IR 05000395/1995025
| ML17291A997 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer, Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1995 |
| From: | Dexter T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17291A996 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-95-25, NUDOCS 9508300231 | |
| Download: ML17291A997 (22) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-397/95-25 License:
NPF-21 Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System 3000 George Washington Way P.O.
Box 968, MD 1023 Richland, Washington Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project-2 Inspection At:
Richland, Washington Inspection Conducted:
August 7-11, 1995 Inspectors:
A. D. Mcgueen, Emergency Preparedness Analyst R.
E. Lantz, Reactor Inspector Approved:
exter, cting se Reactor Inspection Branch ate Ins ection Summar Areas Ins ected:
Routine, announced inspection of the operational status of the emergency preparedness program including changes to the emergency plan and implementing procedures; emergency facilities, equipment, and supplies; organization and management control; training; internal reviews and audits; effectiveness of licensee controls; and followup on previous inspection findings.
Results:
The licensee had properly reviewed and properly submitted to NRC changes to the emergency plan and implementing procedures (Section 2. 1).
The licensee had maintained an effective relationship with offsite emergency response organizations (Section 2. 1).
A Non-Cited Violation regarding updating of agreements with some offsite agencies was appropriately identified by the licensee, and appropriate corrective actions were implemented (Section 2. 1)
950830023l 950829 PDR ADCICK 05000397
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With the exception of one out-of-date emergency plan copy and a
nonfunctional radiation monitor recorder at the Technical Support Center, and an out-of-date emergency telephone directory at the Operations Support Center, the emergency facilities had been maintained in a proper state of readiness for activation (Section 3.1).
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The licensee had trained and qualified an appropriate number of emergency response personnel to ensure a good depth in the organization.
The emergency planning organization was fully staffed with qualified personnel (Section 4. 1).
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The training and emergency planning organizations have maintained an effective emergency response training program.
Emergency response organization personnel had been trained in accordance with applicable station procedures and regulatory requirements (Section 5. 1).
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quarterly drills and annual exercises were conducted and adequately tested the emergency response personnel.
The quality and evaluation of drills were noted as improved since the previous inspection.
Reports and critique comments were incorporated into training and procedures as appropriate.
One area for improvement was noted in the tracking and timely resolution of lower priority drill comments (Section 5. 1).
The performance of operating crews during walkthrough evaluations was generally good, with some exceptions (Section 5.2)
The licensee-developed walkthrough scenario provided adequate challenge for Control Room crews to demonstrate the inspection objectives (Section 5.2)
guality assurance audits and surveillances of emergency preparedness and planning had been performed by qualified personnel and were of proper scope, depth, and effectiveness (Section 6. 1).
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An effective system of controls had been maintained regarding safety issues, events, or problems which emphasized early detection and elevation to an appropriate management level, thorough root cause analysis, and timely, effective implementation of corrective actions (Section 7.1).
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No emergency event had been declared at the site since the last routine emergency preparedness inspection (Section 9).
Summar of Ins ection Findin s:
Inspection Followup Item 397/9406-01 was closed (Section 8. 1).
Non-Cited Violation 397/9525-01 was identified (Section 2. 1).
V Attachments:
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Attachment I Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
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Attachment 2 - Emergency Preparedness Inspection Scenario Narrative Summary
DETAILS
PLANT STATUS During this inspection, the unit operated at full power.
EMERGENCY PLAN AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES (82701-02.01)
The inspectors reviewed changes in the licensee's emergency plan and implementing procedures to verify that these changes had not decreased the effectiveness of emergency planning and that the changes had been reviewed properly and submitted to NRC.
2. 1 Discussion Since the previous inspection, one emergency plan revision (Revision 15)
had been implemented.
The most significant change in this revision was to revise emergency action levels to implement the NUMARC event classification system concept.
The licensee had performed a documented review in accordance with
CFR 50.54(q) to determine that the revision did not decrease the effectiveness of emergency preparedness.
The inspectors also reviewed documentation pertaining to selected Emergency Plan implementing procedure revisions of the 211 revisions or temporary change notices implemented since the last routine inspection.
The inspectors reviewed selected changes in procedures and noted that. marked changes were consistent with regulatory requirements and the licensee's commitments.
