IR 05000346/1990004
| ML20012D935 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1990 |
| From: | Miller D, Paul R, Schumacher M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20012D934 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-90-04, NUDOCS 9003290110 | |
| Download: ML20012D935 (11) | |
Text
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- Report Nok 50-346/90004(DRSS)' "
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- LicenseNS.(NPF-3
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iEdison Plaza ' - ,, , ' w; "'4, 300' Madison Avenue ' >. , %q , W Toledo, OH: 43652 JL % < , y . o 7i
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e Name: Davis-Bess'e' Nuclear;PowerfStation; [4 1 h[., , qin' p>ection At: ' Davis-BessV Site,; 0ak Harbor, Ohio? . s 7-
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- Approved,By
- <iMr C."Schumacher, Chiefi A f
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Mi JInspection Summary. q - - , " , . * K.
. .. :. . .. unc ] ' lInsp'ectjonionFebruary'20-23,"1990(ReportNo.50-346/90004(DRSS)); . ' '. ' ' .. ^ ,' Areas 4 Inspected:>. Routine,-unann.ounced inspection-oftthe licensee?s radiation , g protection. program' during:an extended outagellincluding; organization and- . - man'agementtcontrols,Lcontract technician-qualifications?and training, external?
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' t < ,and;' internal-exposure controls,; outage radiological controls, and! '
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' contaminatio'n' controls and'ALARA:(IP 83750; 83729)l lAlso1 reviewed;was7
t - ..alle'gations'(IPL99024) Land actions taken in response to previous inspection 1 l ' (' ? E ,;Kfindings!(IP 92701; 92702) ' O
g A MResults: JThe licensee's radiation protection program.during. outage conditions ! / ' , appears 3to: function well...One violation'.for failureito follow. technical- > t , M specification.requir.ements forja highiradiationientry; and.one for failuret T ' > m. H i 'ito follow'a ra'diolog'ical posting' procedure, satisfied the criteria listed in W '10!CFR Part 2,, Appendix C,-Section V.4; therefore, Notices ofl Violation are'
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4, . -T. Anderson,tManager, Maintenan'ce.P1anning - m y R.1Br'andt;iManager, Plant Operations,.Sentco - $@ f y e R.?Coad,; Supervisor," Radiological Protection . . _ ~ i v N-hJi,DoironbRadiological~ Assessor , .
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- f R; Gaston,sLicensingl Technologist
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'. ' JB. Geddes,iSupervisor LRadiological Environmental
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Facility Modifi'ations C.fHawley, Manager, LSupervisor,;NuclearLLicensing', - ',
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Honma, Compliance > ?.W. Johnson, Manager,- Plant Maintenance.
m ', - , N< ^ ^J.-Lash,: Manager, ISE, E , .s
, ',, D. l Lightfoot' Manager,i Int.egrated; Planning : . ,,x '. " g.
LJ.;Polyak,-Manager; Radiological Control-j ' ' .. LA.lReynolds,' Site Manager, EWNS' m.
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- R.' ' Risnern Superv,isor; : Quality Verification
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- ElySalowitz, Director,' Planning and Support
, %, l t-R. Schrauder, Manager; Nuclear Licensing , ' ' ' ~J.--Scott,tAssociate Health Physicist e
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. M.7 Stewart, Manager,; Nuclear Training _ ' - .
L' P.cStrahm, Supervisor,7 Radiological Operations.
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b P. Byron,NRCSeniorLResidentiInspector - ' (> - DE Kosloff.. NRC. Resident Inspector
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y .. . 23,71990.e ~ , ,, ' vThe gbove indisiduals: attended the exit meeting.on February , yp, Thelinspectors'also contacted otherl licensee and contractor personnel; ' .- . y: ~ .. -. 2.. General' , ggp_ Thisiinspectionwasconductedtoreviewthe;licenseefsradiatIo'n ' ' u w My ' ' protecti.on program during a major refueling and maintenance. outage.
' ' r Also: reviewed.were licensee corrective measures;for-previously " , - , identified -violations'; and: validity and consequeaces ofl allegations i ' about implementation of.the licensee's: radiation protectioniprogram, ,. , Cp. - iThe inspectors conductsd independent radiation and conta'ination.
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- surveys during the< inspection; one problem concerning
- an unposted:
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i contaminated' valve was identified.
zPosting, L. label ng, and access - o .and contamination controls, appear, generally; adequate.f '. <;. p_o - ,, m , _ ' /3h LicenseeiAction-on: Previous Inspection Findings (IP 92701;192702), - ' o < +. . . . - ,.
