IR 05000397/1978011
| ML17272A308 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 01/08/1979 |
| From: | Bishop T, Haynes R, Vorderbrueggen NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17272A307 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-78-11, NUDOCS 7902260034 | |
| Download: ML17272A308 (21) | |
Text
U, S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT.
N 50 397/78 1 1 50-397
REGION V
License No.
CPPR-93 Safeguards Group Washington Public Power Supply System Licensee:
P. 0.
Box 968 e.
n'ichland, Washington 99352 Faciyit Name Wash'i ngton Nucl ear Prospect No.
(WNP-2)
WNP-.2 Site, Benton County, Washington Inspecci~ccndncceg:
N>>e>><< ~'i->> ~ >>>>
Inspectors:
T.
W. Bishop R
ctor Inspector L
E. Vorderbrueggen, R
r Inspector G
Hernandez, Rea or Inspector
'pproved By:
R.
C. Haynes,
'odect Section, Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Summary:
l 87 Date Signed 8-7 Da e Signed 8 7 Date Signed Date Signed Ins ection on November 14-17, 1978 Re ort No. 50-397/78-11
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inspectors of construction activities including:
observations of safety-related piping work and review of quality records; observations of structural steel and support welding and review of quality records; observations of electrical cable installations and review of quality records; observations of containment penetrations and review of quality records; licensee's action to correct a design error in the SGTS; follow-up on previous inspection findings; and tour of plant areas.
The inspection involved 60 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in the eight areas inspected.
q 90226 0,05 (
RV Form 919(2)
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Washin ton Public Power Su
S stem
- D. L. Renberger, Assistant Directo'r, Technology
- C. R.
Edwards, Yendors/Audits 'Manager
~A. D. Kohler, WNP-2 Project Manager
- J. Janus, Construction Manager
- D. L. Howard, Operational QA Manager
~A.
M. Sastry, WNP-2 Project Quality Assurance Manager
- J.
D. Martin, Startup and Operations Manager
- K.. D.
Cowan, Project Engineering Manager
- J.
R. Holder, WNP-2 Assistant Superintendent
- G. K. Afflerbach, Supervising Test Engineer
- J. F. Peters, Startup Administrative Supervisor E. L. Stevens, Quality Assurance Engineer, Civil R. Schutte.
Mechanical Engineer A. Shearer, Quality Assurance Engineer, Mechanical Burns 5 Roe, Inc.
- R. Root, Deputy Project Manager
- M. J. Parise, Deputy Project QA Manager
- M. A. Lacey, Resident Project Engineer
- G. Harper, Technical Support Manager L. Akers, Sr.
Welding Engineer H. Tuthill, Sr. Project Quality Assurance Engineer D. Reader, Lead Quality Assurance Engineer - Mechanical P.
Massman, Sr. Quality Assurance Engineer - Electrical R. Keating, Supervising Metallurgical Engineer G. Hudak, Quality Assurance Engineer R. Carmichael, Lead Quality Assurance Engineer - Electrical H. Rapp, Civil Engineer I. Alexandrow, Mechanical Engineer WSH/Boecon/Bovee and Grail/GERI E. A. Harrington, General Project Manager A. Larson, Quality Assurance Manager G. Durkee, Quality Engineer P.
Young, QC Inspection Supervisor D. Mitchell, Lead QC Inspector
.
P. Legrand, Welder Pittsbur h-Des Moines (PDM)
F. Lynch, Quality Control Supervisor
fl F
e,
e 1.
Persons Contacted (continued)
-2-Fischback/Lord J. Collins, Quality Assurance Manager H. Zimmerman, Quality Assurance Engineer F.
Madden, Quality Assurance Inspector K. Emanuelson, Quality Assurance Inspector D. Lauro, Lead Inspector Peter Kiewit Sons (PKS)
C. Ferguson, QA Manager L. Lindman, QA Engineer B.
F.
Shaw Com an H. Carlton, Project Manager R.
Damato, Assistant Project Manager J.
