IR 05000397/1978010
| ML17272A263 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia, 07901024  |
| Issue date: | 11/21/1978 |
| From: | Bishop T, Narbut P, Vorderbrueggen NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17272A253 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-78-10, NUDOCS 7901240339 | |
| Download: ML17272A263 (29) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY C01I111ISSIOH OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCE11ENT
REGION V
Report No 50-397/78-10 Docket No.'icense No.
Safeguards Group Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352 Facil ity Name.
Washington Nucl ear Project No.
(WNP-2)
Inspection at.
WNP-2 Site, Benton County, Washington Inspection uc
.
October 24-27, 1978
/
Inspectors:
T.
W. Bisho
,
Rea or Inspector E. Vorderbrueggen, Re r Inspector
.i. M~1 P.
P. Narbut Reactor Inspector Il zD/lp)
Date Signed Dat S>gned ii 2o 7b Date Signed Ir
. 0. Elin, Reactor Inspector Date Signed Approved By:
~I VP R. C. Hayne ef, Projects Section, Reactor Date Signed Constr uc and Engineering Support Br anch Summary:
Ins ection on October 24-27, 1978 Re ort No. 50-397/78-10
~AI td:R td,dt p tt by tt tbdt p t of construction activities including:
observations of structural steel work and work activities and review of quality records; electrical cable installation
~ gA implementing procedures; safety related piping installation and review of qual ity r ecords; saf ety r el ated component instal 1 ation QA impl ementing pr ocedures, observations of work and work activities, and review of quality records; review of licensee action to provide missile protection for diesel generators; follow-up on previous inspection findings; and tour of plant areas.
The inspection involved 100 inspector-hours onsite by four NRC inspectors.
Results:
One item of noncompliance was identified in the 12 areas inspected 7Infraction - structural bo1ting, paragraph 4.a).
7 901 240 339
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IE:V Form 219 (2)
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Washin ton Public Power Su
S stem
- D
- C. R.
- A. D.
- J. C.
- A. M.
- J. D.
- D. C.
S. L.
E. L.
Renberger, Assistant Director, Generation 5 Technology Edwards, Quality Assurance Division Manager, Acting Kohler, WNP-2 Project Manager Janus, WNP-2 Constr'uction Manager
'astry, WNP-2 Project Quality Assurance Manager Martin, Startup and Operations Manager Timmins, Project Engineering Manager, Acting Washington, WNP-2 Quality Assurance Engineer Stevens, WNP-2 Quality Assurance Engineer Burns 5 Roe, Inc.
- R. Root, Deputy Project Manager
- M. J. Parise, Deputy Project QA Manager
- M. A. Lacey, Resident Project Engineer G. Harper, Technical Support Manager H. Tuthill, Senior Project Quality Assurance Engineer D. Reader, Lead Quality Assurance Engineer - Mechanical.
P. Massman, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer - Electrical R. Keating, Supervising Metallurgical Engineer G. Hudak, Quality Assurance Engineer WSH Boecon/Bovee and Grail/GERI E. A. Harrington, General Project Manager A. Larson, Quality Assurance Manager
,G. Durkee, Quality Engineer Pittsbur h-Des Moines PDM R. McMahan, Quality Assurance Manager B. Shea, Quality Assurance Inspector F. Lynch, Quality Control Supervisor Fischback/Lord J. Collins, Quality Assurance Manager H. Zimmerman, Quality Assurance Engineer D. Lauro, Quality Assurance Inspector
- Denotes those present at exit intervie ~
.
2.
Construction Status As of October 1, 1978, overall completion of the WNP-2 project was considered by the licensee to be 71%.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection. Findin s a ~
Licensee response to the following items of noncompliance was examined:
(1)
(Open)
Noncompl iance (397/78-03/01 ):
t3odifications had been accomplished on pipe supports without the required approval.
(2)
(Open)
Noncompliance (397/78-03/02):
Pipe supports were not installed in accordance with prescribed'nstructions, procedures, and drawings.
