ML17289A640
| ML17289A640 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1992 |
| From: | Reese J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Sorensen G WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17289A641 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9206240137 | |
| Download: ML17289A640 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000397/1992017
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COIVIMISSION
REGION V
1450 MARIALANE,SUITE 210
WALNUTCREEK, CALIFORNIA94596
JUN 08 1992
Docket No. 50-397
Mashington Public Power Supply System
P.O.
Box 968
3000 George Mashington
May
Richland, Mashington
993y52
Attention:
Mr.
G.
C. Sorensen,
Manager
Regulatory
Programs
SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION
This letter refers to the inspection
conducted
by Mr. A. Mcgueen of this
office on May ll - 15, 1992, of activities authorized
by NRC License
No.
NPF-21, at the Mashington Nuclear Project, Unit 2. It also refers to the
discussion of our preliminary inspection findings held by the inspector with
yourself and other members of yr"r staff identified in the enc'losed
inspection
report on May 15,
1992.
Areas examined during this inspection
included activities related to emergency
preparedness
as described
in the enclosed
inspection report.
Mithin these
areas,
the inspection consisted of selective
examination of procedures
and
representative
records,
interviews with facility and contract personnel,
and
observations
of activities in progress.
No violations of NRC requirements
were identified within the scope of this
inspection.
In accordance
with 10 CFR 2.790(a),
a copy of this letter and the enclosure
will be placed in the
NRC Public Document
Room.
Should you have
any questions
concerning this letter,
we will be glad to
discuss
them with you.
S'rely,
ir.
Ja
.
ee e,
i f
guards,
Emergency
Preparedness
and Non-Power Reactor
Branch
Enclosures:
Inspection
Report
No. 50-397/92-17
9206240137
920608
ADOCK 05000397
8
cc w/enclosure:
J.
W. Baker,
WNP-2 Plant Manager
A.
G. Hosier,
WNP-2 Licensing Manager
L.
L. Grumme, Acting Director, Licensing
8
Assurance
G.
E.
Doupe,
Esq.,
J.
V. Parrish,
Assistant
Managing Director for
Operations
A.
Lee Oxsen,
Deputy Managing Director
State of Washington
M.
H. Philips, Esq., Attorney
Terry Strong,
R.
Donovan,
FEMA,
RX
JUS 0s
>Sr'cc
w/enclosure
Docket File
8.
Faulkenber ry
J. Martin
G.
Cook
Project Inspector
Resident Inspector
.
bcc w/o enclosure:
M. Smith
J. Zollicoffer
Regio
V/ann
A.
u en
5/8(
92
se
/
/92
YES
/
NO
]
YES /
NO
]
ES /
NO ]
U,
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report
No.--:
50-397/92-17
License
No.
Licensee:
Mashington Public Power Supply System
P.O.
Box 968
3000 George Mashington
May
Richland, Mashington
99352
Facility Name:
Mashington Nuclear Project, Unit 2 (MNP-2)
Inspection at:
MNP-2 .Site,
Benton County, Mashington
Inspection
Conducted:
May ll - 15,
1992
Inspector:
/ac
~
( I fir
c ueen,
me
e
c
repare
ness
na ys
a
e
)gne
Approved by:
arne
.
eese,
ie
,
a eguar s,
mergency
a
e
1gne
a
and
Non-P wer Reactor
Branch
~Summar:
Areas Ins ected:
This unannounced,
routine inspection
by a region-based
) nspec
or
examined
the following portions of the licensee's
emergency
preparedness
program:
Open Items identified during previous
emergency
reparedness
inspections;
Operational
Status of the Emergency
Preparedness
rogram and Inspector Identified Items.
During this inspection,
portions of
Inspection
Procedures
82701,
92701
and 92703 were used.
Results;
In the areas
inspected,
the licensee's
emergency
preparedness
program appeared
adequate
to accomplish its objectives.
The licensee
was
found to be in compliance with NRC requirements within the areas
examined
during this inspection.
INSPECTION DETAILS
Ke
Persons
Contacted
~H.
L. Aeschliman,
Emergency
Planner
"A. J.
Connor, Security
- J.
Bell, Manager,
Plant Services
"D.
R.
Coody, Supervisor
"F.
L. Dehart, Security
I rograms
"R.
E. Fuller, Compliance
"N. L. Garza,
Emergency
Planning Training
"R. J.
