IR 05000389/1978010
| ML17206A619 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1978 |
| From: | Herdt A, Wright R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17206A611 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-389-78-10, NUDOCS 7901180329 | |
| Download: ML17206A619 (12) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report No.:
50-389/78-10 Docket No.:
50-389 License No.:
CPPR-144 Category:
A2 Licensee:
Florida Pouer and Light Company P. 0.
Box 013100 Miami, Florida 33101 Facility Name:
St. Lucie Unit 2 Inspection at:
Hutchinson Island, Florida Inspection Conducted:
October 24-27, 1978 Inspector:
R.
Wri ht.
Reviewed by:
/
I/'tr A. R. Herdt, Chief Projects Section Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Da e
Ins ection Summar Ins ection on October 24-27 1978 (Re ort No. 50-389/78-10)
Areas Ins ected:
Followup on licensee actions on previous inspection findings; housekeeping
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intake structure and auxiliary building; Anchor/Darling Valves - Part 21; generic problems associated I'ith safety-related pumps and valves; and IEB's.
The inspection involved 22 inspector-hours on site by one NRC inspector.
Results:
Of the five areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations vere identified in four areas, one apparent.
item of noncompliance (Deficiency
-
failure to report.
safety significant deficiencies Details I, paragraph 6) vas identified in one are RII Rpt.
No. 50-389/78-10 DETAILS I r
Prepared by:
R.
W. Wright, incipal Inspector Projects Section Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch
//
P.c 7(d Date Dates of Inspect.ion:
October 24-27, 1978 fr Reviewed by:
R. Herdt, Chief Projects Section Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch gizmo g Da e
l.
Persons Contacted a.
Florida Power and Li ht Com an (FPL)
="B. J.
-W.
M.
D.
R.
-E.
W.
"R. E.
C.
E.
"S.
C.
"J L-C.
S.
J.
W.
A. J.
L. L.
Escue, Site Manager Hayward, QA Supervisor Cooper, QA Engineer Sherman, QA Engineer Vaeth, Area Stores Supervisor Carter, Stores Supervisor Wills, Administrative Engineer Parker, Project QC Supervisor Kent, Engineering Project Manager, G.O.
Brown, Assistant Manager QA - Systems, G.O.
Huggins, Stores Supervisor, Electrical Leskovjan, Licensing Engineer, G.O.
b.
Contractor Or anizations Ebasco Services Inc.
(EBASCO)
"-R. A. Garramore, Senior Resident Engineer-G.
A. Maxwell, Materials Supervisor H. T. Powers, Jr'
, Process Control Engineer J.
A. Baysinger, Process Control Specialist
"Denotes those present at exit interview conducted on October 27, 197 RII Rpt.
No. 50-389/78-10 I-2 Licensee Actions on Previous Ins ection Findin s
(Closed)
Noncom liance 389/78-04-01:
Level I Procedural Discre anc The licensee submitted an interim response (L-78-166) to the subject deficiency on May 8, 1978, recognizing. that a procedural inconsistency did exist between procedures QP 2.9, Rev.
0, and CPL:
Ql 2.1, Rev.
3, and stated that during the next session of the QA/QC Coordination Committee (end of May) they would address the necessary revision.
Subsequently a
copy of the subject.
procedure revision was to be forwarded to RII.
Procedure QP 2.9, Rev.
1, was transmitted by FPL's letter (L-78-198)
dated June 7,
1978, to RII.
The subject revision permits Level I inspector personnel to perform reporting of inspection and test results where, evaluation of test results is not required.
The procedure specifies that. evaluation of results is not required in those cases where accept. ance criteria are clearly defined and are readily accessib1e to the inspector.
The RII inspector concurs with this procedural revision and examined FPL controlled QA Manuals numbered
and 118 to verify that this revision had been distributed.
This item is closed.
I (Closed)
Noncom liance 389/78-06-01:
Material Control - Failure to Follow Procedure The RII inspector verified that, the corrective measures specified by FPL's letter (L-78-232) dated July 10, 197S, had been implemented.
Material receiving report (MRR) and purchase order numbers were found written on all items randomly examined that were in the pending QC inspection status.
Pending inspection tag numbers were found to be recorded on the MRR forms as required and materials placed in pending QC inspection status were found to be properly handled in accordance with ASP-3 Rev.
1.
Revision 1 dated August 9, 197S, has been written to clarify procedural ambiguity, eliminate extraneous verbage contained in Rev.
0, and to provide a practical working document for material control.
The RII inspect. or examined two licensee performed audits, (QAC-PSL2-78-28
- Material Control; QAC-PSL2-78-34
- Nonconforming Material) that have been conducted in the materials control area since this noncompliance was identified.
IE inspector review of the above audits, discussions conducted with responsible personnel and visual inspection of site material controls and storage give assurance that the QA committments in the materials control area are being effectively implemented.
This item is close RII Rpt.
