IR 05000335/1997014

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Submits Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-335/97-14 & 50-389/97-14.Corrective Actions:Sg Replacement Project Personnel Alerted to St Lucie Plant Procedural Requirements on Planned Deviations of TS Limits
ML17229A642
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/26/1998
From: PLUNKETT T F
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
50-335-97-14, 50-389-97-14, L-98-039, L-98-39, NUDOCS 9803040302
Download: ML17229A642 (11)


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~CATEGORYlyREGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)'7CESSIONNBR:9803040302DOC.DATE:98/02/26NOTARIZED:NOACIL:50-335St.LuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPower5:LightCo.50-389St.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPower6LightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONPLUNKETT,T.F.FloridaPowerELightCo.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)

SUBJECT: Submitsresponsetoviolationsnotedininsprepts50-335/97-14E50-389/97-14.Correctiveactions:SGreplacementprojectpersonnelalertedtoStLucieplantproceduralrequirementsonplanneddeviationsofTSlimits.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IEOIDCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRiENCLISIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-InspRept/NoticeofViolationResponseNOTES:DOCKETI0500033505000389ERECIPIENTZD.CODE/NAMEPD2-3PDXNTERNAL:ACRSCBNUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS3XTERNALLITCOBRYCEPJHNRCPDRCOPXESLTTRENCL112211111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEGLEAVES,WAEOD/SPD/RABDEDRONRR/DRCH/HHFBNRR/DRPM/PERBOEDIRRGN2FILE01NOACNUDOCSFULLTEXTCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111QRYD0CNNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR19ENCL19

FloridaPower6LightCompany,P.0.Box14000,JunoBeach,FL334080420%PLFEB263998L-98-03910CFR$2.201U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationFloridaPowerandLightCompany(FPL)hasreviewedthesubjectNoticeofViolationand,pursuantto10CFR$2.201,theresponsetoviolationsBandCareattached.NRCInspectionReport97-14statedthatnoresponsetoviolationAwasrequiredsincethecorrectiveactionstakenandplannedtocorrecttheviolationandpreventrecurrence,andthedatewhenfullcompliancewasachieved,wereadequatelyaddressedonthedocket.WithrespecttoviolationB,inadequateoversightofcontractorsbyFPLpersonnelduringtheSt.LucieUnit1SteamGeneratorReplacementProject(SGRP)resultedinafailuretoproperlyimplementplantproceduralrequirementsfordocumentingandapprovingplannedexceedancesoftheTechnicalSpecificationlimitsonovertime.St.LuciesitemanagementwillensurethatthelessonslearnedinregardtothelevelofcontractoroversightrequiredtoperformathighlevelsfromtheSGRPoutageareappliedtofuturerefuelingoutages.WithrespecttoviolationC,personnelerrorscontinuetodominatethecauseofperformanceshortcomingsatSt.Lucie.Ipersonallyhavediscussedtheunacceptabilityofcontinuingpersonnelerrorswiththemanagementteamandthenuclearplantsupervisorsattheplant.Ihavestatedmyexpectationsforerror-freeperformanceinallactivitiesandtheconsequencesfornotmeetingmy'xpectations.Topreventfuturepersonnelerrors,theplantisemphasizingselfandpeer-checkinginadditiontoitsfocusonverbatimproceduralcompliance.Thisisclearlyanareawhichrequiresfocusandactionbytheplantmanagersandstaffinthefuture.9803040302980226PDRADQCK050003356PDRIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIanFPLGroupcompany