IR 05000382/2019011

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Temporary Instruction 2515/194 (Inspection Report 05000382/2019011)
ML20007E701
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 01/07/2020
From: Nick Taylor
NRC/RGN-IV/DRS/EB-2
To: Vazquez S
Entergy Operations
Taylor N
References
IR 2019011
Download: ML20007E701 (10)


Text

ary 7, 2020

SUBJECT:

WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 - TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2515/194 (INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2019011)

Dear Mr. Vazquez:

On December 11, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Nicholas H. Taylor, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000382 License No. NPF-38

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number: 05000382 License Number: NPF-38 Report Number: 05000382/2019011 Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-011-0028 Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Location: Killona, LA Inspection Dates: December 10, 2019, to December 11, 2019 Inspector: S. Graves, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved By: Nicholas H. Taylor, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting Temporary Instruction 2515/194 at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items None.

INSPECTION SCOPE

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the Temporary Instruction (TI)inspection in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Samples were declared complete when the TI requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspector reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL Temporary Instruction 2515/194 - Inspection of the Licensees Implementation of Industry Initiative Associated with the Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems (NRC Bulletin 2012-01)

This inspection was conducted using Temporary Instruction 2515/194 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17137A416), effective November 1, 2017, to verify that licensees have appropriately implemented the Nuclear Energy Institute voluntary industry initiative (ADAMS Accession No. ML15075A454) dated March 16, 2015, including updating their licensing basis to reflect the need to protect against open phase conditions. The inspector reviewed the licensees implementation of Nuclear Energy Institutes voluntary industry initiative in compliance with Commission guidance. The inspector reviewed and discussed the licensees open phase condition system design, installation, testing and maintenance plans with plant staff, and performed system walkdowns to verify that the installed equipment was supported by the design documentation.

Inspection of the Licensees Implementation of Industry Initiative Associated with the Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems (NRC Bulletin 2012-01)

(1 Sample)

Temporary Instruction 2515/194-03.01 - Voluntary Industry Initiative (Part 1)

Entergy Operations Inc. selected the open phase detection system designed and manufactured by PCS2000 Solutions, LLC. as the design vendor for the open phase condition system at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3.

During normal operations, auxiliary power for plant electrical loading is supplied by the units main generator through a unit auxiliary transformer for each redundant train. For unit startup and off-normal conditions, Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, has two Startup Transformers ST-EMT-A and ST-EMT-B, which are connected to the 230-kV switching yard and are normally operated in a standby condition. The startup transformers provide the preferred source of offsite power to the stations safety-related 4-kV power system. Both transformers have solidly grounded wye wound primary windings, which the licensee identified as susceptible to an open phase condition. Startup Transformer ST-EMT-A serves as the standby source for train A, Startup Transformer ST-EMT-B serves as the standby source for train B. The system is designed to fast transfer loads to a startup transformer following a turbine generator or reactor trip without a loss of auxiliary load. Each units engineered safety features buses are capable of being supplied from either the associated unit auxiliary transformer during normal operation or the associated startup transformer from offsite power.

Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, installed redundant open phase detection systems on each startup transformer and at the end of this inspection the PCS2000 system was operating normally with all functions enabled.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Observation: Temporary Instruction 2515/194-03.01 - Voluntary Industry Initiative 2515/194 (Part 1)

Based on discussions with licensee staff, review of design, installation and testing documentation, tour of the control room and discussions with operators, and walkdowns of installed equipment, the inspector had reasonable assurance that the licensee has appropriately implemented the voluntary industry initiative.

Detection, Alarms, and General Criteria

(1) Open phase conditions will be detected and alarmed in the control rooms.
(2) Detection circuits are sensitive enough to identify an open phase condition for all credited loading conditions.
(3) The PCS2000 system is designed and has been tuned to minimize misoperation or spurious action in the range of voltage unbalance normally expected in the transmission system that could cause separation from an operable offsite power source. The licensee had demonstrated that the actuation circuit design did not result in lower overall plant operation reliability.
(4) No Class-1E circuits were replaced with non-Class 1E circuits in the design.
(5) The licensee had updated the Final Safety Analysis Report and the Technical Specification Bases documents to discuss the design features and analyses related to the effects of, and protection for, any open phase condition vulnerabilities.

