IR 05000369/1992026

Insp Repts 50-369/92-26 & 50-370/92-26 on 921025-1114.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Surveillance Testing,Maintenance Observations, LER Followup & Followup of Previous Insp Findings

ML20128C187
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	11/23/1992
From:	Belisle G, Cooper T, Son Ninh, Vandoorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20128C157	List: IR 05000369/1992026 ML20128C153
References
50-369-92-26, 50-370-92-26, NUDOCS 9212040276
Download: ML20128C187 (13)

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d 0 %,#  : UMTED STATES -

1. 0 g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON -

5 o REGION n

.)* $ 1u, A.ANETTA STREET.N.Wi 4" ATL ANTA, GEORGI A 30323

\...../ Report ~Nos. 50-369/92-26 and 50-370/92-26 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station I and 2 Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17 Inspection Conductedi October 25, 1992 - iiovembei' 14, 1992

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Inspector: u%en . //-70 U-fo/LF. K. V nDoorp( Sen ~ r gesident Inspector Date Signed-Inspector: hitug //-2.0-91--

[$A 1. A. C6 prer,}e Wdent Ror Date Signed

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Inspector: ./... On .

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f0/2 S. QTRinh,~ Froject'Engig '

Approved by: . c= q G. A 'Belisle, SEtion Chief

//!23!9L Dat'e Sidned 4 Division of Reactor Projects-i-

SUMMARY Scope: This _ routine, i r ant inspection was_ conducted in the areas of i

plant operation * veillance testing, maintenance observations, l Licensee Cvent + n" i followup, followup on previous inspection l findings, followp of industry issues, review of Auxiliary Feedwater System design, inplant review of plant-logs,: management interface meeting, and -installation and testing of modification '

Results: In the areas inspected,- no violations or deviations were-identified. A possibly significant design problem regarding

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- Auxiliary Feedwater System piping was identified which required

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further review (paragraph 8). .

I 9212040276 921124 PDR ADOCK 05000369 PDR

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REPORT DETAILS 1. f'eriorn.ignt rttled klum m fmph n n D. Baxter Support Operations Manager A. Ucaver Operations Manager J. Boyle Work Control Superintendent D. Bungardner Unit 1 Opnrations Manager B. Caldwell Training Hanager 1. Curtis System Engincoting Manager J. foster Station liealth Physicist F. Fowler human Resources Manager

• Gilbert Safety Assurance Hanager P. Guill Compliance Engineer B. viamilton Superintendent of Operations B. liasty Emergency Planner P. lierran Engineering lianager

• L. Ktmka Compilance Engineer T. McConnell Station Hanager

• T. McMeckin Site Vice President R. Michael Station Chemist 1. federson Safety Review Supervisor N. Pope Instrument and Electrical Superintendent

• tt. Sharpe Regulatory Compliance Hanager B. Travis Component Engineering Manager R. White Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent Other licensee employees contacted includeo craftsmen, technicians, onerators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnn IlRC ReSi.03DLksEedio *P. K. Van Doorn

• 1. A. Cooper

• Attended exit interview Plant 0?erations (71707,1 m se,vations The inspection staf f reviewed plant operations during the report perlod to verify conformance with a)plicable regulatory requirements. Control room lorp, s11f t supervisors' logs, shift turrover records and equipment removal and restoration records were routinnly reviewed. Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and performance personne Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at shift changes. Actions and/or activities obscrved were

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conducted as prescribed in applicable station administrative directives. The complement of licensed personnel on each shift !

ret or exceeded the minimum required by Technical Specifications :

(TS). The inspectors also reviewed Problem Investigation Reports !