L-98-039P~ae2Pleasecontactuswithquestionsontheenclosedviolationresponses.Verytrulyyours,ThomasF.PlunkettPresidentNuclearDivisionTFP/JAS/EJWAttachmentcc:RegionalAdministrator,USNRC,RegionIISeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LuciePlant L-98-039AttachmentP~ae1ViolationBSection6.2.2.fofbothunits'echnicalSpecificationsstate,inpart,that"Administrativeproceduresshallbedevelopedandimplementedtolimittheworkinghoursofunitstaffwhoperformsafety-relatedfunctions."Additionally,"Anindividualshouldnotbepermittedtoworkmorethan16hoursinany24-hourperiod,normorethan24hoursinany48-hourperiod,normorethan72hoursinany7-dayperiod,allexcludingshiftturnovertime."Furthermore,theTechnicalSpecificationsrequirethat"AnydeviationfromtheaboveguidelinesshallbeauthorizedbythePlantGeneralManagerorhisdeputy,orhigherlevelsofmanagement."Contrarytotheabove,deviationsfromtheovertimeguidelineswereroutinelyauthorizedbytheSteamGeneratorReplacementProjectDirectorratherthanthePlantGeneralManagerorhisdeputy,orahigherlevelofmanagementduringthe1997Unit1SteamGeneratorReplacementandRefuelingOutage.ThisincludeddeviationsonOctober21,andDecember1,1997.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementI)applicabletobothUnits.~Resoese1.FPLconcurswiththeviolation.2.REASONFORVIOLATIONThereasonforthisviolationwasinadequatecontractoroversightbyFloridaPowerEcLightCompany(FPL)personnel.ThereplacementoftheSt.LucieUnit1steamgeneratorswasamajorconstructionprojectandaseparateorganizationwasestablishedfortheproject.TheSteamGeneratorReplacementProject(SGRP)organizationwasseparatefrom,butmatrixedwith,otherplantdepartments.SGRPcontractorworkprocedureswerereviewedandapprovedbyFPL.DuringtheSGRP,theplant'sovertimeprocedurewasrevisedtoaddressSGRPpersonneland,specifically,theapplicabilityofTechnicalSpecificationovertimelimitstoSGRPpersonnel.Revision1totheSGRPovertimeguidelinesidentifiedthatSGRPQualityAssurance,Engineering,andnon-destructiveexamination(NDE)personnelweresubjecttotheSt.Lucieovertimerequirements,includingtherequiredapprovalauthorityforexceedingovertimelimits.St.LuciePlantadministrativeproceduresrequirethatpersonnelsubjecttotheTechnicalSpecificationlimitsonovertimedocumentrequestedovertimedeviationsinawaiverletterthatisapprovedbytheSt.LucieVicePresidentorPlantGeneralManager.Additionally,theprocedurerequiresthataConditionReport(CR)bewrittenforeachrequestedwaiver L-98-039AttachmentP~ae2todocumentthedeviation,itscause,andcorrectiveactions.TheSGRPDirector,acontractedemployee,incorrectlyconcludedthatSGRPpersonnelwhohadbeendesignatedasbeingsubjecttotheTechnicalSpecificationlimitsonovertimeandtheassociatedSt.LuciePlantadministrativeprocedure,butwerenotperformingsafety-relatedwork,couldhaveovertimedeviationsapprovedinaccordancewiththeSGRPovertimeguidelines.Incertaincases,deviationformsforapplicableSGRPpersonnelhadbeenapprovedbytheSGRPdirector,andnotbytheSt.LucieVicePresidentorPlantGeneralManager,asrequiredbyplantprocedure.Additionally,insomecases,CRswerenotwrittenforsomeeventsforwhichdeviationformshadbeensubmittedforapproval.3.CORECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDA.TheSGRPdirectorwascounseledontheplant'sandSGRP'sproceduralrequirementsforobtainingapprovalforexceedingtheTechnicalSpecificationlimitsonovertime.SGRPpersonnelwerealertedtotheSt.LuciePlantproceduralrequirementsonplanneddeviationsoftheTechnicalSpecificationlimitsonovertime.SubsequenttoDecember5,1997,deviationsfromtheTechnicalSpecificationlimitsonovertimeforaffectedSGRPpersonnelwereapprovedbytheSt.LucieVicePresident.C.AdditionallevelsofcontractoroversightwereprovidedbytheFPLQualityAssuranceDepartmenttoensureproceduralcompliancebytheSteamGeneratorTeam.4.