IR 05000335/1996009

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Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-335/96-09 & 50-389/96-09.Corrective Actions:Dept Heads & Managers Notified That Apparent Overtime Violations,Payroll Time Sheets Mod by 961031
ML17229A027
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/04/1996
From: PLUNKETT T F
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
EA-96-263, L-96-217, NUDOCS 9609110310
Download: ML17229A027 (20)


Text

CATEGORYj.REGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9609110310DOC.DATE:96/09/04NOTARIZED:NOFACIL:50-335St.LuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPoweraLightCo.50-389St.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPower&LightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONPLUNKETT,T.F.FloridaPower&LightCo.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)

SUBJECT: Respondstoviolationsnotedininsprept96-09.Correctiveactions:plantdeptheads6managersnotifiedthatapparentovertimeviolations,payrolltimesheetsmodsby961031.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITIE:General(50Dkt)-InspRept/NoticeofViolationResponseNOTES:DOCKET0500033505000389RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD2-3PDINTERNAL:ACRSICENTERNRR/DRPM/PERBOEDIRRGN2FILE01XTERNAL:LITCOBRYCE,JHNRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11221111111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEWIENS,L.AEOD/SPD/RABDEDRONRR/DISP/PIPBNRR/DRPM/PECBNUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS3NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL1111111111111111DUNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMOWFNSD-5(EXT.415-2083)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR19ENCL19 FloridaPower5LightCompany,P.O.Box128,FortPierce,FL34954-0128September4,1996L-96-21710CFR2.201U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNo.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationFloridaPowerandLightCompanyhasreviewedthesubjectinspectionreportandpursuantto10CFR2.201theresponsetothenoticeofviolationisattached.Verytrulyyours,T.F.PlunkettPresident-NuclearDivisionTFP/JAS/EJBAttachmentcc:StewartD.Ebneter,RegionalAdministrator,USNRCRegionIISeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LuciePlant9609~CK050003350310960904PDRADOCPDRQanFPLGroupcompany St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationInsectionReort96-09VIOLATIONA:TechnicalSpecification6.2.f,requiresthatthehoursexpendedbypersonnelperformingsafety-relatedfunctionsbelimitedandthatduringextendedperiodsofshutdownforrefueling,thefollowingguidelinesbeobserved:Anindividualshouldnotbepermittedtoworkmorethan16hoursstraight,excludingshiftturnovertime.Anindividualshouldnotbepermittedtoworkmorethan16hoursinany24hourperiod,normorethan24hoursinany48hourperiod,normorethan72hoursinany7-dayperiod,allexcludingshiftturnovertime.TheSpecificationfurtherrequiresthatanydeviationsfromtheaboveguidelinesbeauthorizedbythePlantGeneralManagerorhisdeputy,orhigherlevelsofmanagement,inaccordancewithestablishedplantproceduresandwithdocumentationofthebasisforthedeviation.AP0010119,Revision14,"OvertimeLimitationsforPlantPersonnel,"implementedthisrequirementandprovidedanadministrativevehiclefortheapprovalofdeviationsfromthespecifiedguidelines.Contrarytotheabove,duringtheperiodfromMay13throughJune14,1996,fiveindividualswhoperformedsafetyrelatedfunctionswerefoundtohavecontributedto38deviationsfromthe72-hour-in-any-seven-day-periodrequirement,15deviationsfromthe24-hour-in-any-48-hourrequirement,and3deviationsfromthe16-hour-in-any-24-hour-requirementwithoutobtainingauthorizationfromthePlantGeneralManager,hisdeputy,orhigherlevelsofmanagement.