IR 05000338/2018003
| ML18306A906 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna |
| Issue date: | 10/30/2018 |
| From: | David Hardage NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4 |
| To: | Stoddard D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| References | |
| IR 2018003, IR 2018502 | |
| Download: ML18306A906 (20) | |
Text
October 30, 2018
SUBJECT:
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2018003 AND 05000339/2018003; 05000338/2018502 AND 05000339/2018502
Dear Mr. Stoddard:
On September 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2. On October 16, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. L. Lane and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection. However, inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or significance of this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the North Anna Power Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
David H. Hardage, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-338, 50-339 License Nos.: NPF-4, NPF-7
Enclosure:
IR 05000338/2018003, 05000339/2018003, 05000338/2018502 AND 05000339/2018502
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
50-338, 50-339
License Numbers:
NFP-4, NFP-7
Report Numbers:
05000338/2018003 and 05000339/2018003
05000338/2018502 and 05000339/2018502
Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-003-0046
I-2018-502-0007
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Facility:
North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Mineral, VA
Dates:
July 1, 2018 to September 30, 2018
Inspectors:
A. Siwy, Acting Senior Resident Inspector, North Anna
G. Eatmon, Resident Inspector / Acting Senior Resident Inspector,
North Anna
G. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector, Brunswick
R. Reyes, Resident Inspector, Turkey Point
J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector, Harris
J. Reece, Senior Resident Inspector, Summer
A. Beasten, Resident Inspector, Robinson
P. Heher, Construction Inspector
R. Carrion, Senior Reactor Inspector
J. Dodson, Senior Project Engineer
S. Sanchez, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
C. Fontana, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
J. Walker, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
W. Loo, Senior Health Physicist
Approved By:
David H. Hardage, Acting Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensees performance by conducting a quarterly integrated inspection at North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section 71111.12, Routine Maintenance Effectiveness.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On July 20, 2018, the unit reduced to eight percent of rated thermal power for a repair in the switchyard. The unit was returned to rated thermal power on July 22, 2018, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
External Flooding (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness to cope with external flooding on July 25, 2018.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 2, Control Room Chiller 4B and 4C while 4A chiller out of service on August 1, 2018.
- (2) Unit 2, Charging Pump B while H Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) out of service on August 23, 2018.
- (3) Unit 1, Steam Drive Auxiliary Feedwater Pump after surveillance on August 30, 2018.
- (4) Unit 1, Low Head Safety Injection System, Train B on September 10, 2018.
71111.05AQ - Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly
Quarterly Inspection (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:
- (2) Unit 2, J EDG Room on July 23, 2018
- (3) Unit 2, Quench Spray Pump House on July 26, 2018
- (4) Unit 2, Main Steam Valve House on July 26, 2018
- (5) Unit 2, Main Control Room (MCR) Chiller Room on August 1, 2018
- (6) Unit 1, H EDG Room on August 7, 2018
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Internal Flooding (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the following areas:
- (1) Unit 2, MCR Chiller Room on July 24, 2018
- (2) Unit 1, Quench Spray Pump House Basement on July 26, 2018
71111.11 - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Operator Requalification (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed and evaluated a crew of licensed operators in the plants simulator during licensed operator requalification training on July 31, 2018.