(3)
'(Open)
Noncompliance (397/78-03/03):
Inspections of pipe supports were not adequately performed.
(4)
(Open)
Noncompliance (397/78-03/04):
Nonconforming conditions existing in accepted pipe supports were not documented and processed in accordance with established procedures.
(5)
(Open)
Noncompl iance (397/77-07/01 ):
Pipe support quality records were deficient as evidenced by incom-plete checklists, missing NOE records and weld filler material withdrawal forms, and lack of traceability between welds, welders and gC inspectors.
Licensee response was summarized in WPPSS letters Nos.
G02-78-91 of. Harch 10, 1978, and 602-78-217 of August 31, 1978.
The programmatic revisions, retraining commitments,'nd nonconformance documentations were examined during the current, and previous, NRC inspections and were found satis-factory. It is noted that the response included a commit-ment to perform three levels of inspection on all pipe supports until confidence has be'en established in the con-tractors'irst level inspection program..
Implementation effectiveness of the committed actions was examined during the current inspection by independent inspection and records review of ten (10) completed pipe supports.
Seven of the ten supports inspected were found to be in compliance'with applicable drawings, procedures, and codes.
The following items were identified on the remaining three supports:
RHR-216.
Support detail drawing specifies a double sided fillet weld for attaching the horizontal angle iron to the vertical I-beam.
One side of one angle flange had not been welded, contrary tq drawing require-ments.
Subsequent to the NRC inspection, licensee representatives provided data indicating that the li-censee's MNP-2 215 Task Force had identified the lack of weldment during their third level inspection.
It was not clear why the contractor's records for RHR-216 failed to reflect the licensee's finding.
This item is unresolved, pending further licensee investigation.
RCIC-6.
Two undersized bolts (1/2" vice 5/8") were installed as load bearing bolts.
One pipe clamp bolt was loose and none of the threaded fasteners were equipped with locking devices.
During the inspection, licensee representatives provided data indicating the WNP-2 215 Task Force had identified the lack of locking devices as a generic issue and were separately review-ing this problem.'ubsequent to the inspection, licensee representatives reported, by telephone, that second and third level inspections had not been performed on this support.
The NRC inspector had been previously advised that the "completed" record packages in the contractors vault had been subjected to all three levels of inspec-tion.
The inspector selected the ten supports for examin-ation based on this information.
RCIC-6 nonconformances and the subject of work completion status control is considered unresolved and will be examined in a subse-quent in'spection.
HS-117.
Two welds connecting a reinforcing plate (pc. 14)
to the tube steel (pc. 8) may have not been inspected, as evidenced by lack of assignment of weld numbers and no inspection records.
In addition, records were not imme-diately available to identify the weld filler material used to make the welds.
Based on the results of the current NRC inspection, it appears that additional actions are required to assure all pipe supports and associated quality records fully meet applicable require--
ments.
The subjects of pipe support fabrication, installation, inspection and documentation remain open and will be examined in a subsequent inspection.
b.
(Closed)
Open Item (50-397/78-02):
Cable tray installation was deficient in that several trays were observed with incomplete fastener,
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,
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d.
Approximately 500 feet of Division 3 cable trays were examined in detail.
Other safety related electrical cable trays were observed at random.
No cases of missing or improperly secured bolts or fasteners were noted.
Fischback/Lord's cable tray instaTlation and inspection activities appear satisfactory.
This item is closed.
(Closed )
Open Item (397/78-07/01):
Undefined inspection program. for quencher tower concrete anchors..
The inspector examined the approved Revision 8 of PP-16713-1 for the installation of anchor bolts in the quencher-tower base plates.
The procedure was noted to contain appropriate provisions for inspection of the anchor bolts including the torque value (550-foot pounds) specified for the bolts.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (397/77-05/02):
A number of weld joint offsets (some as great as 1/4 inch) were noted in some flanges of vertical tee stiffeners inside the containment at the 450-foot elevation.
e.
The approved PDM procedure for correcting the flange misalignment of the WT8 x 18 vertical stiffeners was examined by the inspector.
