IR 05000387/1993003
| ML17157C291 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1993 |
| From: | Craig Gordon, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17157C290 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-93-03, 50-387-93-3, 50-388-93-03, 50-388-93-3, NUDOCS 9304220210 | |
| Download: ML17157C291 (8) | |
Text
Docket/Report:
'icensee; U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-387/93-03; 50-388/93-03 Pennsylvania Power & Light Company '
North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101 Facility:
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 & 2 Berwick, Pennsylvania Inspection:
February 23-25 1993 Inspectors:
C. Gor Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist 'a e Approved:
E. Fox, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist B. Haagensen, Sonalysts E. Jende, Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate J. Lusher, Emergency Preparedness Specialist R. Miller, Sonalysts M. Sjoberg, Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate E, McCabe, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
~l<<<3 date Areas Inspected The licensee's annual, full-participation emergency preparedness
{EP) exercise, Implementation of the Emergency Plan during the exercise showed that adequate on-site protective measures can be taken in an emergency.
Except for the exercise play and termination considerations identified by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania after the exercise, exercise development and content were an exercise strength.
Lack of thorough implementation of the Technical Support Center radiological assessment function for an unmonitored release pathway was an exercise weakness.
Areas for improvement included: non-recognition of Simulator Control Room (SCR) indications, SCR status briefings, prioritization ofrepairs in the Technical Support Center, and obtaining information about off-site population during protective action decision-making in the Emergency Operations Facility.
<<y3Q+~
0~0 0387 220 930415 PDR A
DETAILS Persons Contacted The following individuals attended the exit meeting on February 25, 1993.
F. Butler, 'Supervisor, Systems Analysis B. Carson, Health Physicist K. Chambliss, Supervisor, Maintenance Production Services T. Dalpiaz, Manager, Nuclear Planning Services J. Dilta, Assistant Unit Supervisor R. Doty, Supervisor, Operations Technology F. Eisenhuth, Sr. Engineer
'.
Fritzen, Supervisor, Modification Installation N. Dressier, Nuclear Emergency Planner D. Gandenberger, Supervisor, Maintenance Production/ Outage M. Golden, Supervisor, Nuclear Systems Engineering F. Gruscavage, Supervisor, Operations Engineering I. Kaplan, Manager, Energy Information W. Kelley, Emergency Plan Instructor A. Male, Supervisor, Nuclear Assessment F. Malek, Supervisor, Site Support T. Markowski, Shift Supervisor G. Miller, Manager, Nuclear Technology D. Ney, Engineer, Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection E. Panella, Sr. Public Information Specialist R. Peal, Supervisor, Emergency Planning M. Rochester, Sr. Health Physicist C. Roszkowski, Sr. Nuclear Emergency Planner D. Roth, Supervisor, NSSS System R. Saccone, Supervisor, BOP Systems J. Scopellito, Sr. Public Information Specialist R. Stotler, Manager, Nuclear Security G. Stanley, Plant Superintendent D. Walsh, Unit Supervisor, Operations The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel.
Emergency Exercise Afull-participation emergency exercise was conducted at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station on February 23, 1993 from 1500 to 233.1 Scenario Planning Initially, this exercise was to be Federal Field Exercise-3 (FFE-3).
After cancellation of FFE-3 late in October 1992, the licensee and off-site response organizations decided in December 1992 that February 23, 1993 would remain as the annual exercise date.
The licensee then coordinated with NRC Region I, NRC's Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on development ofa new scenario that could support NRC regional and headquarters incident response activities.
The scenario was submitted to NRC Region I on January 7, 1993. That did not meet the NRC 60-day submittal schedule of NRC Inspection Module 82302, but the submittal was timely for the circumstances.
Between January 15-February 10, 1993, continued work between each group resulted in a scenario which, overall, provided many technical challenges and afforded a
challenging exercise of the licensee's Emergency Response Organization (ERO), of off-site response organizations, and of the NRC's base, site and executive teams.
The new scenario needed only minor revisions, adequately tested the major portions of the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures, and also provided for demonstration of areas previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action.
Overall, the training and lessons learned provided by this challenging scenario were assessed as an exercise strength.,
On February 23, 1993, NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on the revised scenario.