Review, approval, and distribution of the plan and procedure changes were conducted in accordance with licensee Administrative Procedure 1.2.4,
"Plant Procedure Approval, Revision, and Distribution."
The licensee maintained an effective relationship with offsite agencies and coordinated changes in emergency action levels with those agencies annually or as appropriate.
This coordination occurred daily as needed or as part of the quarterly Steering Committee Meetings with the states, counties, and the Department of Energy.
The inspectors reviewed Letters of Agreement established with support agencies.
The licensee has an annual review program for support agreements and contracts which, with exceptions in 1994, appeared appropriate.
Appendix 4 to the Emergency Plan states, in part,
"Annually, the Supply System will correspond with outside organizations with whom it has agreements, and request that the agreements be reviewed to ensure they remain accurate and applicable."
Contrary to this, Problem Evaluation Request (PER)
295-0254, based on guality Assurance Audit findings, determined that annual correspondence for 1994 could not be located for seven agreement organizations.
The licensee stated the letters were not sent to the seven organizations during 1994, because the agreements or contracts were in renegotiation.
All seven agreements or contracts contained provisions that the existing agreements would continue in effect until cancelled by one or more of the parties.
Therefore, there was no substantive impact on offsite emergency response support, and the existing agreements remain in effect.
In response to the finding, the emergency preparedness staff has established November 1,
1995, as the date by which all agreements in negotiation will be
finalized.
This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section VII of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 397/9525-01).
2.2 Conclusion The licensee had reviewed and properly submitted to NRC changes in the emergency plan and implementing procedures.
The licensee had maintained an effective relationship with offsite radiological emergency response organizations.
A Non-Cited Violation regarding updating of agreements with some offsite agencies was appropriately identified by the licensee and appropriate corrective actions were "'implemented.
EMERGENCY FACILITIES, E(UIPNENT, INSTRUMENTATION, AND SUPPLIES (82701-02.02)
The inspectors toured onsite emergency facilities and reviewed the licensee's emergency equipment inventories and mairitenance to verify that facilities and equipment had been maintained in a state of operational readiness.
3. 1 Discussion A tour was made of each emergency response facility which included the inspection of various equipment items, instrumentation, and supplies.
Facilities inspected were the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, and the Emergency Operations Facility.
The inspectors also inspected one emergency medical kit and one set of fire brigade lockers located in the plant.
The facilities were observed to be well maintained and ready for emergency use.
Substanti.ve changes had occurred at the Technical Support Center and at the Emergency Operations Facility since the last inspection.
Both had been substantively redesigned and re-equipped making them more functional as emergency facilities and enhancing equipment and capabilities.
Random inspections were performed of radiation monitoring and respiratory equipment at each emergency response facility.
With one exception discussed below, all selected items were verified as being in calibration or had been appropriately inspected on a scheduled basis.
Equipment and supplies placed in response facilities and in emergency equipment lockers matched scheduled inventories.
With the exception of one out-of-date emergency plan at the Technical Support Center (TSC)
and one out-of-date emergency telephone book at the Operations Support Center, current copies of the implementing procedures and emergency telephone directories were maintained in all facilities.
Both of the out-of-date documents were uncontrolled copies and were removed on the spot by an emergency planning staff member.
Primary and backup communications in each facility were as described in the emergency plan.
The inspectors reviewed documentation pertaining to inventories, testing, and maintenance of emergency response facilities and noted that they had been performed as required by procedures.
The Emergency Plan at Section 6. 1.2 states that
"The TSC is as habitable as the Control Room during accidents."
During inspection of the Technical Support Center, it was determined that the Technical Support Center Airborne Radiation Honitor was tagged with Deficiency Tag 28131, dated Harch 29, 1995,
indicating a nonfunctional monitor recorder.
A review of the maintenance work request (MWR 95001685)
indicated the monitor was assigned a priority three for repair.
Health physics personnel indi,cated the monitor cannot be recalibrated without the recorder and other TSC monitors are presently nonfunctional; however, portable monitoring equipment could be moved to the TSC in the event of an emergency.
Emergency planning personnel determined that the monitor is presently within calibration time limits.
A work order had been initiated in March 1995 when the equipment was tagged for repair completion in April 1995.