Operator Performance (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed and evaluated Unit 2 load reduction from 50 percent power to eight percent power per the ramp plan for a repair in the switchyard, that included tripping the turbine and shift turnover on July 20, 2018; and Unit 1 J EDG slow start and additional activities on Unit 2 on July 23, 2018.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
- (1) Unit 1, Main Control Room Chiller 4B Low charge on September 6, 2018
- (2) Unit 1, J EDG Battery Charger Functional Failure Evaluation on September 6, 2018
- (3) Unit 1 and Unit 2, Chiller Sump Pump (a)(2) evaluation criteria on September 12, 2018
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:
- (1) 500KV Switch G206M delta temperature on the A phase in the Switchyard on July 20, 2018
- (2) Unit 2 elevated risk, while Unit 2 Control Room Chiller 4A out of service on August 1, 2018
- (4) Unit 1 and Unit 2, elevated risk due to planned replacement of A reserve service station transformer (RSST) and the 1J emergency bus was aligned to an alternate power source on September 5, 2018
- (5) Unit 1 elevated risk due to H EDG emergent work concurrent with A RSST not aligned to the emergency bus on September 6, 2018
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 2, Pressurizer PORV block valve 2-RC-MOV-2535 seat leakage on August 16, 2018
- (2) Unit 1 and Unit 2, Potential Tornado Missile Vulnerability identified at the Service Water Pump House on August 29, 2018
- (3) Unit 1, Charging Pump A (1-CH-P-1A) speed increaser oil below minimum specification on August 30, 2018
- (4) MCR Chiller expansion tank isolation and train separation on September 6, 2018
- (5) 15H6 breaker mechanism charging excessively for 1-CH-P-1A on September 24, 2018
- (6) Unit 1 and Unit 2, Degraded A and B RSST cable jacket with localized cracking on September 26, 2018
71111.19 - Post Maintenance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2, Clean nozzles/drains associated with the 1B2 and 2B2 service water spray arrays on August 14, 2018
- (2) Unit 2, Emergency Switchgear Penetration Seal on August 30, 2018
- (3) Unit 2, H EDG on August 30, 2018
- (4) Unit 1, MCR Chiller 4B on September 6, 2018
- (5) Unit 1, Component Cooling Pump B seal replacement on September 13, 2018
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Routine
- (1) Unit 1, J EDG slow start on July 23, 2018
- (2) Unit 2, C Charging Pump on August 2, 2018
- (3) Unit 1, H EDG slow start on August 7, 2018
- (4) Unit 2, Pressurizer Power-Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve 2-RC-MOV-2536 Testing on August 16, 2018
- (5) Unit 1, EDG 1H and 1J Batteries on September 12, 2018
In-service (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1, B auxiliary feedwater comprehensive pump test on August 24, 2018 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
71114.01 - Exercise Evaluation
The inspectors evaluated the biennial emergency plan exercise during the week of July 16, 2018. The exercise scenario simulated a diesel starting air tank failure that caused the 1H EDG governor to be destroyed. A short time later, an offsite power supply breaker tripped open causing the 1J EDG to automatically start and load the electrical bus, along with a loose parts alarm for the lower reactor vessel area. A main condensate pipeline rupture resulted in a loss of main feedwater, with no auxiliary feedwater pumps able to successfully provide water to the steam generators. A steam generator tube rupture occurred in the A steam generator, followed by the associated steam safety valve failing in the open position, creating an offsite radiological release that led to a General Emergency simulated classification. Offsite organizations demonstrated their ability to implement emergency actions.
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
The inspectors evaluated submitted Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan changes during the week of July 16, 2018. This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Emergency Planning Drill (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated a licensee emergency plan drill involving loose parts in the lower reactor vessel, fuel cladding degradation, a thrown turbine blade, and an increase to containment high range radiation monitors meeting the conditions for a general emergency on September 18, 2018.
71114.08 - Exercise Evaluation - Scenario Review
The inspectors reviewed and evaluated in-office, the proposed scenario for the biennial emergency plan exercise at least 30 days prior to the day of the exercise.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below for the period from July 1, 2017, through June 30, 2018.===
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Safety System Functional Failures
- (2) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity
- (3) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Heat Removal Systems
- (4) Unit 1 and Unit 2 High Pressure Injection Systems
- (5) Unit 1 and Unit 2 RCS Leak Rate
- (6) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Cooling Water Support Systems The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below for the period from April 1, 2017, through March 31, 2018. (3 Samples)
- (7) Drill & Exercise Performance
- (8) Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation
- (9) Alert & Notification System Reliability
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (3 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Smoldering mop head was found in the SW cross tie vault
- (2) Unit 1 and Unit 2, Chiller Cross tie
- (3) Unit 1 and Unit 2, Casing Cooling Chillers
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
60855.1 - Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
The inspectors evaluated the licensees independent spent fuel storage installation cask loading campaign between August 13, 2018, and August 16, 2018; and normal operation on August 23,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Observation
71152 - Semiannual Trend
Review The inspectors performed a trend analysis on the licensees corrective actions program in order to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue.
