IR 05000335/1997013

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Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-335/97-13 & 50-389/97-13.Corrective Actions:Initiated Work Package Change Notice to Change Step to Match Field Conditions & Provided Addl Levels of Contractor Oversight
ML17229A588
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/14/1998
From: PLUNKETT T F
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
50-335-97-13, 50-389-97-13, L-98-006, L-98-6, NUDOCS 9801220117
Download: ML17229A588 (9)


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CATEGORY1REGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9801220117DOC.DATE:98/01/14NOTARIZED:NOFACIL:$0-335St.LuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPower5LightCo.50-389St.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPowerEcLightCo.AUTH.N'AMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONPLUNKETT,T.F.FloridaPower&LightCo.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)

SUBJECT: Respondstoviolationsnotedininsprepts50-335/97-1350-389/97-13.Correctiveactions:initiatedworkpackagechangenoticetochangesteptomatchfielconditionsprovidedaddilevelsofcontractoroversight.D1STRIBUTIONCODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR1ENCLtSIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-InspRept/NoticeofViolationResponseNOTES:DOCKET0500033505000389RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD2-3PDCOPIES'ECIPIENTLTTRENCLIDCODE/NAME11WIENS,L.COPIESLTTRENCL11INTERNAL:EXTERNAL:ACRS9Q/QTCLECENTNRRDRPM/PECBNUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS3LITCOBRYCE,JHNRCPDR22111111l.1111111AEOD/SPD/RABDEDRONRR/DRCH/HHFBNRR/DRPM/PERBOEDIRRGN2FILE01NOACNUDOCSFULLTEXT1111111111111111D0NNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR19ENCL19 FloridaPower&LightCompany,6351S.OceanDrive,JensenBeach,FL34957'QrAPLJanuary14,1998L-98-00610CFR$2.201U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationNRCInteratedInsectionReort97-13FloridaPowerandLightCompany(FPL)hasreviewedthesubjectNoticeofViolationand,pursuantto10CFR$2.201,theresponsetotheviolationsisattached.TwoofthethreeviolationsfromInspectionReport97-13aretheresultofpersonnelerrors.FPLcontinuesinitseffortstoreinforcetheneedforverbatimcompliancewithprocedurestominimizethepotentialforpersonnelerrors.Thethirdviolationisanexampleofinadequateprocedures.ThisproblemisbeingcounteredbytheongoingeffortatSt.LuciePlanttoensurethatproceduresareproperlywrittenandsufficientlydetailedtoassureproperimplementationofallactivities.Pleasecontactuswithquestionsontheenclosedviolationresponses.Verytrulyyours,ThomasF.Plunkett'residentNuclearDivisionTFP/JAS/EJWAttachmentcc:RegionalAdministrator,USNRC,RegionIISeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LuciePlantf~+cf'..vugg>980i220ii7980if4PDRADOCK050003358PDRanFPLGroupcompanyIIIIIII!IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII L-98-006AttachmentP~ae1silat~inA10CFR50,AppendixB,CriterionVrequiresthatactivitiesaffectingqualityshallbeprescribedbydocumentedinstructionsandproceduresandshallbeaccomplishedinaccordancewiththoseinstructionsandprocedures.Thelicensee'sTopicalQualityAssuranceReportimplementsthisrequirementinSection5.0.LicenseeWorkPackage1038,step38,stated,inpart,"Applyorverifymarkingsonthetopandbottomofoneofthemaingirderstoshowthetravellimitsfromthecenterpostcenterline.Note:Ensurethelocationsofthemarkingsarevisibletothehydrajackoperatorandtothepersoninchargeonthefloor."Contrarytotheabove,onNovember16,1997,nomarkingswereidentifiedonthetopandbottomofthemaingirders.Inaddition,themarkingsononesideofonemaingirderwerenotvisibletothehydrajackoperatorandtothepersoninchargeonthefloor.