IR 05000335/1978017
| ML17206A487 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 08/22/1978 |
| From: | Cottle W, Robert Lewis, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17206A483 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-78-17, NUDOCS 7810230072 | |
| Download: ML17206A487 (11) | |
Text
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+p*y4 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Repor t No.:
50-335/78-17 Docket No.:
50-335 Licensee No.:
DPR-67 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company P.O.
Box 52100 Miami, Florida 33152 Facility Name:
St. Lucie 1 Inspection at:
St. Lucie Plant, Hutchinson Island, Florida Inspection conducted:
July 18-21, 1978 Inspectors:
M. V. Sinkule W. T. Cottle Accompanying Personnel:
N e
Approved by:~)
C R.
C. Lewis, Chief
~Reactor Pro5ects Section No.
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Date Ins ection Summar Ins ection on Jul 18-21 1978 (Re ort No. 50-335/78-17)
Areas Ins ected:
Unannounced inspection of plant operations; plant operations subsequent to refueling; review and audits; annual report; reportable occurrences; unresolved items; outstanding items; noncom-pliance items; IE Bulletins and Circulars.
The inspection involved 56 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
Of the nine areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in eight areas; one apparent item of non-compliance was found in one area (infraction failure to obtain proper approvals for a temporary change to a surveillance procedure - paragraph 11-7$ 78-17-01).
RII Rpt. No. 50-335/78-17 DETAILS I Prepared by:
l. Z~
M. V. Sinkule, Reactor Inspector Reactor Projects Section No.
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Date Dates of Inspection:
Jul 18-21, 1978 Reviewed by:
\\
(
R.
C. Lewis, Chief
~~Reactor Projects Section No.
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Date 1.
Persons Contacted
- J. Barrow, Operations Superintendent
- R. Jennings, Technical Supervisor
- N. Roos, QC Engineer
- A. Bailey, QA Supervisor
- C. Wells, Operations Supervisor
- A. Collier, I 6, C Supervisor
- L. Leskovjan, Licensing Engineer
+L. Pearce, Plant Supervisor, Nuclear
- W. Shell, Plant Engineer
- B. Sweeney, Plant Engineer
- W. Windecker, Plant Supervisor, Nuclear W. Kitchens, Plant Engineer
- Present during the management interview on July 21, 1978.
I 2.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s Unresolved Items a.
(Closed)
(78-09-02):
Accountability of material in the reactor cavity area.
A review of Quality Instruction (QI) 13/PSL-2 was conducted to verify that requirements have been established to require material accountability in the reactor cavity area when the reactor head is removed.
b.
(Open)
(78-15-04):
Evaluation of calibrations found to be out of specifications for retesting requirements.
The inspector verified that temporary measures have been established to insure a prompt evaluation of retesting requirements.
Licensee
RII Rpt. 50-335/78-17 I-2 representatives stated that the permanent revision of the QI's will be accomplished during the week of July 24, 1978.
This item will be reviewed during a future inspection.
3.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable.items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
One unresolved item dis-closed during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 6.
4.
Mana ement Interview A meeting was held with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on July 21, 1978.
The inspector summarized the scope, and findings of the inspection.
5.
Licensee Event Re orts (LERs)
a.
The following LER's were reviewed to verify that (1) reporting requirements specified in Technicdl Specification 6.9 were met; (2) information available onsite supported information in the LER; (3) specified corrective actions have been completed; (4) evaluations and reviews of the event have been completed; and (5) conditions in Technical Specifications 2.0 and 3.0/4.0 have been met:
78-16 This event involved the discovery, that the value of containment high pressure trip setpoints in the Technical Specifications were determined to be in error in the nonconservative direction.
The inspector verified that the containment high pressure trip set-points were reset to the revised value of 3.3 psig.
The licensee representatives stated that a Technical Specifications change will be submitted to reflect the revised value.
No date was given by the licensee for the submittal.
This item will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
(78-17-03)
78-17 This event involved the loss of offsite power for approximately eight minutes on May 14, 1978.
The inspector reviewed the Plant Supervisor's log and conducted discussions with plant personnel to determine that safety related systems functioned as require RII Rpt. 50-335/78-17 I-3 78-19 This event involved the malfunction of the feedwater bypass valve causing the average temperature of the reactor coolant system to drop below 515 F.