The inspectors focused their review on human performance trends, but also considered the results of inspector daily condition report screenings, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The review nominally considered the 6-month period of April 2018 through September 2018, although some examples extended beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend reports. The inspectors also reviewed corrective action documents that were processed by the licensee to identify potential adverse trends in the condition of structures, systems, and/or components as evidenced by acceptance of long-standing non-conforming or degraded conditions.
The inspectors noted a negative human performance trend for the last six months where the licensee was challenged to implement established programs through procedure use and adherence. Specifically, errors were observed for the control of transient combustibles and scaffolding post-erection engineering inspection, on the main control room chiller system, as noted in the examples below. The inspectors reviewed all the associated corrective actions and discussed this negative trend with the licensee and the weaknesses were acknowledged by the licensee.
- CR 1102698 - Exceeding the Transient Fire Loading Report for the Unit 2 Chiller Room
- CR 1103399 - Expired Transient Fire Loading Report for the Unit 2 Chiller Room while material remained installed
- CR 1102735 and CR 1102734 - Engineering Evaluation of Erected Scaffolding less than 2 from SSC was incomplete
The inspectors discussed this observation with the licensee.
Observation
71152 - Annual Follow-up of
Selected Issues The inspectors conducted a detailed review of CR 1101263, initiated on July 10, 2018, regarding a smoldering mop head found in the Service Water cross tie vault as a result of a piece of hot weld slag that came in contact with a water-soaked mop head that was allowed in the vicinity of welders tacking two lugs onto a flow element flange in the vault floor area. The inspectors chose this sample because of the potential safety significance of fires from welding activities that can lead to more significant fire initiating events. The licensee completed a human performance review board (HURB) evaluation of the incident and a review to determine if any organizational or programmatic poor welding practices may have contributed to the incident. A stand down was performed with the welders to emphasize the importance of removing any transient materials in the vicinity of welding and the importance of conducting focused fire watches during hot work activities. The inspectors determined that the licensee conducted a thorough evaluation and implemented appropriate corrective actions to address the human performance issues associated with the incident. Since there was never any actual fire or potential threat of a fire initiating from the wet mop head that could have affected any equipment in the area, the inspectors determined that this incident was of no more than minor safety significance.
Observation
71152 - Annual Follow-up of
Selected Issues On July 24, 2018, the licensee initiated CR 1102100 following a determination that the MCR chilled water headers for both trains were cross-tied via the makeup lines to the expansion tanks. This condition existed for the MCR chilled water system on both Units 1 and 2. The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective actions and their operability determination for this condition.
The inspectors noted that the licensees immediate corrective actions involved issuance of a caution order and respective tags to maintain the expansion tanks isolated from each other to ensure train separation. The additional corrective actions involved past operability review, reportability determination, and research of the design basis for the expansion tanks. The inspectors noted that CR 1102100 did not have any corrective actions relating to procedure changes to ensure long-term train separation and conveyed this observation to the licensee.
The inspectors noted the licensees operability determination concluded the system was past operable. The inspectors reviewed the licensing basis documents and specifically noted that the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (USFAR), Chapter 9.4.1, Main Control Room and Relay Rooms, stated, Each cooling system consists of two independent 100% redundant air conditioning trains, one powered from the H train and the other powered from the J train.
Also, Chapter 9.4.1.2, System Description, stated, An air-conditioning system with two independent trains is installed for each unit. Consequently, the inspectors concluded that on each unit, a non-conforming condition existed for the chilled water system because the cross-tied condition between each train could not meet the independent requirements of the UFSAR. However, the inspectors agreed with the licensees conclusion that functionality of the chiller water system was not degraded as a result of the cross-tied condition, and that no reportability conditions were met.
Observation
71152 - Annual Follow-up of
Selected Issues The inspectors reviewed condition reports which documented Dominions corrective actions to address recurring issues with the casing cooling chillers. The redundancy of casing cooling chillers has allowed operators to maintain the temperature of the water in the casing cooling tanks within technical specifications. The corrective actions were classified and prioritized in accordance with Dominions corrective action program guidance, and the inspectors concluded that Dominions corrective actions were implemented commensurate with the safety impact of the cause, and were appropriately focused to correct the problem. No additional issues were identified.
Licensee Identified Non-Cited Violation 71111.12, Routine Maintenance Effectiveness This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: TS 5.4.1.a, requires in part, that written procedures shall be established per Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, of which part 9.a requires written procedures and documented instructions appropriate to the circumstances for performing maintenance that can affect the performance of safety related equipment.