The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent disrupting plant activities.
2.2 Exercise Scenario The scenario included the following simulated events:
~
Fire in Transformer T-1 and response by off-site fire.company, (an Unusual Event).
Reactor Coolant Temperature increase, and inability to maintain reactor coolant temperature below 200 degrees F (an Alert).
Turbine trip, pressure/power spike, Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV)
closure, and containment isolation due to low reactor water leve ~
Leak in condensate discharge piping.
~
. Main steam supply line break in the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) room.
~
Increase in levels of main steam line and RCIC room area radiation monitors (a Site Area Emergency).
Evacuation of non-essential personnel.
~
Grounding ofelectrical equipment by RCIC steam, and loss of 125 VDC.
~
An unmonitored release of radioactive material to the environment.
Break of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling suction from the Reactor Recirculation System.
Reactor water level falling below top of active fuel,and core uncovery (General Emergency)..
Event termination followed by recovery discussion.
Except for exercise play and termination considerations identified by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania after the exercise (Detail 2.6), the development and content of the exercise scenario (Detail 2.1) was an exercise strength, 2.3 Activities Observed The NRC inspection team observed the following:
1.
2.
3.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Selection and use of control room procedures.
Detection, classification, and assessment of events.
" Direction and coordination of emergency response.
Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies.
Communications/information flow, and record keeping.
Assessment and projection of off-site radiological doses.
Consideration of protective action recommendations (PARs).
Provisions for in-plant radiation protection.
Provisions for communicating information to the public.
Accident analysis and mitigation.
Personnel accountability.
The licensee's post-exercise critiqu.4 Exercise Finding Classifications Inspection findings were classified, where appropriate, as follows:
h
gWl'll lg h
'lllly P
with abnormal plant. conditions and implement the emergency plan.
~W': l h
fl
'
ypl l pl 'lh did not, alone, constitute overaH response inadequacy.
r f r Im rov m n an aspect which did not significantly detract from the licensee's response, but which merits licensee evaluation for corrective action.
2.5 Exercise Observations Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and Emergency Response Facility (ERF) activation and use were generally consistent with the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs).
There was good teamwork in the recognition, anticipation, and mitigation ofadverse plant conditions in each ERF.
Command and control displayed by all emergency facility managers were effective. Good coordination was observed with the NRC's site incident response teams within ERFs for providing team members with status of plant conditions and updates of licensee response activities.
2.5.1 imulator ontrol R m
R The Control Room Operations staffdemonstrated thorough knowledge, anticipated problems, and promptly recommended solutions to degraded plant conditions,
'nitiating conditions were used correctly in classification ofthe Unusual Event and Alert, and notifications foHowing each event were timely.
No exercise strengths or weaknesses were identified.
The foHowing Areas for Improvement were noted:
~
After residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) was cross-tied to the RHR system for restoration ofcore injection, the operations crew did not recognize that three SCR panel indicators for RHR and RHRSW incorrectly indicated zero fiow.
~
During the early stages of the exercise, SCR briefings by the Shift Supervisor (SS) and Unit SS were infrequent.
For those briefings which were made, status of plant equipment for event mitigation, updates on alignment of core spray, and estimated time for restoration of emergency diesel generators were not include.5.2 Technical u
ort Center C
Overall accident assessment activities in the TSC were well performed.
TSC personnel provided good technical support to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) staff and coordinated efficiently with the General Office Engineering Support Center (GOESC) in Allentown.
Direction given to the Operations Support Center allowed prompt dispatch of damage control teams.
The presence ofthe NRC Incident Response Team appeared to affect the Emergency Director's (ED's) overall direction and control ofthe emergency.
The ED provided separate status briefings to keep the TSC, EOF, and NRC base team and executive team staffs informed. TSC management was nonetheless good due to the proactive role of the Operations Coordinator.
No exercise strengths were noted.
The following exercise weakness was identified.
~
The radiological assessment function in the TSC was not thoroughly implemented for the unmonitored release pathway.