For reasons the emergency planning staff could not determine, the work order had been cancelled and no replacement work order initiated.
The tagged monitor was scheduled for calibration on July 16, 1995, and will be overdue as of November 8, 1995.
This deficiency has been recommended by the emergency planning staff for upgrade to a priority two work request.
3.2 Conclusion With the exception of one out-of-date emergency plan copy and a nonfunctional radiation monitor recorder in the TSC, and an out-of-date emergency telephone directory at the Operations Support Center, emergency facilities, equipment, and supplies had been maintained in a state of operational readiness.
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL (82701-02.03)
The inspectors reviewed the emergency response organization staffing levels to determine whether sufficient personnel resources were available for emergency response.
The emergency planning organization was reviewed to ensure that an effective programmatic management system was in place.
4. 1 Discussion The Washington Public Power Supply System emergency preparedness staff for the Washington Nuclear Project - Unit 2 consists of two organizational elements, one for onsite emergency planning and one for offsite emergency planning.
The emergency planning staff reports to the Director for Support Services, who in turn reports to the Vice President, Nuclear Operations.
The emergency planning staff had nine personnel assigned, The inspectors found the emergency preparedness organization was staffed with appropriately qualified, trained, experienced, and apparently motivated personnel.
The site emergency response organization was made up of about 205 personnel with about 30 vacancies on 5 response teams.
The primary callout system for activating the emergency response organization was by pager.
A new activation system by DIALOGICS had been installed at the Supply System headquarters and was expected to be activated by the end of August 1995.
A list of personnel trained and experienced to function in emergency response organization positions was being maintained by Site Emergency Planning.
The organization had a depth of five response teams, which appeared appropriate for sustained response to an emergency event of extended duration.
All personnel are called in the event of an emergency response organization activation, and the team on call is expected to call in their availability and respond.
Positions not filled by call-ins are recalled.
If they are not filled in that recall, the system will then call individuals from other response teams to fill vacancie Emergency response organization primary functions are designated for fill by a cognizant manager.
Remaining positions are filled by personnel identified by the emergency planning manager with approval of the cognizant plant manager.
Changes in offsite emergency response organizations recently occurred when the Franklin County emergency response organization underwent a major reorganization with significant personnel changes and when the Washington State Emergency management organization was transferred from the Community Trade and Economic Division to the State Hilitary Department.
The new Franklin County personnel were being trained and were being supported during the development period by Benton County emergency preparedness personnel.
The licensee provided training and support to offsite emergency response agencies on an as-requested basis and offsite monitoring teams participate at least once annually in a mini-response drill with the licensee.
4.2 Conclusions The licensee had trained and qualified an appropriate number of emergency response personnel to ensure a good depth in the organization.
The emergency planning organization was fully staffed with qualified personnel.
TRAINING (82701-02. 04)
The inspectors reviewed the emergency response training program and interviewed selected individuals to determine whether emergency response personnel had received the required training and complied with the requirements of the Washington Nuclear Project Unit 2 Emergency Plan and implementing procedures,
CFR 50.47(b)(15),
and
CFR Part 50, Appendix E. IV.F.
5.1 Discussion 5.1.1 Training Program The emergency preparedness training program and records were reviewed by the inspectors.
The inspectors reviewed a sample of lesson plans and a sample of individual emergency preparedness training records.
The conclusion was that the emergency preparedness training program was being well implemented.
A sample of training records indicated that individuals in the emergency response organization had been trained and had been requalified as required.
Changes to emergency preparedness procedures/programs have been documented and records maintained indicating personnel attending training sessions.
Reports/critiques for quarterly drills and the last annual exercise were reviewed and improvements were noted since the last routine emergency preparedness inspection.
High priority drill critique comments, that potentially required a safety evaluation and change to the facility emergency plan, were tracked and resolved in accordance with a formal facility procedure.
The tracking system for lower priority drill critique comments consisted of a summary document composed of a list of the comments with numerical tracking numbers.
This document was maintained by the emergency
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i preparedness training supervisor, who periodically reviewed the document for open items.
There were no procedural directions or requirements to review or resolve these issues within a specified time period.