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementI).RESPONSEA:1.FPLconcurswiththeviolation.2.REASONFORVIOLATIONSt.LucieTechnicalSpecificationsandAdministrativeProceduresrequirethatwrittenauthorizationbeobtained,asaminimum,fromthePlantGeneralManagerorhisdeputypriortoexceedingtheplantovertimelimits.Thecauseofthisviolationwasa St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationInsectionReort96-09lackofsupervisoryandmanagementoversightintheconductofoutageactivities,inthatovertimelimitdeviationswerenotproperlyforecasted,anddeviationrequestswerenotcompletedtodocumentthedeparturefromovertimelimits.Severaladditionalfactorscontributedtothisevent:1.Managementexpectationsregardingtherequirementforpre-approvalofovertimeguidelinedeviationswerenotcleartoallstationpersonnel.TheAdministrativeProceduregoverningtheuseofovertime,AP0010119,"OvertimeLimitationsforPlantPersonnel,"Revision14,wasnotclearindefiningwhenovertimedeviationrequestsmustbecompletedandapproved.3.Personnelassociatedwithseveralkeyoutagemaintenanceactivitiesfailedtoselfidentifyhoursworkedinexcessoftheovertimelimitsandcompletetheappropriateovertimedeviationrequestpaperwork.Payrolltimesheets,aspresentlyformatted,provideinsufficientinformationtopermitpropermonitoringofhoursworkedbypersonnel.3.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDA.PlantdepartmentheadsandmanagerswerenotifiedonJune19,1996,thatapparentovertimeviolationshadoccurred.Increasedattentiontoovertimemonitoringandpre-approvalofovertimeguidelinedeviationswereemphasizedbythePlantGeneralManager.B.AConditionReportwaswrittentoaddresstheapparentovertimeviolations.Acorrectiveactionwhichresultedfromthiswasthecompletionoftherequireddocumentationrequestingthesubjectovertimedeviationsinaccordancewithplantprocedure.ThiswascompletedonAugust15,1996.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONS0A.AP0010119,"OvertimeLimitsforPlantPersonnel,"wasrevisedtoclarifythecircumstancesunderwhichanovertimedeviationauthorizationmustbeobtainedandtobetterdefinetheexpectationsforpersonalaccountability.ThisrevisionwasissuedonAugust23,1996.Thisprocedurewillbefurtherrevised St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationInsectionReort96-09torequirethataPlantConditionReportbegeneratedtoassesstheapprovalofanydeviationsfromovertimelimits.ThisactionwillbecompletedbyOctober31,1996.B.Atrainingbulletinwasissuedtositesupervisoryandmanagementpersonnelregardingthechangesmadetotheovertimeprocedure,AP0010119.Thisbulletinrequiresdiscussionswithdepartmentalpersonnelandastatementofunderstandingandsignaturetoensureaccountability.C.TheSt.Luciesecuritysystemsoftwareisbeingupgradedtogenerateareportthatwillidentifypotentialdeparturesfromovertimelimits.ThisactionwillbecompletedbyOctober31,1996.D.PayrolltimesheetswillbemodifiedbyOctober31,1996,toincorporatethefollowingfourimprovements:1.Documentationofallovertimeworkedregardlessofpaystatus.2..Documentationofhoursworkedsixdayspriortothepayrollperiodtoensurethatforanycontinuoussevendayinterval,overtimelimitsarenotexceeded.3.Documentationofturnovertime.4.Acertificationbysubmitterandapproverthatovertimelimitshavenotbeenexceeded.5.FullcompliancewasachievedonAugust15,1996,withthecompletionofitems3Aand3Babove.VIOLATIONB:TechnicalSpecification6.2.frequires,inpart,thatdeviationsfromovertimeguidelinesbeapprovedinaccordancewithestablishedproceduresandthatcontrolsbeincludedinestablishedproceduressuchthatindividualovertimebereviewedmonthlybythePlantGeneralManagerorhisdesigneetoassurethatexcessivehourshavenotbeenassigned.Contrarytotheabove,theserequirementswerenotmetinthat:

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationInsectionReort96-09Establishedplantprocedureswereinadequatetoassurethatdeviationsfromovertimeguidelineswouldbeapproved,inthatcontrolsincludedinAdministrativeProcedure(AP)0010119,Revision14,"OvertimeLimitationsforPlantPersonnel,"lackedspecificityindefiningwhenanovertimedeviationrequestwasrequired,resultingininconsistenciesinapplication.Establishedplantprocedureswereinadequatetoassurethatproperreviewswereperformedmonthlytoassurethatexcessivehourswerenotassigned,inthatcontrolsincludedinAP0010119,Revision14,"OvertimeLimitationsforPlantPersonnel,"didnotincludeanappropriatelevelofspecificityindefininghowsuchareviewwastobeconducted.Sourcesofinformationwerenotspecified,samplesizewasnotdefined,andwhat,ifany,recordsofthereviews'esultsweretobegeneratedwerenotdefined.Asaresult,managementfailedtoidentifythatunauthorizeddeviationsfromtheovertimeguidelinescontainedinTechnicalSpecification6.2.2.fwereoccurring.