The inspector verified by review of the Plant Supervisor's log and discussion with personnel that the proper corrective action was taken.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
b.
The inspector reviewed LER's 76-28 supplemental report, 78-22, and 78-23 in the office and had no further questions.
6.
Committee Review The inspector reviewed the Facility Review Group (FRG)
and the Company Nuclear Review Board (CNRB) meeting minutes for the past year to verify that the requirements of Technical Specifications (TS) 6.5.1.4, 6.5.1.5, 6.5.1.6.b,
.c,.e,.f,.g, 6.5.2.6, 6.5.2.7,
.c,.d,.e,
.g, and 6.5.2.5 were met.
No noncompliance items or deviations were identified~ however, more review will be required to determine if the CNRB is reviewing.;
(1) the minutes of the FRG; and (2) safety evaluations of special tests described in the 1977 annual report.
This item will be considered unresolved pending further review.
(78-17-02).
7.
Audits The inspector reviewed the Quality Assurance Department audit reports during the period July 1, 1977, to July 1, 1978, to verify that the requirements of TS 6.5.2.8, FSAR 17.2.18.5.2,
.3, 17.2.18.6, and FPL Quality Procedures 18.0, 18.1, and 18.2 have been implemented.
No noncompliance items were identified; however, the inspector commented during the exit interview that the sample size was not specified on the audit checklist.
This information may assist the audit reviewer in determining the significance of the audit.
8.
Penetration Fire Barrier Materials The inspector reviewed QI ll-PR/PSL-3, Revision 4, dated January 1978 which establishes material requirements for penetration fire barriers that have been repaired.
This item is considered closed.
(77-17-01)
9.
Shield Buildin Vent Heater Testin The inspector reviewed confirmatory correspondence from Ebasco which indicates that the acceptance criteria for testing of the small heaters in the Shield Building Vent System would be met
RII Rpt. 50-335/78-17 I-4 under accident conditions with a high temperature between the shield building and containment structure.
This item is closed.
(78-14-02)
10.
IE Bulletin 78-05 The subject bulletin issued April 14, 1978, discussed mal-functioning of GE Model CR150X, circuit breaker auxiliary contact mechanism.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation to verify the accuracy of the FPL response L-78-196.
This item is considered closed.
11.
Plant Tour The inspector conducted a tour of the turbine deck and control room on July 20, 1978.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
12.
IE Circulars (IEC)
The inspector verified that a copy of the following IE Circulars were received and evaluated to determine applicability and that corrective action was taken as appropriate:
a.
IEC 78-03, Shipment of Radioactive Materials b.
IEC 78-04, Installation Errors on Fire Doors c.
IEC 78-05, Inadvertent Safety Injection d.
IEC 78-06, Potential Common Mode Flooding of ECCS Equipment Rooms.
The licensee determined that this problem is applicable to St. Lucie 1; however, it was identified and discussed in FSAR 9.5.1.3.
The prelicensing review recommended that an additional valve be installed in the drain lines to the ECCS pump room sumps.
It was also recommended that a redundant level switch be added to each ECCS pump room.
As a result of the circular, the licensee has added the surveillance of the watertight doors to the "each shift" checklist.
In addition, the licensee had established drain valve surveillance requirements (valves HCV 25-1 thru 25-7 and HCV 25-1A thru 25-7A) to be performed each refueling to FPL Administrative Procedure (AP) 0010125,
"Schedule of Periodic Tests, Checks, and Calibrations".
RII Rpt. 50-335/78-17 I-5 The circular suggested that if surveillance is required that the Technical Specifications be revised to include the surveillance.
The licensee stated in the exit inter-view that no plans exist to submit a TS change on this matter.
e.
IEC 78-07, Bergen Patterson Test Stand f.
IEC 78-09, Arching of GE NEMA Size 2 Contactors.
No noncompliance items or deviations were identified.
13.
Annual 0 eratin Re ort A review of the 1977 Annual Operating Report was conducted to verify conformance with the Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 50.59.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie RII Rpt. No. 50-335/78-17 DETAILS II Prepared by:
W. T. Cottle, Reactor Inspector Reactor Projects Section No.
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch M. V. Sinkule, Reactor Inspector Reactor Projects 'Section No.