Forty-one (41) flange joints have been identified for repair.
The procedure specifies the addition of weld filler metal using previously approved welding pro-cedures followed by grinding as. required to obtain a 3:1 taper.
This is in accord with the governing Paragraph HE-4232 of ASME Section III, Division 1.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (397/77-05/01):
Circumferential crack in concrete horizontal su~face at the 446 foot eleva-tion inside the containment wetwell.
The planned resolution of this situation is contained in the approved revision of Specification 2800-234, Special-Decontaminable Coatings for the Suppression Chamber.
Sur-face preparation of all steel and concrete surfaces is to be done by sandblasting, followed by cleanup by vacuuming and airblasting.
All cracks which are then evident and determined to be other than tight surface cracks will be filled with a sand/mortar.
grout mix or Hu-Klad 110 AA epoxy.
The coating
"system" is then applied which utilizes fiber-glass cloth, hand-worked into the base coat (1/16" to 3/16")
of Nu-Klad 110 AA at the concrete/steel interfaces, with a
,
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final 10 mil coating of Amercote 90 epoxy-resin.
This
"system," which is a minor modification of'ne which has passed'the standard ANSI 101.2 test for withstanding the DBA environment, will also be subjected to the ANSI 101.2 qualification test.
The licensee has engaged the services of Ken Tator Associates for this testing effort.
This item is considered closed.
Open)
Open Item (397/78-09/02):
Pittsburgh-Des Moines PDM) procedures do not address the calibration or calibra-tion check frequency for torque wrenches or Skidmore->lilhelm bolt tension indicating device.
Licensee and Burns 5 Roe representatives provided the inspector data from Skidmore-1lilhelm suggesting recal ibra-tion of their tension indicating devices at one year or-six month intervals, depending on use.
Licensee repre-sentatives stated that they have established a calibration frequency of six months for the indicator and weekly for inspecting torque wrenches.
These requirements, however, have not been documented.
Licensee representatives stated that action would be taken to document these requirements.
This item remains open pending completion of documentation.
(Closed)
Open Item (397/78-09/03):
PDM has accepted bolting materials based on the vendors stamp of confor-mance.
Records of audits establishing validity of the conformance stamp were not immediately available for NRC r eview.
Since the last NRC inspection, the contractor has determined that the bolts were accepted based on chemical and physical data reports.provided by the vendor, rather than solely on the stamp of conformance.
These records of tests were exam-ined by the NRC inspector and found to be satisfactory.
The inspector has no further questions on this matter.
(Closed)
Open Item (397/78-09/04):
Control of PDM noncon-formance (NCR) reports.
PDM has reorganized their NCR control system and established a control log which indicates the status of all NCRs.
The insPector examined the control log and verified the log re-flected NCRs.
The controls appear adequate.
This item is close i
-6-(Closed)
Open Item (397/78-03/06):
HPPSS'ethod for maintaining cognizance over comnitmenis for future actions, resulting from NRC Bulletins and Circulars, has not been formal ized.
Responsibilities for tracking corr'mitments initiated in the 10 CFR 50 and 10, CFR 21 cycle and the coordination of IE Bulletins/Circulars has been assumed by WPPSS Engineering Department.
The tracking system is identified in WPPSS gA Procedure No. 27, Rev. 4; and an inter -office memorandum dated August 31, 1978, from C. Romine to W. Stockdale.
In addition, a proposed Engineering Department Instruction (EDI 1.3, Rev. 0) will identify detail processing proce-dures for NRC Bulletins and Circulars.
The above documents were examined by the inspector and found satisfactory, ex-cept in the area of reporting 50.55(e)
items.
It was noted that the documents required the reports to be sent to the, Director of the NRC Regional Office, but made no reference to forwarding a copy of each 50.55(e) report to the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C.
A check by the licensee established that WPPSS has not been forwarding copies of 50.55(e) reports to the Director of.
OIE.
Licensee representatives agreed to provide a copy of all past 50.55(e) reports for the WNP-2 project to the Director of OIE and include this requirement in their procedures.