Given, Security
"J.
A. Gloyn, Manager Security Training
~R:
E. Jorgensen,
Senior Trainer,
Emergency
Planning
"A. F. Klauss, Supervisor,
Emergency Planning
(EP)
"J;
A. Landon, Drills and Exercises
Supervisor
D.
E. Larson,
Manager,
Emergency
Preparedness
"L. A. Lei ngang
Safeguards
Systems Specialist,
Safeguards
Compliance
"R.
D. Madden,
I rincipal
QA Engineer,
Corporate
Programs
and Audits
"D.
W. Martin, Manager,
Security
Programs
M.
M. Monopoli, Manager,
Suppor'; Services
- L. S. Morris, Emergency
Oper ~:.'.n.",,j-.acj lity Communications
Center
~
Coordinator
"R.
P. O'Reilly, Senior Engineer,
Plant Technical
"A. L. Oxsen,
Deputy Managing Director
"M. C. Peterson,
Safeguards
Specialist
"D. J. Pisarcik,
Manager,
Health Physics/Chemistry
G. 0.
Ray,
Emergency
Planner
"M.
P. Reis,
Compliance Supervisor
- D. J.
Schumann,
Principal Engineer,
Operating
Events Analysis and
Resolution
- G.
C. Sorensen,
Manager,
Regulatory
Programs,
"R. L. Utter, Supervisor,
EP Training
"D.
M. Vorheis, 'Security Programs
"D.
H. Walker, Manager,
Health Physics
and Fire Protection
- A. C. Ware, Security
"R.
L.
War d1ow, Supervisor,
Radiological
Services
"S.
L. Washington,
Manager,
Nuclear Safety Engineering
The above individuals denoted with an asterisk
were present
during the
exit mech;ing
on M~y 15, 1992.
The inspector also contacted
other members
of the licensee
s emergency
preparedness,
administrative,
and technical
staff during the course of the inspection.
NRC Personnel
at Exit Interview
H.
D.
Chancy,
Health Physics Inspector,
RV
N.
L. Mamish, Health Physics
Inspector,
RV
A.
D.
McQueen,
Emergency
Preparedness
Analyst,
RV
L.
R.
Norderhaug,
Physical Security Specialist,
RV
D.
L. Proulx, Resident Inspector,
RV
2.
Functional or Pro
ram Areas. Ins ected
The licensee
seemed
to be maintaining their previous level of performance
in the following areas
and their program appeared
adequate
to accomplish
their objectives.
a.
0 erational
Status of the
Emer enc
Pre aredness
Pro
ram (MC-82701)
(1)
Emer enc
Plan
and
Im lementin
Procedures
.Several
Licensee
Emergency
Plan Implementing Procedures
(EPIP),
which had been revised since the last routine inspection,
were
reviewed
as indicated
by margin change
bars during this
inspection.
o
EPIP 13.4. 1
Notifications, Revision 12, date'd
April 2, 1952.
o
EPIP 13.5.3,
Evacuation of Exclusion Area and/or Nearby
Areas,
Revision 8, dated
March 26, 1992.
o
EPIP 13.5.4,
Columbia River Evacuation,
Revision 8, dated
March 26,
1992.
o
EPIP 13.5.5,
Personnel
Accountability, Revision 8, dated
March 26,
1992.
o
EPIP 13.5.6,
Personnel
Search
and Rescue,
Revision 6,
dated
March 26,, 1992.
o
EPIP 13.8.2,
Backup
Emergency
Dose Projection
System
Operations,
Revision 10, dated,March
26,
1992.
o
EPIP 13. 9. 1, Environmental Field Team Operations,
Revision
6,,dated
March 26,
1992.
o
EPIP 13.9.2, Field Exposure
Rate Surveys,
Revision 8,
dated
March 26,
1992.
0
EPIP 13. 9. 7, Aerial Monitoring, Revision 7, dated
March 26,
1992.
EPIP 13.9,8,
River Evacuation Monitoring, Revision',
dated
March 26,
1992.
o
. EPIP 13.10.1,
Control .Room Operations
and Shift Manager
Duties,
Revision 8, dated
March 26,
1992.
o
EPIP 13. 10.3, Technical
Support Center Operations
and
Technical
Support Center
Director Duties,
Revision 9,
dated
May 4,
1992.