Bowser, QA Supervisor C. Smith, QC Inspector
- Denotes those present at exit interview.
In addition, Nr.
G. Hanson, Senior Project, Engineer, Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council of the state of l<ashington attended the exit interview.
2.
Construction Status
.
As of November 1, 1978, the licensee considered the construction of NNP-2 project to be 725 complete.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s
a ~
(Closed)
Open item (397/78-09/02):
Pittsburg-Des Moines (PDM) procedures do not address the calibration or calibration check frequency for torque wrenches on Skidmore-Milhelm bolt tension'iridicatipg devices.
A review of Revision 2 to Procedure 34117 showed that the calibration method and frequency for the subject torque wrenches was now documented.
Calibration records were reviewed and found satisfactory.
This item is close O.
t I.
I
(Closed)
Unresolved item (397/78-10/04):
Flexible metallic electrical conduit is used for safety-related cable applications contrary to information presented in the FSAR.
Burns and Roe has initiated action to revise the FSAR to state the specific applications of flexible conduit used at WNP-2.
This action is documented in Burns
Roe memorandum No. SgA-78-507 of November 16, 1978.
The inspector has no further questions on this item.
(Closed)
Unresolved item (397/78-10/02):
Forging bur sts were identified in A325 high strength bolts used in the reactor building superstructure.
The A325 bolts identified in the last NRC inspection have been removed and replaced, and documented on NCR No. 207-3892.
As of November 15, 1978, the licensee had completed a 100K visual reinspection of approximately 16,000 bolts.
Eighty bolts were identified as questionable.
These bolts will be removed.
Any indication which is on the bearing surface and any bolt with the chamfer circle broken is considered rejectable.
A secondary program to randomly pull and inspect an additional 160 bolts is planned.
The inspector examined approximately 500 bolts in various locations on the west and north walls of the Reactor Building to verify the adequacy of the reinspection program.
One bolt with a forging burst was identified by the inspector.
This bolt was marked by the licensee for removal.
The bolt storage areas were checked to assure that the re-jected bolts were being properly segregated and controlled.
The inspector ascertained that the action taken and planned by the licensee is appropriate to correct the condition.
This item is closed.
(Open) Unresolved item (397/78-10/03):
Information was not available to verify that clamps used to support rigid electrical conduit will perform their intended function during a seismic event.
Since the last inspection, the licensee obtained seismic acceleration information from one clamp manufacturer (Unistrut)
and has requested a written reply from the designer regarding the seismic adequacy of their equipmen The licensee provided selected conduit clamp seismic calcu-lations to the inspector.
The calculations had been developed by Nuclear Power Systems, Inc.,
and considered clamps manu-factured by both Unistrut and
"KORNS."
The inspector noted that the calculations did not address the seismic adequacy of the friction connections at the clamp-channel interface fol Unistrut, or the clamp-pipe or clamp-angle iron interfaces for
"KORNS" assemblies.
The inspector, requested the following information be made available for NRC review:
(1)
Identification of the various types of friction joints employed in electrical equipment seismic restraints at lJNP-2.
(2)
Verification that each type of friction joint can adequately perform its intended function during a seismic event.
The licensee agreed to assemble the requested information for NRC examination during a subsequent inspection.
(Open) Unresolved item (397/78-10/05):
Potential cable separation problem was observed for safety division 2 and
wireways below control room panel No.
P680.
Cable separation requirements are identified on design drawings.
However, to assure that cable separation is accomplished in accordance with requirements, a-new Project Engineering Directive (PED No. 218-E-0460 of 10/10/78)
has been developed which details quality Class I cable separation requirements.
The inspector was advised that the 218 contractor will reinspect all installed quality Class I cables and will inspect future installations to assure compliance with the new directive.
The inspection program for this purpose has yet to be defined.
This item will remain open pending NRC examination of the planned cable separation inspection program.
(Open)
Unresol ved item (397/78-02/02):
Installed guality Class 1 equipment was not maintained in a clean and protected condition.