The inspector has no further questions on this item.
(Open)
Unresolved Item (397/78-02/02):
Installed guality Class I equipment was not maintained in a clean and protected condition.
Equipment maintenance. inspection records identified out-of-specification conditions with no evidence that correc-tive action was taken.
Inspection tool calibration records were not available.
Other inspection records indicated satis-factory completion of inspections at a time when these inspec-tions could not have been performed.
Inspection'ool calibration records (Simpson Meter) were available and were reviewed.
Inspection of installed guality Class I equipment during the current inspection identified valves and pumps which had collected debris and were poorly protected.
This item remains open, see Paragr aph 6 of thi s report for details.
4.
Structural Steel and Su orts a ~
Observations of Work and Work Activities Structural steel erection activities performed by Pittsburgh-Des Moines (PDM) were examined.
This included observations of structural steel at the 606 foot elevation of the Reactor
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Building and above, as well as Reactor Building Bridge Crane bolting.
The structures were examined for compliance to the requirements of the PSAR, Contract Specification 31A and 207, Drawing Nos.
B&R S727-Rev.
13, B&R S650-Rev.
27, PDM R-E10-Rev. 7, and PDM Bolting Procedure No. 34117-Bolt Rev. l.
Bridge crane bolting was found to be adequately controlled and in compliance with the specified requirements.
Two items of concern, as indicated below, were identified during the exam-ination of Reactor Building structural steel.
Burns
& Roe Drawing Nos.
S727-Rev.
13 and S650-Rev.
27 identify the requirements for the bolting of vertical structural columns at the 606 foot elevation of the Reactor Building.
The columns provide support for the Reactor Building bridge crane.
It was observed by the inspector that three anchor bolts, on one of the six columns inspected, were missing the required locking nuts.
The construction work in this area was'onsidered to be complete and no specific inspection requirements had been spe-
.
cified for this bolting.
The failure to install the lock nuts in accordance with the design drawings is considered to be an item of noncompliance.
(397/78-10/01)
PDM drawings R-E10-Rev.
5 and R-E12-Rev.
7, and Procedure 34117-Bolt, Rev. 1, provide the requirements for high-strength bolting of the east and north walls of the Reactor Building above elevation 606.
During the examination of the completed bolting on these walls, the inspector found six 1", A325, high-strength bolts with forging bursts in the head of the bolt.
Licensee and B&R representatives stated that this situation will be reviewed 'to determine the number of bolts involved and the significance of the forg-ing bursts.
This item is considered unresolved.
(397/78-10/02)
Review of ualit Records The quality records associated with the inspection of structural steel in the east and north walls of the Reactor Building above the 606 foot elevations were reviewed.
It was noted that the high-strength bolting, containing the A325 bolts with forging bursts, had been accepted by the contractor's quality control inspectors.
Ho items of non-compliance or deviations were identifie f~
I l,
5.
El ectrical Cable Install ation a.
Review of A Im 1 ementin Procedures The following Fischbach/Lord procedures relating to electrical cable installation activities were reviewed:
(1)
CP-404, Rev. 4, Cable Pulling and Inspection (2)
QAP-404.1, Quality Assurance Procedure for Inspection of Insulated Cable Installation.
The procedures were found to be consistent with requirements of the licensee's QA Program and industry practice.
b.
Observations of Work and Work Activities Electrical cable installation activities were observed.
This included an examination'of the following items for compliance with specified procedures and drawings:
cable tray ground-ing and fastener installation; conduit installation and supports; cable routing, safety division separation, and pulling operations; cable terminations; crimping tool control and calibration; and control of nonconforming condi-tions.
The inspector observed a total of ten Quality Class I control cables (including two pulling operations),
the com-pleted installation of two 4160 volt safety related power cables, and interviewed cognizant personnel regarding cable pulling, inspection procedures and control of crimping tools.