This EPIP contained
an added "Action 10" on page
3 of 8,
which indicated that
"When advised the
TSC is
uninhabitable,
the Plant Emergency Director will select
staff members to go to the Control
Room or the
Emergency
Operations Facility based
on functional need."
The
licensee
confirmed that there
was
no alternate
TSC "per
se,"
and that the support expertise
required in such
cases
would be redistributed to the most appropriate
location to
continue support.
"Open C.A.R. Report" (Corrective Action
Request)
90-0062 indicated
a finding that "Control
Room
(CR) may not be adequate
for handling
TSC staff.
Last
3
drills have
had scenarios
that rendered
the
uninhabitable
and
made it necessary
to relocate
TSC staff
members to the
CR.
Observations
of this work arrangement
note that the Simulator (thus the
CR)
may lack adequate
space
and equipment. to support this influx of personnel."
The C.A.R.
remarks section indicated that "Installation of
~
~
hones in the control
room is waiting for action on tQR AR
693 (est.
completion August 92)."
This item will be
reviewed in future emergency
preparedness
exercises
and
inspections
to insure that adequate
technical
support
can
be accomplished
in event of an actual
emergency
event.
(92-17-Ol)
EPIP 13. 10.4, Radiation. Protection
Ma:>.ger Duties,
Revision 8, dated April 0, 1992.
EPIP 13. 10.5, Operations
Manager Duties,. Revision 5, dated
May 4,
1992.
o
EPIP 13.10.6,
Plant/NRC Liaison Duties,
Revision 7, dated
April 2, 1992.
o
EPIP 13. 10.7, Plant Administrative Manager Duties,
Revision 8, dated April 2, 1992.
o
EPIP 13. 10.8, Security Supervisor Duties, Revision 7,
dated April 2, 1992.
0-
EPIP 13. 10.9,
Operations
Support Center Director and
Staff Duties,
Revision 13, dated April 2, 1992.
o
EPIP 13. 11. 10, Security Decision Center Operations
and
Security Manager Duties, Revision 7, dated April 2,
1992.
o
EPIP 13. 10. 11, Plant
Emergency
Team Duties,
Revision 7,
dated
May 4,
1992.
EPIP 13.10.12,
Reentry/Recovery
Team Duties,
Revision 7,
dated
May 4,
1992.
EPIP 13. 11.4, Safety Manager Duties, Revision 6, dated
May 4,
1992.
o
EPIP 13. 11.8,
Licensing Manager Duties,
Revision 5, dated
May 4, 1992.
0.
EPIP 13.11.11, Offsite Agency Coordination Center
Operations
and Offsite Agency Coordinator Duties,
Revision
8, dated
May 4,
1992.
o
EPIP 13. 12. 1, Crisis Management
Center Operations,
Revision 6, dated
May 4, 1992.
o
EPIP 13.12.2
Headquarters
Communications
Center
Operations,
kevision 6, dated April 2, 1992.
o
EPIP 13.12.3, Joint Information Center
News Coordination
Team Duties,
Revision 7, dated
March 3, 1992.
o
EPIP 13. 12, 11, Joint Information Center Information
Manager Duties,
Revision 8, dated
March 3, 1992.
o
EPIP 13. 12. 15, Joint Information Center Support Manager
Duties,
Revision 8, March 3, 1992.
o
EPIP 13. 12. 18, Headquarters
Administrative Support
Supervisor Duties, Revision 4, dated
May 4, 1992.
o
EPIP 13. 13. 1, Reentry,
Revision 5, dated
May 4, '.992.
o
EPIP 13. 13.2,
Recovery Operations,
Revision 5, dated
May
4,
1992.
o
EPIP 13. 14.4,
Emergency
Equipment,
Revision ll, dated
May 4, 1992,
o
EPIP 13. 14.9,
Emergency
Program Maintenance,
Revision 7,
dated April 2,
1992.
No apparent
degradations
in site emergency
preparedness
or
inconsistencies
with regulatory requirements
were noted.
(2)
Emer enc
Facilities
E ui ment
Instrumentation
and
Su
lies
The Technical
Support Center
(TSC) was inspected,
to include
annual radiation monitoring calibration records.
(See also
item 4.c below.)
Maintenance
records
and corrective action
requests
(CAR) were reviewed regarding
emergency
preparedness
equipment
and supplies.
Equipment
was verified as being in
calibration.
