IR 05000335/1996016

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-335/96-16 & 50-389/96-16.Corrective Actions:Revised Security Procedure 0006125, Reporting of Safeguards Events, & Will Develop Security Event Response Guidance
ML17229A088
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/18/1996
From: PLUNKETT T F
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
L-96-255, NUDOCS 9610250150
Download: ML17229A088 (13)


Text

CATEGORYj.REGULATORYINFORMATION-DISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)*ACCESSION'NBR:9610250150DOC.DATE:96/10/18NOTARIZED:NOFACIL:50-335St.LuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPoweraLightCo.50-389St.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPower6LightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONPLUNKETT,T.F.FloridaPoweraLightCo.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)

SUBJECT: Respondstoviolationsnotedininsprepts50-335/96-16a50-389/96-16.Correctiveactions:revisedsecurityprocedure0006125,"ReportingofSafeguardsEvents,"6willdevelopsecurityeventresponseguidance.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-InspRept/NoticeofViolationResponseNOTES:DOCKETg0500033505000389RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD2-3PDINTERNAL:ACRSCFILCENTERNRRDRCHHFBNRR/DRPM/PERBOEDIRRGN2FILE01EXTERNAL:LITCOBRYCE,JHNRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11221111111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEWIENS,L.AEOD/SPD/RABDEDRONRR/DISP/PIPBNRR/DRPM/PECBNUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS3NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL1111111111111111DENT'OTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR19ENCL19 FloridaPower5LightCompany,P.O.Box14000,JunoBeach,FL33408.0420OCT18$996L-96-25510CFR2.201U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNo.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationNRCSecialInsectionReort96-16FloridaPowerandLightCompanyhasreviewedthesubjectNoticeofViolationand,pursuantto10CFR2.201,theresponsestotheviolationsareattached.Verytrulyyours,T.F.PlunkettPresidentNuclearDivisionTFP/JAS/EJWAttachmentcc:StewartD.Ebneter,RegionalAdministrator,USNRCRegionIISeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LuciePlant~.,'rj/l~9trrf0250i505000335096i018pDRADOCK06anFPLGroupcompany