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(PIRs) and Operations incident Reports (OIRs) to determine whether the licensee was appropriately documenting problems and E implementing corrective action ,

Plant toers taken during the reporting period included, but were i not limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building, -

electrical equipment rooms, cable spreading rooms, and the station yard zone inside the protected are During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, fire protection, security, equipment status and radiation control :

practices were observe b. Unit 1 Operations l The unit began the inspection period at 100 percent steady state power. Operation continued at this level until November 9,199 ,

At 1:20 p.m., on Newmber 9, pressurizer pressure began a slow, but steady decrease. in res)onse, all pressurizer heaters were on. Dem nd position for bot 1 pressurizer spray valves was for full closed. One spray valve, NC-27, indicated full closed, but the other valve, NC-29, indicated an intermediate position, as.it

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had for several day l The operators began decreacing load in an attempt to reduce the-pressure decrease. When the pressure had dropped from 2235 psig to 2160 psig and with reactor power at approximately 85 percent, the component engineer removed the driver card to the electronic-to pneumatic (E to P) converter for NC 29. The position ,

indication on valve NC 29 changed to full closed and the pressure- i decrease halted. This actien prevented a significant plant transient. The ennine u held appropriate discussions with operations personnel prior to pulling the car It has t.een postulated that the output for the E to P converter had drifted up, resulting in the valve opening when the demar5d was fer the valve to be full closed. By removing the driver card, the sigrial was decreased to O milliampsi which normally corresponds to >

rull close The E to P converter is located inside of containment in an area-

not accessible during operation. Until a time occurs when maintenance can be performed on the converter, a temporary modification was performed to leave the driver card remove '

full aower operations resumed at approximately 8:00 p.m., on Novem xr 9, 199 .;

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3 Unit 2 Operations The unit has o)erated at approximately 100 percent steady state power during tie inspection period, Review of the Tagout/ Removal and Restoration (R&R) Log The inspector reviewed the R&R procedure, Control Room Reactor 0)erator's logbooks and Control Room R&R Index log-to determine w1 ether the licensee has an adequate control mechanism to remove safety related equipment from service for maintenance or personnel safety considerations and return this equipment back to servic The inspector determined that the licensee conducted a weekly audit of R&R record sheets (R&Rs) to verify that all outstanding R&Rs were listed in the affected procedures. The licensee also performed a quarterly safety tag sample audit to check for proper tagout log entries, status of tagged conipment, proper tag attachment and condition of tags. Dif arent tagout samples were reviewed each audit. Outstanding tags issued greater than or equal to 6 months were routinely evaluated for continued nee The inspector selected several outstanding. red tags to verify that they met procedural requirements during a walkdown. One inconsistency was noted during the inspector's walkdown. Unit I breaker IMXNA-3C was attached with the red tag and locked open while Unit 2 2MXNA-3C was just open. The inspector notified the Control Room Senior Reactor Operator of this inconsistency. The inspector was informed that procedure OP/1,2/A/6150/020, Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Oil Fill and Drain System, had been revised to

, proceduralize removing power from the Reactor Coolant pump motor drain tank pump preventing inadvertent _ starting. Therefore, a lock and red tag were no longer needed for the Unit'l breake Subsequently, corrective action was taken to remove the red. tag and the lock from breaker IMXNA-3 Based on the above reviews, it was concluded that the -licensee r appeared to have an adequate program to control the R&R~ proces No violations or deviations were identified, i 3. Surveillance Testing (61726)

Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the resident inspection staf f to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with the applicable T Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain that current written approved proceduros were available and in use, that test equipment in use was calibrated,-that test prerequisites were met, that system restoration was completed and acceptance criteria were me The selected test listed below was reviewed or witnessed in detail:

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PROCE]URE 10VIPMENT/ TEST j l

PT/0/A/4600/014F Perform PT functional Test on Unit 1 '

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Nuclear Instrumentation System Channel N43 PT/1/A/4253/02B Perform Unit 1 CF Train B Valve Stroke d Timing Quarterly  ;

PT/0/A/4601/08A Perform PT with NC System >l955 Psig on Unit 2 Train A Solid State Protection System PT/0/B/4700/58 Operations Quarterly Safety Tag Audit PT/1/n/4208/02A Containment Spray Train A Valve Stroke Timing Quarterly -