RHR, LPCS, and HPCS equipment items were not protected from corrosion.
The inspectors observed that adequate actions had been taken to assure the RHR, LPCS, and HPCS pumps are protected from corrosion.
Other equipment maintenance and protection activities were not specifically examined during the current inspection.
However, the general housekeeping conditions observed indicate additional actions are necesssary.
See Paragraph 10 of this report for detail (Open)
Item 397/78-10/08:
Possible. concrete voids in sacri-ficial shield.
The licensee identified several locations in the completed shield structure that were susceptible to formation of voids when the interior concrete was placed.
In order to locate any voids that may be present, the licensee studied the practi-cabilityy of the various examination techniques that could be emp'loyed.
This included infra-red scanning, gamma scanning, neutron scanning, sub-sonic and ultrasonic testing, and radio-graphic examination.
The licensee concluded that the most practical approach was to develop a scanning technique employing a neutron source.
The licensee currently plans to determine the presence of any voids in the shield prior to reactor startup.
This item will be followed during subsequent in-spections.
(Closed)
Item 397/78-01/01:
An interview with a former contractor employee disclosed the possible use of the practice of cold springing pipe to obtain proper fitup for welding.
This subject was discussed with the piping contractor's gA manager.
The gA manager stated that the general superinten-dent has repeatedly emphasized to his foremen that cold springing of pipe is not permitted and dismissal would result if the practice is used.
The gA manager also stated that his gC inspectors are continually cautioned to be alert for pipe-fitters attempting to cold spring pipe into position.
He pointed out that the Burns
Roe installation specification specifies that only "hot" bending of pipe is permitted and must be done only with their express approval and under con-trolled conditions.
The inspector did not observe nor find evidence of cold springing of pipe and had no further'uestions on this matter at this time.
(Open)
Item 397/78-07/02:
Removal of arc strikes from piping.
The piping contractor's
"Punch List Procedure" is currently'cheduled to be issued on Hovember 20, 1978.
This procedure is to be followed f'r documenting and closing out discrepancies observed during final inspection of systems prior to release for startup.
This procedure is to be approved by Burns
Roe and will include inspections for arc strikes according to the.
contractor's representative.
This item remains open pending
, issuance and implementation of the punch list procedur ~,
l
,d
4.
El ectrical Cable Installation a ~
Observations of Work and Work Activities b.
Electrical cable installation activities were observed.
This included an examination of the following items for compliance with approved procedures and drawings:
cable tray grounding and fastener installation; conduit installation and supports; cable routing, safety division separation, and protection; cable terminations; crimping tool calibration; and control of nonconforming conditions.
The inspector observed the in-stallation of four control cables, and one power cable, all guality Class I.
In addition, cognizant personnel were inter-viewed regarding cable pulling, inspection procedures and control of crimping tools.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified; however, the inspector observed that additional action is needed.to improve the protection of installed cables.
While tracing cable 3HPCS-0344 through the reactor building, the inspector observed that welding rod and rod stubs had been discarded in a cable tray containing guality Class I cable.
Craftsmen of the HVAC contractor were welding in the general area, using weld rod similar to that found in the trays.
Efforts had been made to protect some of the cables as evidenced by tarps in some trays.
However, the practice of discarding weld rod, or other debris, on top of cable is of concern.
Licensee representatives stated that action would be taken to assure installed equipment is properly protected.
This subject will be examined further in conjunction with licensee's actions
~
to improve the overall housekeeping at WNP-2.
(397/78-11/Ol)
Review of ualit Records The inspector examined the quality records associated with five cables for conformance with the licensee's procedures.
The records included cable manufacturers'est data, receiving inspection records, installation. records, and one noncon-formance report.
The records were found to be complete.
No items of noncompliance or deviations wer e identified.
5.
~5f
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Observation of Work and Work Activities On the spray ring header in spray pond lA, the inspector.
examined completed field weld 20-6 joining spool pieces 20-SW22-2-6 and 20-SW22-2-7.