The inspector reviewed the open items from the last annual drill and exercise conducted in August of 1994 and found several items that had been resolved with an action item, such as incorporation into a procedural change or addition to the training plan but had not yet been implemented.
The inspector considered the lack of a formal policy or procedure to resolve lower priority drill comments to be a challenge to the continued improved performance in emergency preparedness.
5. 1.2 Simulator Walkthroughs The inspectors conducted a series of emergency response walkthroughs with three operating crews to evaluate the adequacy and retention of skills obtained from the emergency response training program.
One walkthrough scenario was developed by the facility, reviewed by the inspectors, and administered to the crews to determine, through demonstrated performance, whether Control Room personnel were proficient in their duties and responsibilities as emergency responders during a simulated accident scenario.
Attachment 2 to this inspection report contains a narrative summary of the walkthrough scenario.
The scenario was administered to three shift operating crews on two separate days to evaluate the licensee's ability to respond to a rapidly evolving casualty scenario and demonstrate the execution of the emergency plan from the plant (simulated)
Control Room.
The scenario was designed to run for approximately I hour, during which time limited assistance from other plant personnel or outside agencies was available.
Each of the crews was evaluated using the same scenario administered dynamically i.n the plant simulator.
The inspector observed good teamwork and communications during the walkthroughs.
The panel operators took appropriate actions and provided accurate and timely plant status information to the Control Room supervisor and shift manager.
The Control Room supervisor directed crew operations in accordance with established procedures and exhibited good command and control.
The shift manager maintained awareness of current plant conditions, provided oversight direction to the Control Room supervisor, and coordinated with the shift technical advisor and Control Room emergency communicator for emergency action level classifications and notifications.
During the scenario, the crews responded to simulated plant conditions and referenced the appropriate procedures when required.
One minor exception was noted in that none of the crews were knowledgeable of the incorporation, and subsequent cancellation of the earthquake abnormal procedure into the alarm response procedure.
Each of the crews responded to a simulated seismic event by referring to the alarm response procedure, then searched through the abnormal procedures for the earthquake response procedure, which had been deleted and incorporated into the annunciator response procedure.
In general, emergency operating procedures were used successfully to mitigate scenario casualty events.
One exception was noted with one crew while in leg "X" of the emergency operating procedures during a simulated anticipated
transient without scram (ATWS) scenario.
The crew did not recognize that reactor vessel level conditions necessary to reestablish vessel injection had been met.
When a second condition was met, the crew was slow to act to initiate injection and restore vessel level.
These errors resulted in a significantly lowered reactor vessel level, below the top of active fuel, and consequently resulted in additional fuel damage and higher release rates.
Also, the Control Room supervisor initially established a reactor vessel level band of -191 inches to -190 inches (fuel zone.)
This was an incorrect and unrealistic level band.
All three crews exhibited strong command, control and communications; however, one instance was noted in which each of the crews were in an ATWS scenario and did not meet management expectations with respect to operation of standby liquid control.
Direction in the Emergency Operating Procedures call for injection of standby liquid control prior to wetwell temperature exceeding 110 degrees Fahrenheit (F).
Management has published an interpretation of that direction that states immediate injection of standby liquid control is expected when that decision point is reached.
Each of the crews delayed injection for various time periods while evaluating the heatup rate of the wetwell but did inject standby liquid control prior to reaching the wetwell temperature limit.
The shift technical advisor assisted the shift manager in emergency action level classifications, performed the initial facsimile transmission to state and local authorities, conducted the followup voice notification "crash" calls, and completed the notification worksheets for use by the emergency communicator on the emergency notification system line with the NRC.
Additionally, the shift technical advisor performed dose projections and evaluation of protective action recommendations.
Although the inspectors considered this to be a challenging array of duties for the shift technical advisor to perform, in each of the crews the duties were performed accurately and timely and greatly contributed to the availability of the shift manager for plant operations oversight.
5.2 Conclusion The licensee has maintained an effective emergency response training program, and all emergency response organization personnel had been trained in accordance with applicable station procedures.
The performance of operating crews in implementing emergency response actions during walkthrough evaluations was good.
Effective communications and emergency operating instructions usage were demonstrated by the operating crews.
