IR 05000338/1990010
| ML20044A592 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1990 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, King L, Lesser M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20044A590 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-90-10, 50-339-90-10, NUDOCS 9006290256 | |
| Download: ML20044A592 (11) | |
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g Report Nos.:. 50-338/90-10 and 50-339/90-10
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Licensee:
Virginia Electric &-Power Company p
'5000 Dominion Boulevard
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Glen Allen, VA 23060-
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Docket Nos.:' 50-338 and 50-339 :
License Nos.:
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Facility Nume: North Anna 1 and 2
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' Inspection Conducted:. April 21 Ma 25, 1990-l C
Inspectors:
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22/90-
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M.' Lesser, Senio FRe ide t Inspector Date. Signed j//f l /k m s/M/'lo L.
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,1Resi nt Inspe,ctor Date Signed
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Approved by:
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P.'E.-Fredrickson, Section Chief Dste. Si~gned --
I Division of Reactor Projects-t SUMMARY t
Scope:
This. routine inspection by the resident inspectors involved the following
- areas: plant status, maintenance, surveillance, engineered safety feature' walk
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.down, licensee' event report follow up, and action on previous inspection :
findings.
During the. performance of this inspection, the resident inspectors conducted reviews of the licensee's-back shift operations on May 15, 16, 23,
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Results':
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Within thel areas inspected, two weaknesses and one strength were identified.-
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s Inadequate controls and prerequisites for fuel building ventilation system.
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testing'is a weakness (paragraph 4.c.).
This item is similar to Control! Room.
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. ? ressure Testing discussed in Inspection Report 338,339/90-07. The;secondh P
' weakness was' identified through a-review of the licensee's October 3,1989, f,. C 'e oc,
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t 3 / response' to Generic Letter.89-04. Guidance on' Developing Acceptable Inservice
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a Tes ti ng.'
'The response and subsequent action reveal a weakness in the P
Licensee's'. review process and implementation of the Generic Letter 89-04 m
guidance 1(paragraph 6.b).
The placing of computers in the control room that
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J, are capable' of accessing jumper status, plant equipment status, annunciator
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'p response procedures, etc. is considered to be a strength (paragraph 6.c).
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees L'. Edmonds, Superintendent, Nuclear Training l
R. Enfinger, Assistant Station Manager
- M. Bowling, Assistant Station Manager
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i J. Hayes, Superintendent, Operations (Acting)
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- D. Heacock, Superintendent, Engineering G. Kane, Station Manager P.-Kemp, Supervisor, Licensing
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W. Matthews, Superintendent, Maintenance
- A. Parker, Jr., Supervisor, Maintenance Engineering
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- T. Porter, Nuclear Safety Engineering. Supervisor
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- J. Smith, Quality Assurance Manager
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A. Stafford.: Superintendent, Health Physics
- J. Stall, Superintendent of Operations F. Terminella, Supervisory, Quality V. West, Superintendent, Outage Management j
Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, cechnicians, I
operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
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- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are. listed in the.
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2.
Plant Status j
Unit I commenced the inspection period on April 21 operating at 100% power.
l and completed the inspection period on May.25 operating at 100% power,- day:
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121 of continuous operation.
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Unit 2 commenced the inspection period on April 21 operating at 100% power and completed the inspection period on 11ay 25,1990, operating at 100%
. power, day 382 of continuous operation.
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Maintenance (62703)
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Station maintenance activities affecting safety-related systems and j
components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that the activities were l
conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and
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l industry codes or standards, and in conformance with TS requirements.
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On April 23, 1990, the inspectors observed replacement of the low
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head SI pump 1-SI-P-1A seal assembly.
The inspectors reviewed l
procedure MMP-C-SI-1, Mechanical Maintenance Procedure for Low Head
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S1 Pump Inspection,. Repair and Seal Replacement.
The inspectors-
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how the total lift of the pump would be measured. This was discussed L
with the maintenance foreman. It was determined that the foreman had l'
identified this problem and had obtained clarification on how to properly measure total pump lif t.