It appeared that cable installation activities were, in general, properly controlled and in compliance with pro-cedures and drawings.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified, but the following items were noted which require action by the licensee and will be re-examined during a subsequent inspection.
(1)
Installation of Unistrut Conduit Clamps:
The inspector noticed that in installing Unistrut clamps to provide support for full weight rigid galvanized steel conduit, the clamp was in close proximity to the edge of its channel in some cases.
This could cause the clamp to come out of the channel during a seismic event or while tightening the clamp's retaining bol A4 l
(2)
(3)
A Burns 8 Roe civil engineer stated that Burns 5 Roe's position was that there is no minimum edge separation requirement between Unistrut clamps and channel open ends.
This position was based on a phone conversation reported between Fischbach/Lord and Unistrut engineers.
The inspector observed a Unistrut clamp installation in the Rad Waste Building where the clamp had come out of
'its channel.
It appeared that in tightening the retain-ing bolt on the Unistrut clamp, the clamp end was forced away from the conduit and out of the channel.
This left the conduit unsupported at this'oint.
The conduit was not safety related.
Burns 5 Roe agreed that some minimum edge separation criteria needed to be established to prevent further occurrences of this nature.
The installation, procedure and inspection of Unistrut clamps is an unresolved item..
(397/78-10/03)
Use of Flexible Conduit:
The inspector noticed that flexible steel conduit was used in short lengths in various safety related and nonsafety related applica-tions throughout the facility.
This flexible conduit appears to be made with a flexible metal core and a
smooth polyolefin or polyethylene copolymer cover.
This type of installation was noted in the cable spread-ing room, the drywell, the corridor between the Rad Waste Building and the Reactor Building and in the Turbine Building.
Use of this conduit is detailed in the Burns
Roe Contract Specification No. 2808-218.
However, the use of this material is not consistent with FSAR statements (Section 8.3.1.1.10).
Burns
Roe representatives stated that the use of the flexible coupling was re-quired in certain applications to provide for relative
'ovement of the rigid conduit.
Accordingly, the licensee stated that a change to the FSAR would be initiated to correct the current description.
This item is unresolved pending submittal of the FSAR change.
(397/78-10/04)
Potential cable separation problem between safety divisions: It was noted that there is a potential separation problem between wireways for Division 2 and Division 3 cables below Control Room Panel P680,
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-10-Bay G.
This problem cannot be further evaluated until cable installation is complete and fire bar-riers are in place.
This item will be re-examined during a subsequent inspection.
(397/78-10/05)
Review of ualit Records d.
The inspector examined quality records associated with five control cable installations, termination documentation, crimp-ing tool calibration, inprocess cable pulls, and a nonconfor-mance report..
Ho items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
However, the inspector found that additional cri-teria may be appropriate for determining the need for cable pull calculations.
Contractor representatives stated that it was their practice to calculate and document on F/L Form 224 the cable pull tension for each high voltage cable.
Two 4160 volt cables under review, however, did not have such documenta-tion.
A "worksheet" calculation had been made and was shown to the inspe'ctor.
It was apparent to the inspector that from this
"worksheet" calculation and from observing the short (50 foot)
length of these cables that this was a cable placement within the scope of the "simple pull" definition of F/L CP-404, Rev. 4, V.A.14.b.
The inspector observed that clear criteria for de-termining when cable pull calculations need not be made was apparently not available to those who must perform this task.
Contractor representatives stated that this topic would be reviewed and appropriate action taken.
This item will be examined in a subsequent, inspection (397/78-10/06).
ualit Assurance Audits Burns 5 Roe audits of Fischbach/Lord activities f'r the previous year were reviewed.
The audits appeared compre-hensive and corrective actions appropriate.
The inspector
'ound that proper surveillance of the contractor's activities was being maintained.
6.