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSManagementexpectationsconcerningFPLoversightofcontractorswillbereinforcedduringthesitewidepre-outagestanddownmeetings.FPLfieldcoverageofcontractorsandadherencetoFPLproceduresbycontractorswillbeoneofthetopicscoveredinthesemeetings.B.FPLisrevisingandenhancingitscontractcoordinatortrainingprogram;thiseventwillbeincludedincontractorcoordinatortrainingbyJuly31,1998.5.FullcompliancewiththeSt.LucieovertimerequirementsbytheSGRPwasmetonDecember5,1997,withthecompletionofcorrectiveaction3.B.abov L-98-039AttachmentP~ee3ViolationCTechnicalSpecification6.8.1requiresthatthelicenseeimplementandmaintaintheproceduresrecommendedinAppendixAofRegulatoryGuide1.33,Revision2,1978includinglockingandtaggingofequipment.ProcedureADM-09.04,Revision2,"In-PlantEquipmentClearanceOrders,"Section6.15.10statedthatboundarymodificationsshouldbeprocessedusingthecomputersystem.ProcedureADM-09.04,Revision2,"In-PlantEquipmentClearanceOrders,"Section6.1.17allowedasystemwithanunisolableclearanceprovidedthat"ParametersarebeingmaintainedbytheOperationsshiftforcontrolofprotectiveconditions."Contrarytotheabove,OnNovember16,1997,theClearanceCenterSupervisorfailedtoprocessaboundarymodificationusingthecomputersystem.AnEquipmentClearanceOrderBoundaryModificationwasimplementedusingonlythehardcopyoftheclearance.AdifferenceinthetwoversionsoftheclearanceorderledtothevalvebeingleftopenaAerreturningthesystemtoservice.eOnDecember16,1997,thelicenseechosetoimplementanunisolableclearancebutdidnotmaintainparametersforthecontrolofprotectiveconditions.AtaglessclearancewasestablishedtoallowfillingtheReactorCoolantSystemto29feet6inches.However,thelevelintheReactorCoolantSystemwassubsequentlyraisedto30feet.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementI)applicabletoUnit1only.R~esense1.FPLconcurswiththeviolation.2.REASONFORVIOLATIONThereasonforthefirstexampleofthisviolationwascognitivepersonnelerrorbytheAssistantNuclearPlantSupervisor(ANPS)andSeniorNuclearPlantOperator(SNPO).TheclearanceprocedurerequiresthataAeraclearanceboundaryisestablished,allsubsequentclearanceboundarymodificationsandreleasesfortestaretobeperformed

'1L-98-039Attachment~Pae4usingthecomputerrecordoftheclearance"ashung"inthefield.Contrarytothisprocedure,theANPSmodifiedtheoriginalclearanceboundaryonthehardcopyoftheequipmentclearanceorder(ECO)toallowfortheopeningofadrainvalvetopermitpipepurgingtoremovehydrogenfromthepipingwithintheworkboundary.Thedrainvalvewasremovedfromthehardcopyclearance,withoutupdatingtheclearancecomputerdatabase,toallowmanipulatingthevalveunderaletterofinstruction(LOI)thatwasdevelopedtocontrolthegaspurgingevolution.TheANPSfailedtoupdatethecomputerizedrecordoftheECOtoreflectthemodifiedclearanceboundary.Post-modificationtestingrequiredmodifyingtheclearanceboundary,soaclearancereleasefortest(RFT)wasgeneratedbasedontheerroneouscomputerizedclearancedatabase,whichshowedthedrainvalvepositionastaggedopen.WhentheRFTwassubsequentlyreleased,thedrainvalvewastaggedopeninaccordancewiththeerroneousclearancecomputerdatabase.TheECOwaslaterreleasedusingthehardcopyoftheclearance,andthedrainvalveremainedtaggedopeninthefield.Thisresultedinahydrogenleakinthereactorauxiliarybuildingviatheopendrainvalve.Additionally,thefailuretoupdatethecomputerizedclearancedatabaseshouldhavebeenidentifiedbytheSNPOwhohungtheclearanceRFTboundarymodification.TheSNPOthathungtheclearanceRFTboundarymodificationshouldhaveidentifiedthefailuretoupdatethecomputerizedclearancedatabaseandshouldhavereportedthatthedrainvalvewasfoundclosed,nottaggedopen,asexpectedontheclearanceRFTboundarymodification.ThereasonforthesecondexampleofthisviolationwasaproceduralinadequacywithinADM-09.04,Revision2,"In-PlantEquipmentClearanceOrders"inthatacautiontagwasinappropriatelypermittedbyproceduretoimplementaclearance.Inordertoallowmaintenanceontheprimarymanways,anunisolablesystemclearancewashungonthereactorcoolantsystem(RCS).Theclearanceincludedthefollowingstatement:ThisisanECOforanunisolablesystem.ParametersarebeingmaintainedbytheOperationsshiftforcontrolofprotectiveconditions.DONOTRAISERCSLEVELABOVE29'"PRIMARYMANWAYSBEINGINSTALLED.Acautiontagwasplacedonthetygontubingthatstated:Donotraiselevelgreaterthan29'"withoutANPS/NPSpermissionTherewasnoproceduralrequirementthatthecautiontagreferencetheclearanceorder.Whencontrolroomsupervisionwasnotifiedthattheprimarymanwayswereinstalled,theydidnotunderstandthatthecautiontagwasrelatedtoanunisolableclearanceorde L-98-039AttachmentP~ae5Subsequently,theANPSauthorizedincreasingRCSlevelgreaterthan29'".RCSlevelwasincreasedto30'eforethesourceofthecautiontagwasrecognized.3.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDForthefirstexample(failuretoupdatecomputerclearancedatabase):ThedrainvalvewasclosedonNovember27,1997,andasystemlineupwasconductedontheportionofthereactorauxiliarybuildinghydrogensystemthatwaspotentiallyaffectedbytheclearance.StanddownmeetingswereheldwithOperationspersonneltodiscusstheevent,andemphasizetheneedforkeepingthehardcopyandcomputerizedclearancedatabaseidentical.C.TheANPSandSNPOinvolvedwiththeclearanceerrorweredisciplined.D.ProcedureADM-09.04,"In-PlantEquipmentClearanceOrders,"wasrevisedtorequireawalkdown(orprocedurallineup)ofmajorflowpathvalvesandcomponentswithintheboundaryofallclearanceswhentheclearanceisreleased.Forthesecondexample(unisolablesystemclearance):E.TheclearancewasreleasedonDecember17,1997.4.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSForthefirstexample(failuretoupdatecomputerclearancedatabase):A.Theprocessusedtoprocedurallychangeclearancesisunderreview.ThiseffortincludescoordinationwithFPL'sothernuclearfacility,TurkeyPoint.ThisreviewwillbecompletedbyApril30,1998.TheneedtorevisethecomputerclearancesoAwaretoallowdeletionofindividualclearancetagsiscurrentlybeingtrackedonthe10highestprioritysafetyitemslist.Thiswillcorrectthemanualworkaroundrequiredtochangethecomputerclearancedatabase.Therevisiontothecomputerclearancesoftware,andassociatedprocedurechanges,willbecompletedbyJune30,199 L-98-039AttachmentP~ee6Forthesecondexample(unisolablesystemclearance):C.ProcedureADM-09.04,"In-PlantEquipmentClearanceOrders,"wasrevisedtorequiretheuseofaclearanceinformationtag,includingtheclearanceordernumber,ontheinstrumentbeingusedtocontroltheparameter.5.FullcompliancewiththeclearanceprocedurewasreachedonDecember17,1997,withthecompletionofcorrectiveaction3.E.above.