No. 50-389/78-10 I-3 (Closed)
Noncom liance 389/78-06-02:
Preventive Maintenance-Failure to Follow Procedure FPL acknowledged in its response letter (L-78-232)
dated July 10, 1978, the subject SI pump motor had been receiving monthly shaft rotation which was not in accordance with the 2-week frequency interval specified on side 2 of attachment 1 to ASP-17.
CEND-353, Rev.
6, paragraph 4.2.19 states,
"Motor shafts shall be rotated by hand in accordance with motor manufacturer's instructions or every two weeks in absence of such information."
The licensee was not able to produce the manufacturers instruction when this noncompliance was identified hence the two week frequency as specified on side 2 of attachment 1 to ASP-17 was assumed correct.
Subsequent to the above inspection the licensee.apparently located the pertinent.
GE manufacturers maintenance instructions.
As stated in.
FPL's reference letter (L-78-232)
the manufacturers instructions (letter dated August 23, 1978) state,
"The shaft should be rotated by hand periodically at, intervals of approximately thirty days to distribute the oil over the critical bearings and journal surfaces."
The above document was examined by the RII inspector along with GE instructions for,
"Custom 8000 Horizontal Induction Motors" which requires a one month rotation interval for outdoor storage and a three month rotation interval for indoor storage locations.
Receiving inspection report documentation examined verified that these manufacturers instructions were received on site prior to the start of the maintenance program on the SI pump motor.
In retrospect, the noncompliance appears to be a paper deficiency in that a
more frequent (conservative)
interval of shaft rotation was specified on side 2 of attachment 1 to ASP-17 than was actually needed.
Since the start, of the maintenance program on the subject pump motor the licensee has met and is currently abiding by the manufacturers long term storage monthly frequency shaft rotation requirement thereby assuring no adverse effect on the integrity of the subject pump motor.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item 389/78-06-03:
Control and Handlin of Discre ant Conditions The controls exercised over nonconforming materials were examined for the site warehouse storage facilities and the southwest field storage area during this inspection and during a previous IE inspection 78-7
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RII Rpt.
No. 50-389/78-10 I-4 conducted July 18-21, 1978.
"Inspector Hold" areas were found to be well defined and material on hold and material pending inspection was found satisfactorily segregated from acceptable material.
The licensee has implemented an approved "site temporary change" to be included in ASP-16, Rev.
2,
"Corrective Actions" which clarifies methods for physically storing discrepant items.
This item is closed.
3.
Unresolved Items No unresolved items were identified during this inspection.
4.
Inde endent Ins ection Effort The inspector conducted a walk-through inspection of the intake structure building and the auxiliary building noting the construction activities underway, status of construction and general housekeeping conditions of these facilities.
In the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Part 21 Identification No. 78-055-000 - Anchor/Darlin (A/D)
Tiltin Disc Check Valve Deficienc A/D's letter to the Director of Inspection and Enforcement, NRC, (Washington)
dated Hay 23, 1978, identified certain tilting disc valves which may be installed in vertical pipeline that may not close with gravity and stated that A/D would notify all purchasers of such valves by June 9,
1978.
A/D's corrective action stated,
"the owner or their agent must evaluate the use of such valves and the safety aspects."
A/D's letter to Ebasco Services Inc. dated June 12, 1978, reports that two such valves (Tag No. I-V-09-357) were supplied to FPL for Unit 2 and recommended all safety-related systems in which these valves may be installed be evaluated.
A copy of A/D's Nay 23, 1978, letter to the NRC was included as an enclosure.
FPL telephoned RII on June 20, 1978, reporting the valve problem.
The valves were placed in a
(}C Hold disposition and nonconformance report 523M was initiated.
The corrective action specified was to field test the valves in a vertical orientation verifying that the disc closes under gravity alone.
Subsequent testing of the valves revealed that one of the two subject valves failed to close when teste RII Rpt.
No. 50-389/78-10 I-5 Ebasco/FPL have since returned both valves to A/D for center of gravity modifications to be made to the disc counterweights to assure positive closure by gravity alone when installed in a vertical line.
This will be identified as an inspector followup item 389/78-10-02.
6.
Re ortable
CFR 50.55{e) Items RII informed Plant St. Lucie Unit 2 (PSL-2) site QA Construction group by tel'ephone on August 23, 1978, of possible generic problems concerning the following safety-related pumps and valves that may be planned for use PSL-2.
e.
2-Inch Tar et Rock Safet; In'ection Valve Deficienc The problem identified was that potentially excessive pressure drop across the valve could occur, which could cause the valve not to pass the required flow on initiation of a safety injection signal.
RII examination of site documentation revealed that Combustion Engineering lnc.
(CE) notified FPL by letter dated July 28, 1978 (L-CE-3826) of Arkansas Power and Light Co.'s above problem with the subject valves.
CE in their letter also stated that the subject valves are of the same type to be used at PSL-2 HPSl system and to avoid the problem it was decided to ship the PSL-2 valves (8 each)
back to Target Rock for change in valve trim to meet required CV/Flow relation.