PT/1/A/4403/02A Nuclear Service Water Traiti A Valve Stroke Timing Quarterly PT/2/A/4350/OuA Diesel Generator Lube Oil Valve Stroke Timing Quarterly

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No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Maintenance Observations (62703) Observation Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the resident inspection staff to ascertain arocedural and performance adequacy and conformance with tie applicable T The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that, where applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use, that prerequisites were met, that equipment restoration was completed and maintenance results were adequat The selected maintenance activitie: listed below were reviewed or witnessed in detail:

WORK RE0 DEST / WORK ORDER ACTIVITY 92077132 Perform PM on Unit 1 CXA Battery Cc11s 92077133 Perform PM on Unit 1 CXB Battery Cells

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92080352 Repair Unit 1 Train B Containment Spray Test Circuitry in the Solid State Protection System 920C1307 Reset Unit 1 CA Pressure Switch IMCAPS5350 from 2 Psig to 3 Psig >

92081307 Roset Unit 2 CA Pressure Switch 2MCAPS5380 from 2 Psig to 3 Psig 92071277 investigate / Repair 202 Diesel Generator Starting Air (VG)

Air Dryer 92069554 Perform PM/PT on Lube Oil (0/G IB)

02971617 PT Overspeed Alarm and '

Shutdown Switch ILDLP5300 92080764 PM/PT on IRN73A Limitorque Actuator 92083610 VG Leakage Inspection Review of Outstanding Work Order Status The inspector reviewed the latest licensee performance indicator status for work orders (W0s) and discussed this information with the Work Control Superintendent. The licensee tracks _non-outage /non-modification (N0/NM) W0s, total W0s and Control Room

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Indication Problem-(CRIP) W0s. As of the third calendar quarter, the licensee had reduced the number of N0/NM W0s greater than one ,

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year old by 14 percent with a year _ end goal of a- 15 percent reduction. The number of corrective W0s completed within 30 days was at- 29 percent with a goal of 60 percent. N0/NM WO preventive maintenance to total maintenance-ratio was at 42 percent with a-goal of 60 percent. CRIP_W0s had been less than 40 for-34 weeks:

with a goal of 40 or-less for 26 weeks or more. . Total W0s-were reduced from over 3,000 at_the first of the year to 2513 at the-end of October. Total W0s greater.than.12 months old remained at or near 500 the-entire year through October. - Although some goals were not met, .the licensee has established goals and tracking mechanisms to affect -improvement in completing W0s, Use nf Commercial Grade Materiais in Safety Related Applications i

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The use of commercial grade items in a safety related application is allowable, provided certain regulatory requirements are me CFR 21.3 (a)(1) defines a basic component as a plant structure, system, component, or part necessary to assure: the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or the -!

capability to provent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to 10 CFR 100 referenced value CFR 21.3 (a)(3) states that in all cases, " basic component" includes design, inspection, testing, or consulting services important to safety that are associated with the component _ ,

hardware, whether these services are performed by the component ,

supplier or other CFR 21.3 (a)(4) discusses the use of commercial grade items. A commercial grade item means an item that is not subject to design ,

or specification requirements that are unique to facilities or licensed activities, used in applications other than activities or facilities that are licensed by parts of 10 CFR, and to be ordered from the manufacturer / supplier on the basis of specifications set forth in the manufacturer's published product description, it also states that a commercial grade item i's not part of a basic component until after dedication. Dedication of a commercial grade item occurs after receipt when that item is designated for uso as a basic componen For safety related applications of a commercial grade item, 10 CFR