Contrary to the above, on June 12, 2018, the licensee failed to adequately establish a procedure appropriate to the circumstances during maintenance on the safety-related main control chillers. Specifically, licensee mechanical preventative maintenance procedure, 0-MPM-0806-02, Inspection of Control Room Chillers, Revision 0, did not provide a proper method to adequately monitor the Freon level in main control room chillers. Consequently, the licensee discovered a low Freon level condition on main control room chiller 1-HV-3-4B, which rendered the chiller inoperable.
Significance: The inspectors reviewed Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions of IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for findings at Power and determined this finding was of very low safety significance, Green, because there was no design deficiency, it did not represent a loss of system or function, and did not represent an actual loss of function for greater than its TS allowed outage time.
Corrective Action Reference: CR109958
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public disclosure.
- On July 19, 2018, the lead inspector presented the emergency preparedness exercise inspection results to Mr. Larry Lane, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On October 16, 2018, the inspector presented the quarterly resident inspector inspection results to Mr. Larry Lane, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Common Documents Reviewed
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
Technical Specifications and Bases
Technical Requirements Manual
Control Room Narrative Logs
Licensee event reports from 2017 through 2018
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Procedures
0-OP-49.4A, Valve Checkoff - Control Room A/C Service Water, Revision 73
1-OP-31.2A, Valve Checkoff - Auxiliary Feedwater, Revision 25
71111.05AQ - Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly
Procedures
2-FS-QS-1, Fire Fighting Strategy. Quench Spray Building 274 (SG-74), Rev. 3
NAPS UFSAR Section 9.5,1, Fire Protection System, Rev. 53
CM-AA-FPA-101, Revision 8, Control of Combustible and Flammable Materials
MA-AA-105, Revision 19, Scaffolding
1-FS-SBO-1, Station Blackout Building Fire Fighting Strategy, Revision 6
2-FS-MS-1, Main Steam Valve House, Revision 4
CM-AA-FPA-101, Control of Combustible and Flammable Materials, Revision 10
Condition Reports
CR 1102698
CR 1102608
Other Documents
North Anna Power Station Transient Fire Loading Report for Fire Zone 8D dated July 9, 2018
North Anna Power Station Transient Fire Loading Report for Fire Zone 8D dated July 23, 2018
North Anna Power Station Transient Fire Loading Report for Fire Zone 8D dated August 2, 2018
North Anna Power Station Fire Watch Assignment and Briefing Sheet for Unit 2 MCR Chiller
Room (Fire Zone 8D) dated July 23, 2018
71111.06 - Flood Protection
Procedures
2-AR-K-G7, SFGDS Area Sump Level Hi, Rev. 2
2-AR-A-F2, Valve Pit Sump Hi-Hi Level, Rev. 1
2-AR-A-E8, Valve Pit Sump Hi Level, Rev. 2
2-AR-G-A7, Chiller Room or Inst Rack Rm Sump Hi-Hi Level, December 4, 2014
0-MPM-1208-01, Inspection of Station Flood Barriers and Dikes, Revision 6
0-MCM-1305-01, Removal and Installation of Removable Flood Walls for Chiller Rooms and
Emergency Switchgear, Revision 8
Condition Reports
CR109912
Other Documents
ET-N-10-0014, Development of Flooding TRM, Rev. 1
Design Change 96-179, Quench Spray Pump House Sump Pump, Rev. 0
CE0963, IPE Flooding Mods, Revision 0
DNES-AA-GN-BAR-1001, Passive Design Features and Barriers, Revision 7
WO59102762115, Chiller Room Sump Level Calibration
WO59102925529, Flood Dike and Barriers Inspection U2
CA3049645, Perform MRule Functional Failure evaluation 1-DB-P-10A/B not pumping
71111.11 - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator
Performance
Procedures:
Licensed Operator Requalification Program (LORP) cycle 2018-4, SXG#76, Revision 4
2-OP-2.2, Unit Power Operation from Mode 1 to Mode 2, Revision 77.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Procedures
ER-AA-MRL-100, Implementing Maintenance Rule, Revision 12
0-AP-55, Loss of Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room Air Conditioning, Revision 8.
