on past experience.
The inspectors were concerned that, if the wrong lubricant was used, the scram valves
-7-could have been rendered inoperable (e.g., gumming of parts). The system engineer reviewed the procedure and determined that the lubricant used was appropriate and noted in his copy of the procedure the required change.
The inspectors noted that Procedure SWP-PRO-02 addressed procedure changes and provided instructions for initiating procedure changes.
The inspectors noted that Procedure SWP-PRO-02 authorized the use of several procedure change processes, including verbal and written temporary changes.
However, based on discussions with the system engineer, neither of the authorized methods were employed.
The licensee initiated PER 299-0173 to address the identified issue.
The licensee:
(1) initiated a procedure change, (2) reemphasized to craft personnel the need to stop and get clarification on questionable procedure areas, and (3) reemphasized to supervision the need to receive procedure changes as required. The failure to obtain a required procedure change in accordance with licensee procedures was identified as a minor violation not subject to enforcement.
b.3 Ball check valve replacement The inspectors observed mechanics remove a ball check in accordance with Procedure 10.5.9, step 6.4.2, that required using a ball check extractor to remove the ball check from the check valve port. The inspectors observed that a rod with a piece of tape secured on the end was used as a ball check extractor.
However, the inspectors noted that Procedure 10.5.9, Section 5.0, identified a specific ball check extractor tool, which consisted of a small suction cup and a device to draw a vacuum.
The inspectors questioned the mechanics and the craft supervisor as to why tape on a stick was a suitable substitute and why the procedure did not recognize it. The supervisor stated that personnel used tape on a stick in training and that personnel removed and replaced the ball check without damaging it or other components.
The inspectors expressed concern because of the disconnect between what was presented and performed in training and what the procedure actually recognized as the correct tool for the job.
In addition, the inspectors noted that several attempts were required by the mechanics to remove the ball check from its seat when using the tape-on-a-stick method.
The licensee independently determined that the repetitive attempts to remove the ball check were an ALARAconcern and fabricated a better ball check extractor. The inspectors noted that the licensee initiated PER 299-0128 to address that a required change to Procedure 10.5.9 was identified, prior to the procedure being approved; however, the procedure was not changed.
The failure to obtain a required procedure change in accordance with licensee procedures was identified as another example of a minor violation not subject to enforcement, as described abov '.
Conclusion The second example of a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a and plant procedures occurred because personnel failed to followthe written procedures for adjusting the outlet scram valve limitswitch. Because the licensee implemented appropriate corrective. actions, no response was required.
Maintenance personnel performance during control rod drive hydraulic control unit refurbishment demonstrated knowledge deficiencies in the proper use of, adherence to, and change of procedures.
In addition, the mechanic's knowledge on the proper adjustment of limitswitches was insufficient and postmaintenance testing did not identify that the outlet scram valve limit switch was improperly adjusted.
M2 Plant Material Conditions a.
Ins ection Sco e 61707 The inspectors toured the reactor building and observed material conditions and general housekeeping.
b.
Observations and Findin s The inspectors found that material conditions of the areas toured were generally good.
However, the inspectors did observe water dripping and pooling on the ground from a flange below a control rod drive system filter unit. The inspectors contacted a health physics technician who sampled and cleaned up the water. The water was not contaminated.
The inspector noted that the leaking flange was not identified as being deficient.
The inspectors also identified an out-of-date licensee procedure in Containment Atmosphere Control Room A. The licensee stated that the procedure was probably left in the room when it was in the process of being revised (i.e., walked down) and that it was never used.
The inspectors were confident that the procedure was never used based on its age and location.
From review of the guidance in Procedure SWP-MAI-02,
"Station Material Condition Inspection Program," Revision 0, the inspectors determined that personnel had not met management expectations for housekeeping in this instance.
C.
Conclusion Material condition of and housekeeping in areas toured was generally good.
However, water was identified leaking from a flange below a control rod drive filter housin Qi M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance M4.1 Performance of Scram Dischar e Volume Testiri a.
Ins ection Sco e 61726 The inspectors reviewed and observed the performance of Procedure ISP-CRD-Q901,
"RPS Trip System A and Control Rod Block on SDV Level High - CC/CFT," Revision 1.
In addition, the inspectors interviewed personnel responsible for testing.
b.
Observations and Findin s The inspectors observed good three-way communications among the technicians
'outside of a posted high radiation and contamination area that surrounds the scram discharge volume and the valve operator within the area.
The inspectors also noted that individuals were appropriately following and marking off procedure steps when completed.
All individuals appeared confident in their actions.
Peer verification was evident as individuals verified correct valve positions.
The inspectors verified that the individual within the high radiation and contaminated area was aware of dose levels.
In addition, the inspectors observed that the individual, when not directly involved with testing, stayed in as low a dose area as possible.
The inspectors also noted the use of a staged reach rod and the rapid execution of steps in the high radiation'area.