- O (Clos'ed).0 pen Item-(346/89023-01): Use of;N/AIin semiannual rep' orts.
' . ' The; licensee;now-presents : lower limit of detection information 'for ' , Jisotopesinot seen but which have'a high probability of being present, - ! + , > instead of listing them as N/A.
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, y[ , . , a: a g . , , , g -- . L '(Closed)' Violation (346/89023-02): Failure to sample and analyze a ' t liquid _ effluent before its release.
The inspectors reviewed thei ,, !w N + licensee'slresponse: dated'Oecember.14c1989. The corrective actions
appear adequate ~and ' appropriate.
'
-.e ., .. _ . . ? (Closed) Violation (346/89023-03): Failure to' write an LER for'a < ' ' technical specification violation.
The inspectors reviewed the & - , , ty i' . lice'nsee's. response dated. December 14, 1989. 'The corrective actions ' 1 4 appear adequate and appropriate, kg ~
- Radiation Protectib,J0rganization,andManagementControls(IP83750;
~ 4,. ,f ' 83729)' % ,ap ' -
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.F .L',i~' Thelicense'e's'RbdiologicalControlorganization(HPandRadwasteGroups).
. . , ' ' .- include:.the. Radiation Control Manager (RPM), four: General' Supervisors : responsible'for Radiological-Controls and Radwaste, Radiation Protection, ' EnvironmentaleCompliance, and Radiological Health.
The RPM reports ~, )directly to the Plant. Manager.- Currently the licensee's permanent onsite radiological; staff comprises.6 HP supervisors, a training coordinator, < , 'two2 master rad. control testers, 6 senior testers, 9 testers, and 6 assistantctesters. 'Recently, HP technician staff turnover has been
low;l average plant experience is about 3 years.
About 50 HP contract - technicians were hired to support HP activities for the current outagec
, p.," The licensee is considering hiring about 16 more. technicians to support ' iT ' technicians are performing job coverage and oversight for outage ..
radiological controls for turbine building work.
Both house and contractT ^ activities. Adequate technician coverage was observed-by the inspectors . ' , Eduring several tours of the containment and auxiliary buildings.
' ' ., ! i No violations or deviations were-identified.. ' , s 5.
Contbact~ Radiological Control (RC) Technician Qualifications and Training (IP 83729; 83750)
Prior to being selected to work at the station, the resumes of available
- contract RC technicians are reviewed to determine if they meet experience qualifications. _ The licensee performs /past experience verifications for q
, randomly selected incoming contract RC technicians.
' ! Prior to providing site specific-training to'the incoming technicians;, .the technicians must pass a theory test with an 80 percent passing grade; y some who fail are permitted self-study and retest. mThose who pass the 'i , theory. test are tested in their competency in the tasks they will be q assigned at the station.
Conduct of the testing, site specific training, ' and' normal NGET training normally is completed in two weeks.
No problems 'were noted.
- No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
External Exposure-Control (IP 83750; 83729) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's external exposure control and personal dosimetry programs, including: changes in program to meet- , ' '
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, ~.... ..n: > .., , , y y7y , . - -outage;needs; use of, dosimetry to determine.w,hether requirements are yC ,4 . +
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- Theilicensee'sextern'alexposureLcontrolsprogramis'descfibedin g.
W ' y" ' ~ Inspection Report No.'346/88008(DRSS).
No significant programmatic-changes have cince been'made.
Personnel whole body dose for-1989 wass
s, ,4 about;37 person-rem.
> Ch,' The inspectors observed and discussed with licensee: representatives yy
radiological controls and access to radiation and high radiation-areas.
' iThe inspectors also reviewed selected RWPs and associated radiation .
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surveys and observed the' instructions given by health physics personnel n.1, to workers entering into'and working in controllediareas.: Overall, the licensee's practices appeared to provide adequate radiological controls-
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' ' over outage activities including controls for. entry into the reactor- .. , . containment.after shutdown and on entrylto the reactor, cavity: and steam CF generator manways.
- , , ~ The inspectors reviewed a FeDruary 13, 1990 event where a contractor employee: entered-a high radiation area (HRA) in a mechanical penetration: ' s / room without meeting the requirements-for HRA entry listed in Technical; . Specification 6.1.2; these' req'irements are either specified radiation, u ' monitoring devices or-positive controls over activities by an individual: o qualified in radiation protection procedures.