~~L-96-255AttachmentReItoaNoticeofViolationVIOLATIONA:10CFR73.71,ReportingofSafeguardsEvents,AppendixG,(a)(3)"ReportableSafeguardsEvents,"requiresthelicenseetoreporttotheNRCwithinonehourfollowingdiscovery,followedbyawrittenreportwithin30days,eventswhichcauseinterruptionofnormaloperationsthroughtamperingwithcontrolsincludingthesecuritysystem.Thelicensee'sSecurityProcedure,SP-0006125,ReportingofSafeguardsEvents,Revision9,datedApril20,1995,Paragraph8.2(I)definesoneofthosespecificeventsasbeinga"confirmedtamperingofsuspiciousoriginwithsafetyorsecurityequipment."ContrarytotheaboveonJuly29,1996,thelicenseefailedtoreporttheconfirmedtamperingwithsecurityequipment(locks)withinonehourtotheNRC.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementID)RESPONSE:1.FPLconcurswiththeviolation.2.REASONFORVIOLATIONThereasonfortheviolationwaspersonnelerrorinthattheeventwasnotcorrectlyidentifiedasinvolvingtampering.Acontributingfactortotheerrorwasinadequateproceduralguidance.ThesecurityeventreportingprocedureinuseonJuly26,1996,didnotprovideacleardefinitionoftamperingnorclearguidanceformakingreportabilitydeterminationsfortamperingevents.OnJuly26,1996,gluewasdiscoveredinthelockcoreofanentrydoortotheUnit2ControlElementDriveMechanismControlSystem(CEDMCS)room.Furtherinspectionrevealedthatseveralpadlock/doorlocksets(atotalofelevenlocks)onbothunitshadbeensimilarlyvandalized.TheaffectedlocksweredeterminednottoadverselyimpactplantoperationsorthePhysicalSecurityPlan.Basedonthisdetermination,itwasincorrectlyinterpretedthatthiseventdidnotconstitute"tampering"asdescribedinSt.LuciePlantSecurityProcedureNo.0006125,"ReportingofSafeguardsEvents."Theprocedurerequired

~~~~L-96-255AttachmentRe1toaNoticeofViolation"confirmedtamperingofsuspiciousoriginwithsafetyorsecurityequipment"tobereportedasaSafeguardsEvent.Failuretoidentifythisincidentas"tamperingwithsecurity/safetyequipment"resultedinutilitypersonnelnotreportingtheincidenttotheNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)withinonehour,asrequired.3.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDTheeventwasreportedtotheNRCinLicenseeEventReport96-S01onSeptember11,1996,inFPL's30dayreportonthediscoveryofadditionaltamperingofkey-lockedswitchesonAugust14,1996.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSA.SecurityProcedureNo.0006125,"ReportingofSafeguardsEvents"wasrevisedtoclarifythedefinitionof"tampering"andthereportabilitydeterminationsforsimilarevents.B.Securityeventresponseguidancewillbedevelopedtoprovideforactionsinresponsetoaneventthatresultedfrom,orissuspectedtohaveresultedfrom,deliberateormaliciousactsdirectedagainstplantsafetyorsecurityequipment.ThisactionwillbecompletedbyOctober31,1996.5.FullcompliancewasachievedonSeptember11,1996withthecompletionofItem3above.VIOLATIONB:TechnicalSpecification6.8.1.arequiresthatwrittenproceduresbeestablished,implemented,andmaintainedcoveringtheactivitiesrecommendedinAppendixAofRegulatoryGuide1.33,Revision2,February1978.AppendixA,paragraphl.cincludesadministrativeproceduresforequipmentcontrol.AdministrativeProcedureNo.2-0010123,"AdministrativeControlofValves,LocksandSwitches,"Revision73implementsthisrequirementwithrespecttoadministrativelycontrolledkeys.Step8.2.1ofthisprocedurestatesinpartthatcubiclescontainingcriticalcontrolsinremotelocationsshallbelockedandthekeysmaintainedunderAdministrativeControl.Contrarytotheabove,onAugust19,1996,keysusedforthecontrolofPowerOperatedReliefValvesV1474andV1475locatedinthe2Aand2Belectricalpenetrationroomsrespectively,werelocatedintheunlockedcubicleswhichhouse L-96-255AttachmentReItoaNoticeofViolationtheseswitches.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementI)RESPONSE:1.FPLconcurswiththeviolation,asclarifiedbelow.2.REASONFORVIOLATIONReuirementsStep8.1.2.ofAdministrativeProcedure(AP)No.2-0010123,"AdministrativeControlofValves,LocksandSwitches,"states,inpart,that:Avalve,switchorfuseisplacedunderAdministrativeControlby:A.PhysicallylockingthevalveorswitchStep8.2.1.ofAPNo.2-0010123states,inpart,that:Cubiclesandrackscontainingcriticalinstrumentationandcontrolsshallbelockedandthekeysmaintainedunderadministrativecontrol.