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch
~&w~r Date Szi qp Date Dates of Inspection:
July 18-21, 1978 Reviewed by:
R.
C. Lewis, Chief Reactor Projects Section No.
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Date 1.
Persons Contacted Florida Power and f.i ht Com an
- J. Barrow, Operations Superintendent
- J. Bowers, Maintenance Superintendent C. Wells, Operations Supervisor
- R. Jennings, Technical Supervisor
- N. Roos, QC Engineer 0. Hayes, Plant Supervisor Nuclear
- L. Pearce, Plant Supervisor Nuclear
- W. Windecker, Plant Supervisor Nuclear D. Kuntz, Nuclear Watch Engineer Six control 'center operators and two nuclear operators were also contacted in the course of the inspection.
- Present during the exit interview on July 21, 1978.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s Noncom liance (Closed) Infraction (78-09-01):
Failure to maintain records in accordance with established administrative controls.
Implementa-tion of the corrective action stated in FPL response dated June 20, 1978, L-78-211, was verified by review of an internal memorandum to all plant operations personnel dated June 19, 1978, and the revisions to Administrative Procedures 0010120 (Duties and Responsibilities of Operators on Shift) and 0010125
'(Schedule of Periodic Tests, Checks and Calibrations).
RII Rpt. No. 50-335/78-17 II-2 3.
Unresolved Items None 4.
Mana ement Interview A meeting was held with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on July 21, 1978.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
Licensee representatives had no conment on the item of noncompliance (78-17-01)
discussed in paragraph 9 of these details.
5.
Review of Plant 0 erations The inspector conducted a review of operating records as indicated below.
The records were checked for accuracy, completeness and conformance to licensee administrative commitments and applicable codes, standards and guides.
a ~
b.
The Nuclear Plant Supervisor Logbook was reviewed for the period June 26 through July 18, 1978.
II ~
The Control Center Operator Logbook was reviewed for the period June 26 through July 18, 1978.
C ~
The Nuclear Operator and Nuclear Turbine Operator log sheets were reviewed for the period June 1 through June 24, 1978.
The Nuclear Control Center Operator log sheets were reviewed for the period June 14 through July 7, 1978.
Each of the sets of log sheets reviewed by the inspector contained improperly corrected entries.
The Nuclear Operator and Nuclear Turbine Operator log sheets contained instances where log taking had been suspended due to plant conditions but supervisory approval of the suspension was not documented.
The inspector reviewed the 'requirements of Administrative Procedure 0010120 (Duties and Responsibilities of Operators on Shift) as relates to the above areas with licensee representatives who indicated, that increased emphasis would be placed on these areas both on shift and in the records revie~ process.
d ~
The Equipment Out of Service Log was reviewed for the period June 15 through July 17, 1978.
The inspector noted that no entry had been made for the removal of "A" charging pump from service on July 17, 1978.
This was subsequently corrected by the on-shift Nuclear Plant Supervisor when the inspector pointed out the omission on July 19, 197 RII Rpt. No. 50-335/78-17 II-3 e.
Surveillance Checksheet CS-1 for surveillance performed each shift was reviewed for the period July 1 through July 18, 1978.
The entries in the Night Orders Log were reviewed for June 1, 2, 6, 8, 21, 26, 30 and July 5, 12, 1978.
go Operating Guidelines issued for the period February 21 through July 11, 1978, were reviewed.
h.
The Disconnected Lead/Temporary Jumper Record was reviewed for entries
/l997 through 81056.
An entry dated May 21, 1978, for which a lead was lifted to facilitate current transformer (CT)
testing on the main generator was not authorized by either a
Nuclear Plant Supervisor or a Nuclear Watch Engineer as required by Administrative Procedure 0010124 (Control and Use of Jumpers and Disconnected Leads in Safety-Related Systems).
The Nuclear Plant Supervisor on-shift reviewed the entry and granted after-the-fact authorization when the error was brought to his attention.
The alteration had involved lifting a ground lead in the main generator CT circuit, a non-safety-related circuit.