A report from the "Emergency
Preparedness
Tracking System,"
dated
May 12,
1992,
was reviewed to determine status of routine
emergency
planning maintenance
tasks.
A discussion of a
perceived
problem with response
to requests
on status of items
tracked
by this system is contained in the inspection report
for the previous routine emergency
inspection at MNP-2
(Inspection report 50-397/92-05,
dated
March 20, 1992, Section
2. c.(2)).
Although tasks
on the report were indicated
as being
"overdue," the licensee
indicated that they were in fact not
5
known to be overdue.
The
EP staff had simply not yet received
some of the task sheets
to verify that they were done.
In some
cases,
the report indicates
items 'as overdue,
which are in fact
not yet due.
For example,
a monthly task is indicated
by the
computer printout as overdue
by mid-month even. though the true
overdue date is the last day of the month.
In some cases,
'ocumentation that the tasks
were appropriately performed
on
time are not received
by the
EP staff until sometime in the
month following the due,date.
The licensee
indicated that the
tracking system
was "inherited" and they are not completely
satisfied with it.
The system
appears
to present
a problem
that
EP testing
and maintenance
tasks
could be missed without
the
EP staff being aware unti 1 long after due dates'r
suspense
dates.
The. licensee
indicated they would again review the
system
and seek
a better
way to track routine tasks.
(3)
Or anization
and
Mana ement Control
(a)
At the time of this inspection,
the licensee
was in the
early stages
of a major outage,
to last about ten weeks
until mid-July 1992.
The outage
was indicated
as having
some impact on virtually'll organizations
at the plant.
In emergency
planning .{EP), of twelve individuals on the
organization chart furnished
by the licensee;
seven
were
available full-time for their normal routine
EP functions.
Of the remainder;
one
was full-time,'with the outage
organization,
one
was two days
a week with the outage
organization,
two were engaged,for
the week in
revalidation of the plant simulator,
and one
was
on leave,
The licensee
indicated that this was having
some impact;
- however,
the necessary
functions were being performed.
(b)
Licensee
Open C.A.R. Report" 92-0001 indicated
a finding
that
PER
NUREG 0654 and Supply System
Emergency
Plan
4.3.2.3 - six Environmental
Field Team responders
are
required to be available to respond within one hour
to an alert or higher classification.
On January
14, 1992,
Supply System
emergency
responders
were contacted
by the Melita Automatic
Dialer
as part of a routine notification test.
Only
five Field Team members
were contacted.
During a
notification test
conducted
on February
13, 1992,
only three Field Team members
were contacted.
To address
this potential regulatory problem,
the licensee
recruited
and trained three
new team
members for call-out.
Two are trained health physicists.
As a result
the two
most recent drills Plarch
26 and April 27, 1992] have met
the six team
member requirement with no difficulty.
The
licensee is continuing to address
the potential
problem
'nd is considering recruiting even
more team members if
deemed appropriate.
The licensee
indicated that the
is being kept open for tracking.
Thi.s will be tracked
as
an inspection followup item for the next few routine
inspections
to insure that the team continues to meet
regulatory requirements.
(92-17-02)
(4)
~Trainin
(a)
(b)
A review of training records indicated that required
training for the emergency organization
was being
~
~
~
~
~
erformed, albeit with some
m>nor difficulties.
The
mergency Training Supervisor tracks training requirements
for the emergency organization at the site.
He makes
notifications of required training to the individuals
affected
and then conducts
the training.
In the event
an
individual misses'hee
scheduled training,
he is sent
a
notice of the fact and an attempt is made to reschedule
the training.
A copy of the notice is sent to the
individual
s supervisor,
who is responsible
under plant
procedures
to see that his subordinates
receive the
necessary
training.
The review of records indicated
several
individuals listed as "overdue" for some training
modules.
The worst case
noted
was
an individual who had
been sent five notices over a five month period.
In most
cases,
when individuals miss the first training session
and possibly followup sessions,
the training function
=
defaults to a one-on-one training. session
between the
Emergency Training Supervisor
an6 the individual
concerned.
In these
cases,
the individual misses
the
class
discussion
and quest>on
and answer sessions,
which
are also important elements of the education
process.
Another area
reviewed
was that of training documentation.
The WNP-2 Technical Training Manual indicates at Sectioi.