INDEPENDENT AND INTERNAL REVIEWS AND AUDITS (82701-02.05)
The inspectors met with quality assurance personnel and reviewed independent and internal audits of the emergency preparedness program performed since the last inspection to determine compliance with the requirements of
CFR 50.54(t).
-10-6. 1 Discussion The inspectors reviewed and discussed with a quality assurance lead auditor the most recent annual audit (guality Assurance Audit Report 295-018) of the emergency preparedness program which had been performed from March 20 through April 7, 1995.
The audit team members appeared to be well qualified.
All team members had audit experience, and two were certified with current lead auditor recertification as set forth in the licensee's guality Assurance Procedure (gAP 7), "gualifications and Certification," which incorporates certification criteria to perform audits in accordance with ANSI Standard N45.2. 12 and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.144.
The team included personnel familiar with and experienced in emergency planning, including one individual from the emergency planning staff of another utility.
The inspectors reviewed the audit plan, scope of the audit, and the audit check list.
The audit appeared to be thorough and complete.
The audit report was issued to appropriate levels of management at the plant.
guality Assurance maintained a tracking 'system which established suspense dates for response by cognizant managers for items identified in a report that required correction or improvement.
PERs were issued for tracking each audit finding and enhancement item.
Since the last routine NRC inspection, the quality assurance organization conducted two quality surveillances related to emergency preparedness.
The surveillances were reviewed by the inspectors and were verified as being appropriate to observed activities and findings.
6.2 Conclusion Audits of emergency preparedness had been conducted in accordance with
CFR 50.54(t).
guality assurance audits and surveillances of emergency preparedness and planning had been performed by qualified personnel and were of proper scope, depth, and effectiveness.
EFFECTIVENESS OF LICENSEE CONTROLS (82701-02.06)
The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the licensee's controls systems pertaining to safety issues, events, or problems.
The review included discussions with quality assurance and emergency preparedness staff personnel and review of procedures and documentation of problem identification, root cause analysis, management review of problem identification and solution, and corrective actions.
7. 1 Discussion The licensee's controls systems were satisfactory in identifying, resolving, and preventing problems by providing for review of such areas as corrective action systems, root cause analyses, safety committees, and self assessment in the area of emergency preparedness.
The primary tool used in managing corrective actions was the PER.
All personnel were instructed in the use of the PER in their general employee training.
They are instructed to initiate the requests through their supervisors or directly to the Control Room.
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nuclear safety issues program exists separately for managing nuclear safety issues.
Major problem issues are reviewed by the site Corrective Action Review Hoard until resolved.
This board includes members of senior site management, including the Vice President, Nuclear Operations.
Additionally, a tracking system used by Site Emergency Planning for tracking commitments and requirements is the Emergency Planning Activity Scheduling System (EPASS).
The system is used for scheduling on a continuing basis all activities impacting emergency preparedness and support to other elements at or off the site.
Items in the system are assigned to a specific individual as a task with appropriate suspense dates to assure their completion.
The inspectors reviewed several PERs including those generated by the 1995 audit, and determined that the corrective action program was properly implemented.
7.2 Conclusions The licensee had maintained an effective system of controls pertaining to safety issues, events, or problems which emphasized early detection and elevation to an appropriate management level, thorough root cause analysis, and effective implementation of corrective actions.
FOLLOWUP ON PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS (92904)
8. 1 Closed Ins ection Followu Item 397 9406-01:
Difficulties in Accountabilit Procedures Prior to Site Evacuation During a previous routine emergency preparedness inspection, the inspector reviewed Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure PPM 13.5.5,
"Personnel Accountability."
The inspector noted that the licensee directs that accountability be accomplished at an Alert or higher event classification.
The procedure does not require evacuation of nonessential personnel or that nonessential personnel go to assembly areas to use security card readers to locate themselves.
The current accountability procedure would only locate emergency response essential personnel at their respective emergency response facilities.
The inspector noted that under conditions which the plant emergency director directs accountability, with no evacuation, the list of names provided would list all nonessential personnel in the Protected Area.
Under these conditions, this process would not be adequate to "ascertain the names of missing individuals,"
as directed by NRC guidance in NUREG 0654 II.J.5.
The licensee and the inspector noted that accountabi'lity could be accomplished if the controlled Protected Area evacuation procedure was also performed.