The maintenance superintendent agreed that the procedure needed to be changed to clarify the proper method'to measure pump lift. The changes were made to the procedure.
The Mal replacement was accomplished and the' pump was tested and declared operable in less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from the initial tag out. A
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root cause analysis of the seal failure was inconclusive.
The seal-that was removed had no damage.
The licensee will monitor the seal for future indication of leakage, b.
On May 21, 1990, the inspectors observed removal and replacement of reactor coolant letdown filter 1-CH-FL-5.
This maintenance was performed per procedure MMP-C-FL-5, Removal and Reinstallation.of the.
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l Reactor Coolant Letdown Filter.
No problems were identified.
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On May 22, 1990, testing was conducted on Unit 1 Train
"A" Solid State Protection System. - During the test, the universal logic card.
for P-12 (Low Low Tave. Permissive) was determined 'to have failed.-
The inspectors' observed corrective actions including the application i
of the proper TS action statement, card replacement and satisfactory I
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retest.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Surveillance (61726)
l The inspectors observed / reviewed TS required testing and verified that a
p testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test l
instrumentation was calibrated, that LCOs were met and that any deficiencies identified were properly. reviewed and resolved; a.
Auxiliary Feed Water Turbine-driven Pump Test.
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i On May 2,1990, the inspectors witnessed portions of the performance of PT-2-PT-71.1, AFW Pump (2-FW-P-2) Test, for the AFW turbine-driven
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pump.
The inspector observed verification of initial prerequisites-
and questioned the licensee concerning operator action for pre-lubricating the bearings prior to starting-the pump (step. 6.6.5 of the procedure).
The licensee. stated that the pre-lubrication
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provision for this type of test was implemented to extend pump
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bearing-life and wss recommended by the manufacturer. This explana-tion was determined to be acceptable because the pump's installed oil pucp is ccfficient to lubricate the bearings during emergency pump opi, rations.
The inspector verified that the required data was taken and acceptance criteMa was satisfied.
During the test, the inspcctor noted that the pump discharge relief valve was leaking l
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approximately 1 GPM.
The licensee was aware of the leaking relief valve and has evaluated the leakage as acceptable.
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Auxiliary Feed Water Motor-driven Pump Tr,st.
On May 3, 1990, the inspectors observed the performance of 2-PT-71.2, AFW Pump (2-FW-P-3A) Test. - This ir, a monthly test required by TS.
No problems were identified, c.
Fuel Building Negative Pressura Test.
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Technical Specification 3.9.12 requires that the fuel building
ventilation system be operaale during irradiated fuel movement within
)r the spent fuel pit, and turing crane operation with loads over
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irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pit.
The surveillance requires
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that at least once per eighteen months during system operation a i
.0125 inch vacuum, water gauge, relative to the outside atmosphere.
'3 be achieved and verified.
On May 9, 1990, the inspectors witnessed
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1-PT-95.2, Fuel Building Negative Pressure Test and only.01 inch vacuum, ' water gauge, was achieved during the test. -The test was re-performed and since the decontamination building is adjacent to
.the fuel building, the decontamination building door was closed for
- the retest.
In addition, the second fuel building exhaust fan was operating during the re-performance of the test.
The retest passed with.015 inch vacut.in, water gauge.
The inspector - informed the licensee that these conditions for passing the test (decontamination building ) door closed, and a second fuel building exhaust fan i
operating should be a prerequisite to any further movement of fuel or crane operation with loads over the fuel and hence a condition for operability of the fuel building ventilation system.
The licensee
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Operations Superintendent. agreed that these requirements would be l
prerequisites.
This appears to be similar to problems ' identified with the control room ventilation test discussed in NRC Inspection Report 338,339/90-07.
The licensee'has in the past, adjusted the
,I adjacent ventilation to pass the fuel building ventilation test, but this was not made a requirement for operability.