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementI).RESPONSEB:FPLconcurswiththeviolation.2.REASONFORVIOLATIONThecauseoftheviolationwasthatSt.LuciemanagementpersonneldidnotadequatelyassurethattheTechnicalSpecificationrequirementsregardingtheuseofovertimewerestrictlyadheredto.Contributingtothiswasaproceduralinadequacy,inthattheAdministrativeProceduregoverningtheuseofovertime,AP0010119,"OvertimeLimitationsforPlantPersonnel,"assignedresponsibilitiesformonitoringovertimeusebutprovidednodetailonhowtoaccomplishthismonitoringfunction.Additionally,theprocedurewasunclearonthecircumstanceswhichwouldrequireanovertimedeviationrequesttobecompletedandapprovedpriortoexceedingtheovertimelimits.Severaladditionalfactorscontributedtothisevent:A.Payrolltimesheetsdonotreliablyindicateallhoursworked.Thetimeshetreflectsonlythosehourswhicharetobepaid.Exemptemployeesandnon-

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationInsectionReort96-09bargainingunitemployeeshavetheabilitytoarrangecompensatorytimeoffinlieuofpay.B.Personnelpossessinguniqueskillsandexperienceonkeyoutageactivitiespaidinsufficientattentiontotheirhoursworkedandfailedtoself-identifytheneedforauthorizationofovertimelimitdeviations.C.MonitoringofpersonnelbydepartmentheadsandmanagerswasinadequatetoensurecompliancewithTechnicalSpecificationrequirements.3.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDPlantdepartmentheadsandmanagerswerenotifiedonJune19,1996,thatapparentovertimeviolationshadoccurred.Increasedattentiontoovertimemonitoringandpre-approvalofovertimeguidelinedeviationswasemphasizedbythePlantGeneralManager,andamonthlyreviewofovertimewasinitiated.B.AP0010119,"OvertimeLimitsforPlantPersonnel,"wasrevisedtoclarifythesurveillancerequirementsandmethodologyformanagingtheuseofovertime.ThisrevisionwasissuedonAugust23,1996.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSA.PayrolltimesheetswillbemodifiedbyOctober31,1996,toincorporatethefollowingfourimprovements:Documentationofallovertimeworkedregardlessofpaystatus.2.Documentationofhoursworkedsixdayspriortothepayrollperiodtoensurethatforanycontinuoussevendayinterval,overtimelimitsarenotexceeded.3.Documentationofturnovertime.4.Acertificationbysubmitterandapproverthatovertimelimitshavenotbeenexceede St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationInsectionReort96-09B.QualityInstructionQI7-PR/PSL-l,"ControlofPurchasedMaterial,EquipmentandServices,"willberevisedtorequireatimelysubmittalandreviewofcontractorhoursworked.ThisactionwillbecompletedbyOctober1,1996.C.ThiseventandtherevisedrequirementsformanagingovertimelimitationswillbeintegratedintocontractororientationtrainingtoemphasizepersonalaccountabilityforovertimecontroltoFPLcontractors.ThisactionwillbecompletedbyNovember30,1996.D.St.Luciesecuritysystemsoftwareisbeingupgradedtogenerateareportthatwillidentifypotentialdeparturesfromovertimelimits.ThisactionwillbecompletedbyOctober31,1996.AP0010119,"OvertimeLimitsforPlantPersonnel"waschangedtoreflectthattheemployeetimesheetistheprimarymeansofidentifyingovertimelimitproblems,andthatthesecuritysystemwillprovideameansfordepartmentheadstocross-checkemployeehours.FullcompliancewasachievedAugust23,1996,withthecompletionofitems3Aand3Babove.VIOLATIONC:TechnicalSpecificationSection6.8.1.cstatesthatwrittenproceduresshallbeestablished,implementedandmaintainedcoveringsurveillanceandtestactivitiesofsafetyrelatedequipment.ProcedureQI5-PR/PSL-1,Revision71,"Preparation,Revision,Review/ApprovalofProcedures,"Section5.11.1,stated,inpart,thatformaintenancethatcanaffecttheperformanceofsafetyrelatedequipment,nuclearplantworkordersinvokingdetailedvendortechnicalmanualstep-by-stepinstructionsrequiredFacilityReviewGroupreviewandPlantGeneralManagerapproval.ProcedureQI5-PR/PSL-1,Revision71,"Preparation,Revision,Review/ApprovalofProcedures,"Section5.11.3,statedthatchangestotechnicalmanualsreceivedfromthevendororch-".ngesinitiatedbyFPLshallbeforwardedtoProductionEngineeringGroup/JunoBeachforreviewandapprova