Examples of assessments which were not appropriately evaluated included:
dose calculations from the RCIC steam line break to determine estimates ofoff-site consequences, estimation of fiow rate to the environment, and projected dose rate from the controlled containment vent following large source term buildup (50-387/93-03-01; 50-388/93-03-01).
The following area for improvement was identified.
~
Prioritizing accident mitigation tasks was good with one exception, Initiallytagged out of service, restoration of the B-train RHR system was neither actively identified as a high priority TSC action nor pursued until the core was uncovered.
2.5.3 rati n l u
n r In response to the fire in transformer T-10 (the Unusual Event), the decision to activate the OSC and TSC was made.
Rapid response on the part of craft and technical personnel allowed OSC and TSC activation prior to the Alert declaration.
Performance by OSC personnel was generally good.
Command of in-plant repair teams was effective; communications with ERFs and other emergency responders was maintained throughout the exercise while teams performed repair actions. Briefings and debriefings of teams were complete and thorough.
Contamination control techniques were appropriately demonstrated.
No exercise strengths, weaknesses, or areas for improvement were identifie.5.4 Em r enc ra i F
ili Command and control demonstrated by the Interim Recovery Manager, Recovery Manager, and other key EOF staff were good. That included overall management ofengineering, dose assessment, and resources staffs. Direction and coordination offield teams, protective action decision-making, and coordination with the NRC response team were effective.
No exercise strengths or weaknesses were identified.
The following areas for improvement were identified:
~
While considering the protective action recommendation (PAR) upgrade, the licensee relied on the State representatives for information pertaining to 2-mile population distribution and evacuation time estimates (ETEs).
The position specific implementing procedures did not direct the EOF staff to reference Appendix I (population) or Appendix G (ETEs) to the Emergency Plan.
~
The EOF Radiological Assessment Manager liaison to the NRC team was not proactive in providing information to the NRC Protective Measures Manager.
2.6 Exercise Termination Satisfactory demonstration ofon-site objectives by the licensee's ERO was n'oted by NRC and licensee observers and controllers.
Likewise, demonstration ofoff-site objectives was found to meet pre-exercise FEMA extent-of-play agreements.
Following discussions of recovery actions by key licensee,'RC, and State responders in the EOF, the exercise was terminated.
Immediately after termination, concerns were raised by the Commonwealth ofPennsylvania Bureau ofRadiation Protection (BRP) and by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) regarding the inability of off-site participants to fully demonstrate and complete their emergency response activities.
To address the Commonwealth concerns, on March 25, 1993, the NRC held a meeting with the licensee,'EMA, PEMA, and BRP to discuss potential improvements in the conduct of exercises.
As a result of the meeting, an agreement was reached to more closely review exercise termination criteria and
.,
coordinate critique findings among each organization.
For future scenarios, the NRC expects to evaluate, in conjunction with FEMA, exercise play arrangements to more thoroughly support off-site response Licensee action on previously identified items Based upon NRC observations, discussions withlicensee representatives, and examination of procedures and records, the status of open items is as follows:
(Closed) 50-387/92-04-01; 50-388/92-04-01: Interaction between the TSC and EOF prior to EOF amval of a qualified Recovery Manager.
A revision to the EOF activation procedure was made which provides an Interim Recovery Manager to assume direction and control until relieved by corporate staff from Allentown.
During this exercise, the EOF was staffed within minutes including the Interim Recovery Manager.
Other areas for improvement identified in the previous annual exercise were acceptably demonstrated and not repeated.
4.0 Licensee critique On February 25, 1993, the Senior Emergency Planner and lead controllers summarized licensee observations.
The critique was thorough in scope and identified areas in need of corrective action.
No licensee critique inadequacies were identified by the NRC.
5.0 Exit Meeting Following the licensee's critique, the inspection team met with the personnel denoted in Detail-1 of this report.
Team observations were summarized.
The licensee was informed of the following:
The NRC team's conclusion that the licensee performance provided reasonable assurance that adequate on-site protective measures can and willbe taken in the event of an emergency.
No violations were found.
~
Previous concerns had been adequately addressed and were resolved.
/
~
The strength, weakness, and areas for improvement identified during this exercise.
Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that they would evaluate and take appropriate action on the identified items.