Problems associated with ventilation test failures is a weakness and will be followed up on future inspections to insure that these prerequisites and any other licensee resolutions will be effective. ~
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
ESF System Walk Down (71710)
The inspector walked down the control room air conditioners service water system on May 23, 1990, using operations valve checklist 1-0P-49.4A and drawing 11715-F13-400.
The following minor discrepancies were identified and forwarded to the licensee for correction:
1-SW-363 "B" supply to 1-HV-F-4A was labelled "A" Supply, i
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k 1-SW-369, 371 were not labelled as #1 isolation.
1-SW-370, 372 were not labelled as #2 isolation.
1-SW-1171,1172-Downstream isolation to the seal are not on the checkoff sheet.
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1-SW-419 "A" Supply to 1-HV-E-4B is labelled "B" supply.
1-SW-426 is not labelled #1 drain.
1-SW-430, 429 and. 440 are not labelled #2 isolation.
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1-SW-395 is not labelled #2 isolation.
1-SW-290 is labelled "A" Return Header Isolation Valve, not #4.
1-SW-289 is labelled "B" Return Header Isolation Valve, not #3
.l 1-SW-288 is. labelled "B" Supply Header Isolation Valve, not #2.
1-SW-287 is labelled "A" Supply Header Isolation Valve, not #1.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Operational Safety Verification (71707'
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'By observations during the inspection s riod, the inspectors verified that the control room manning requirements were being met.
In addition, the inspectors observed shift turnover to verify that continuity of system j
status = was maintained.
The inspectors periodically-questioned shift-l personnel relative to their awareness of plant conditions.
Through log review and plant tours,'the inspectors. verified compliance.with selected
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TS requirements and LCOs.
i In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included-a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts of the security' force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access controls, q
searching of personnel,' packages and vehicles; badge issuance and cretrieval; escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory posts._ On a-j regular basis, RWPs were reviewed and the specific work activity was j
monitored to assure that the activities were being conducted per the RWPs.
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.The inspectors' kept informed, on a daily basis, of overall status of both
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units and of any significant safety matter related to plant operations.
Discussions were held with plant management and various members of_ the
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operations staff on a regular basis.
Selected portions of operating logs and data sheets were reviewed daily.
The inspectors conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the control room.
Observations included:' witnessing work activities in progress; verifying the status of
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operating and standby safety systems and equipment; confirming valve positions, instrument and recorder readings, and annuciator alarms; and observing housekeeping, a.
1 Unit 1 Battery Room Inspection, a
During a tour of the Unit 1 battery rooms, ~ the inspector noted a
'l large. amount of oxide build-up in the bottom of cells 22, 27 and 28 l
for the 120 volt station battery 1-IV.
The inspector held discus-
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sions with the system engineer, who indicated that he_ was aware of-l
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the problem and was closely monitoring the situation.
Currently, the
three cells are being monitored for specific gravity,. cell voltage,
temperature, and-electrolyte level, on a weekly basis where the TS requires only the pilot cell to be monitored this often.
All cells meet the'TS values, and the licensee considers the battery operable.
The Unit 1 battery 1-IV is only one year old, and the manufacturer-
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(Exide) has. agreed to replace the battery since it was designed to
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last 20 years.
The battery is scheduled to be replaced during the.
next rer'ueling outage currently planned for spring 1991.
If the cells in question fail, the overall battery voltage would be _ reduced to approximately 127 volts, which is still above the required 125 volts, b.
Generic Letter 89-04 Guidance on Inservice Testing.
Generic Letter 89-04 " Guidance on Developing Acceptable Inservice Testing Programs" dated April 3,1989, recognized that a number of generic deficiencies 'affecting plant safety have frequently appeared-as IST programmatic weaknesses.
In order to remedy these generic.IST -
deficiencies, to clarify the status of current programs with respect l
to applicable ~TS's and 10 CFR 50.55a requirements, and to alleviate
the problem with respect to review of program revisions, the NRC '
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established guidance, j
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For plants not listed in Table 1 or 2 of the G/L currently submitted -
IST program relief requests were approved provided the licensee reviewed their most recently submitted IST programs and implementa-tion procedures against the position in Attachment'l of the generic-letter, and within six months confirmed in writing their conformance L
with the stated positions.