. 50, Appendix B, Criterion Ill, IV, and Vil require that the. item be assured to fulfill all of the safety related requirements that an item procured as safety related must meet. The tests to assure this level of-quality must be performed either by the manufacturer / supplier, or by the purchaser. This is part of the ,

dedication program discussed in 10 CFR, The inspector began a review of the licensee's commercial. grade application program by reviewing the associated licensee procedures; NPP 220, Commercial Grade items, CGP 1.1, Design Engineering Commercial Grade Technical-Evaluation' Procedure, and CGP-1.2, Commercial Grade Program Procurement and Acceptance Manual - Generating and Processing of Document The inspector noted that these procedures use guidance from EPRI'

NP-5652, Guideline for the Utilization of Commercial Grade items in Nuclear Safety Related Application The inspector verified that a program does exist fo/ the dedication of comercial grade items, based on the EPRI guidanc Evaluation is performed to' determine if the item is truly commercial grade, and if so, to qualify it for use in safety related application. The engineer must identify certain critical

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characteristics necessary to fulfill the safety related function f and develop the necessary test to verify these characteristic l The inspection included a review of licensee procedures and Ciscussions with licensee personnel. The procedures ap; eared to i be adequate. Review of completed evaluations and the taoroughness -

of the evaluations will be assessed in future inspection No violations cr deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Report (LER) followup (90712,92700)

The below listed LER was reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements. The determination included: adequacy of description, verification of compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and discussion with plant aersonnel, as appropriate, were also conducted. The following ER is closed:

(Closed) LER 370/92-04: A Unit 2 Reactor Trip Occurred from Equipment failure and Possible Installation Deficienc The inspector verified that procedure EP/1,2/A/5000/1.3, Reactor Trip, Enclosure 2, was revised to include a step to close the Reactor Trip Breakers prior to resetting the feedwater isolation signal. Procedure IP/0/0/3203/08, Moore Model 72 Valve Positioner Maintenance and Calibration was developed to address 1 set up and maintenance of the valve positioners associated with the Steam Generator feedwater control valve No violations or deviations were identifie . Followup on Previous Inspection findings (92701,92702)

The following previously identified items were reviewed to ascertain that the licensee's responses, where applicable, and licensee actions -  ;

were in compliance with regulatory requirements and corrective actions have been implemente Selective verification included record review, observations, and discussions with licensee personnel, (Closed) Violation 370/91-11-02: Failure to follow Operations-Procedure for Red Marking of Control Room Drawings. 1his item

- involved the licensee's failure to mark control room drawings

- after. a modification as required by licensee. procedures. The licensee responded to this item in letters dated June 24,-1991 and-June 15, 1992. Corrective actions included providing training to appropriate:persnnnel and incorporating requirements in a new station modification program. Implementation of drawing markup will now be flagged for completion at the ready for functional test stage instead of when declared operable. An appropriate check list is established to assist in verifying drawings are marked. -The inspector verified that these corrective actions were

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complete The licensee has also established a long term goal of ;

computerized drawings with the capability of very timely updating eliminating the need for red markin i (Closed) Inspector followup Item 369.370/92 24-02: Adequacy Of ;

Operations Staffing During Emergency Conditions. The inspector reviewed the results of the study of operator staffing adequacy, .

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for two scenarios: Loss of Plant Control Due To A Fire and Loss Of All AC On One Unit Coupled With A Fire. The team performing the review consisted of two Assistant Shift Supervisors and one staff SR '

The preliminary results concluded that with the minimum Technical Specification required staffing, the units could be placed in a

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stable condition. liowever, as a result of the review, several recommendations and observations were made:

(1) Install spare breakers in the standby 6900V and 4160V compartments, so that when aligning power from_one unit to ,

the other through SATA or SATB, one person could swap the breakers, rather than the two presently required. _

(2) Continue the review of all Emergency Procedures and Abnormal Procedures, using the Appendix R engineer, and PRA group inpu (3) Simulator Training with minimum shift staffing and classroom training on various accidents coupled with a fire, may be beneficia (4) The team stressed the im)ortance of communications in these scenarios. They noted t,at the radio system is necessary to efficiently stabilize the plant, in lieu of returning to the control room for instructions .