St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationInsectionReort96-09ProcedureQI5-PR/PSL-1,Revision71,"Preparation,Revision,Review/ApprovalofProcedures,"Section5.11.5,statedthatmaintenanceandpreventativemaintenancerequirementsspecifiedintechnicalmanualsshallbeconsideredwhenwritingmaintenanceproceduresandthatvendorrecommendationsforpreventativemaintenanceactivitiesorfrequenciescontainedintheseVendorTechnicalManualsmaybedeviatedfrom,providedatechnicalreviewisperformedbytherespectivemaintenanceengineeringgroup.Contrarytotheabove,theserequirementswerenotmetinthat:MaintenanceandtestsperformedduringtheUnit11996refuelingoutageontheUnit1reactorcavitypressurereliefdampersinvokedtheuseofthevendor'stechnicalmanualbutdidnotrequirethatthismanualandworkorderbereviewedbytheFacilityReviewGroupandapprovedbythePlantGeneralManager.ThefrequencyforthemaintenanceandtestsspecifiedbythevendormanualfortheUnit1reactorcavitypressurereliefdamperswaschangedfromannuallytoonceevery54monthswithoutatechnicalreviewbytherespectivemaintenanceengineeringgroup.3.ThetorquevaluesspecifiedfortheUnit2reactorcavitypressurereliefdamperswerechangestovendorspecifiedcriteriaandwereimplementedwithoutatechnicalreviewbytherespectivemaintenanceengineeringgroup.Inaddition,thesechangeswerenotsenttotheProductionEngineeringGroup/JunoBeachforreviewandapproval.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementI).RESPONSEC:1.FPLconcurswiththeviolation.2.REASONFORVIOLATIONThecauseoftheviolationwascognitivepersonnelerrorbyutilitymaintenancepersonnelwhofailedtofollowplantproceduresinthefollowingareas:

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationInsectionReort96-09Thelevelofusageforthetechnicalmanualwasincorrectlyspecifiedwithintheworkpackageduringtheplanningprocess.TheworkdescriptionspecifiedthatFacilityReviewGroup(FRG)approvalwasnotrequiredwheninfact,thevendormanualwasbeingusedasaprocedure.FRGapprovalisrequiredpriortouseofanyvendortechnicalmanualasaprocedure.ThisrequirementisspecifiedinplantprocedureADM0010432,"ControlofPlantWorkOrders."andinPlantQualityInstruction,QI5-PR/PSL-1,"Preparation,Revision,Review/ApprovalofPlantProcedures."B.ThevendorspecifiedmaintenancefrequencyfortheSt.LucieUnit1damperswaschangedwithoutobtainingadocumentedtechnicalreviewbythemaintenanceengineeringgroup.Additionally,a1987engineeringmemorandumwhichdescribedchangestoacceptancecriteriaandwasnotapprovedthroughaformalengineeringprocesswasinappropriatelyplacedintheSt.LucieUnit2technicalmanualandsubsequentlyusedduringtheperformanceofpreventativemaintenanceonthereactorcavitydampers.Anadditionalcontributingfactorwasthatthereactorcavitypressurereliefdamperswerenotgivenpriorityforreviewinthepreventativemaintenancebasisprojectduetotheirlackoffailurehistory.Thisprojectreviewsanddocumentsthebasisforpreventativemaintenanceincludinganydeviationsfromvendorrecommendations.3.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDFPLengineeringperformedasafetyevaluationissuedonJuly5,1996,whichconcludedthateliminationofthepressurereliefven'titanfortheSt.Luc'",Unit1reactorcavitydampers(RCD1&2)fromthedes;gnbasisaidnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion,andthatthedamperswerenolongerrequiredtoactuatefollowingalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).TheonlyrequiredfunctionfortheUnit1dampersistoremainclosed,andthisfunctionwasverifiedonJuly14,1996,priortotheUnit1cyclefourteenstartup.TherequirementonUnit1toperformperiodicspringadjustments,calibrations,andtestingisr,~longerapplicable.B.ThemostrecenttestsoftheUnit2reactorcavitypressurereliefdamperswerecompletedonOctober23,1995.Thesetestsshowedtheasfoundvaluesforreactorcavitydamperspringtensiontobeincompliancewiththeacceptancecriteriaspecifiedintheapprovedvendortechnicalmanua St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationInsectionReort96-09C.Theunapprovedengineeringmemorandumwhichchangedthevendor'srecommendedsetpointswasremovedfromtheaffectedcopiesoftheUnit2technicalmanual(TM2998-12979).ThisactionwascompletedonAugust22,1996.