IR 05000335/1996012

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Forwards Response to NRC 961021 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-335/96-12 & 50-389/96-12.Complete Review of Plant Change/Mod (PC/M) 341-192 Was Conducted
ML17309A860
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/21/1996
From: PLUNKETT T F
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
EA-96-236, EA-96-249, L-96-254, NUDOCS 9610300138
Download: ML17309A860 (15)


Text

CATEGORY1REGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9610300138DOC.DATE:96/10/21NOTARIZED:YESFACIL:50-335St.LuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPower5LightCo.56-389St.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPower6LightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONPLUNKETT,T.F.FloridaPower6LightCo.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)

SUBJECT: ForwardsrespondstoNRC961021ltrreviolationsnotedininsprept50-335/96-12a50-389/96-12.Completereviewofplantchange/Mod(PC/M)341-192wasconducted.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt}-InspRept/NoticeofViolationResponseNOTES:DOCKET0500033505000389RECIPIENT-IDCODE/NAMEPD2-3PDINTERNAL:'CRSAEOECENTERBNRR/DRPM/PERBOEDIRRGN2FILE01EXTERNAL'ITCOBRYCEtJHNRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11221111111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMENIENS,L.AEOD/SPD/RABDEDRONRR/DISP/PIPBNRR/DRPM/PECBNUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS3NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL1111111111111111RDNOTETOALL<<RIDS"RECIPIENTSPLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUK'NTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR19ENCL19 FloridaPower5lightCompany,P.O.Box14MO,Juno6each,FL33408-0420OCT23$996L-96-25410CFR2.201U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNo.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationNRCSecialInsectionReort96-12EA96-236and96-249FloridaPowerandLightCompanyhasreviewedthesubjectNoticeofViolationand,pursuantto10CFR2.201,theresponsestotheviolationsareattached.Verytrulyyours,T.F.PlunkettPresidentNuclearDivisionTFP/JAS/EJWAttachmentcc:StewartD.Ebneter,RegionalAdministrator,USNRCRegionIISeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LuciePlantt-Co{'9hi0300i38qhi02iPDRADQCK050003358PDRanFPLGroupcompany

STATEOFFLORIDA))COUNTYOFPALMBEACH)ss.J.A.Stallbeingfirstdulysworn,deposesandsays:ThatheisVicePresident,St.LuciePlant,ofFloridaPower&LightCompany,theLicenseeherein;Thathehasexecutedtheforegoingdocument;thatthestatementsmadeinthisdocumentaretrueandcorrecttothebestofhisknowledge,informationandbelief,andthatheisauthorizedtoexecutethedocumentonbehalfofsaidLicensee.J.A.StallSTATEOFFLORIDACOUNTYOFSworntoandsubscribedbeforemethis~dayof,19byJ.A.Stall,whoispersonallyknowntome.NameofNotPublic-StateofFl';+8"+y808ERTAs.Ecologyssf:olMYCOMMSSOMICC283823BAREStune1,1997"gyral60NOSTWWfFANNeuRIICe,Iie'-(Print,typeorstampCommisionedNameofNotaryPublic)

l L-96-254.AttachmentRe1toaNoticeofViolationVIOLATIONI:10CFR50.59,"Changes,TestsandExperiments,"provides,inpart,thatthelicenseemaymakechangesinthefacilityasdescribedintheSafetyAnalysisReport(SAR)withoutpriorCommissionapproval,unlesstheproposedchangeinvolvesanunreviewedsafetyquestion.AproposedchangeshallbedeemedtoinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestioniftheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARmaybeincreased,ifapossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSARmaybecreated,orifthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisreduced.Contrarytotheabove,inJuly1995,thelicenseemadeachangetothefacilitywhichinvolvedanunreviewedsafetyquestionwithoutpriorCommissionapproval.Specifically,the2BEmergencyDieselGenerator(EDG)fueloillinewasmanuallyisolatedtosecureathrough-wallfueloilleak.Intakingthisaction,thelicenseeintroducedtwonewfailuremodesforthe2BEDG,whichbothincreasedtheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionoftheEDGabovethatpreviouslyevaluatedintheSARandthepossibilityformalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSAR,resultinginanunreviewedsafetyquestion.