~BackroundThepoweroperatedreliefvalve(PORV)electricalisolationswitchesareusedtoelectricallyisolatePORVoperationfromthecontrolroomintheeventofafirerequiringreactorshutdownandevacuationofthecontrolroom.Theelectricalisolationswitchesarelocatedintheelectricalpenetrationroomandarekeylockedswitcheshousedinprotectiveboxes.Sincetheelectricalisolationswitchesthemselvesarekeylocked,theprotectiveboxesinwhichthekeylockedelectricalisolationswitchesarehousedarenotrequiredtobelockedinaccordancewithAPNo.2-0010123.ThekeysusedfortheelectricalisolationofthePORVsrequireadministrativecontrolinaccordancewithAPNo.2-0010123.MaintainingthekeysforthePORVelectricalisolationkeylockedswitchesintheunsecuredswitchboxesviolatedtheadministrativecontrolrequirementsofAPNo.2-001012 L-96-255AttachmentRe1toaNoticeofViolationDiscussionThecauseoftheviolationwasinadequateadministrativecontrolstoensureadequatekeyaccessibilityandwhile,atthesametime,maintainingkeycontrol.Thedevelopmentandreviewoftheoriginalproceduresforcontrolroominaccessibilityfocusedonlyontheabilityoftheoperatorstocarryouttheirshutdownfunctions.Thereviewwasnotsufficientinthat,whiletheprocedureassuredtheaccessibilityofkeyspost-controlroomevacuation,itdidnotensurethatthekeysweremaintainedunderadequateadministrativecontrol.OperatingprocedureONOP2-0030135,"ControlRoomInaccessibility,"statedthatabackupsetofthePORVelectricalisolationswitchkeysarelocatedintheswitchboxesintheelectricalpenetrationroom(onesetofkeysisalsomaintainedinthelockedkeyboxontheremoteshutdownpanel).Maintainingasetofkeysintheswitchboxeswasintendedtoensurethatthekeyswereaccessibletosupportcontrolroomevacuation.ProcedureAPNo.2-0010123,instep8.1.2.A,listsonemeansofadministrativecontrolforswitchestobethephysicallockingoftheswitch.Placingthekeysinsidetheunsecuredswitchboxes,inaccordancewithONOP2-0030135,violatedtheadministrativecontrolrequirementsofAPNo.2-0010123.3.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDA.TheUnit2PORVelectricalisolationswitchkeyswereremovedfromtheunsecuredswitchboxes.ControlofthePORVelectricalisolationswitchkeyswasassignedtoautilitynonlicensedoperator,theseniornuclearplantoperator(SNPO).B.TherequirementforthePORVelectricalisolationswitchkeystobekeptintheunsecuredswitchboxeswasdeletedfromONOP2-0030135.ThisactionwascompletedbyAugust29,1996.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSA.PhysicalcustodyofthePORVelectricalisolationswitchkeyswasassignedtotheSNPO,whomaintainsthemonthewatchstandingshiftkeyring.Thiswasdonetoensureboththecontrolofthekeysaswellastheiravailabilitytooperatetheswitchesinatimelymanner,ifrequired.Thisresolvesthepreviousconflictbetweentheoperatingprocedureandadministrativeprocedure.ThechainofcustodyforthekeysismaintainedbytheSNPOacknowledgingcustodyofthekeys,viahissignature,onCheckSheet2,NuclearPlant

L-96-255AttachmentReItoaNoticeofViolation0erator/SNPOTurnoverCheckSheetofAPNo.0010120,Conductof~Oeretioos.B.ProceduresAPNo.1-0010123andAPNo.2-0010123(forUnits1and2,respectively)willberevisedtoaddtoeachprocedurealistofkeyringsandkeysheldbyeachwatchstander.Thiswillalsoensuretheperiodicperformanceofakeyinventory.TheprocedurerevisionswillbecompletedbyOctober31,1996.C.ThepotentialforadditionalpreviouslyunrecognizedproceduralconflictsinUnit2proceduresAPNo.2-0010123andONOP2-0030135concerningkeyandlockcontrolwasreviewedandnoadditionalconflictswereidentified.D.ThepotentialforpreviouslyunrecognizedproceduralconflictsinUnit1proceduresAPNo.1-0010123,"AdministrativeControlofValves,LocksandSwitches,"andONOP1-0030135,"ControlRoomInaccessibility,"concerningkeyandlockcontrolwasreviewedandnoadditionalconflictswereidentified.E.ProgrammaticimprovementstotheSt.LuciePlant'sadministrativecontrolofkeyswillbemade.Thechangesbeingconsideredinclude:1)Strictershiftcontrolsandaccountabilityforkeyscheckedoutbytheoperatingcrewduringtheoperatingshift;2)Areviewofthekeycontrollogatshiftturnovermeetingstoconfirmshifttoshiftcontrolofadministrativelycontrolledkeys;3)ChangestotheOperationsandSecurityprocedurestodefineactionsandnotificationstobetakenintheeventoflossofcontrolofadministrativelycontrolledkeys;and,4)Theestablishmentofasite-widenumberingsystemforcontrolledkeystoensurebetterresponsetomissingorlostkeyevents.TheevaluationandimplementationofchangesdeterminedtoberequiredwillbecompletedbyNovember29,1996.ThequalityofSt.LuciePlantprocedures,andrevisionstothoseprocedures,aswellasthequalityofproceduresbeingdevelopedtoimplementplantprocess

L-96-255AttachmentRe1toaNoticeofViolationimprovements,arethefocusofmanagementattentionandaction.Inordertoensurethatplantproceduresareofconsistentquality,St.LuciePlanthasformedtheProceduresDevelopmentGroupwithintheInformationServicesDepartment.Itisintendedthatthisgroupwillultimatelyberesponsibleforthedevelopmentof,andrevisionsto,plantprocedures.Thefocusedaccountabilityforthedevelopment,maintenance,andadministrationofplantprocedureswillhelptoensurethatproceduralconflictssuchastheoneidentifiedbythisviolationwillbepreventedfromoccurringfornewprocedures,andsystematicallyidentifiedandcorrected,ifpresentinexistingprocedures.5.FullcompliancewasachievedonAugust29,1996,withthecompletiontheactionsidentifiedinItem3above.