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSA.Inter-officecorrespondenceletterswereissuedtomaintenanceplannersandsupervisorsonJuly22,1996,whichre-emphasizedtherequirementsofADM0010432,"ControlofPlantworkOrders,"regardingtheuseofvendortechnicalmanualsandlevelsofmanagementreview.Additionally,theneedforpersonneltoensureappropriateengineeringreviewofallinstructions,notesandvendorletterspriortotheiruseinworkpackageswasstressed.OperatingProcedureNOP1-0030120,"PrestartCheck-offList,"willberevisedtoincludetherequirementthatthereactorcavitydampersbecheckedclosedpriortoentryintoMode4.ThisactionwillbecompletedbyOctober31,1996.C.FPLwillperformadetailedreviewofthePMbasisprogramtoensurethatothersafetyrelateddampersareincludedintheprogram.ThisreviewwillbecompletedbyDecember15,1996.D.FPLengineeringwillperformasafetyevaluationtoreviewthepressurereliefventfunctionoftheSt.LucieUnit2reactorcavitypressurereliefdampers.ThisevaluationwillbesimilartothatperformedforUnit1,andwillassesstheeliminationofthepressurerelieffunctionforthesedampersonUnit2.TheevaluationwillbecompletedbyOctober15,1996.E.St.LucieUnit1andUnit2technicalmanualrequirementsforreactorcavitydamperspringtestingwillberevisedtoreflecttheconclusionsreachedintheengineeringsafetyevaluations.ThiswillbecompletedbyOctober31,1996.AtrainingbulletinwasissuedtoallFPLmaintenancedisciplinestoreemphasizetherequirementspertainingtotheuseofvendortechnicalmanuals.Additionally,thisevent,andvendortechnicalmanualusagerequirementswillbeintegratedintocontractorsitecoordinatortrainingbyNovember30,199 St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationInsectionReort96-09G.AsapartofFPL'scontinuingmaintenancetraining,usagelevelrequirementsassociatedwithvendortechnicalmanualswillbeincorporatedintoDynamicLearningActivities(DLA)formaintenancepersonnelbyNovember30,1996.5.FullcompliancewasachievedonAugust22,1996,withthecompletionofitems3A,3Band3Cabove.VIOLATIOND:10CFR50AppendixB,"QualityAssuranceCriteriaforNuclearPowerPlantsandFuelReprocessingPlants,"CriterionXI,"TestControl,"states,inpart,that"...atestprogramshallbeestablishedtoassurethatalltestingrequiredtodemonstratethatstructures,systemsandcomponentswillperformsatisfactorilyinserviceisidentifiedandperformedinaccordancewithwrittentestprocedureswhichincorporatetherequirementsandacceptancelimitscontainedinapplicabledesigndocuments...Testproceduresshallincludeprovisionsforassuringthatallprerequisitesforthegiventesthavebeenmet...Testresultsshallbedocumentedandevaluatedtoassurethattestrequirementshavebeensatisfied."Contrarytotheabove,adequateproceduresandcontrolswerenotestablishedforthetestsperformedontheUnit1andUnit2reactorcavitypressurereliefdamperstoassurethatthesedamperswouldperformsatisfactorilyinserviceandmeettherequirementsspecifiedbythedesigndocumentsandthevendor'stechnicalmanual,inthat:TestsoftheUnit1reactorcavitypressurereliefdamperscompletedonDecember7,1990,indicatedthat4ofthe7damperbladestodampernumbers1,and3ofthe7damperbladestodampernumber2,failedtomeettheacceptancecriteriaofthevendor'stechnicalmanual.Theworkorderrecordsdidnotindicatethatthedamperswereadjustedtomeettheacceptancecriteria.TestsoftheUnit2reactorcavitypressurereliefdamperscompletedonOctober24,1990,indicatedthat4ofthe7damperbladesfordampernumber1,and5ofthe7damperbladesfordampernumber2,didnotmeettheacceptancecriteriaofthevendor'stechnicalmanual.3.TestsoftheUnit2reactorcavitypressurereliefdamperscompletedonMay21,1992,indicatedthatall7damperbladesfordampernumber2didnotmeet St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationInsectionReort96-09theacceptancecriteriaofthevendor'stechnicalmanual.Theworkorderrecordsdidnotindicatethatthedamperwasadjustedtomeettheacceptancecriteria.Thetestresultsindicatedthatdampernumber1wassatisfactory.TestsoftheUnit2reactorcavitypressurereliefdamperscompletedonFebruary17,1994,indicatedthatall7damperbladesfordampernumber1didnotmeettheacceptancecriteriaofthevendor'stechnicalmanual.Theworkorderrecordsdidnotindicatethatthedamperwasadjustedtomeettheacceptancecriteria.Thetestresultsindicatedthatdampernumber2wasnottested.