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVViolation(SupplementI)applicabletoUnit1.R~si~n1.FPLconcurswiththeviolation.2.REAONFORVIOLATIONThecauseoftheviolationwascognitivepersonnelerrorbyanon-utilityfieldengineer.Additionally,thecontractoroversightbyFPLpersonnelwasinadequate.FPLreviewedtheworkpackagerequirementsfortheloadlimitmarkingsfortheTemporaryLiftingDevice(TLD)andverifiedthattheoriginalsteamgeneratorswereliAedsafelywithinthesafeloadlimitsimposedonthelift.However,markingsusedtodefinethesafeloadlimitswereplacedinadifferentconfigurationthancalledforintheprocedureusedfortheinstallationoftheTLDinsidecontainment.TheloadlimitmarkingsfortheerectionandtestingoftheTLDoutsidecontainnient(workpackage1039)requiredthatmarkingsbeappliedonthesideofonemaingirder,whichwerevisibletotheperson-in-charge(PIC)fromthegroundandtothehydrajackoperators.However,theseloadlimitmarkingrequirementsweredifferentfromtheloadlimitmarkingrequirementsfortheTLDwhenerectedinsidecontainment(workpackage1038).Workpackage1038requiredmarkingsonthetopandbottomofonemaingirderonceinstalledinsidecontainment.Thenon-utilityfieldengineerincorrectlysignedofftheholdpointbasedonthisstepbeing"previously

L-98-006AttachmentP~ag2installedduringtheloadtestatsouthyard,"(i.e.,whentheOLDwasloadtestedoutsidecontainment).Aworkpackagechangerequestshouldhave'beensubmitted,oradditionaltapemarksappliedinaccordancewiththeworkpackage.ThelevelofcontractoroversightprovidedbyFPLpersonnelwasinadequatetoidentifytheworkpackagenoncomplianceandtheresultantdiscrepantTLDsafeloadmarkings.RRECTIVETEPTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDA.AworkpackagechangenoticewasinitiatedtochangethesteptomatchtheGeldconditions.Thesafeloadlimitmarkingsonthesideofthemaingirderwereverifiedascorrectandadditionalmarkingswereappliedtotheothermaingirder.ThecorrectloadlimitmarkingswereappliedonNovember20,1997.B.AdditionallevelsofcontractoroversightwereprovidedbytheFPLQualityAssuranceDepartmenttoensureproceduralcompliancebytheSteamGeneratorTealii.ORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVIDTHERVIOLATIONSA.Therequirementsofverbatimcompliancewithworksteps,proceduralsteps,andsign-opswerethetopicofdocumentedtrainingforFPLandcontractorpersonnelwhichwascompletedonNovember21,1997.ManagementexpectationsconcerningFPLoversightofcontractorswillbereinforcedatthesitewidepre-outagestanddownmeetings.FPLGeldcoverageofcontractorsandadherencetoFPLproceduresbycontractorswillbeoneofthetopicscoveredinthesemeetings.5.FullcompliancewasachievedonNovember20,1997,whenthepropersafeloadlimitmarkingswereappliedtotheTL I98-006AttachmentP~ae3Y~ilaimBTechnicalSpecification6.8.l.arequiresthatwrittenproceduresbeestablished,implemented,andmaintainedcoveringtheactivitiesrecommendedinAppendixA,RegulatoryGuide1.33,QualityAssuranceProgramRequirements(Operation),Revision2,February1978.AppendixAparagraph7.erequireslicensee'sestablishproceduresfor(1)AccessControltoRadiationAreasIncludingaRadiationWorkPermitSystemand(7)PersonnelMonitoring.Contrarytotheabove,onNovember4,1997,thelicenseedidnothaveadequatewrittenaccesscontrolprocedurestoradiationareasinthattheproceduresdidnotprovidefortheissuanceoftele-dosimetrydevicesthatwouldensurethedoselimitsetpointsappliedintele-dosimetrymonitoringsystemswereinagreementwiththelimitsestablishedontheapplicableRadiationWorkPermits.