The individual performing valve manipulations was knowledgeable as to valve locations, thereby minimizing dose received.
The removal of anticontamination clothing was performed adequately..
c.
Conclusion Personnel performing a surveillance test at the scram discharge volume limitswitches used good three-way communications, peer verification, procedure adherence and place-keeping, and ALARApractices.
III. ENGINEERING E1 Conduct of En ineerin E1.1 Circulatin Water Pum C Re air and Postmaintenance Testin a.
Ins ection Sco e 37551 The inspectors reviewed the plans to repair and test Circulating Water Pump C. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a Technical Specification change that was submitted by the licensee to allow the performance of postmaintenance testin,
Observations and Findin s-10-C.
The inspectors noted that the engineering evaluation of postmaintenance testing following repair of Circulating Water Pump C was detailed and identified the need for a Technical Specification change.
The licensee identified that, when operators started the circulating water pump for testing, a continuous source of electrical power might not be available to a vital bus because of the potential for a sustained undervoltage condition. The licensee determined that the vital bus should be transferred to another source of power'to ensure a continuous source of power existed.
However, the licensee found that Technical Specifications would not allow the transfer of the vital bus. The licensee requested a
change to Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.8 that was approved by the NRC on January 27, 1999.
Repair and testing of Circulating Water Pump C was successfully completed on February 1.
Conclusion The evaluation of postmaintenance testing required for the repair of Circulating Water Pump C, including any impact on plant operations and Technical Specification requirements, identified the need for a Technical Specification change.
The licensee completed the repair and testing of Circulating Water Pump C without incident.
ES Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92902)
E8.1 (Closed Unresolved Item 50-397/97009-05:
failure to include all terminal ends in the Final Safety Analysis Report The NRC staff identified, during a review of the Final Safety Analysis Report, that four terminal ends (pipe break locations) were not appropriately documented in Table 3.6-6,
"Design Basis Break Locations Outside Primary Containment."
The terminal ends included four 2-inch diameter main steam drain line piping intersections with the 26-inch diameter main stream lines.
Final Safety Analysis, Section 3.6;2.1.1.1, specified that these piping locations should have been identified as terminal ends.
The licensee initiated Problem Evaluation Request 297-0426 to document this deficiency and identify the root cause.
The licensee determined that the potential break locations were originally included in Table 3.6-6 but were inappropriately removed when the table was updated in 1995 following a change to Engineering Calculation 8.01.215, "Tabulation of High Energy Pipe Breaks." The inspectors found that the licensee will update the Final Safety Analysis Report and took actions to ensure that calculation changes would be correctly transferred to the Final Safety Analysis Report in the future. Since the potential safety consequences of this discrepancy were minimal, the inspectors identified this as a minor violatio Qi-11-IV. PLANT SUPPORT R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 Radiolo ical Controls a.
Ins ection Sco e 71750 The inspectors reviewed the use of access control, posting, and labeling while observing work within the reactor building. In addition, the inspectors reviewed Procedure 11.2.7.1,
"Area Posting," Revision 11.
b.
Observations and Findin s While observing maintenance activities, the inspectors found that a contaminated area located on the 606-foot elevation of the reactor building was cordoned off with yellow and magenta rope and a contaminated area sign was posted.
However, the area was not marked in accordance with Procedure 11.2.7.1.
Specifically, the inspectors found that no tape was used on a small section of the floor of the raised platform to mark the boundary.
The licensee took immediate corrective action ahd placed tape on the floor of the platform. The inspectors found no other marking discrepancies during the, inspection period.
c.
Conclusions
.A contaminated area was not completely marked.
Specifically, yellow and magenta tape was not used on a small section of floor to designate a contaminated area.
No other marking or posting discrepancies were noted during the inspection period.
V. MANAGEMENTMEETINGS X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management on February 7, 1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identifie Qi ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIALLIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee V. Harris, Assistant Maintenance Manager P. Inserra, Licensing Manager J. McDonald, Production Manager S. Oxenford, Operations Manager D. Perry, Radiation Operations Supervisor G. Smith, Vice President - Generation/Nuclear Plant General Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551:
IP 61726:
IP 62707:
IP 71707:
IP 71750:
IP 92903:
Onsite Engineering Surveillance Observations Maintenance Observations Plant Operations Plant Support Followup Engineering ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
~Oened 50-397/98025-01 VIO Scaffolding installed withouta required engineering evaluation and failure to properly adjust the outlet scram valve limitswitch (Sections M1.1 and M1-2)
Closed.
50-397/98025-01 VIO Scaffolding installed without a required engineering evaluation and failure to properly adjust the outlet scram valve limitswitch (Sections M1.1 and M1-2)
50-397/97009-05 UNR Failure to include terminal ends in Final Safety Analysis Report (Section E8.1)
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ALARA CFR HCU NRC PDR PER UNR as low as reasonably achievable Code of Federal Regulations hydraulic control unit U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission public document room problem evaluation request unresolved item violation