IR 05000397/1988043
| ML17285A187 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 12/29/1988 |
| From: | Jim Melfi, Richards S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17285A185 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-88-43, NUDOCS 8901190011 | |
| Download: ML17285A187 (9) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Number Docket Number License Number Licensee:
50-397/88-43 50-397 NPF"21, Washington Public Power Supply System P.
0.
Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project No.
2 (WNP-2)
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site, Benton County, Washington Inspection conducted:
December 5 - December 9, 1988 Inspector:
Approved By:
J.
F. Melfi, Rea or spector S.
A. Richards, Chief, Engineering Section C~wc ~
Date igned l2 a9 8S Date Signed Ins ection Summar
Ins ection on December 5 - December
1988 Re ort No. 50"397/88-43 Areas Ins ected:
A routine, unannounced inspection of the licensee's calibration program as it applies to technical specification instruments at the Washington Nuclear Project No.
2 (WNP-2).
The inspection assessed the conformance of the calibration program at WNP-2 in meeting technical specitication requirements.
Followup items and Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
were also inspected, Inspection procedures 30703, 56700, 92701 and 92702 were used during this inspection.
Safet Issue Mana ement S stem SIMS Items:
No SIMS items were addressed in this inspection report.
S90tis00lS Sai229 PDR ADOCK 05000397
Results:
General Conclusions and S ecific Findin s:
The inspector found the licensee's program to calibrate technical specification required instrumentation to be adequate.
The licensee did not have an extensive backlog of calibrations to perform, nor were any calibrations overdue.
Violations and Deviations:
No violations or deviations were identified.
0 en Items Summar
No followup or unresolved items were opened during this inspection.
One licensee event report (2 revisions)
was closed (paragraph 3)
during this inspection.
One previous followup item remains open pending licensee action (paragraph 4).
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Washin ton Public Power Su
S stem
"C.
M. Powers, Plant Manager
- S.
L. McKay, Operations Manager
"S.
L. Washington, Lead Compliance Engineer
- G. J.
Freeman, Lead Plant IBC Engineer
"R.
L. Koenigs, Plant Technical Manager
"T.
W. Albert, Plant ILC Maintenance Engineer
"D.
R.
Kobus, Plant guality Assurance Manager
"A. G. Hosier, Plant Licensing Manager R.
Ray, I8C Supervisor D.
Ross, Mechanical Engineer F. Walton, Maintenance Engineer USNRC
- C. J.
Bosted, Senior Resident Inspector
~R.
C.
Sorenson, Resident Inspector
" Denotes those attending the exit meeting on December 9, 1988.
The and inspector also contacted licensee operators, engineers, technicians, other personnel during the course of the inspection.
2.
Calibration (56700)
Introduction This inspection assessed whether the licensee has developed and implemented a calibration program to assure that the plant instrumentation is in conformance with license requirements, licensee commitments, technical specifications, and industry guides and standards.
b.
'Calibration Fre uenc Review The inspector reviewed the calibration and channel functional test records for approximately 50K of the instruments for the technical specification (TS) systems of reactor protection (TS 3/4.3. 1),
emergency core cooling activation (TS 3/4.3.3),
and isolation activation (TS 3/4.3.2).
The licensee was maintaining these instruments in calibration within the specified time frames referenced in the technical specifications.
The inspector also reviewed the calibration records for approximately 20X of the instrumentation in the technical specification systems of reactor coolant (TS 3/4.4),
emergency core cooling (3/4.5),
and containment (TS 3/4.6).
The inspector found
that the licensee was maintaining the instruments selected within their technical specification calibration frequency.
Calibration Mitnessin and Test Documentation Review The inspector reviewed the test documentation and observed the work for the following technical specification surveillance procedures.
The control rod (CR). block was for the Average Power Range Monitors (APRMs), and the HPCS initiation is part of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS).