Also, field weld 18-6 joining spool
pieces 18-SH22-2-5 and 18-SlJ22-2-6 in the 18-inch supply line from service water pump house 1B to spray ring header lA was examined.
Workmanship was acceptable and in accordance with ASME Section III, Class 3 requirements.
lJelding fit-up activities were also observed for field weld 18-10 joining spool piece 18-SlJ22-2-10 to the 20 x 18 eccentric reducer on header ring lA entrance segment 20-SH22-2-1.
In addition, the gC inspection of completed fit-up of spools 20-SH22-2-9 and 20-SH22-2-10 for field weld 20-9 in spray header lA was observed.
The inspection checkoff list called for in the inspection procedure was being used by the gC inspector.
Also, the NRC inspector measured the root gap and interior alignment of the fit-up of field weld 20-9 mentioned above and verified that the mismatch did not exceed the specified maxi-mum tolerance of 3/32-inch.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
The inspector checked the fit-up of field weld No.
(shown on Isometric Drawing RRC 568-1) connecting the 12-inch RHR return line to recirculation pump No.
1 discharge line (System RRC 7-45).
The material was the specified ASTM SA 312-Type 304 stainless steel, the welding requirements were as specified for ASME Section III, Class 1, and the joint was undergoing argon purge with the ER 308 consumable insert tacked in place pr'eparatory to the start of welding.
The work was-being performed in accordance with the licensee's requirements and commitments to the NRC.
'.
Review of ualit Records 6.
Pi e
The inspector examined the records pertaining to the welds identified in Paragraph G.a above for conformance with the licensee's procedures.
Included were filler metal withdrawal slips-, manufacturer's spool sheets, work traveler sheets, weld procedure and welder qualification records, gC inspection checklists, and NDE reports.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Su orts and Restraints a ~
Observation of Work and Work Activities The inspector examined pedestal supports 8A-lA-7 and 8A-lA-8 for spray ring header 1A.
At the time of the inspection, Embeco grout'as being placed under the support plates.
Following grout surface finishing, electric blankets were put
4 e
in place and energized for cold weather protection.
The inspector returned approximately two hours later and noted the temperatIIre of the support pedestals just above the blankets to be
F.
The inspector also examined numerous completed welds associated with the pedestals and their cross-bracing.
The work was governed by ASHE Section III, Subsection NF.
l<orkmanship was found to be acceptable.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
The contractor initially experienced a weld distortion problem with'the fabrication of the saddle supports that are located on top of the pedestals and support the 20-inch ring header.
The inspector discussed this problem with the Burns 5 Roe senior welding engineer.
The supports are fabricated from ASTH A36 carbon steel plate 1-inch thick with the 180 saddle member 3/8-inch thick.
The distortion was a severe bowing of the two end plates which serve as bolting flanges for the pedestal diagonal braces.
The distortion was due to residual welding stresses in the large, heavily restrained segments which make up the support assembly.
The problem was resolved by bolting a restrainer plate to each end plate prior to commencing welding of the assembly, accompanied by a minor change in the welding sequence.
The inspector examined a
typical problem saddle support and several other support assemblies in various stages of completion in the fabrication shop.
l<elding of the assemblies in the shop appeared good and there was no evidence of distortion in any of the completed units.
b.
Review of ualit Records The inspector examined the records pertaining to the 7/8-inch bolts which anchor the pedestals listed in Paragraph 6.a above to the spray pond bottom concrete surface.
The records docu-mented the embedment depth (4-inches minimum) and torque values of the hold-down nuts (165-210 ft.lb. range).
Ho items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Structural Steel and Su orts ~lleldin a e Review of ual it Im 1 ementin Procedures The inspector reviewed the following Peter Kiewit Sons'rocedures and specifications to ascertain compliance with PSAR and AllS Dl. 1 requirements:
(1)
CP-34, Revision 1, Visual Weld Inspection (2)
CP-37, Revision 2, Welding Procedure (3)
Specification 170, Revision 1, Welding and NDE for Building Construction and Structural Application The procedures were found to be consistent with requirements.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Observation of Work and Work Activities C.