This item was again reviewed in this inspection and the inspectors determined that the licensee's accountability procedure had been revised to clarify accountability actions and to require a site evacuation prior to implementing accountability.
Personnel responsible for conducting accountability had been trained in the new procedure ONSITE FOLLOWUP OF EVENTS AT OPERATING POWER REACTORS (93702)
No emergency event had been declared at the site since the last routine emergency preparedness inspectio 'I
PERSONS CONTACTED ATTACHMENT 1 1. 1 Licensee Personnel
- H. L. Aeschliman, Emergency Planner
- P. T. Bagan, Emergency Planner L.
W. Ball, Emergency Planner
- P.
R. Bemis, Director, Regulatory Affairs
- L. C. Fernandez, Licensing, Regulatory Programs
- D. B. Holmes, Senior Emergency Planner
- R. E. Jorgensen, Emergency Planner
- A. F. Klaus, Emergency Planner
- D. W. Martin, Manager, Security Programs K.
P.
Meehan, Emergency Planner
- J. V. Parrish, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- G. J.
Reed, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
- D. W. Schaeffer, Manager, Operations Training
- C. J.
Schwarz, Manager, Operations
- G. 0. Smith, Director, guality J.
H. Swailes, Plant Manager R.
L. Webring, Support Services Director The inspectors also held discussions with and observed the actions of other station and corporate personnel.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
EXIT MEETING The inspectors met with the licensee's representatives and other personnel indicated in Section 1 of this Attachment on July ll, 1995, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as presented in this report.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to, or
'eviewed by, the inspection team during the inspectio ATTACHHENT 2 EHERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INSPECTION SCENARIO NARRATIVE SUHHARY Simulation Facilit:
Initial Conditions:
Events Se uence:
Washington Nuclear Project, Unit 2 (WNP-2)
The plant is at 100N power, all equipment is operating and nothing is out of service.
A minor steam leak has developed on the piping to Hain Steam Trap one (HS-T-2)
on the 471 Turbine building.
Plant management and Engineering are aware of this leak and are investigating.
Weather conditions are clear skies, wind from 290 degrees at 5 miles per hour, temperature is 70 degrees Fahrenheit.
The scenario began at IDOL power, with all equipment operating normally.
A small steam leak had developed near a main steam trap and was being monitored.
An earthquake is felt at the plant and initiates seismic alarms in the Control Room, which meets the conditions for an ALERT declaration.
The earthquake causes some offsite damage related to the 500kv Hiero Wave Transfer Trip (HWTT) system and worsens the steam leak.
Offsite troubleshooting of the Hiero Wave Transfer Trip system inadvertently causes a Hain Generator trip.
The reactor fails to trip and a
hydraulic anticipated transient without scram results with power remaining above 5N.
This results in declaration of a Site Area.Emergency.
Power oscillations result in severe fuel damage, the steam leak increases further, and one line of main steam isolation valves are stuck partially open, creating a
direct release of fission products to the turbine building and offsite.
Conditions for a General Emergency are met, and continue to worsen as dose projection at the site boundary continue to increase.
The crew will terminate the release by emergency depressurizing the reacto EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INSPECTION SCENARIO NARRATIVE SUMMARY Simulation Facilit
Washington Nuclear Project, Unit 2 (WNP-2)
Licensee-rovided Timeline:
Time Event Descri tion 0 min Start Scenario
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2 min Alarm "OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE EXCEEDED" Ops I call reporting he felt earthquake Alarm "BPA 500 KV MWTT TROUBLE" ALERT declared
+ 20 min Alarm "LEAK DET TURBINE BLDG TEMP HIGH"
+ 25 min EO reports steam leak from Main Steam line increasing
+ 30 min BPA calls to report trouble shooting MWTT system
+ 35 min Reactor SCRAM ATWS Power oscillations SITE AREA EMERGENCY declared
+ 45 min Steam leak increases Core damage occurs Radiation monitor readings rise
+ 50 min MSIVs in one steam line stuck open GENERAL EMERGENCY may be declared
+ 60 min Effluent monitors above General Emergency levels GENERAL EMERGENCY declared Reactor Emergency Depressurized Additional PARs recommended
+70 min Scenario terminated
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