1-EI-CB-21B, Emer Diesel Gen Battery Voltage Trouble, Revision 4
1-EI-CB-21H, Emer DG#1 Trouble, Revision 1
01040.4910-E-1, Emergency Diesel Generator DC System Sizing Verification (Battery, Charger
and Cables), July, 15, 199
01040.4910-E-1, Emergency Diesel Generator DC System Sizing Verification (Battery, Charger
and Cables), Addendum D, November 16, 2011
Condition Reports
CR1103463
CR1098584
Other Documents
Maintenance Rule Functions for Emergency Diesel Generator and Batteries
Maintenance Rule Evaluation CA7280636, received annunciator alarms for battery charger
trouble on 1J emergency diesel generator
Equipment Apparent Cause Evaluation CA7280637, annunciator alarms for battery charger
trouble on 1J emergency diesel generator
Maintenance Rule Function DB002 scoping documentation
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Procedures
North Anna Power Station PRA Risk Summary, Revision No. 1
OMD for CR1101068, G206M-500KV Switch
G206M Forced Outage Plan
Condition Reports
CR1104561
CR1101868
CR1096775
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Procedures
Root Cause Evaluation Response - N - 2006 - 3753-E1
0-OP-26.9, 4160 Volt Breaker Operation, Revision 34
1-PT36.38, Operability Testing of Interlocks from Control Circuits for Breaker 15H6, Charging
Pump 1-CH-P-1A, Revision 5
1-PT-14.1, Operations Periodic Test, Charging Pump 1-CH-P-1A, Revision 57
1-EI-CB-21C Annunciator A5, CH PP-1A 15H6 Lockout, Revision 1
OP-AA-102, Operability Determination, Revision 15
Condition Reports
CR 1095669
CR 1090499
CR 1098135
CR1103057
CR1101735
CR1101071
CR1105623
CR1101003
Work Orders
Other Documents
ACE 013252
Root Cause Evaluation Response - N - 2006 - 3753-E1
71111.19 - Post Maintenance Testing
Procedures
0-OP-49.4, Shifting Service Water Components (Pumps and Sprays), Revision 28
0-GEP-76.0, Control Room Pressure Boundary Leak Determination, Revision 2
0-OP-21.7, Main Control Room and Relay Room Emergency Ventilation Operation, Revision 27
1-PT-74.2B, Component Cooling Pump 1-CC-P-1B Test, Revision 39
2-PT-82.4A, 2H Diesel Generator Test (Start by ESF Actuation), Revision 76
2-OP-6.1, Operation of 2H Emergency Diesel Generator form Control Room, Revision 56
Condition Reports
CR1104969
CR1104862
CR1105020
CR1105136
CR1103962
CR1103974
CR1103995
Work Orders
WO 59103101419
Other Documents
North Anna Narrative Logs regarding spray array 1B2 and 1B2 nozzle cleaning on
August 14, 2018
TestOil Industrial Analysis for 1-CC-P-1B, dated 9/7/2018
TestOil Industrial Analysis for 1-CC-P-1B, dated 9/12/2018
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
Procedures
1PT-82J, 1J Emergency Diesel Generator Slow Start Test, Rev. 59
1PT-71.3Q.1, 1-FW-P-3B, B Motor-driven AFW Pump IST Comprehensive Pump Test and
Valve Testing, Rev. 16
1-PT-82H, 1H Emergency Diesel Generator Slow Start Test, Rev. 61
1-PT-83.5H, Under Voltage/Degraded Voltage Operational Test of Miscellaneous Equipment on
1H Bus, Rev. 9, 08/07/2018
2-PT-44.7, PORV Block Valves, Revision 33
2-PT-14.3, Charging Pump 2-CH-P-1C, Revision 53
Other Documents
Operations periodic test 2-PT-44.7, completed May 21, 2018 and May 30, 2018, on PORV block
valves 2-RC-MOV-2536 and 2-RC-MOV-2535, respectively
North Anna Narrative Logs regarding PORV Block Valve 2-RC-MOV-2536 testing on
August 16, 2018
71114.01 - Exercise Evaluation
Procedures
CPIP-3.2, North Anna LEOF Activation, Rev. No. 25
CPIP-6.0, LEOF Recovery Manager Guidance, Rev. No. 14
CPIP-6.2, Radiological Assessment Coordinator, Rev. No 15
EP-AA-400, Drill and Exercise Program, Rev. No. 12