Two areas of structural steel welding outside of containment were examined during this inspection.
The areas selected were the Sampling and Analyzer room at the 548'evel and the CRD platform area at the 522'evel.
In both areas, welds were examined for compliance to requirements" of AWS Dl.l.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
The inspectors observed A325 bolts used for fit-up of the structural steel which had not been removed.
According to a licensee representative, an engineering decision had been made to leave the bolts in place after welding had been completed.
An examination of bolts in both areas revealed that some bolts had not been torqued.
The licensee representatives indicated that they would investigate this matter and take appropriate action to assure safety-related equipment below the structures would not be damaged by a falling bolt or nut.
This item will be re-examined during a subsequent inspection (397/78-11/02).
Review of ualit Records guality records relative to completed welds observed in the Sampling and Analyzer and CRD platform areas were unavailable for review.
A Peter Kiewit Sons'epresentative stated the records could not be located, although the welds had been inspected and accepted.
NCR No.
206A-3537 was issued to document this situation and a program was started to reinspect the welds and establish replacement records.
This item is un-resolved and will be examined further during a subsequent inspection (397/78-11/03).
8.
Containment Electrical Penetrations The inspector examined four Westinghouse cannister-type penetra-tions, Nos.
103A, B, C and D, that were in the final stages of installation.
The procedures, nonconformance reports, material
t
-10-receiving reports and'nspection reports relating to.these electrical penetrations were reviewed for compliance with the licensee's requirements.
Iield records, welder and inspector qualification for the work performed on the pressure retaining welds were also reviewed.
During review of the receiving inspection records, it was noted that two of the checklists did not have all of the required attrib-utes checked off, although the form was signed off as completed.
The licensee stated that this matter would be investigated and appropriate action taken.
This item will be re-examined during a
subsequent inspection (397/78-11/04).
Moisture Over load of Standb Gas Treatment S stem (SGTS)
50.55 e
Item By letter dated August 18, 1977, the licensee informed Region V of the details regarding a design error which if not corrected could have resulted in a moisture overload of the SGTS.
The original design did not compensate for the additional reactor building atmosphere moisture which could, result from fuel pool boiling (following a SSE).
The excess moisture would result in a reduced reactor building negative pressure.
degrading its effectiveness as a secondary containment for fission products.
To correct the error, the licensee is modifying the SGTS to include cooling coils which will condense the water vapor, assuring design conditions are achieved.
The required size of the cooling coils will be affected by the amount of fuel in storage.
The licensee is currently modifying the fuel storage rack design to accommodate high density storage racks.
The sizing of the cooling coils will be completed in conjunction with the higher density fuel storage modification.
The inspector verified that the licensee has established the ad-dition of cooling coils as a design requirement and has included this in the commitments control system.
The details of-design, installation, and testing have been incorporated into their routine systems for accomplishing these activities.
The inspector ascertained that the specified additional action would adequately rectify the existing condition.
Plant Tour The inspectors walked through various areas of the plant to observe
'activities in progress and to examine the general state of cleanli-ness and housekeeping.
The inspectors observed numerous unrestrained gas cylinders, damaged protective tarps, and excess wood scaffolding and support steel at the 606 ft. elevation of the reactor building.
At other levels of the reactor building, the inspectors observed
-11-poorly controlled staging of pipe support and cable tray materials.
As noted in Paragraph 4 of this report, weld rod and rod stubs were found discarded in trays containing guality Class I electrical cable.
These observations were discussed in the exit interview with the licensee and his representatives (see below).
11.
Exit Interview At the conclusion of the inspection, a meeting was held with
. licensee and Burns 5 Roe representatives denoted in Paragraph 1.
The activities covered during the inspection and observations and findings of the inspectors were discussed.
The i'nspectors noted that additional actions appear necessary in the area of house-keeping.
Licensee. representatives stated that immediate action would be taken on this and other items identified during the current inspectio e
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