Safet Related Com onents a ~
Review of A Im lementin Procedures The following contractor documents, applicable to safety related components, were examined:
(1)
Work Procedure Ho. 23, Rev. 1, Storage and Maintenance of LPCS, HPCS, RHR and Clean Up Circulation Pumps
l
(2)
Work Procedure No. 38, Rev. 1, Equipment Handling, Setting, Installing and Aligning (3)
Work Procedure No. 59, Rev. 3, Cleanliness Program and Control Procedure (4)
Work Procedure No. 28, Rev. 3, Storage and Maintenance of Valves, Storage Level C
(5)
Work Procedure No. 29, Rev. 3, Storage and Maintenance of Valves, Control, Air and Motor Operated (f1601)
and Specialties (M602), Storage Level B
The following items were noted from the review:
(1)
The Inspection Maintenance Record form, included in Work Procedure No. 23, was found to be inconsistent with the text of the procedure, in some cases.
For. example, the record form indicates inspections for internal preserva-tive are not required for pumps LPCS-l, HPCS-l, and RHR-2A, 2B, and 2C; when the text of the procedure indi-cates preservative is to be applied to all pumps except RWCU-P-l.
(2)
Work Procedure No. 23 requires the pump internals be coated with Tower 635RP preservative.
It is noted that the pumps are installed in a Class B clean sys-tem as defined by ANSI N'45.2.1.
ANSI N 45.2.1 states that components in Class B systems shall have internal surfaces free of organic films and contam-inants such as preservatives.
Licensee representatives stated that applicable work procedures would be reviewed and appropriate action taken.
This item will be examined further in a sub-sequent inspection.
(397/78-10/07)
b.
Observation of Work and Work Activities Completed and in-process work on safety related components was examined for compliance to applicable procedures and standards.
The -specific components inspected included valves RHR-V-113, RHR-Y-112B, RRC-V-60B and pumps RHR-P-2C, HPCS-P-l, LPCS-P-1.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified, but the following conditions were noted during the inspection:
I
e
~ -12-(1)
The bottom internals of installed valve RHR-Y-112B was observed to have gritty particles present.
(2)
Rigging sling used for handling valve RHR-Y-112B was observed to be coated with a tar like substance which in turn had various forms of debris adhering to it.
(3)
The pl@eood cap for valve RHR-Y-112B was only covered with tape on periphery of the cap.
(4)
The drilled bottom boss of valve RRC-U-60B was observed to be uncovered, an operating line nozzle was noted to be only partially covered with tape.
~
Several gland seal cooling lines on pump RHR-P-2C were also observed to be uncovered.
(5)
Pumps RHR-P-2C, HPCS-P-l, and LPCS-P-1 were observed to be installed in concrete sump which'contained
'ater.
Corrosion was evident on each of the pump casings, with the heaviest corrosion noted on RHR-P-2C.
Licensee representatives stated that maintenance of installed equipment would be examined and appropriate action taken.
This item will be examined further during a subsequent inspection.
(397/78-02/02)
c.
Review of ualit Records The quality records associated with valve RHR-Y-112B and pump RHR-P-2C were reviewed to ascertain compliance with applicable procedures.
No items of noncompliance or devia-tions were identified.
It was noted, however, that the most current (October 4, 1978) sign off for exterior pre-servation and rust on maintenance record form NF-124 for pump RHR-P-2C did not identify the presence of water in the sump or the existence of corrosion.
=d. 'eview of Licensee ualit Assurance Audits Licensee equality Assurance audits 215-78-S2 of 10/21/78, and 215-78-2 of 9/20/78 were examined and found satisfactory.
7. Safet'elated Pi in Installation Three completed welds in the main steam relief piping inside the containment wetwell were selected for examination of workmanship.
These were the pipe spool to field fabricated quencher assembly
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0
-13-weld on relief lines HSRY-1B, -4B and -58.
The weld on NSRV-4B was complete except for radiography and surface grinding (re-quired f'r coating preparation for underwater protection);
the other two welds were fully complete.
All three welds displayed good workmanship.
The quality records pertaining to the three welds were also examined for compliance with site procedural requirements.
Included were the fabrication check lists, material receiving reports for pipe spools, filler metal and spool piece material test reports, weld procedure (75-55 and 75-55A) qualifi-cation records, welder qualification records, and final weld radiographs.