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementIV)applicabletobothUnits.R~g~ny1.FPLconcurswiththeviolation.2.REASONFORVIOLATIONTherewereseveralcauseswhichcontributedtothisevent.Theuseoftele-dosimetryatSt.LuciegraduallyevolvedfromaninformationaltoolusedbyHealthPhysicstoasystemactivelyusedforcontrollingradiationexposure.However,St.Luciedidnotrecognizetheneedforproceduralrequirementsandtrainingoncetele-dosimetrywasactivelyrelieduponfordosecontrol,whichresultedinthefollowingdeficiencies:1)HealthPhysicsprocedureHPP-1,"RadiationWorkPermits,"'didnotcontainthenecessary,instructionstoHealthPhysicspersonnelwhentele-dosimetryisrequiredbytheRadiationWorkPermit(RWP).2)TherewasnospecificprocedurethataddressedtheuseofTelemerlindosimetry..3)TrainingprovidedtoFPLandcontractpersonneldidnotresultinanadequatelevelofknowledgeandunderstandingofthesystem.TheREMACSsystem,whichisusedtocreateandadministerRWPsdoesnotcommunicatewiththetele-dosimetrysystem,soasetpointchangetoonedoesnotautomaticallyresultinachangetotheother.Doseanddoseratealarmsetpointsmustbemanuallychangedonthetele-dosimetry I98-006AttachmentP~ae4systemafterachangeismadetotheRWP.Personnelinvolvedinthiseventwerenotawareoftherequirementtomanuallyupdatethetele-dosimetrysystem,anddidnotnotifytheappropriateindividualworkinginthemultibadgeofficetofacilitatethechangeaAertheTelemerlindosealarmsetpointwaschangedonRWP97-1431.ThisRWPwaswrittentogovernworkontheUnit1pressurizerduringheaterreplacementandnickelplatingoperations.3.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDA.ThedosealarmsetpointforRWP97-1431wasrevisedonthetele-dosimetrysystemto400mremupondiscoveryoftheproblem.B.HealthPhysicssupervisionincludedthetele-dosimetryissuestationinthedistributionofRWPsandrevisionstoRWPsthatrequireTele-dosimetry.C.HealthPhysicsProcedureHPP-1,"RadiationWorkPermits,"wasrevisedtoincludeinstructionsaddressingthedistributionoforiginalandrevisedcopiesofRWPstothetele-dosimetryissuestationforRWPsrequiringtheuseoftele-dosimetry.ThischangewasapprovedonDecember10,1997,andwasissuedforuseonJanuary9,1998,followingpre-implementationtraining.4.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSA.FPLwilldevelopaprocedureaddressingtheuseoftele-dosimetrybyMarch31,1998.B.FPLwillincreasethefrequency,andenhancethelevel,oftrainingontheuseoftele-dosimetryforFPLandcontractHealthPhysicspersonnelbyMay31,1998.Thesechangeswillincludetele-dosimetrytrainingintheannualrequalificationprogramforFPLHealthPhysicspersonnelandtele-dosimetrytraininginthecontractHealthPhysicstechniciantrainingprogram.Thetrainingwilluseanon-the-jobtraining(OJT)method.5.FullcompliancewillbeachievedonMarch31,1998,withthecompletionof4.A.above.~