A licensee radiological control supervisor saw the. individual within;the HRA,' advised'him1to' e -
leave'the'HRA,'and then questioned him about why he was in the*HRA. -The individual-stated that he knowingly abrogated the required controls.. (rather>than take time to follow the procedure) to-"get the job done."
- l The> individual was immediately denied further access to the RCA, and:was terminated from employment soon thereafter.
This matter satisfies the ' L " - -five criteria in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix.C, and'therefore no Notice of Vio,lation issued.
y ,No violations or deviations'were identified.
7.
InternaltExposure Control (IP 83750; 83729) i The in5pectoft reviewed the license'e s internN exposure control andL i ! . assessment programs, including:. changes to procedures affecting internal.
< , exposureicontrol and* personal' assess' ment; determination whether f .. engineering controls, respiratory equipment, and assessment of individual.
intakes:. meet regulatory; requirements; and required; records, reports, and notifications.
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, . , The' program'to control intern'al.exposu're's includes engineering controls, airborne sampling and contamination surveillance, and use of approved ' i respiratory devices;and' protective clothing. ~Whole body-counting is used ~ . to1 supplement the monitoring program to ensure its effectiveness. The- - engineering controls-include use of portable ventilation units in selected areas.
No' oroblems were noted.
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- Air sample'dstaiwere1 selectively, reviewed. ' Air samples appear lto i
D ~ ' . W Q W be~taken,[ counted,'and evaluated in accordance with' procedural.
- i' requirements.<tThe proceoures appear adequate for use in determining air' . ^ - X sample results,. placement, and-type. _ Special air ' samples are collected ,
.< x <-Jto: establish RWP requirements and job conditions,'and it appears the! 'i n '. { licensee adequately uses air-sample results to establish requirement's H
for_use'of r,espirators:and'protectiveTclothing; y l - .4 w ., , . _ _
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The 11cens'ee uses;a commercial.. standup-(Canberra) whole body counter as , , J~ the_ primary; instrument;to measure radioactive intakes,'and two chair. type
f counters * (Canberra) for'back'up.:.Thecinspectors selectively-reviewed ~ i , i relevant 1wholeibody count (WBC) procedures,n the WBC1 facility and ,; A _ equipment, and. discussed the WBC program with the health physicist. l
6-responsible for the program and-technicians. performing the counts. iTheL
R, ~ ' ' . L ^ ,# tinspector also" reviewed the results Jof calibrations recently performed on ' , the st' ndupVcounter.1 -No problems werefnoted with these aspects of the t 'WBC program reviewed by the inspectors.
~ ' a + J f . i W ' V 2 i J - Tha inspectors liso1 reviewed:WBC' Procedure DB-HP-01340 " Internal-Dose , Assessment" and its method of relating whole b'ody counting data to . regulatory limits,(MPC-hours).
Use of;the procedure was discussed with c
' membe_rs of'the-HP staf f.
The inspectors' requested the staff'to use the ! procedure,to convert WBC data to~MPC-hours from.~an' example given by the~ l F1 inspectors; the:results of-the staf f's conversion wsre correct.
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- Sel'ctid aspec'ts'of the. licensee's. respiratory program were reviewed.
l e Workerst authorization information included-respirator qualifications, pproof of required training; and expiration date.
Provisions are made 1; , during 1the issuance <and return cycle for MPC-hours accountability.
No '
,
- unreturned respirators were observed in the plant during-inspector
tours,;although there is no specific mechanism which ensures workers q - . return respirators before reissuance of aJrespirator;the'following-xj
shift / day.
Observation of the licensee's processing. facility,:and;
- respirators' ready for issuancel indicated sufficient attention is given -
' to L respirator l inspection,T storage, and. maintenance. - The general' scope : . ' of, the respiratory protection program was discussed with the cognizant health physics supervisor. The licensee appears to have a satisfactory
program.
.o , , _No: violations or deviations:were, identified.
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' Outage Radiological Controls ~(IP 83729) , [ ~ During this outage auxiliary and containment building access and exit' ~
' tcontrol points =were well maintained by RPTs. The1 flow of perso'ns, , , materials, and equipment.in and out of these control points is monitored
, , by.the_ RPTs, as is personal frisking performed using portable friskers or - ,
a whole body:frisker.
Sufficient radiation protection coverage was , provided and it appeared outagesactivities were accomplished in ~ > , + accordance with special' instructions and requirements.
The supply of portable survey instruments, portable ventilation equipment, protective clothing and respiratory, equipment for this outage appeared adequate, a.