Facility Review Group meeting minutes were reviewed to insure that
CFR 50.59 evaluations had been performed on those modi-fications to safety-related systems which were not removed from service for the time period during which the modifications were in effect.
All records entries reviewed were found to be adequate and contained no conflicts or noncompliance of Technical Specifications.
Each of the examples of failure to adequately follow established administra-tive controls were discussed with licensee representatives.
6.
Plant Tour A facility tour was conducted of the Unit 1 control room, auxiliary building, diesel generator building, turbine area and intake area'.
Items inspected were as follows:
a.
b.
C ~
d ~
e.f.
go h.
Monitoring instrumentation recording as required Radiation controls properly implemented Plant housekeeping conditions Existance of fluid leaks Pipe hanger/seismic restraint settings Selected valve positions and equipment start positions Equipment caution and lockout tag information Status of main control board annunciators and operator awareness of status Licensee's policy regarding plant tours by Nuclear Plant Supervisors and Watch Engineers Control room manning and operations
RII Rpt.
No. 50-335/78-17 II-4 The inspector could not locate the facility's commitment to maintaining a licensed operator in the "At-The-Controls Area".
Subsequent investigation by the Operations Supervisor revealed that the commitment had been inadvertently removed in a recent revision to Administrative Procedure 0010120 (Duties and Responsibilities of Operators on Shift).
The procedure was rewritten, approved and issued prior to the exit meeting on July 21, 1978.
Observation of operations personnel and interviews with licensed operators indicated that the manning requirement had been strictly adherred to even in the absence of the administrative guidelines.
The inspector had no questions concerning other areas inspected during the tour.
7.
S stem Restoration Followin Refuelin The inspector reviewed the completed copies of OP 0030122 (Precritical Checklist)
and OP 0030221 -(Initial Criticality Following Refueling) for the initial startup following the refueling outage.
In addition, surveillance requirements on High Pressure Safety Infection, Low Pressure Safety Injection and Nuclear Instrumentation Systems were reviewed to insure that required surveillance was performed prior to startup.
The inspector verified that OP 0030221 (Initial Criticality Following Refueling) contained adequate guidance on control rod withdrawal sequence and rod withdrawal authori-sation.
8.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Surveillance Testin Durin Refuelin The inspector reviewed the surveillance test records for the month of April, 1978.
Verification was made that the following surveillances were conducted in accordance with Technical Specification requirements during this portion of the refueling outage:
a.
b.
C ~
d ~
e.f.
Charging Pumps (Monthly) (T/S 4.1.2.3)
Seismic Monitoring Channel Check monthly)
(T/S Table 4.3-4)
AC Bus Availability geekly)
(T/S 4.8.2.1, 4.8.2.2)
CVCS Boration Flow Paths, Sources, Heat Tracing (Weekly)
(T/S 4.1.2.1)
Ultimate Heat Sink (Daily) (T/S 4.7.5.1.1)
Offsite Power Breaker Alignment (Daily) (T/S 4.8.1.1.1a, 4.8.1.2)
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie RII Rpt.
No. 50-335/78-17 II-5 9.
Normal Surveillance Testin The inspector reviewed the surveillance check sheets and completed surveillance procedures for July 19 and 20, 1978.
Surveillance procedure OP 0420050 (Containment Spray Periodic Test, Pump and Valve Operability) was found to have four valve numbering errors.
These errors involved the NaOH eductor inlet isolation valves in both the "A" and "B" spray headers.
The errors were such that the procedure could not be conducted as written and could possibly have resulted in the "A" NaOH eductor being left isolated at the completion of the test.
The inspector had the actual valve positions verified by the on-shift operations personnel and determined that the containment spray system was properly aligned.
The last completed surveillances on the "A" (July 5, 1978)
and "B" (July 19, 1978) spray headers were reviewed.
In both instances, OP 0420050 had evidently been changed to correct the valve numbering errors and allow performance of the test.
A temporary change to the procedure was not properly executed in either instance in that the required management approval was not obtained and the change was not documented for subsequent FRG review and Plant Manager approval.
This constitutes an apparent nonconformance with the requirements for execution of a temporary change to a safety-related procedure as established by Technical Specification 6.8.3 and Quality Instruction QI5-PR/PSL-1.
This item is designated as an infraction (78-17-01).