L-98-006AttachmentP~ay5~Vi~latiLnnTechnicalSpecification6.8.1.arequiresthatwrittenproceduresbeestablished,implemented,andmaintainedcoveringtheactivitiesrecommendedinAppendixA,RegulatoryGuide1.33,QualityAssuranceProgramRequirements(Operation),Revision2,February1978.AppendixAparagraph7.erequireslicenseeestablishproceduresfor(1)AccessControltoRadiationAreasIncludingaRadiationWorkPermitSystemand(7)PersonnelMonitoring.Section5.9ofHealthPhysicsProcedure(HPP)-1,Revision10,"RadiationWorkPermits(RWPs)",requiredajobspecificRWPforentryintotheReactorContainmentBuilding(RCB).Section7.1ofHPP-3,Revision6,"HighRadiationAreas(HRAs)",specifiedresponsibilitiesofradiationworkersinHRAs.TheprocedurerequiredradiationworkersbeknowledgeableofdosemarginandRWPrequirements.Contrarytotheabove,onNovember4,1997,aradiationworkerenteredtheUnit1ReactorContainmentBuilding(RCB)withoutsigninginonajobspecificRWPfortheRCBasrequiredbySection5.9.Inaddition,onNovember4,1997,aradiationworkerenteredtheUnit1RCBwithoutknowledgeoftheRWPdoselimitanddoseratelimitsfortheRWPtheworkerwasusingasrequiredbySection7.1.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementIV)applicabletobothUnits.R~esnse1.FPLconcurswiththeviolation.2.REASONFORVIOLATIONTheprimaryreasonforthisviolationwasafailureofaradiationworkertoutilizethecorrectRWPinthatthepersonenteredthereactorcontainmentbuilding(RCB)onaRWPthatdidnotauthorizeentryintothatarea.TheMerlinaccessmachinesatthenormalRCBentrylocationoutsidethepersonnelairlockwilldenyaccessifanon-RCBRWPisused.Whenthetemporarycontainmentaccessbuilding(CAB)wasestablishedforSteamGeneratorReplacementProject(SGRP)personnel,aseparatesetofMerlinaccessstationswereinstalledtologpersonnelintoandoutoftheRCA.PersonnelwereallowedtosigninandoutofeithertheauxiliarybuildingandotherRCAareas,ortheRCB,fromthislocation.ThissystemwasestablishedtofacilitatetrafficflowsinceSGRPpersonnelcouldentertheRCBfromeithertheannulusorthepersonnelairloc L-98-006.AttachmentP~ae6Thisu'niquesetup,whichwasestablishedfortheonetimesteamgeneratorreplacementonUnit1,coupledwiththelackofpersonnelaccountability,resultedintheindividualbeingabletoentertheRCBontheincorrectRWP.Additionally,thisviolationinvolvedanindividualnotbeingknowledgeableofhisallowabledosemarginuponbeingquestionedbyaHealthPhysicstechnician.DoseanddoseratemarginsaredisplayedontheMerlinaccessstationscreeneachtimeanentryismadeintotheRCAandtheimportanceofknowingthesemarginsisstressedinRCAtraining.Followingthisincident,HealthPhysicspersonnelquestionedindividualsabouttheirdoseanddoseratealarms,andallowableexposuremargins.Ahighpercentageofindividualsquestionedwerenotabletoprovidethecorrectanswersthusindicatingthatsomeworkerswererelyingonthealarmfunctionofthedosimeter,andnotplacingtheproperimportanceonrecognizingandknowingtheirindividualsettingsandlimits.3.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDTheimmediatecorrectivesteptakenwastoassigndedicatedpersonnelattheRCAentrypointatthetemporaryCABaccess,andattheUnit1RCBentrancetoquestionallpersonnelastotheirdosemarginsandalarmsetpoints.TheseindividualswereprovidedalistofRWPnumbers,andthecorrespondingdoseanddoseratealarmsetpoints.AnyindividualnotabletoprovidethecorrectresponsewasrequiredtoexitthroughtheMerlinaccessstation,andsignbackintodeterminetheircorrectmargins.4.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSTheHealthPhysicsDepartmentwillcontinuethepracticeofhavinganindividualstationedatthecontainmententranceforthepurposeofensuringpersonnelareknowledgeableofapplicablelimitsandmargins,untilsuchtimethattheaccessmonitoringisnolongerneeded.ThiswillbeaddedasaSt.LucieUnit1outagecritiqueitemforreplicationatfutureoutages.5.FullcompliancewasachievedonNovember6,1997,withthecompletionofitem3,above.