The technical specification, procedure number and title are listed below:
Technical S ecification Procedure Number Title 4.3.6.2:A, C,& D 4.3.6.2.A, C,& D 7.4. 3. 6.4. 1 7. 4. 3. 6. 4. 2 4. 3. 6. 2. A, C, & D 4.3.6.2.A, C,& D 4. 3. 6. 2. A, C, & D 4.3.3.1 7. 4. 3. 6. 4. 4 7. 4. 3. 6 ~ 4. 5 7.4. 3. 6.4. 6 7. 4. 3. 3. l. 53 4. 3. 6. 2. A, C, & D 7. 4. 3. 6. 4. 3 CR Block CH A; Upscale, Downscale CR Block CH B; Upscale, Downscale CR Block CH C; Upscale, Downscale CR Block CH D; Upscale, Downscale CR Block CH E; Upscale, Downscale CR Block CH F; Upscale, Downscale HPCS Initiation Drywell Pressure A & C - CFT/CC The test documentation for these survei llances was complete, with the prerequisites indicated, as-tound and as-left conditions recorded, and the procedural steps were initialed when completed.
The test equipment used was in calibration.
The technical personnel were knowledgeable and qualified on the procedures utilized for these calibrations.
For these technical specification requirements, the procedures noted that failure to complete the procedure or to meet the acceptance cr iteria in the procedure had to be referred to the shift supervisor.
The inspector noted that the acceptance criteria were met, the procedures completed and the as-left conditions recorded.
The inspector noted in the procedure that the APRM instruments were calibrated to certain voltage trip setpoints.
The actual setpoint varies over core life and is calculated by a computer program, to account for core burnup and core thermal power.
In discussions with the licensee, the inspector did not have any concerns with the setpoint calculation.
The inspector noted that the individual channels were bypassed during the surveillance so that an inadvertent scram would not occur.
The inspector also randomly reviewed other completed test documentation for completeness.
The reviewed documentation was complete with appropriate signoff Procedure Ade uac The inspector performed a review on the following technical specification Channel Calibration (CC) and Channel Functional Test (CFT) procedures for technical adequacy.
Technical S ecification Procedure Number Title 4.3.2.1 4.3.3.1 4.3.3. 1 4.3.2.1 and 4. 3. l.l. 6 7. 4. 3. 2. 1. 17 7.4. 3. 3. 1. 53 7. 4. 3. 3. 1. 51 7. 4. 3. 6. 4. 3 Isolation - MSL Pressure Low - Channels A & C - CFT/CC HPCS Initiation Drywell Pressure High A & C - CFT/CC HPCS Initiation Vessel Mater Level 2 (A & C) - CFT/CC Main Steam Line High Radiation Channel A-CC The inspector did not identify any inadequacies with the above procedures.
e.
Safet -Related Com onent Calibration There are instruments not addressed in the technical specifications, but which are associated with safety-related functions or systems.
The inspector did not review the calibration frequency of these instruments during this inspection.
However, the calibration frequency of instruments associated with post-accident monitoring instrumentation was addressed in NRC inspection report 50-397/88-19.
During the previous inspection, the inspectors found that all the instrumentation was in calibration.
The inspector also assessed the backlog of instrumentation calibration.
This effort revealed that the licensee did not have an extensive backlog, and no instrumentation was overdue for calibration.
The licensee was in the procees of combining several procedures into one procedure to reduce the amount of procedures and surveillances done.
The inspector did not identify where any calibrations were missed.
f.
Conclusions The licensee is maintaining their technical specfication instruments in calibration, with qualified personnel who are using approved procedures.
The licensee did not have a large backlog of instruments due for calibration.
3.
Licensee Event Re orts LERs (92703)
Closed LER 85-23
"10CFR50 A
endix 'R'able Fire Protection and Electrical Se aration " Revisions
1 and 2.
This LER and its revisions were issued concerning cable separation in trays.