Changes to the IST programs as a result of this generic letter should be submitted to the NRC along with the confirmation letter.
Approval is granted provided the programs are consistent with the positions taken in Attachment 1 or provided the adequacy of the proposed alternative testing for detectina degradation is justified.
North Anna falls into the categey of plants not listed in Table 1 or 2 of the generic letter and therefore is required to meet Attachment 1 guidance.
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The inspector became aware on April 23, 1990 that the licensee was not testing the outside recirculation spray pumps in accordance with the established IST program and the G/L submittal.
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notified the NRC' project manager via telephone that this was an.
i administrative oversight; The licensee failed to identify, when they
,y-submitted the response to G/L 89-04 on October 3,1989. that.they were not. testing in accordance with the IST program.
The inspector questioned _' the~ licensee management on-whether this was 'the only.
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oversight with regard to meeting IST requirements, and was informed that a special QA performance evaluation had_ been initiated and was j
beingl conducted at management's request to review and compare a
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sample of applicable TS compliance with the IST program.
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The conclusions of the licensee's performance evaluation were:
(1) A lack' of attention to detail exists for development, conduct l
and review of completed pts.
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(2) No " basis-type" document exists for decisiens made relative to
E relief requests under the IST program.
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(3) The IST program does-not adequately res iew relief requests-
'i against design bases and licensing documants when changes to the-e program or implementing procedures are processed.'
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I (4) Significant differences. exist between the North Anna and Surry
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L site IST organizations, responsibilities and functions.
Weaknesses relative to availability. utilization and retention
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of personnel resources were evident.
The' licensee plans to resubmit the response.to Generic Letter 89-04 by -
June 14, 1990.
The licensee review of a selected sample _ of pts for performance of ASME
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Section XI pump and valve testing requirements ; identified several
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deficiencies and weaknesses.
An example of this is that the North Anna L
units have different TS requirements concerning pressure isolation valves.
4, The testing requirements are specifically detailed in TS providing' an individual-valve acceptance criteria.
The pts that perform the test have l_
not been revised since 1983 and provide no'-instructions as to the minimum
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l-pressure differential and leak rate.
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The 'above weaknesses are recognized by the licensee and the inspector discussed aspects of a proposed corrective action plan with licensee i,
l responsible personnel and NRC~ Region Il man 1gement. This is identified as E
. Inspector Follow-up Item 338,339/90-10-01, iST Program Weaknesses and will be inspected after the issuance of the licensee's new submittal of June 14, 1990 and NRC's acceptance of the su'amittal.
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.New Computers in the Control Room to A'd Operators.
The licensee recently located a computer system in the control room for use by operators.to access -various informationt This system includes the ability to obtain annunciator response procedures, to
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access jumper and plant equipment status, to obtain -various - plant log 3, and to trend parameters with graphics.
The _ computer information will be a-_ valuable tool for eiding operators in plant.
status and control-and is considered a strength.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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LERFollow-up(90712)
j The following LERs were reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that
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reporting requirements had been met, that causes had been identified, that
corrective actions ' appeared appropriate, that generic applicability had-
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been considered, and that the LER forms.were complete. Additionally, the inspectors confirmed that no unreviewed safety questions were involved and that violations of regulations or TS conditions had been identified, y
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(CLOSED)LER 338/89-008, Service Water Flow to RSHXs Less Than Design
'l Assumptions.
Te!, ting of the SW flow to the RSHXs revealed that only 15990 GPM was being supplied in-lieu of.the required 18000 GPM. The
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throttle position-of the HX supply valves had been incorrectly set.
L The immediate corrective action involved manually repositioning the l
valves to their required position and ensuring that the required flow -
could be achieved.