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementI).RESPONSED:1.FPLconcurswiththeviolation2.REASONFORVIOLATIONThecauseoftheviolationwasafailureofmaintenanceforemenandsupervisorstofollowplantAdministrativeProcedureADM0010432,"ControlOfPlantWorkOrders."Thisprocedurerequiresthatacceptancecriteriadatabewithinspecifications.Ifnot,thedegradedconditionistobeevaluatedorcorrectiveactionistobetakenusingascopechange,anewPlantWorkOrderorothermeans.Intheinstancescited,noadditionalactionwastakentoevaluatetheconditionortoperformrework.Inaddition,forUnit2,a1987informalengineeringmemorandumwhichdefinedchangestoacceptancecriteriawasusedtoperformpreventativemaintenancework.Useofthecriteriaprovidedinthememorandumresultedinacceptanceofdamperspringtensionvalueswhichdidnotmeetthetechnicalmanualacceptancecriteria.OneadditionalfactorcontributedtothefailuretotestadamperonFebruary17,1994:1)TheNuclearPlantWorkOrder(NPWO)instructionslackedclaritywhichresultedinthemaintenanceforemaninterpretingtheNPWOinstructionsasaddressingonlyonedamper(RCD-1).Thecomponentnumber"RCD-2"fortheseconddamperwaslistedinanattachmenttotheNPWO.Asaresult,testingspecifiedtobeperformedonUnit2onFebruary17,1994fordamperRCD-2wasnotcompleted.11 St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationInsectionReort96-093.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVE<DForUnit1,EngineeringSafetyEvaluationJPN-PSL-SENP-96-021,Rev.0issuedJuly5,1996,concludedthateliminationofthepressurereliefventfunctionforreactorcavitydampers(RCD-1&2)fromthedesignbasisdidnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionandthatthedamperswerenolongerrequiredtoactuatefollowingalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).Theonlyrequiredfunctionforthedampersistoremainclosed,andthisfunctionwasverifiedonJuly14,1996,priortotheUnit1cyclefourteenstartup.TherequirementonUnit1toperformperiodicspringadjustments,calibrations,andtestingisnolongerapplicable.B.ThemostrecenttestsoftheUnit2reactorcavitypressurereliefdamperswerecompletedonOctober23,1995.Thesetestsshowedtheasfoundvaluesforreactorcavitydamperspringtensiontobeincompliancewiththeacceptancecriteriaspecifiedintheapprovedvendortechnicalmanual.C.Theunapprovedengineeringmemorandumwhichchangedthevendor'srecommendedsetpointswasremovedfromtheaffectedcopiesoftheUnit2technicalmanual(TM2998-12979).ThisactionwascompletedonAugust22,1996.4.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSInter-officeCorrespondenceLetter,"RequirementsforEquipmentTesting"datedJuly22,1996,wasissuedrequiringthatallmaintenanceplannersperformareviewofworkordertestactivitiestoensurecompliancewithSiteQualityManualtestrequirementspriortopackageissuance.Additionally,thisrequirementistobeincorporatedintothePlanningChecklistusedbythemaintenanceplannersandcontainedinAdministrativeProcedureAP0010432,"ControlofPlantWorkOrders."ThisactionwillbecompletedbyOctober31,1996.B.Inter-officeCorrespondenceLetter,"UseOfNon-ApprovedDocuments"datedJuly22,1996,wasissuedtosupervisorsandplannersreaffirmingthatonly"Controlled"technicalmanualsorportionsthereof,maybeusedinconjunctionwithNuclearPlantWorkOrders.Anyuncontrolledinformationmustreceive12 