EPIP-1.01, Emergency Manager Controlling Procedure (with 3 attachments), Rev. 52
EPIP-1.03, Response to Alert (with 1 attachment), Rev. 22
EPIP-1.04, Response to Site Area Emergency (with 2 attachments), Rev. 22
EPIP-1.05, Response to General Emergency, Rev. 24
EPIP-1.06, Protective Action Recommendations (with 5 Attachments), Rev. No. 13
EPIP-2.01, Notification of State and Local Governments, Rev. 39
EPIP-2.02, Notification of NRC (with 3 attachments), Rev. 23
EPIP-3.02, State Emergency Manager Guideline, Attachment 6, Rev. 38
EPIP-3.03, Activation of the Operations Support Center (OSC), Rev. 23
EPIP-3.05, Augmentation of Emergency Response Organization, (with 2 attachments). Rev. 11
EPIP-4.03, Dose Assessment Team Controlling Procedure (with 8 Attachments), Rev. 22
EPIP-4.07, Protective Measures (with 5 Attachments), Rev. 24
EPIP-4.09, Source Term Assessment (with 6 Attachments), Rev. 20
EPIP-4.18, Monitoring of LEOF (with 4 Attachments), Rev. 15
EPIP-4.34, Field Team Radio Operator Instructions (with 4 Attachments), Rev. 7
EPIP-5.03, Personnel Accountability, Rev. 21
EPIP 5.09, Security Team Leader Controlling Procedure (with 8 attachments), Rev. 16
North Anna Power Station Emergency Plan, Rev. No. 45
PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Rev. No. 34
Condition Reports
CR 1101691
CR 1101692
CR 1101664
CR 1101688
CR 1101667
CR 1102034
CR 1103338
Other Documents
North Anna Power Station Biennial Exercise NJUL18BE Scenario Book
Control Room Simulator, Operations Support Center, Technical Support Center, and Local
Emergency Operations Facility/Joint Information Center - Documentation packages (logs,
Event Notification Forms, Protective Action Recommendations, Media Releases, and
Radiological Dose Assessments)
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Procedures
DQR-EP-AA, Emergency Preparedness Change Evaluator, Rev. 2
EP-AA-101, 10 CFR 50.54(q) Change Evaluation, Rev. 8
EPIP-1.01, Emergency Manager Controlling Procedure, Rev. 52
EPIP-2.01 Notification of State and Local Governments, Rev. 39
North Anna Power Station Emergency Plan, Rev. 45
Other Documents
NA-16-006, 50.54(q)(3) Screening/Evaluation for EPIP-2.01 Rev. 39, dated 10/22/14
NA-17-06, 50.54(q)(3) Screening/Evaluation for NAPS Emergency Plan Rev. 45, dated 5/1/17
NA-17-17A, 50.54(q)(3) Screening/Evaluation for EPIP-1.01 Rev. 52, dated 9/21/17
NA-18-01S, 50.54(q)(3) Screening/Evaluation for NAPS Emergency Plan Rev. 45, dated 2/6/18
NA-18-02S, 50.54(q)(3) Screening/Evaluation for NAPS Emergency Plan Rev. 45,
dated 1/29/18
NA-18-05S, 50.54(q)(3) Screening/Evaluation for NAPS Emergency Plan Rev. 45, dated 2/6/18
71114.08 - Exercise Evaluation Procedures
Procedures
CPIP-3.1, CERC & CEOF Activation, Rev. 3.0
CPIP-3.2, North Anna LEOF Activation, Rev. 25
EP-AA-400, Drill & Exercise Program, Rev. 12
EPIP-3.02, Activation of the Technical Support Center, Rev. 38
EPIP-3.03, Activation of the Operational Support Center, Rev. 23
Other Documents
2-Year Exercise Plan Objectives & Elements 2018-2029
Drill & Exercise Objectives & Elements Demonstrated during 2017
Drill & Exercise Objectives & Elements Demonstrated during 2018
NAPS 2/9/16 Biennial Exercise Management Critique, dated 3/9/16
NAPS 8/16/16 Emergency Plan Drill Management Critique, dated 9/9/16
NAPS 8/23/16 Emergency Plan Drill Management Critique, dated 9/20/16
NAPS 11/1/16 Emergency Plan Drill Management Critique, dated 11/28/16
NAPS 3/9/17 Emergency Plan Drill Management Critique, dated 4/4/17
NAPS 5/2/17 Emergency Plan Drill Management Critique, dated 5/31/17