The licensee indicated that the stops for the-throttle valves have also been readjusted and set.-
The failure of E
the SW system to provide adequate flow to the RSHXs was evaluated and L
discussed in -NRC Inspection Report 50-338,339/89-08.
Escalated H
enforcement action was taken as a result of this problem and the
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I licensee comitted to test SW pump performance every refueling
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l outage. Additionally, the licensee committed to verifying SW. flow to L
the RSHXs'if SW pump degradation became evident.
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(CLOSED) LER 338,339/89-010, Loss of Power to. Emergency Busses.
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one train of redundant power for each unit was lost. ~This event was attributed to personnel error and failure to have adequate procedural
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instructions during the performance of work in.the substation /
switchyard area. ~ Work was being done in accordance with.DCP 88-05, Installation of. Third System Reserve Transformer.
Prior to starting this work. the licensee took action to insure two off-site sources of electrical power were supplying power to the emergency busses of each.
unit.
(Switchyard bus 3 supplied power to Unit 1 emergency H bus and emergency J bus and Unit 2 emergency H bus.)pplied power to Unit ~1 to Unit 2 emergency J bus; Switchyard bus 5 su The modification involved rewiring relay circuits in the Switchyard bus 4 area.
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panel containing the-Switchyard bus 4 relays also contained relays
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for a bus-tie breaker for busses 3 and 4.
A conductor for bus 3 and 4 tie-breaker-differential relay inadvertently grounded before the electrician could insulate it. The grounding caused switchyard bus-3 breaker to sense a failure in the tie breaker.
This initiated
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automatic breaker operation in the switchyard that isolated Switch-yard bus 3.
As a result, power was lost to one redundant train
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.(busses 1H and 2J) of each unit.
When power was lost to busses 1H and 2J. the EDG for these busses s
- started' and supplied power. to their respective busses.
Plant operators imediately diagnosed the' event as a loss of. power event
and -entered Abnormal Procedure 10, Loss of Electrical Power.
i Switchyard personnel also notified the plant operators that relay j
work' resulted in a loss of electrical power.
Within an hour of the-
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l initiating event, both busses;were returned to their normal' power i
supplies and the EDG's were secured. - Since redundant power remained'
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available to power-required plant equipment, no significant safety i
i consequences occurred..
-The licensee indicated that future switchyard procedures will be I
upgraded to include panel wiring and operation check precautions.
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- Subsequently, a change, which was reviewed by the, inspector, was made-
to.the Control Operations Methods Manual.
The change provides
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additional instructions and precautions when new construction control
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't-wiring is tied into existing substation control circuits.
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-(CLOSED) LER 338,339/89-015, Error in LBLOCA Analysis for the 18%
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Steam Generator Tube Plugging Case. During the performance of-the 18%
j lP steam generator tube plugging reanalysis an error was discovered
involving the: average enthalpy of the pressurizer steam and water i
volume. To ensure that the error would not affect the current analysis the licensee verified' that actual-SG. tube-plugging was less than the analyzed 15% value and also-invoked administrative controls, i
through a JCO, over several variables to ensure that PCT limits would not be violated.
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(CLOSED) LER 338/89-016, Two Parallel Motor lNerated Service Water Header Isolation Valves 101A and 1018 were Simultaneously Closed
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Rendering Two RS System HX Inoperable.. Because North Anna's RSHX are i
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designed for dry layfup conditions, it is not desirable for SW to leak into the HX. Therefore, a test is performed weekly to ensure SW leakage 's not going into the HXs.
Previous tests indicated that.SW was leaking past the SW header isolation valves.
Consequently, :the system was :et up on August ' 26,1989 to allow performance ofi 1-0P-49.6, Adysting RSHX Isolation MOVs to Reduce SW Inleakage.
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adjustment, OP-49.6 requires that cross-tie valves between the A 'and
.i B SW supply headers be closed with a worker stationed in the QS Pump House-to open the cross-tie valves in the event of a DBA and also requires. removing power from only one SW isolation valve at time.-
Due to poor comunications, electrical power was removed from both valves.