(01013)ThisisaSeverityLevelIIIviolation(SupplementI)RESPONSEI:FPLconcurswiththeviolation.2.REASONFORTHEVIOLATIONThecauseoftheviolationwasthatFPLproceduralguidanceforperforming10CFR$50;59evaluationsinplaceatthetimeoftheviolationwasnotconsistentwiththeNRC'sinterpretationoftheregulation.Thesubjectevaluationwaspreparedinaccordancewiththe"NuclearEngineeringDepartmentGuidanceforPerforming10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluations."TheprimarybasisforthisengineeringprocedurewasNSAC-125,"Guidelinesfor10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluations,"whichisthegenerallyacceptedindustrystandardonthesubject.InJuly1995,boththeFPLprocedureandNSAC-125allowedaconclusionofno

L-96-254.AttachmentRe1toaNoticeofViolationincreaseinprobabilityiftheincreasewasdeterminedtobeinsignificant.Thesubject10CFR$50.59safetyevaluationallowedplantoperationwiththe2Bdieselfueloiltransferpumpdischargeisolationvalve(normallylockedopen)intheclosedpositioninordertoisolatealeakintheundergroundportionofthepiping.CompensatoryactionswererequiredbytheevaluationtoensurethevalvewouldbeopenedintheeventofanEDGstart.ThesecompensatoryactionswereconsistentwiththeguidelinesofNRCGenericLetter91-18,"InformationtoLicenseesRegardingTwoNRCInspectionManualSectionsonResolutionofDegradedandNonconformingConditionsandonOperability"fortheuseofmanualactioninplaceofautomaticaction.AsnotedintheFPLevaluation,twonewfailuremodesandaslightincreaseintheprobabilityofacomponentfailurewerecreated.PursuanttotheFPLprocedure,theevaluationconcludedthatthisslightincreaseinprobabilitywasinsignificantandthatnounreviewedsafetyquestionexistedasaresultoftheproposedplantconfiguration.3.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDTheunreviewedsafetyquestionidentifiedinNRCInspectionReport96-12wasassociatedwiththeclosingofthedieselfueloiltransferpumpdischargeisolationvalve.Compliancewasre-establisheduponrestoringthevalvetoitsnormallyopenpositionfollowingreplacementoftheleakingundergroundpipingdownstreamofthevalve.Thereplacementoftheleakingpiping,restorationofthevalvetotheopenposition,andreturnofthe'2BEDGtoOPERABLEstatuswerecompletedbyNovember25,1995.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSFPLEngineeringissuedaTechnicalAlerttoengineeringpersonnelonMarch6,1996,informingthemthatwhenperforming10CFR$50.59evaluations,anyquantifiedincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceofaccidentsoranyquantifiedincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetymustbeconsideredanunreviewedsafetyquestion.B.Revision1tothe"NuclearEngineeringGuidanceforPerforming10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluations"wasissuedonMay17,1996.ThisrevisionproceduralizedtherequirementstatedintheTechnicalAlertdiscussedin4.A.abov L-96-254.AttachmentRe1toaNoticeofViolationFPLwillevaluatetheneedforfurtherproceduralrevisionstakingintoaccounttheNRC'spositiondocumentedinTIA95-013andthelatestindustryguidanceonperforming10CFR$50.59evaluations.ThisactionwillbecompletedwithinthreemonthsfollowingtheissuanceofNRCandindustryguidanceonperforming10CFR$50.59evaluations.FullcompliancewasachievedbyNovember25,1995,withthecompletionofItem3above.6.~ADDITIONALINFORMATIONWhileFPLconcurswiththeviolationascited,itwasnotuntilAugust19,1996,thatFPLhadthebenefitofreviewingtheNRCmemorandumdatedJuly30,1996,whichrespondedtoaTechnicalAssistanceRequest(TIA95-013).TheresponsetoTIA95-013illustratestheexistingconfusionsurroundinginterpretationof10CFR$50.59.TheissueofconcerndealswiththeStaff'spositionontheintroductionofnewfailuremodesastheyrelatetopermittedcompensatoryactions.TheNRRresponsetoTIA95-013containsanarrowerinterpretationofthepermissibleuseofadministrativecontrols,specificallycompensatoryactions,whencomparedtoapreviousNRCposition.Specifically,NRCInspectionManual,Part9900interimguidanceon10CFR$50.59,issuedinApril1996.Part9900