NAPS 7/13/17 Emergency Plan Drill Management Critique, dated 8/2/17
NAPS 11/7/17 Emergency Plan Drill Management Critique, dated 12/13/17
NAPS 2/20/18 Emergency Plan Drill Management Critique, dated 3/28/18
North Anna Power Station Biennial Exercise NJUL18BE Scenario Book
Scenario Review Checklist
71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
Procedures
LI-AA-500, NRC/INPO/WANO Performance Indicator and MOR Reporting, Revision 2
Technical Report SE-0007, NRC Mitigating System Performance Index (MPSI) Basis
Document, North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2, Revision 3
0-PT-172.6, Early Warning System Sirens Activation Monitoring, Rev. 5
0-PT-172.7, Early Warning System Polling Functional Test, Rev. 7
ANS Updated Design Report, North Anna Power Station, Doc. # 300-170420-NPS-001, Rev. 1
EP-AA-103, Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators, Revision 5
Condition Reports
CR 1071117
Other Documents
Unit 1 and 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System, System Health Report 08/07/2018
Record of Unavailability for the MSPI Components, 10/01/2017 through 06/30/2018
DEP opportunities documentation for 2nd, 3rd, 4th quarters 2017, & 1st quarter 2018
Siren test data for 2nd, 3rd, 4th quarters 2017, & 1st quarter 2018
Drill & exercise participation records of ERO personnel for 2nd, 3rd, 4th quarters 2017, & 1st
quarter 2018
Early Warning System (EWS) Polling Function Bi-Monthly Test, results from 2Q2017 to 1Q2018
FEMA Analysis of Alert Notification System for North Anna Plant, dated 10/19/87
North Anna Power Station Site-Specific Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Alert &
Notification System Quality Assurance Verification, dated 10/3/87
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Procedures
CM-AA-FPA-100, Fire Protection/Appendix R (Fire Shutdown) Program, Revision 13
Condition Reports
CR1102608
CR1102734
CR1102735
CR1103399
Other Documents
Drawing 11715-FE-32AU, Ductline Plan Details & Grounding, Substation Service Water Tie-In
Vault and Pumphouse, Revision 5
Drawing 11715-FE-75E, Conduit & Lighting Plan, Service Water Tie-In Vault, Revision 6
Drawing 11715-FE-83E, Cathodic Protection Conduit Plan, Service Water Tie-In Vault,
Revision 3
Drawing TESK-SW025, SW Pump Discharge Header Flow Monitoring Instrumentation,
Revision 2
60855.1 - Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
0-PT-152, Operations Periodic Test, Operations Special Nuclear Material Physical Inventory,
Revision 8
1601092-11715-FY-9P, Finished Grading & Drainage, Sections & Details, ISFSI Pad (Dry
Storage) Facility #3, Revision 0
1601092-0-S-002, Temporary Vehicle Barriers for Construction of ISFSI Pad (Dry Storage)
Facility #3, Revision 0
1601092-11715-FC-49C, Plans, Sections & Details, ISFSI Pad (Dry Storage) Facility #3,
Revision 0
1601092-11715-FC-49C1, Miscellaneous Concrete Structures, ISFSI Pad (Dry Storage)
Facility #3, Revision 0
1601092-11715-FY-1M, Site Plan, Revision 0
Engineering Technical Evaluation (ETE) -NAF-2018-0037, NUHOMS Canister DOM-32PTH-
067-D ISFSI Fuel Assembly/Control Component Certification, Canister Loading Map, and
Supplemental Data Package, Revision 0
Engineering Technical Evaluation (ETE) -NAF-2018-0038, NUHOMS Canister DOM-32PTH-
068-D ISFSI Fuel Assembly/Control Component Certification, Canister Loading Map, and
Supplemental Data Package, Revision 0
License No. SNM-2507, License for Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level
Radioactive Waste, Amendment No. 5