This was discovered approximately 3/4 of an hour later, and power was restored to one of the valves.
The adjustments were
- y completed satisfactorily on August 29, 1989, and the "A" SW header was returned to operable status.
Personnel associated with this event were re-instructed on the importance of correct communication
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and attention to detail.
The licensee initially considered this event reportable when TS 3.0.3 was entered and it was reported. in b
accordancewith10CFR50.72(b)(ii).
However,-since that time and as a result of a re-evaluation, the licensee. determined that the event i
does not fall under the reportability criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(ii)
or 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B).
The inspector' concurs with the licensee's position.
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8.
Action on Previous Inspection items (92701, 92702)
(Closed) IFl 338/88-22-01, Adjustment of Limit Switches on MOV' Isolation i
Valve
"C" for Main Feed Water Line to SG "C."
On August 6,1988, j
motor-operated main feed water isolation valve C failed-to fully close
during a reactor trip.
These valves are fast acting with a large amount of~ inertia and the limit switches are set to de-energize the motor for the
valve so that the ' valve will coast into its seat.
This is to insure that
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the seating thrust is not exceeded and valve damage is thus prevented.
Since the valve failed to fully close, maintenance performed EMP-P-MOV-3,
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Predictive ' Analysis of M0V, on the subject valve -and determined that the
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limit switch needed adjustment.
A M0 VATS motor load unit test was
performed, and during this test,- valve stroke characteristics were noted to change in relation to the stem lubrication. The stem was cleaned and a j
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new lubricant in accordance with the manufacturer's guidelines was i
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applied.
_This cleaning and re-lubrication was considered to improve
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the-valve closing and stroking characteristics.
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It has been determined that several parameters such as valve age and.
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mochanical condition, the length.of time -the valve is dormant, and conditional changes from the time of limit switch adjustment to the time the valve is called on to operate, all have an effect on the valve's operation and repeatability.
A small limit switch adjustment-has -a dramatic effect on the operator output.
As indicated, the valve stem was cleaned and re-lubricated, and the limit switch was readjusted..The valve
was subsequently tested satisfactorily.
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As a result of-this event and on-going engineerir.g evaluations, including.
discussions with the manufacturer, a modification has been proposed that will better. control the valve / actuator inertia and repeatability, and enhance the valve's reliability.
The modification involves a new motor actuator that has a significant lead time for procurement..The modifica-tion is scheduled for the 1990-1991 refueling-outages and are covered by EWR 89-112.
9.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and finoings were summarized on May 24, 1990, with i
those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
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Item Number Description and Reference IFl 338/90-10-01 IST Program Weaknesses (Paragraph 6.b)
q A weekness was identified with regard to inadequate contrcis and prerequisites for fuel building ventilation system testing (paragraph 4.c).
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A weakness was identified concerning the licensee's review process and implementation of Generic Letter 89-04 guidance (paragraph 6.b).
l A strength was identified-in the placement of informational computer access in the control room (paragraph 6.c).
10. Acronyms and initialisms
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AFW Auxiliary Feed Water ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers CFR Code of Federal Regulations DBA Design Basis' Accident DCP Design Change Package OG Diesel Generator.
I EDG Emergency Diesel Generator
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EWR Engineering Work Requests FW Feed Water
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G/L Generic Letter
GPM Gallons Per Minute.
-HX Heat Exchanger'
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IFl Inspector Follow-up-Item
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IST Inservice Testing-JC0.
Justification for Continued Operation
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LBLOCA large Break Loss of Coolant Accident LCO, Limiting' Condition for Operation LER Licensee Event Report
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MMP Mechanical Maintenance Procedure M0V Motor Operated. Valve M0 VATS Motor Operated Valve Analysis and Testing System NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OP Operating Procedure PCT Peak Centerline Temperature PT Periodic Test
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QA Quality Assurance
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Quench Spray RS Recirculation System RSHX Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger RWP Radiation Work Pennit SG Steam Generator SI Safety injection
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TS Technical Specification b
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