(pg.3,paragraph4)statesthat"...thestaffhasfoundcompensatingeffectssuchaschangesinadministrativecontrolsacceptableinoffsettinguncertaintiesandincreasesintheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSARorreductionsinmarginofsafety,providedthepotentialincreaseorreductionsinmarginarenegligible."Ontheotherhand,theresponsetoTIA95-013suggeststhatcompensatorymeasurescannolongerbecreditedtooffsetsmallpotentialincreasesinprobability.InthecaseoftheFPL10CFR$50.59evaluation,acompensatoryoperatoractionwasusedinplaceofanautomaticfunction.Specifically,theresponsetotheTIAassertsthat"anunreviewedsafetyquestionexistsbecausetheproposedchangeintroducesanewprocedureandassociatedmalfunctionofadifferenttype(operatorerror)..."TheresponsetotheTIAfurtherassertsthat"[I]ngeneral,theintroductionofcompensatorymeasuressuggeststhatthereisanunreviewedsafetyquestionforwhichcompensationisneeded,hence,a50.90submittalshouldbepreparedbythelicenseeandevaluatedbythestafftodeterminewhetherthecompensationisadequate."ThispositionconflictswiththepositionsetforthintheApril1996Part9900guidanc L-96-254.AttachmentRe1toaNoticeofViolationThenewpositionalsohasimplicationsfortheNRC'soperabilityguidanceinGenericLetter91-18,"InformationtoLicenseesRegardingTwoNRCInspectionManualSectionsonResolutionofDegradedandNonconformingConditionsandonOperability."Underthisguidance,NRCrecognizesthatsubstitutionofmanualactionforautomaticactionmaybeacceptableundercertaincircumstances.Additionally,inanNRClettertoNortheastNuclearEnergyCompanydatedOctober21,1994(JohnF.StolztoRichardM.Kacich),itisstatedthat,"[I]fanoperabilityconclusionismadebaseduponimplementingcompensatoryactionsresultinginachangetothefacilityorproceduresasdescribedintheFSAR,anevaluationpursuantto$50.59mustbeperformed..."However,asstatedabove,thenewpositiontakenintheresponsetotheTIA,withregardtocompensatorymeasures,wouldappeartoforeclosethepossibilitythatsuchachangecouldbemadepursuantto10CFR$50.59.TheinconsistenciesbetweenthepositionssetforthintheTIAresponse,NRCInspectionManualPart9900guidance,anddocketedcorrespondenceillustratethecurrentstateofconfusionregardingtheinterpretationof10CFR$50.59.IntheresponsetotheTIA,theStaffstatesthatit"...isintheprocessofbetterdefiningwhatconstitutesappropriateuseofcompensatorymeasuresin10CFR50.59safetyevaluations."Furtherattestingtothecurrentlyevolvingstateof10CFR$50.59interpretationisNRC's"ActionPlanforImprovementsto10CFR$50.59ImplementationandOversight,"fromJamesM.TaylortoChairmanJackson,datedApril15,1996.TheactionplanrecognizesseveralissuesinneedofclarificationandthatafinalpapertotheCommissionontheactionplanisnotscheduledforissuanceuntilFebruary1997.FPLrespectfullyrequeststhat,inlightofthepositionontheintroductionofnewfailuremodesthroughmanualoperatoractionexpressedintheresponsetotheTIA,theStaffresolve,inatimelymanner,thedifferencesininterpretationandapparentinconsistenciesthatexist.TheStaffsresolutionofthesedifferenceswillpermitFPLandotherlicenseestoproperlyimplementtherequirementsof10CFR$50.59and10CFR$50.90inday-to-dayplantoperation L-96-254.AttachmentReItoaNoticeofViolationVIOLATIONIIA:10CFR50,AppendixB,"QualityAssuranceCriteriaforNuclearPowerPlantsandFuelReprocessingPlants,"CriterionIHrequires,inpart,thatmeasuresbeestablishedtoassurethatapplicableregulatoryrequirementsandthedesignbasisforsafety-relatedstructures,systems,andcomponentsarecorrectlytranslatedintospecifications,drawings,procedures,andinstructions.FloridaPowerandLightCompanyTopicalQualityAssuranceReport,TQR3.0,Revision11implementstheserequirements.Section3.2,"DesignChangeControl,"provides,inpart,thatdesignchangesshallbereviewedtoensuretheirimplementationisineachcase,coordinatedwithanynecessarychangestooperating'procedures.Inaddition,Section3.2.4,"DesignVerification,"provides,inpart,thatdesigncontrolmeasuresshallbeestablishedtoverifythedesigninputs,designprocess,andthatthedesigninputsarecorrectlyincorporatedintothedesignoutput.Contrarytotheabove,thelicenseefailedtocoordinatedesignchangeswiththenecessarychangestooperatingproceduresasevidencedbythefollowingexamples:PlantChange/Modification(PC/M)109-294,"SetpointChangetotheHydrazineLowLevelAlarm(LIS-07-9),"wascompletedonJanuary6,1995,withoutensuringthataffectedProcedureONOP2-0030121,"PlantAnnunciatorSummary,"wasrevised.ThisresultedinAnnunciatorS-10,"HYDRAZINETKLEVELLO,"showinganincorrectsetpointof35.5inchesintheprocedure.PC/M268-292,"IntakeCoolingWaterLubeWaterPipingRemovalandCirculatoryWaterLubeWaterPipingRenovation,"wascompletedonFebruary14,1994,withoutensuringthataffectedProcedureONOP2-0020131,"PlantAnnunciatorSummary,"wasrevised.ThisresultedintheinstructionsforAnnunciatorE-16,"CIRCWTRPPLUBESPLYBACKUPINSERVICE,"incorrectlyrequiringoperatorstoverifythepositionofvalvesMV21-4Aand4Bfollowingasafetyinjectionactuationsystemsignaltoensuretheywerede-energizedandhadnocontrolroompositionindication.3.PC/M275-290,"FlowIndicator/SwitchLowFlowAlarmandManualAnnunciatorDeletions,"wascompletedonOctober28,1992,withoutensuringthataffectedProcedureONOP2-0030131,"PlantAnnunciator L-96-254-AttachmentRe1toaNoticeofViolationSummary,"wasrevised.Thisresultedintheinstructionsforsafety-relatedAnnunciatorsLA-12,"ATMSTMDUMPMV-08-18A/18BOVERLOAD/SSISOL,"andLB-12,"ATMSTMDMPMV-08-19A/19BOVERLOAD/SSISOL,"incorrectlyrequiringoperatorstocheckAuto/Manualswitchorswitchesforthemanualposition.(02014)ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementI).RESPONSEIIA:1.FPLconcurswiththeviolation.REASONFORTHEVIOLATIONThecauseoftheviolationwasaninadequateconfigurationcontrolprocesswhichfailedtoensurethatproceduresandprocessesaffectedbyplantmodificationswereidentifiedandupdatedinatimelymannerasrequiredtoaccuratelyreflectthemodificationsmadeintheplant.Acontributingfactortothisviolationwasthat,atthetimeofimplementationoftheplantmodificationsintheexamplestotheviolation,therewasageneralacceptancebyplantmanagementofroutinebacklogsforopenitemsrelatedtoplantmodifications.3.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDTheSt.LuciePlantAnnunciatorSummaryProcedure,ONOP2-0030131,wasrevisedtocorrectthethreediscrepanciesidentifiedinthisviolation.ThisactionwascompletedonJuly5,1996.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSA.Aself-assessmentoftheplantmodificationfront-endreviewprocesswasconducted,whichincludedbenchmarkingwithFPL'sTurkeyPointPlant.Inaddition,aQualityAssuranceauditofthedesigncontrolprocesswasconducted,whichsupportedtheresultsoftheself-assessment.B.St.LucieDesignControlProcedureQI3-PR/PSL-1wasrevisedtoincorporateapositivecheckforcompletionofprocedureupdatespriortosystemturnover L-96-254AttachmentReItoaNoticeofViolationandtoensureupdatingandtrackingofaffectedprocedurespriortorestoringamodifiedsystemtoservice.TherevisedQI3-PR/PSL-1processwasfirstimplementedatSt.LuciePlantduringtheSummer1996St.LucieUnit1refuelingoutage.ProcedureQI3-PR/PSL-1wasfurtherrevised,post-Unit1-refuelingoutage,toincorporatetheresultsoftheself-assessmentdiscussedin4.A,above.C.TheConfigurationManagementGroupatSt.LuciePlantwasreorganizedandrestructured,withtheadditionofstaffingandsupervisiontosupportthenewplantmodificationreviewprocessandtocontinuetooptimizeprocesscontrolanddesign/procedureintegration.D.Plantmanagementexpectationsandrequirementsforthoroughreview,processing,andcloseoutofmodification-relatedactionitems,andthedocumentationoftheseactionspriortorestoringamodifiedsystemtoservice,werecommunicatedtoplantpersonnelviaItems4.B.and4.C.,above.Theplant'sacceptanceofbackloggedmodification-relatedactionitemswasreplacedwithanunambiguousrequirementtofullyprocessmodificationdocumentationtoclosurepriortodeclaringrestorationofoperability.FullcompliancewasachievedonJuly5,1996,withthecompletionofItem3above.VIOLATIONIIB:10CFR50,AppendixB,"QualityAssuranceCriteriaforNuclearPowerPlantsandFuelReprocessingPlants,"CriterionIIIrequires,inpart,thatmeasuresbeestablishedtoassurethatapplicableregulatoryrequirementsandthedesignbasisforsafety-relatedstructures,systems,andcomponentsarecorrectlytranslatedintospecifications,drawings,procedures,andinstructions.FloridaPowerandLightCompanyTopicalQualityAssuranceReport,TQR3.0,Revision11implementstheserequirements.Section3.2,"DesignChangeControl,"provides,inpart,thatdesignchangesshallbereviewedtoensuretheirimplementationisineachcase,coordinatedwithanynecessarychangestooperatingprocedures.Inaddition,Section3.2.4,"DesignVerification,"provides,inpart,thatdesigncontrolmeasuresshallbeestablishedtoverifythedesigninputs,designprocess,andthatthedesigninputsarecorrectlyincorporatedintothedesignoutpu