5.6.1.b.2 that
Fire Brigade Refresher Traininq in actual
fire-fighting practice is required
on an annual
basis,
It was noted in a review of the "Supply System
Personnel
qualification System Retraining Report'ated
May 12,
1992,
numerous fire brigade
members
were indicated
as
overdue for annual fire brigade continuing training.
This
report was listed as the "FILE: MASTER."
In a review of
the "Radwaste
Control
Room Log," which lists members of
the Plant
Emergency
Team
on each shift for the date of May
12, 1992, it was noted that of nine
names
selected
from
the three
team lists for that date,
only one of the nine
were indicated
as current in annual fire brigade training
on the master retraining report.
The remaining eight had
training past
due dates
from August 1991 through October
1991.
In an interview with the site Fire Marshal,
he
produced
documentation to confirm that the dates
on the
master training report were incorrect.
Training
Attendance
Records for August,
September',
and
November
1991 indicated that all of the fire brigade'embers
had
received the proper training.
He also provided
a printout
from a personal
data
base
he maintained
on fire brigade
training, which indicated that all fire brigade
members
had been properly trained
and requalified
on time and
before
due dates.
He could not account for the past
due
dates in the master training report; but indicated that
he
does
not rely on it in any respect for current
requal,ification status.
He prefers his
own data
base
wh)ch
he insures is current
and complete
as training and
retraining occur.
He uses this personal
data
base for
assigning
members to.the. site emergency
team,
not the
master training record.
These traininq observations
were reviewed with the licensee
during the exit meeting
on May 15,
1992.
(5)
Inde endent
and Internal
Reviews
and Audits
(a)
Annual Audit
The 1992 Annual Audit of the Emergency
~PP
2
2
IIPPdhdh
hdl ddt
t
yet conducted.
(b)
Licensee Drill and Exercise Criti ues
Licensee
emergency
preparedness
drill/exercise evaluation
report titled "DRILL 92-1,
REPORT
OF
PLAYER ACTIVITIES,
dated April 15,
1992,
was reviewed.
Player
and controller
comments critiquing the exercise
appeared
appropriate
and
offered several
suggestions
for improving emergency
planning and response.
d.
Licensee Initiatives
(1)
ualit
Action Team
( AT for the
0 erations
Su
ort Center
In NRC Inspection
Report
Number 50-397/91-02,
based
on
interviews with two
OSC director-designees, it was observed
that
~ ..based
on the results of the
OSC Director interviews,
the licensee
should consider whether corrective actions
are necessary
to ensure that the
OSC can
be effectively
managed
during an emergency.
Licensee
CAR Number 91-0002
was initiated to address
the
performance
issues.
A Quality Action Team
(QAT) was selected
to review the issues
and
make appropriate
recommendations
to
lant management.
The first meeting
was held on November 25,
991,
and the team is expected
to make its recommendations
prior to June
1992.
The
QAT has
focused it's 'information
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
athering in three areas:
Facilities, Organization
and
raining.
The licensee
indicated that the
Team report is in
draft and is expected to be completed
and finalized on
schedule.
(2)
Scenario
Generator
The licensee
provided
a project schedule for development of a
"plant specific exercise
scenario radiological data generation
computer
program."
The project was initiated in January
1992.
The scenario
generator
should
enhance
emergency
preparedness
training since it allows for.production of more realistic
radiological conditions'n the plant and will model the plant
source
term and plant systems.
As with the
QAT, the licensee
indicated that this project is on schedule for completion
as
planned.
f.
Onsite Followu
of Written Re orts of Nonroutine Events at Power
eac or
ac)
)
ses
The licensee
had
no emergency
events classified or declared
since
the previous routine emergency
preparedness
inspection.
The
licensee
had documented
the review of an incident of Harch 8, 1992,
wherein
a WNP-2 plant worker had been injured
The event
was reviewed
and the licensee's
determination
that the incident did not constitute
an emergency
event under
NRC
regulatory requirements
and guidance
appeared
appropriate
based
on
event circumstances.
3.
Follow-u
on. NRC Information Notice
NRC Information Notice (IN) 92-32,
dated April 29, 1992, Subject:
Problems Identified With Emergency Ventilation -Systems for Near-Site
(Within 10 Miles) Emergency Operations Facilities and Technical
Support
Center,
was addressed
to all holders of operating licenses for nuclear
power reactor.
The licensee
had not 'received
a copy of the
IN and was
provided one by the inspector.