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Contamination Controls.(IP 83750: 93729)-t 'Although it is the licensee's pra'ctice<not to release y material'to an i > unrestricted area with measured levels:of. contamination above back round, their procedure specifies a numerical releaso limit (100' cpm /100cm -above { background), thereby implying permission to release measured levels of
radioactive contamination to an unrestricted area.. The licensee was informed that NRC regulations do not. permit disposal of licensed' material except as specified in 10 CFR 20.301.
The inspectors also referred to ' Information Notice No. 85-12 which provides guidance in this matter.
The licensee stated the procedures will be revised to indicate their current . practice. -(0 pen Item 346/90004-01)
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Over several days, the inspectors noted there was an inordinately high number of false positive PCM-1B alarms during worker exit' at the auxiliary building control point.
This matter-was brought t6 the licensee's attention who found that the. problem was caused by inadequate cleaning of the foot pad.
The pad was cleaned and the number of false j ' positive alarms decreased; the licensee intends to' clean the pad more ) frequently.
' As discussed in Section 11, associated with expressed concerns about ' radiological contamination controls in the turbine building, the f inspector found a. valve on an auxiliary steam pipe to have loose surface contamination of greater than 1,000 dpm/100cm2 without being posted and
controlled as a contamination area as required by licensee procedure HP 1601.04.14 " Radiation, Contamination, and Airborne Radiation Areas."
> Using the discretionary enforcement policy authorized by Section V. G.
of'10 CFR Part 2, no violation is being issued for failure to follow the radiological procedure because: the valve was immediately properly posted by the licensee when informed; prior to the end of the inspection ' a licensee _ manager discussed this event, and the need to assure ' procedural compliance, with all station RC supervisors and station and contract RC technicians; and a followup memorandum reinforcing the oral < discussion was given to all supervisor and technicians.
The radiological , hazards surrounding this event, which appears to be an isolated event J-e was minor, j Fifty-two personal contamination events (PCEs) occurred at the' station i during 1989; about 80 percent of which were personal clothing. There
was no refueling and maintenance outage during 1989.
The licensee has ' experienced 43 PCEs during 1990 as of February 16; the increase, according to licensee representatives, is associated with increased activity in the primary coolant; increased toolant activity is discussed .further in Section 10.
The licensee's review and followup of individual ' PCEs appears good.
Enhanced scrutiny appears needed to identify and correct radiological situations that result in PCEs;'this matter was i ' discussed with licensee. representatives during the inspection.
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ALARA and Outage Plannina i . , The licensee does not have a " formal" ALARA group. 'The ALARA program is
- coordinated by the Supervisor-Radiological Protection and his staff.
For this outage, additional-contract ALARA personnel were hired to provide assistance to this staff.
The staff reviews' exposure trends,' radiation " - reduction practices requiring reviews that involve almost all dose ' producing jobs, and is involved in conceptual design change and , modifications and major' work early in the planning stages.
Information , y' < . gained from coverage of work performed during previous refueling outages was used to aid in the planning and preparation of similar jobs during.
this outage.' Development and implementation of engineering controls was the responsibility of the Radiological-Protection Staff.
, ' The licensee's annual doses have been low since the plant'has been in operation.' One of the primary reasons has been reasonably low radiation - ' fields during outage conditions.
For 1990, the station set the annual goal at 180 person-rem based on historical data and projected work / outage ' activities for the year.
The goal now appears unattainable because plant radiation levels during this outage are higher than had been anticipated, and the. scope of the work is greater than originally anticipated.
, l Licensee representatives speculate the primary reasons for the elevated s , . plant dose rates were the plant's longest run without a reactor trip
(270 days), a reactor trip at the end of the run which caused a crud ." . burst and fission product spiking, and the unavailability of a.
a demineralizer on the -letdown for clean up during post-trip and the entire cool down period due to the' failure of valve MU 28.- In - I addition to the elevated dose rates,;there are many one-time ~ jobs which are projected to total about 300 person-rem.
These include, core barrel bolt replacement,' ten year reactor, vessel and RCS component ISI, S/G , nozzle dam installation, reactor' head vent line modification / repair, - ' pressurizer: heater bund b replacement, and' feed and bleed modifications.
l . Othermajordoseproduci..gjobsfincludeS/Gtubeplugging,'CRDMrepair, ~ j nozzle and RCP motor / bearing inspection.
, ALARA initiatives for the outage include: useofadditional: shielding for. jobs involving CRDM and core bolt work, increase personnel awareness to increased radiation fields, reduced early pulling of the incore
, detectors to reduce exposures for canal work, and hiring additional ALARA
, specialists.