The LER was issued on 4/16/85, and its revisions were issued on 7/ll/85 and 9/9/85 respectively, as new information became availabl The LERs resulted from field inspections which identified various electrical 'cable and cable tray configurations which compromised the cable separation criteria of IEEE 384-1974 (in air, 5 feet vertically or 3 feet horizontally)
~
The cable trays which were separated only by air could be made to conform,to the separation criteria by the installation of cable tray covers or its equivalent.
There were no appendix 'R'able trays addressed in this LER, although the LER title indicates otherwise.
The licensee committed in the LER to do a gA evaluation on cable separation, training on cable separation and the adequacy of previous verification programs.
The licensee also had WYLE laboratories perform a test report on electrical separation, and was implementing design changes to the cable trays to meet the separation criteria.
This LER has been inspected previously in NRC inspection reports 50-397/85-30, 50-397/85-37, and 50-397/86-21.
The issues of these LERs that were not addressed in the three previous inspection reports are the following:
(1)
Review of the WYLE test report.
(2)
Examination of the design changes.
(3)
Verification of the completion of corrective actions which include:
a) The LER referred to a gA evaluation on electrical separation is'sues.
b) Training was to be given to gA/gC and engineering personnel on the licensee's requirements on electrical separation.
The inspector reviewed the WYLE test report (Test Report No. 48067-02),
which was conducted to verify compliance at WNP-2 with IEEE 384-1974,
"IEEE Trial-Use Criteria for Separation of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits."
This trial-use standard allows the use of testing and analyses to justify separation of less than the spatial requirements of sections 5. 1.3 and'5. 1.4 of the IEEE standard.
The report looked at control and power cables and concluded that only power cables could cause a fire problem.
The licensee used the results of th'e WYLE report and only performed corrective action on those trays with power cables.
- Based on the results of the WYLE report, the licensee also limited the corrective action to cover trays with only power cables.
Based on the inspector's review of the WYLE report, and discussions with the licensee, the results of the report seem appropriate.
The licensee implemented Design Change Packages (DCPs) 85-0352-0A,
-OC, and-OD to install cable tray coverings.
The inspector reviewed DCPs 85-0352-0A,
-OC, and-OD for completeness, signoffs, and closure by the licensee.
The licensee was initially planning on installing thermolag for providing the required separation, but decided on installing 3M thermal blankets due to easier implementation.
The inspector did not have any concerns with the design change packages after his review.
The inspector toured several locations where these DCPs were implemented, and found the insulation installed as describe The inspector reviewed the gA evaluation, dated 12/13/85, (Feldman to Powers)
and did not identify any concerns.
The inspector also reviewed training records from classes given by the licensee on electrical separation issues.
The training on electrical separation was complete to the various licensee groups.
The inspector verified that the engineering group is aware of requirements to limit the number and size of cables for a tray that is covered.
A covered cable tray cannot carry as many power cables, since it is insulated and higher temperatures will result in a tray leading to possible insulation degradation.
The licensee has developed a
calculation methodology (Calculation 02.06.20,
"Cable Ampacity Verification Calculations for Conduit and Tray") for derating a cable tray.
The engineers were aware of this calculation.
Based on the inspector's review, this LER is closed.
4.
Follow-u Items (92701)
0 en) 88-19-01
"Labelin of Status of Standb Power Indicators" This item was opened during the Regulatory Guide 1.97 inspection at MNP-2.
The Regulatory Guide 1.97 inspection assessed the licensee's post-accident instrumentation.
The Status of Standby Power instruments are those control room indicators that provide the operator with information on the availability of emergency power sources (e.g.
emergency batteries, diesels).
The inspectors had a concern with the labeling of these indicators.
At the time of this inspection, the licensee had not significantly progressed with this item.
This item will remain open pending the licensee's review of the labeling of these indicators, and the NRC's review of what actions they may take.
On December 9,
1988 an exit meeting was held with the licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1.
The inspector summarized the inspection scope and findings as described in this report.