St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationInsectionReort96-09technicalreviewsandapprovalsinaccordancewithQI5-PR/PSL-1priortouse.AmemorandumwasissuedbytheMaintenanceManagertoallmaintenancesupervisorsemphasizingstrictadherencetoacceptancecriteriaasoutlinedinADM0010432,"ControlOfPlantWorkOrders".Additionally,thiseventandtherequirementsassociatedwithadherencetoapprovedacceptancecriteriainplantworkorderswillbereemphasizedinmaintenancetraining.ThisactionwillbecompletedbyDecember15,1996.D.FPLengineeringwillperformasafetyevaluationtoreviewthepressurereliefventfunctionoftheUnit2reactorcavitypressurereliefdampers.ThisevaluationwillbesimilartothatperformedforUnit1,andwillassesstheeliminationofthepressurerelieffunctionforthesedampersonUnit2.TheevaluationwillbecompletedbyOctober15,1996.E.St.LucieUnit1andUnit2technicalmanualrequirementsforreactorcavitydamperspringtestingwillberevisedtoreflecttheconclusionsreachedintheengineeringsafetyevaluations.ThiswillbecompletedbyOctober31,1996.5.FullcompliancewasachievedonAugust22,1996,withthecompletionofitems3A,3Band3Cabove.VIOLATIONE:TechnicalSpecification6.8.1.arequiresthatwrittenproceduresbeestablished,implemented,andmaintainedcoveringtheactivitiesrecommendedinAppendixAofRegulatoryGuide1.33,Revision2,February,1978.AppendixA,paragraphl.dincludesadministrativeproceduresforproceduraladherence.QI5-PR/PSL-1,Revision71,"Preparation,RevisionReview/ApprovalofProcedures,"Section5.13.1,statesthatallproceduresshallbestrictlyadheredto.HP-2,FloridaPowerandLight(FPL)HealthPhysicsManual,Revision10,describestheradiationprotectionprogramatFPL'snuclearpowerplants.Thelicensee'scontaminationguidelinesaresummarizedinTable4.2,"ContaminationGuidelines,"ofthemanual.ThefollowingcontaminationlimitsaredescribedinTable4.2.13 St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationInsectionReort96-09Thelicensee'scontaminationlimitsformaterials,tools,equipmentandsolidwasteunconditionallyreleasedfromtheRadiationControlArea(RCA)are:1,000dpm/100cmforloosebetaandgammacontaminationand5,000dpm/100cm'orfixedbetaandgammacontamination(directmeasurement)Thelicensee'scontaminationlimitsfortoolsandequipmentusedintheRCAare:1,000dpm/100cm'orloosebetaandgammacontaminationand10mrem/hrforfixedbetaandgammacontaminationContrarytotheabove,theserequirementswerenotmetinthat:OnJune18and19,1996,licenseehealthphysicstechniciansfoundcontaminatedtoolsoutsidetheRCAhavingcontaminationlevelsgreaterthantheunconditionalreleaselimits.OnJune18,1996,healthphysicstechniciansremoved12M&TEtoolsfromthecleantoolroomhavingcontaminationlevelsuptoapproximately12,500dpm/100cm(250netcountsperminute/probe).OnJune19,1996,healthphysicstechniciansremovedfiveriggingslingsfromthelicensee'scleantoolroomhavingcontaminationlevelsfromapproximately40,000to600,000dpm/100cm(8,000to120,000dpm/probe).OnJune13,14,and16,1996,healthphysicstechniciansfoundtoolsintheRCAhavingcontaminationlevelsgreaterthanthelimitsfortoolsandequipmentutilizedintheRCA.OnJune13,1996,healthphysicstechniciais,ernovedninetoolsfromatemporaryhottoolroomhavingloosecontaminationlevelsfromapproximately1,000to20,000dpm/100cm~.14 eSt.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationInsectionReort96-09OnJune14,1996,healthphysicstechniciansremovedfivewrenchesfromtheUnit1hottoolroomhavingloosecontaminationintherangeof1,000to4,000dpm/100cm.OnJune16,1996,healthphysicstechniciansremovednumeroustoolsfromatemporaryhottoolroomhavingloosecontaminationintherangeof1,000to30,000dpm/100cm.OnJune16,1996,healthphysicstechniciansremovednumerous(twobags)oftoolsfromtheUnit1hottoolroomhavingloosecontaminationintherangeof1,000to120,000dpm/100cm~.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation'(SupplementIV).RESPONSEE:FPLconcurswiththeviolation.2.REASONFORVIOLATIONThisviolationaddressedtoolsfoundoutsidetheRadiationControlArea(RCA)thatwereabovetheunconditionalreleaselimits,aswellastoolsfoundinsidetheRCAtoolroomsthatwereabovetheprocedurallyprescribedlimitsforuseintheRCA.ThecauseofcontaminatedtoolsbeingoutsidetheRCAwasafailureofplantpersonneltoensurethathealthphysicspersonnelperformedunconditionalreleasesurveyspriortoremovalofthetoolsfromtheRCA.ToolsfoundintheRCAtoolroomswhichwereaboveprocedurallyprescribedlimitswerearesultofplantpersonnelreturningtoolsusedincontaminatedareastothetoolroomswithoutfirsthavingthemdecontaminatedandsurveyedbyhealthphysics.Severaladditionalfactorscontributedtotheseevents:1)TheSt.LucieMaintenanceDepartmenthadinstitutedmorestringentcontrolsovertoolissueandaccountability.Inanefforttoreducethenumberoflosttools,personnelwererequiredtologeachtoolout,andthenbackinfollowinguse.Failuretologanitembackintoinventorycouldresultinthepersonbeingheldresponsibleforlossofthatitem.Thisresultedinpersonnelreturninge