In addition, the licensee is gathering detailed baseline survey data to use to evaluate the effect of programs in use or being- , considered for personnel exposures.
These programs include increasing ' lithium concentrates in'the reactor coolant system, adding hydrogen ' peroxide at shutdown, and reduction of cobalt based alloys for hard-faced
surfaces.
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., , I Outage dose was also discussed with'the plant manager byLtelephone on March 12 and again in a licensee requested management. meeting held in b Region III on March 15, 1990.,The plant manager indicated that the i.
180 man-rem projection made in November'1989 was based on unrealistically low shutdown radiation assumptions;.In* addition, it'did not reflect the s
full. scope of'the outage as it evolved-in planning or the emergent work that developed during the outage.itself.
The plant manager indicated that a more realistic prediction would be in the 500 to 600 person-rem range.
i He also stated that while an early estimate of 700+ person-rem was made by - some of his staff, that number was never an off.icial estimate, and that'a new 1990 projected dose would be forthcoming near the' end of' March.
He indicated that at present, exposure was tracking well below the ' 7- . ' 700 person-rem line, which he believed reflected the additional attention- ' being given.to ALARA.
He stated that consideration was given to repairing r the. broken letdown valve and then performing normal system cleanup.before . final shutdown.for the outage, but this was not done because such action would have extended the outage by a' week or more.
He also stated that neither area radiation process monitors nor reactor coolant samples gave forewarning of4 the higher than normal radiation .t levels seen after shutdown.
' ~ Because of the unexpected elevated dose rates during.this outage and a' staff which is unaccustomed to such rates, additional efforts to limit exposures were instituted by the licensee.
The inspectors.found that while-the HP staff was vigorous in its attempt to control worker entry and - ' work activities, better efforts to achieve ALARA were desirable by other groups,-particularly in planning, scheduling, and communicating by first line supervisors and containment coordinators.
This matter was discussed at the exit' meeting.
, ' No violations or deviations were identified.
11.- Allegation Followup (IP 99024) (AMS No. RIII-90-A-0019) On February 16, 1990, an individual contacted the NRC Resident Inspector at Davis-Besse Station and expressed concerns about the radiation protection program at Davis-Besse Station.
During this inspection, the inspector contacted the. individual by telephone and discussed the allegations further to obtain morg specific
information.
The inspector performed surveys, reviewed licensee procedures and
' standards : interviewed licensee and contractor personnel, and reviewed selected records to determihe the validity and consequences of the < concerns expressed by the alleger.
The. allegations are presented and discussed below.
' ' ' Allegation: I surveyed an auxi11ary steam valve that had Vented and
contaminated the nearby area.
.I swiped the area and found contamination but was told not to post the area.
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Discussion: When asked by the inspector for more specific '_ , information concerning the allegation, the alleger described the > location of the valve and named the: individual who allegedly said , f not to post (tags and. barricades) the area.
The alleger stated that
, i he believed that a survey sheet had been' generated recording the l survey results.
.; '-The. inspector went to the location described.. The valve was~a
, W sample tap external to a nominal 18-inch auxiliary steam line, located about ten feet above the floor on the 603' level of the.
'
f turbine building.
Temporary scaffolding was erected under the ' steam line (apparently to reach the valve) and the valve was tagged . with a maintenance information tag indicating that the valve was
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leaking and needed repair.
There was no indication that repair
' work had be0un.
w The inspector swiped the valve, insulation on the steam line near , the valve, and portions of surrounding equipment and scaffolding.
Minor transferable contamination was found on several swipes; one , swipe, on the valve itself, indicated Beta-Gamma activity of - 1430 dpm/100cm2 which was greater than the licensee's procedural
designation for a contaminated area of 1000 dmp/100cm or greater.
. ' The valve was not posted as being contaminated. When informed of the contaminationton the valve, the licensee immediately posted the } area as a contaminated area.
The inspector reviewed records of contamination surveys performed in the 603' level of the turbine building during the time period indicated by the. alleger; no survey sheet containing, swipe results on the valve / valve area was found.
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.The inspector discussed this matter with the. individual who'had <- -allegedly told the alleger not to post the valve / valve area.
The + individual stated that he had no recollection of any discussion - concerning this valve.
Methods of control of contamination and monitoring for containination - in the turbine building is discussed in follow paragraphs.of this . section.