L-96-254AttachmentReItoaNoticeofViolationContrarytotheabove,thelicenseefailedtoassurethatthedesignoftheCirculatingandIntakeCoolingWaterSystemwascorrectlytranslatedintoplantdrawings.Specifically,duringimplementationofPC/M341-192,"IntakeCoolingWaterLubeWaterPipingRemovalandCirculatoryWaterLubeWaterPipingRenovation,"theas-builtDrawingNo.JPN-341-192-008wasnotincorporatedintoDrawingNo.8770-G-082,"FlowDiagramCirculatingandIntakeCoolingWaterSystem,"Revision11,Sheet2,issuedMay9,1995,forPC/M341-192.ThisresultedinDrawingNo.8770-G-082erroneouslyshowingvalves1-FCV-21-3Aand3Bandassociatedpipingasstillinstalled.(03014)ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementI).RESPONSEIIB:1.FPLconcurswiththeviolation.2.REASONFORTHEVIOLATIONThecauseoftheviolationwascognitivepersonnelerrorbyutilitydrawingupdatepersonnelwhofailedtoincorporateas-builtdrawingnumberJPN-341-192-008intodrawingnumber8770-G-082,Revision11,Sheet2,whichresultedinaninaccuratedocumentationofdesignchangesmadetotheplant.Severaladditionalfactorscontributedtotheevent:A.Thedrawingupdatediscrepancynotedabovewasnotidentifiedduringsubsequentindependentreviewbyutilitypersonnel'riortorelease.B.Forthedrawingthatwasnotupdated,adiscrepancywasobservedinthecomputerbaseddrawingupdatetrackingprograminplaceatthetime,regardingthedateoftransmittalofthesubjectdrawingtodocumentcontrol.Thisdiscrepancyintransmittaldateprovidedasourceofconfusionregardingactualdrawingstatusatthetimeoftransmittal,andcontributed'asacausalfactortotheviolation.C.Themisseddrawingupdateinthiseventwasassociatedwithaplantmodificationwhichwasimplementedoveralongperiodoftime,whichalsocontributedtotheeven L-96-254.AttachmentRe1toaNoticeofViolationD.AccountabilitiesandresponsibilitiesassociatedwiththeDrawingUpdatecheckerandverifierroleswereinformallycommunicatedatthetimedrawingverificationwasinitiallyperformed.3.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDDrawingnumber8770-G-082,Sheet2,wasrevisedtoincorporateas-builtdrawingnumberJPN-341-192-008,whichdeletedvalves1-FCV-21-3Aand3B.ThisrevisionwasissuedonApril24,1996.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSA.Acompletereviewofplantchange/modification(PC/M)341-192wasconducted.Threeadditionaldrawingerrorswerediscoveredandalldrawingshavebeencorrectedandreissued.B.Thiseventwasreviewedwithdrawingupdatepersonneltoprovidetrainingandensureunderstandingoftheresponsibilities,accountabilities,andexpectationsofpersonnelinvolvedintheprocessofdrawingupdate.Toensureproperupdating,andtogenericallyassessthepotentialforothererrorsresultingfromothercauses,asampleofupdateddrawingsfrompreviouslyimplementedPC/Msisbeingreviewed.Thissampleincludesdrawingsexhibitingapotentialdiscrepancybetweenstatustransmittaldate,asdescribedabove,andalsodrawingsassociatedwithPC/Mswhichwereimplementedoveranextendedperiodoftime.ThisactionwillbecompletebyDecember30,1996.D.Thecomputerbasedsystemusedtotrackdrawingupdateswasconvertedtoanewsystemin1996.Thenewsystemallowspersonnelcheckingdrawingupdatestoprintacompletelistofalldrawingupdatesrequiredforagivenmodification.TheaccountabilitiesandresponsibilitiesassociatedwiththeDrawingUpdatecheckerandverifierarebetterdefinedinthatdrawingupdatepersonnelarerequiredtousethislistwhenverifyingthedrawingupdatesperformedbythedrafterforagivenmodificationpackage.Theuseofthislistaidspersonnelinverifyingthatallapplicablerevisionrequirementsforagivendrawinghavebeenincorporated.FullcompliancewasachievedonApril24,1996,withthecompletionofItem3above.