St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationInsectionReort96-09toolstothetoolroomwhichwerepotentiallycontaminatedaboveprocedurallimitstoensurethatthetoolswereloggedinandaccountedfor.2)Therewerenopersonnelassignedfulltimetooperatethetooldecontaminationarea.Thisresultedinareluctanceofpersonneltosimplydropoffthetoolsatthedecontaminationarea,astherewerenoprovisionstoallowthetoolstobeloggedbackintoinventorypriortotheirbeingdecontaminated.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDA.ToaddresstheissueofcontaminatedtoolsoutsideoftheRCA,thefollowingcorrectiveactionsweretaken:1.Allitemsfoundtobecontaminated,asdescribedintheaboveviolation,wereimmediatelyreturnedtotheRCA.ThisactionwascompletedbyJune19,1996.Asite-wideinspectionwasmadeofareasoutsidetheRCA,wheretoolsandequipmentwhichcouldhavebeenusedintheRCAarestored,toensurethatnoadditionalcontaminateditemsexisted.Eightadditionalitemswerefoundduringtheinspectionwhichdidnotmeettherequirementsforunconditionalrelease,andwerethereforereturnedtotheRCA.ThisactionwascompletedonJuly7,1996.SupervisorsfromInstrumentandControl(INC),Electrical,andMechanicalmaintenancedisciplineswerereq'-'oconductstanddownmeetingswiththeircrewstodiscussthisin<<tuen(.4,AprocedurechangewasimplementedtoHPP-4,"SchedulingofHealthPhysicsActivities,"whichincreasedthefrequencyofsurveysinthedesignatedsecondarysidetoolstorageareafrommonthlytoweekly.Surveysperformedinthisareaaremorethoroughthaninthepast,withem-hasisonitemsknowntobeusedintheRCA.5.Workstanddownmeetingswereheldwithhealthphysicspersonneltostresstheimportanceofperformingthoroughunconditionalreleasesurveys,includingadequatesearchesofallvehiclesleavingtheRCAtoidentifyanyitemsnotreadilyvisible.16 St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationInsectionReort96-09ToaddressthematteroftoolsfoundabovetheprocedurallimitsintheRCAtoolrooms,thefollowingcorrectiveactionsweretaken:Extensivesurveyswereperformedtoensurethatthecontaminationlevelsofalltoolslocatedinthetoolissueareaswerewithinprocedurallimits.Alltoolingfoundtobeabovetheselimitswerereturnedtotheappropriatedecontaminationarea.ThisactionwascompletedbyJuly1,1996.AplantConditionReportwasgeneratedwhichresultedinRCAtoolroompersonnelbeinginstructednottoplaceanytoolingbackontheshelfforreissue,regardlessofwhetherthetoolwasusedinacleanorcontaminatedarea.Alaydownareawasdesignatedineachtoolroomtobeusedasaholdingareaforreturnedtoolinguntilhealthphysicssurveyscanbeperformed.3.Workstanddownmeetingswereheldwithhealthphysicspersonneltoensurethatthenewtoolreturnpolicywasstrictlyenforced.4.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSA.ThisviolationwasdiscussedattheUnit1outagecritiquemeetingheldonAugust8,1996.Asaresult,themechanicalmaintenancetoolingsupervisorwillbeworkingwiththeHealthPhysicsDepartmenttodevelopwrittenpoliciesgoverningtoolissuanceandresponsibilities.ThisactionwillbecompletedbyDecember15,1996.St.LucieHealthPhysicsDepartmentwillworkwiththeMaintenanceDepartmenttoreducetheamountoftoolinglocatedintheRCA.Thiswillallowmorethoroughandefficientsurveystobeperformed.ThisactionwillbecompletedbyDecember15,1996.Ataskteamwillbeformedtogenericallyaddresstheissueofsitetoolcontrol.Theteamwilladdressbothoutageandnon-outagecontroloftools.AdditionallongtermcorrectiveactionswillbeevaluatedtoenhancethepositivecontrolmeasuresfortoolingbothinsideandoutsidetheRCA.ThisactionwillbecompletedbyDecember15,1996.17 St.LucieUnitsIand2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationInsctionReort96-09D.ThiseventandtheproceduralrequirementsfortheremovalofmaterialsfromtheRCAwillbeincorporatedintothemaintenancecontinuingtrainingprogram.ThisactionwillbecompletedbyDecember15,1996.5.FullcompliancewasachievedonJuly7,1996withthecompletionofitems3.A.I,3.A.2and3.B.1,above.18