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Finding: The inspector was unable to confirm that the named-
individual had instructed the alleger not to post the auxiliary
y steam valve, and was unable to_ locate any record of survey of the ,, ' valve by the alleger or anyone else during the specified time
, period.
Although the specific allegation could not be substantiated, the.' ' inspector's smear survey of the valve did find low level contamination ( nominally above the licensee's conservative level for a contaminated '
area, so the alleger's statement was plausible.
The radiological hazard surrounding this event, which appears to;be an isolated occurrence, was minor and the licensee took appropriate corrective actions when it was brought to their attention.
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.bt< . l [. E ~ ' ' ' Allegation:, A potentially contaminated system had tubing that drained ", ' to an uncontrolled floor drain. ~I found no contamination at the location, o but felt uneasy about the situation.
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Discussion: During a telecon,- ihe. alleger provided information [G concerning the~1ocation of system, tubing, and-drain. The inspector ' -located.the area in question and determined that two valves in a secondary coolant line were leaking into temporary catch containments ~ , which drained:through tubing to a floor drain; the floor. drain lead to a turbine building sump. The inspector learned that'when
identifiable primary to secondary leakage began during late 1989 o b, (less than 0.1 gpm), the licenses realigned the sump discharge to b the north settling basin within the licensee's controlled area.
The north settling basin overflows to the south settling basin which-overflows to a collection box and then to the lake; releases via , this pathway are quantified by analysis of samples collected at the ' L collection. box.
The quantity of radioisotope releases'via this l pathway is small.
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- Findinc:
The. allegation that the tubing drained to an uncontrolled floor c rain was not substantiated.
The floor drain is controlled in that radioactive releases via this. pathway-are known and monitored.
l Allegation: Parts of the turbine building (TB) were contaminated ' but were not being= surveyed;lthis was in violation of=the licensee's procedures.
- Discussion:
According to the licensee and licensee records, after-primary to secondary leakage; began in late 1989, the licensee routinely-performed extensive radiation and contamination surveys-in.the.TB.
Valves, equipment, and surfaces found contaminated, because of leaks, were posted and controlled as Radiologically
- Controlled Areas-(RCAs)..~After shutdown, the licensee performed
- further surveys'tosidentify contaminated equipment / areas.
Recognizing , that<some. contaminated components could have been missed during the survey, program, and much work was planned,=the licensee posted all . entrances to the TB with signs' stating " Notify-Rad Con Prior to Work in-Any RCA or Breaking Any System Boundary in the Turbine Building."
During a'telecon, the alleger stated that he believed that the
entire TB should have been controlled as an RCA instead ofs i controlling individually identified contaminated equipment or.
areas.as RCAs.
During review'oftthis allegation, the inspector identified no ' , regulatory requirement, radiological condition, or licensee procedure which would require posting of the entire building as.an . RCA. - A review of personal contamination incidents indicated one occurrencefiri the TB.so far in 1990; this incident occurred within a posted RCA.' Also,' a review of routine radiological surveys c , d indicated no identified spread of contamination from the TB to ' x
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t' > x -, . < -< r ,s - , , j v . , , , k '.., . ' ~ ' adjacentwalkways..Therefore, control of contamination in the i
- , TB appears adequate.
- , ' E . The allegation that-the methods of contamination
Finding: . .. , control in the TB are in violation of licensee procedures was
- , not substantiated, j-s
12.
Exit Meetino (IP 3G703) j
i i ' The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Section 1) i at the conclusion of the inspection on February 23,-1990, to discuss the scope of the inspection and the ' findings.
The. inspectors also-discussed-the likely informational content of_the inspection report with regard to ! documents or process reviewed by1the inspectors during the inspection.
The licensee identified no such documents / processes as proprietary.
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+ The following mattersLwere discussed specifically by the inspectors: l , a.
'The need to revise the station procedure.which specifies an i acceptable contamination release level.
The>1icensee stated that the procedure would be revised.
(Section 9) i ! b.
The need for enhanced scrutiny of individual and collective personal l ' > L-contamination events (PCEs) to identify and correct radiological.
l conditions leading to.PCEs.
, < c.
The allegations / concerns about radiological controls imposed in the j , " ' turbine building.
(Section'11) - l '
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d.
The-need for a11' personnel, especially radiation workers, planners, [- ., , E, schedulers,2 and first line supervisors to be more responsible for - ' [^,,'- ALARA. ;(Section 10) , , hddii,ional disbuss' ions concerning ALARA and dose for current outage ! . as discussed during.a management' meeting' held in Region III on i'n G w , f (' 2 March 15, 1990. - ' , , .y '
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