The letter further states,
"Recent flow tests of a valve of the same type as PSL-2 with the problem and these changes will be incorporated in eight (8) PSL-2 valves."
CE later advised FPL by letter dated August.
1, 1978, (L-CE-3830)
that. the subject design deficiency was not reportable under 10 CFR 21 however was reportable under )0 CFR 50.55(e).
A subsequent FPL letter to CE dated August 15, 1978, from the Engineering Project.
Manager and a'PL Memo to Files dated August 16, 1978, from the Site Group indicate that the subject valve deficiency was evaluated in accordance with FPL's QA procedures and determined to be not report. able.
Contrary to the above evaluation, 10 CFR, Part 50.55(e)
and FPL's procedure QP 16.6, Rev.
0 defines a reportable deficiency as,
"each deficiency found in design and construction, which were it,
RII Rpt.
No ~ 50-389/78-10 I-6 to remain uncorrected, could have affected adversely the safety of operations of the nuclear plant at.
any time throughout.
the expected lifetime of the plant.,
and which represents:
(ii) a significant deficiency in final design as approved and released for const. ruction such that the design does not conform to criteria and bases stated in the safety analysis report or construction permit, The above Target Rock safety injection valve deficiency appears to meet the listed
CFR 50.55(e)
reportable deficiency criteria; however, the licensee failed to report this matter to the NRC.
b.
In ersoll-Rand (I-R) Low Pressure Safet In ection (LPSI)
and Containment S ra Pum CSP Deficienc The problem identified was that the pump impeller locking device may come off and cause possible casing damage.
By copy of a letter dated November 21, 1975, from FPL's Project Manager to Ebasco and CE the licensee informed his agents that on several occasions it was observed during the disassembly of the Turkey Point pumps (RHR) for seal maintenance that the impeller locking nut assembly had worked loose.
FPL expressed their concern that PSL-2 had the same vendor (I-R) and indications were that the same impeller locking device assembly would be used for PSL-2 LPSI and CS pumps.
Records examined at the site indicate that.
FPL had knowledge of this potential significant deficiency in final design as early as November 21, 1975 and although later alerted by RII on August 23, 1978, of the possibility that this generic impeller locking nut deficiency might affect PSL-2 the licensee failed to report this matter to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The above two examples of failure to report apparent safety significant deficiencies in accordance with FPL's procedure QP 16.6, Rev. 0, and
CFR 50.55(e)
reporting requirements were identified as deficiency item No. 389/78-10-01.
7.
IE Bulletins
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v RII Rpt.
No. 50-389/78-10 I-7 (0 en)
IEB 78-05: Malfunctionin of Circuit Breaker Auxilia Contact Mechanism - General Electric Model CR 105X Discussion with responsible FPL personnel revealed that approximately 20 percent of all the potential electrical suppliers notified by the licensee have not responded to their inquiry concerning this IEB to date.
(0 en)
IEB 78-06: Defective Cutler-Hammer T
e M Rela s
With DC Coils The licensee responded by letter (L-78-253) dated August 1,
1978, stating that FPL has requested from all suppliers with a potential for use of the subject relay a response in writing concerning its use on equipment purchased for St. Lucie Unit 2. If these relays are found on such equipment, the relay will be either replaced or modified in accordance with the recommended corrective action.
The results of this investigation should be available by January 1, 1979.
(Closed)
IEB 78-07: Protection Afforded B
Air-Line Res irators and Su lied-Air Hoods FPL stated in its letter of response (L-78-269) dated August 14, 1978, that PSL-2 does not intend to utilize supplied-air respirators in the demand mode.
If supplied-air hoods are used, a prot. ection factor will be utilized based on the manufacturer's recommended maximum air flow rates (greater or equal to 6 cfm) as measured by calibrated air-line pressure gauge or flow measuring equipment.
A description of the respiratory protection program will be presented in the FSAR.
RII has no further questions regarding this matter at this time.
(Closed)
IEB 78-08 Radiation Levels From Fuel Element Transfer Tubes The licensee responded by letter (L-78-252)
dated August 1,
1978, stating that, FPL plans to present a
thorough discussion of the shielding design in plant areas adjacent to the fuel transfer tube in the FSAR.
Measures taken to prevent access to potential high radiation areas vill also be documented in the FSAR.
Rll has no further questions regarding this matter at this time.
Exit Interview The inspect, or met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on October 27, 1978.
The inspector summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and I
RII Rpt.
No. 50-389/78"10 I-8 the findings and discussed the identified item of noncompliance
{failure to report safety significant deficiencies)
documented in paragraph 6.
The licensee raised some questions concerning what constitutes prompt notification, potential CDR's, significant deficiencies and when the clock starts for the 30-day report.
requirement.
The RII inspector described IE's position regarding these items to be reported and the time frame for reportin U y
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