The licensee has completed the review of the scenarios that were felt, by the team, to be the most staff 4ng intensive. Based on the review, the minimum staff could feltill the requirements. The

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team also provided additional recommendations to improve l efficiency and conduct additional reviews, for increased l confidenc No violations or deviations were identifie . Followup of Industry Issues (92701) Evaluation of Westinghouse Relays The licensee discovered a problem with Westinghouse Type SBFU relays subsequent to a loss of offsite power event at its Oconee Nuclear Station on October 19, 1992. -These relays can apparently inadvertently actuate if control power battery negative is driven

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positive with respect to battery positive by an inductive kick or battery positive is driven to more than 200 volts positive with respect to battery negative for a period of two milliseconds. A vendor letter describing an appropriate modification was issued in february 198 The licensee determined that 43 switchyard relays recuired the modification and initiated plans to implement the mocifications to non buss line relays by the end of the calendar )

yea Buss line related relays (16 of the 43 total) will be modified during upcoming refueling outages. Also, additional administrative controls were placed on battery work, Use of Non-conservative Mass and Energy Release Data for Main I Steam Line Break Analysis The subject non conservative analysis was identified by the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. This situation involved previously unrecognized problems with pressurizing the main steam valve vault during a postulated break and subsequent structural damage. The inspector verified that the licensee was aware of the issue and had evaluated it as not being a problem at the McGuire Station since the valve, rooms have large openings to the atmosphere. The licensee also evaluated possibic effects of non-conservatism on other transients and found no problem No violations or deviations were identifie . Review of Auxiliary feedwater System Design (93702)

The Auxiliary feedwater System (CA) is provided with three pumps, two motor driven and one turbine driven. Three preferred non-safety related suction sources are provided from the Condensato Storage Tank, the Upper Surge Tank and the Hotwell. .A common pipe from these three sources is connected to the CA suction header for all three pumps. A portion of this pipe is located in the Service Building and was not seismically designed. In addition, a seismic suction source is provided by the Nuclear Service Water System (RN). Valves to RN are actuated by CA pressure switches upon sensing low pressure in the suction header and include a three second time delay, On October 27, 1992, during an instrument setpoint verification l associated with the Design Basis Documentation program, the licensee questioned whether failure of this non seismic portion of piping was a '

problem. The licensee postulated a failure of the non-seismic pipe which would result in a loss of the~ normal CA suction sources plus a partial draindown of the CA suction header. The-licensee questioned l whether the setpoints of the pressure switches would allow the RN suction source to be available-in sufficient time to prevent air ~ binding-of the pumps. A pIR (0 M92-0406) was written, calculations were started, a modification to raise the setpoints was started and the licensee began to evaluate the non-seismic. pipe against Seismic- 1 Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) seismic guidance. The licensee also questioned whether this piping required protection for security events ,

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t and, therefore, posted security guards at the piping. Additional review of the security aspects of _the event were reviewed by NRC, Region !!

personnel, and will be documented in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-369, ,

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370/92 2 On October 29, the licensee completed modifications to raise the switch setpoints by one pound. The licensee also determined that the piping met the SQUG criteria and further determined that the new setpoints ,

assured CA operabilit At the end of the inspection period, the licensee was evaluating operability scenarios relative to the old setpoints and evaluating a i scenario involving normal depletion of the non-seismic /non-safety- _

suction source It appears that the licensee failed to fully consider the instrument error in the original design process for the pressure switch setpoints subjecting CA to the postulated piping failur ,

However, as described above, further review by the licen,ee and NRC is ,

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necessary to evaluate technical significance. This evaluation will-be completed during the next reporting period. This is identified as Unresolved item No. 369, 370/92-26 01: Review Of Auxiliary feedwater !