The licensee
indicated that the notice
will be thoroughly reviewed in that both the
EOF and
TSC for WNP-2 are.
located within 10 miles of the site.
4.,
Follow-u
on Previous
Ins ection Findin
s
a.
0 en)
Follow-u
Item (91-33-01).
Emer
enc
Notification S stem
annwfn
as
ure ln
nnua
xercs se
During the 1991 Annual
Emergency
Exercise, it was noted at the
that the'n-line
Emergency Notification System
(ENS) communicator
, with the
NRC was unable to view status
boards
from his location and
the line was left unmanned
at. times
up to fifteen minutes while
gathering
requested
data.
This was contrary to 10 CFR 50.72(c)(3),
which indicates that "Each licensee shall, during the course of the
event:
Maintain an open,
continuous
communication
channel with the
NRC Operations
Center
upon request
by the NRC."
This request
had
, been
made
by the
NRG.
A review of this item during the previous
inspection determined that the licensee
has installed portable
telephones
for manning of the
ENS and
HPN during events.
Several
of
the
reviewed during this in'spection contained procedural
changes
to address, this item.
This item will be reviewed during the
1992 annual
emergency
preparedness
exercise.
b.
(Exercise Observation)
Dose
Pro 'ections for Future Offsite Releases
It was observed
..luring the 1991 Annual
Emergency
Exercise that
approximately*45 minutes prior to the termination of the exercise
fo)lowing discussions
with the
NRC Site
Team and Operations
Center
Staff, the Meteorology and Unified Dose Assessment
Center
(MUDAC)
staff performed
a dose
consequence
assessment
of a complete core
damage
scenario.
To perform this assessment,
the
MUDAC staff
utilized the core inventory of radionuclides
tabulated in Chapter
15
of the
FSAR and attempted to estimate
the response
of the
elevated'elease
point monitor.
Rather than
use the iterative process that
was actually used,
the
MUDAC staff should
have
had
a more efficient
method for estimating the offsite consequence
of a release
of lOOX
of the core inventory.
Such
a method would have facilitated
smoother interaction with the
NRC site team and operations
center
staff.
The licensee
indicated that they are looking at several
options to accomplish this type task and the most promising one will
be considered for implementation.
This item will be reviewed in the
1992 annual
exercise.
C.
(0 en)
Follow-u
Item (92-05-01).
The tour of the Technical
Support Center
(TSC) indicated that
~
reviously identified conditions were recurring.
NRC Inspection
eport
Number 50-397/91-02,
dated
February
19, 1991,
had indicated
that the
TSC did not appear in a state to be quickly and efficiently
converted to an emergency facility.
The inspector s had also
observed that there
was
a pool of standing water in the
instrument
room.
The licensee
determined that the water resulted
from a leaking relief valve on
a hot water heater
located in 'the
room.
The licensee's
review concluded that the condition was
a
safety concern
and raised the priority of the repair work.
10
It was noted
on this tour of the
TSC that
some desk clutter was
still evident in the actively used office areas,
but the
decision center area
appeared
cleared
and ready for use
as
an
emergency center.
The water heater relief valve was still leaking.
These observations
appeared
to indicate that
TSC emergency
readiness
may not have
been receiving appropriate attention
as
an emergency
facility.
Preparation
and activation of the
TSC will be observed
'during the 1992 annual
emergency exercise.
d.
(0 en)
Follow-u
Item (92-05-02);
One item identified by the licensee's
1991 annual audit is being
tracked
by NRC as
an inspection followup item (IFI).
The audit
report found that the Agreement Letter between the Washington Public
Power Supply System
and the State of Washington
Department of
Emergency
Preparedness
and,Response
had exp>red
and a replacement
letter had not yet been
approved.
Ouring this inspection the
licensee
indicated that the parties to the agreement
have set
a 90
day target date
as of the week of this inspection for execution of
the letter.
In that this is an emergency
plan requirement,
the item
wi 11
be tracked until an appropriate letter is promulgated.
r
Exit Intervi ew.
~ go(
On May 15, 1992, at the conclusion of the site visit
the inspector
met
with the licensee
representatives
identified in paragraph'
above to
summarize the scope
and the preliminary results of this inspection.
The inspector
reviewed the issues
and followup items discussed
in
paragraph
2 above
and the licensee
indicated that they would review
improvements
to their procedures
and performance.