Protective Actions Criteria

(1) Startup Transformers ST-EMT-A and ST-EMT-B were identified as susceptible to an open phase condition and the licensee had implemented design changes to mitigate the effects.
(2) With an open phase condition present and no accident condition signal present, the PCS2000 system would not adversely affect the function of important-to-safety systems, structures, or components. The licensees open phase condition design solution added a set of additional tripping inputs in parallel with existing transformer isolation controls. This addition added a new tripping condition (open phase) to the previously analyzed electrical faults which result in isolation of the transformers. The credited plant response was unaffected and would be the same independent of the conditions that generated the isolation of the transformer.
(3) With an open phase condition present and accident condition signal present, the PCS2000 system would not adversely affect the transfer of 4.16-kV engineered safeguards buses to the onsite emergency diesel generators as required by the current licensing bases; only a new tripping condition (open phase) was added to the electrical faults which result in isolation of the startup transformer. The 4.16-kV engineered safeguards buses are normally energized from the main generator through each train's unit auxiliary transformer and the non-engineered safeguards buses. Upon loss of the normal power source, the engineered safeguards loads are automatically transferred to the selected startup transformer. Isolation of the startup transformer due to an open phase condition results in the engineered safeguards loads being automatically transferred and energized from the respective emergency diesel generator in the same manner as required by the current licensing bases.
(4) The inspector held discussions with licensee staff and identified that the vendor guidance, including periodic tests, setpoint verification, and equipment maintenance and inspections had been integrated into plant procedures and processes. The licensee had performed a pre-inspection self-assessment, documented in Condition Report LO-WLO-2019-00029 which documented, in part, the licensee's actions to determine if any of the open phase detection components needed to be included in the Maintenance Rule program and integrate previous operating experience from other Entergy inspections into the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, program. The licensee was in the process of developing additional procedures and processes to inspect and maintain the PCS2000 equipment in addition to that recommended by the vendor, and to meet North American Electric Reliability Corporation standards.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspector verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On December 11, 2019, the inspector presented the Temporary Instruction 2515/194 results to Mr. S. Vazquez, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

2515/194 Calculations ECE15-002 Coordination of Open Phase Detection Time Delay Trip 0

Setting

Corrective Action AR 264850 Create a new RQ under PMID-5234 and PMID-5235 to 12/16/2016

Documents replace batteries for components installed in the Open Phase

Detection System for ST-A and ST-B. Battery replacements

must occur at or before 10 years.

CR-WF3-2019-

06595, CR-WF3-

2019-06597, CR-

WF3-2019-06599

Corrective Action CR-WF3-2019-

Documents 08921

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings 5817-14365 SUT-A Start Up Transformer OPD Systems 1 & 2

Communication Block Diagram

5817-14375, SUT-A Start Up Transformer OPD Systems 1 & 2 Plant 0

Sheet 1 Contacts Schematic Diagram

5817-14376, SUT-B Start Up Transformer OPD Systems 1 & 2 Plant 0

Sheet 1 Contacts Schematic Diagram

B424, Sheet 2244 Startup Transf 3A Diff Relay and Open Phase Detection 4

B424, Sheet 2245 Startup Transf 3A Lockout Relay 20

B424, Sheet 3089 ST EMT-A Open Phase Detection Control Wiring Diagram 0

B424, Sheet 3090 ST EMT-B Open Phase Detection Control Wiring Diagram 1

G285 Main One Line Diagram 24

G347 Transformer Yard Conduit & Grounding 13

Engineering EC 52305 Design Change to Detect Open Phase Condition on Primary 000

Changes Side of Startup Transformers A and B (Byron Event)

IER-L2-12-14, CR-WF-2012-932, SIPD 1630

EC 52306 Startup Transformer A - Design Change to Detect Open 0

Phase Condition (CHILD EC OF 52305)

EC 62976 Activation of Trip Circuit on The PCS2000 Open Phase 000

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Detection System for Startup Transformers A and B (Byron

Event) IER-L2-12-14, CR-WF3-2012-932 (PARENT)

Miscellaneous Factory Acceptance Test - Waterford SUT A 9/2/2015

Factory Acceptance Test - Waterford SUT B 9/3/2015

LBDCR #16-066 LBDCR updates FSAR Section 8.2.1.6.4 and TS

Bases 3/4.8.1 to include descriptions of the Open Phase

Detection system trip capability for Startup Transformers ST

EMTA and ST EMTB as a result of EC62977.

OPD ST-A PMTP Enable Open Phase Detection Trip Function - CHILD for ST 0

CHILD EC62977 EMTA

EC80850

PCS2000 Open Waterford SUTB Site Acceptance Test 0

Phase Detection

System SAT

Post Modification Startup Transformer A - Design Change to Detect Open

Test Plan for EC Phase Condition (CHILD EC OF 52305)

2306 ECN61227

Post Modification Startup Transformer B - Design Change to Detect Open

Test Plan for EC Phase Condition (CHILD EC OF 52305)

2307 ECN61228

Procedure Add A New Section to ME-004-071 for the Open Phase N/A

Improvement Detection System (OPD)

Request to

ME-004-071

Topic Notes EC Enable Open Phase Detection Trip Function - PARENT EC No. 62976, Rev.

No. 0

WF3-EE-17- SUT-A & SUT-B Open Phase Detection Monitoring Period 0

00001 Report November 2015 - May 2016

WF3-EE-17- SUT-A & SUT-B Open Phase Detection Monitoring Period 0

00002 Report May 2016 - May 2017

Procedures OP-600-035 MT, UAT, SUT Local Panel (Section 4.3, SUT A(B) Open 017

Phase Detection)

Self-Assessments LO-WLO-2019- Self-Assessment NRC Inspection TI 2515/194 8/15/2019

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

00029

Work Orders 00397144 Perform Modification EC52306 on ST EMTA Open Phase 12/11/2015

00441413 RF21-Complete Install of Open Phase Detect Sys for ST 3/11/2019

EMTA

00441419 RF21-Complete Install of Open Phase Detect Sys for ST 4/2/2019

EMTB

00524970 ST IC3089-A1, Retrieve OPD Computer Data 5/17/2019

00524972 ST IC3090-B1, Retrieve OPD Computer Data 5/17/2019

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