No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.
Tornado Missile Protection for Safet Related Diesel Generators 50.55 e
Item By letter dated May 30, 1978, the licensee informed IE:V of the details regarding a design error which resulted in inadequate missile protection for diesel generators.
The original design resulted in a
"window" or gap approximately 3" wide by 7 feet high which would permit a tornado-propelled missile to enter through the door opening and possibly damage the diesel genera-tor.
The inspector examined the licensee's plan to correct the condition.
The corrective action consists of adding a new struc-tural member to the inside face of the diesel generator exterior wall, adjacent to the door.
The inspector concluded that the proposed addition should adequately rectify the existing condition.
Concrete Void in Sacrificial Shield On September 8, 1978, the licensee informed Region V via telephone that a void approximately 24-inches in diameter and 14 inches deep had been detected in the top ot'he sacrificial shield eall nb]eh surrounds the reactor vessel.
The void was located at the 315 azi-muth at the 567 foot elevation.
Nonconformance Report Ho. 03698 was written to initiate remedial action.
The inspector reviewed the activities associated with this matter.
The licensee's review for 50.55(e) reportability was documented on Evaluation Report No. 78-8; the determination was that it was not reportable on the basis that there was no'mpact on safety from
either a structural o'r radiological shielding viewpoint.
The void was filled with a measured quantity (1.26 cubic feet) of fine magnetites aggregate.
The licensee is conducting a further review of the shield geometry and fabrication sequence in order to ascer-tain if there are any other locations in the shield that might be particularly susceptible to a similar void development.
Sus-pect regions identified in this review might then be investigated using a
gamma scanning technique.
This topic will be examined further during a subsequent inspection.
(397/78-10/08)
0
-14-Fault Electrical Workmanshi Alle ations During the latter part of June 1978, an employee of the principal electrical contractor, Fischbach/Lord Electric Company, complained to the licensee about procedure and specification violations by electrical craftsmen and foremen.
His concerns principally involved cable pulling activities.
He alleged that his attempts to get the situation rectified were being ignored by contractor supervision and management.
The licensee promptly began a confidential investiga-tion of the contractor's work practices to judge the accuracy of the allegations.
The licensee also notified Region V via telephone of the complainant's notification to them and periodically'here-after kept Region V apprised of the progress of their investigation.
During this inspection, the licensee's documented activities in the pursuit of this investigation were examined.
It was noted that the licensee's electrical gA engineer had earlier observed ques-tionable practices by the craftsmen, and a meeting between the licensee and Burns 5 Roe during the last week in April 1978 re-sulted in the issuance of a request for corrective action (CAR No. 1275, dated Hay 2, 1978) to the electrical contractor concern-ing cable pulling.
On July 14, 1978, the complainant was discharged for reportedly intentionally violating a provision of his employer's gA program.
Following that circumstance, the licensee's investi-gation of the contractor's work practices assumed a more open posture.
The contractor's own gA organization performed an in-depth review which resulted in the issuance of their own corrective action request (CAR No. 20, dated July 17, 1978).
This CAR consisted of 101 pages which covered all areas of concern identified in the com-plainant's 29 page "punchlist" which he had given to the licensee at the outset of their investigation.
The contractor has conducted training sessions 'for his personnel both in proper construction practices and gA program provisions.
The licensee's investigation to date has revealed items of significant concern.
They are con-tinuing to monitor the contractor's activities both with respect to the allegations and the expeditious close-out of all items identified in CAR No. 20.
The inspector concluded that the licensee'.s actions
,identifying and correcting nonconforming practices and items have been responsive and appropriate.
Exit Interview At the conclusion of the inspection, a meeting was held with licensee and Burns 5 Roe representatives denoted in Paragraph l.
The activities covered during the inspection and observations and findings of the inspectors were discussed.
The inspectors noted that additional actions appear necessary to assure pipe supports meet applicable requirements.
Licensee representatives stated that immediate action would be taken on this and other items identified during the current inspectio f I
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