System Desig No violations or deviations were identifie . Inplant Review Of Plant Logs (71707)

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The licensee recently completed an inplant review of various plant logs to assure that personnel were performing activities for which they were signing. This review was performed in response to an industry issue (see NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-369, 370/92-23, paragraph 7.). The inspector reviewed the licensee's Inplant Review Report No. 92-16 and discussed the results with licensee personne The licensee reviewed a total of 383 activities for-the time period of :

March 1 through September 18, 1992. Activities included all shifts and >

weekend and night activities. Groups reviewed included Operations.(183 activities), Chemistry (48 activities), Security-(53 activities),

Maintenance (63 activities), Industr_ial. Safety (17 activities) and Radiation Protection (54 activities).

One problem was identified. This involved the' failure of a non-licensed- *

operator to conduct a general visual inspection' of the motor generator

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rooms and interior doghouses on one occasion for which he signed, This-

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was a general inspection required by routine rounds and was not a-TS requirement. These areas are accessed from the Control Room. Although the individual could not recall the occasion, the investigators verified: '

that the person had entered the Control Room and concluded that the individual was probably diverted from entering the areas by Control Room personnel and then forgot to complete the rounds. The investigators

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expanded the evaluation to include 56 other entries of the individual'.-

No other problems were foun ;

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The licensee intends to perform a similar periodic review. Specific corrective actions have included counseling with the individual, and  ;

revisions to the rounds guidance to clarify requirements and expectations. The licensee review was thorough and the licensee's corrective actions appear to be appropriat :

No violations or deviations were identifie . Management Interface Meeting (30702)

On November 5, 1992. NRC personnel met with licensee management

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personnel to discuss general issues of interest. The licensee made presentations regarding the work control quality improvement project, >

the new problem investigation program and the electronic licensing library. The NRC made a presentation regarding establishing the current licensing basis. General discussion was-held regarding NRC expectations, status of the Design Basis Documentation project, the TS -

improvement project, and team inspection coordination. A detailed  ;

meeting summary will be issued by NRC, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulatio . Installation and Testing of Modification (37828)

The inspector reviewed Minor Modification Nos. MGMM-5200 and MCMM-5201, .

Change Unit I and Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater (CA) Pressure Switch Setpoints to verify that the packages were-prepared in accordance with regulatory requirements and applicable industry codes and standards; to verify that the modifications were reviewed and a] proved in accordance with the licensee's requirements; and to verify t1at 10 CFR 50.59 safety--

evaluations performed by the licensee were adequate. In addition to inplant reviews and discussion with the licensee's engineering staff, the inspector also observed the installation activities in progress to verify compliance within the design document During the review of calculations for the CA design basis (see paragraph t 8), the licensee's design engineering staff determined that CA pressure switch setpoints should be modifie These modifications were developed and implemented to revise the 10 CA pressure switch setpoints for each Unit. Eighteen pressure switch setpoints were changed from 2 psig to 3 psig and two Unit-2 pressure switch setpoints were changed from 3 psig to 4 psig., The two Unit 2 switches were different due to a difference of reference elevation'for- ,

CA motor driven pump A piping at the flow orifice location. .These new setpoints increase the probability that swap over will occur before.it is no longer feasible to obtain water from the normal suction source Based on the review of the_above modification packages and-the performance of the' field verification of selected installations,-the -

inspector determined that the quality and technical information in the -

packages were goo The 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations performed for the modifications were detailed and adequate. Selected calculations q

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performed in support of the modifications were reviewed and found to be l acceptable. The CA design basis documentation is being revised to

incorporate the pressure switch setpoint chang No violations or deviations were identifie '

1 Exit Interview (30703)

1he inspection scope and findings identified were summarized on November 13, 1992, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The  ;

following item was discussed in detail: Unresolved item 369, 370/92-26-  !

01: Review Of Auxiliary feedwater System Design (paragraph 8), The . i licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments, nor did- #

they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the inspectors during the course of their inspectio ,

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