IR 05000335/1997004
| ML17229A391 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 06/25/1997 |
| From: | PLUNKETT T F FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 50-335-97-04, 50-335-97-4, 50-389-97-04, 50-389-97-4, L-97-165, NUDOCS 9707020148 | |
| Download: ML17229A391 (32) | |
Text
vnxuava.xREGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:970FACIL:50-335St.~E~~~50389St.TH.NAMEUNKETT,T.F.RECIP.NAME7020148DOC.DATE:97/06/25NOTARIZED:NOLuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPower&LightCo.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPower&LightCo.AUTHORAFFILIATIONFloridaPower&LightCo.RECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)NOTES:
SUBJECT: ForwardsresponsetoNRCltrreviolationsnotedininsprepts50-335/97-04&50-389/97-04.Correctiveactions:EDGDCoilsoakbackpumpwassecured&fusesremoved.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IEOlDCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-InspRept/NoticeofViolationResponseDOCKET0500033505000389RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD2-3PDINTERNAL:ACRSFILECENTERBNR/DRPM/PERBOEDIRRGN2FILE01RNAL:LITCOBRYCEgJHNRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11221111111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEWIENSgL.AEOD/SPD/RABDEDRONRR/DISP/PIPBNRR/DRPM/PECBNUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS3NOACNUDOCSFULLTEXTCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTEICONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK/ROOMOWFN5D-5(EXT~415"2083)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEEDlTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR20ENCL20
FloridaPower&LightCompany,6501SouthOceanDrive,JensenBeach,FL34957F.PIU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555June25,1997L-97-16510CFR52.201Re:St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationNRCInteratedInsectionReort97-04FloridaPowerandLightCompany(FPL)hasreviewedthesubjectNoticeofViolationand,pursuantto10CFR$2.201,theresponsestotheviolationsareattached.Asnotedintheinspectionreport,FPLhadpreviouslyidentifiedtheadversetrendintheplant'sequipmentclearanceprocessasaresultofthequarterlyanalysisofConditionReports.St.LuciePlantmanagementsubsequentlyconvenedamulti-disciplinaryteaminthefirstquarterofcalendaryear1997toevaluatetheadversetrendandtoidentifycausesandcorrectiveactions.SeveralcorrectiveactionshavealreadybeenimplementedandremainingactionstobetakenwillbepresentedtoplantmanagementforapprovalbyJuly7,1997.WithrespecttoViolationBonreactoroperatorovertime,FPLhasincreasedtheshiftstafIingofReactorOperatorsthroughpersonnelreassignments,down-relievingofon-shiftpersonnel,andthetrainingandlicensingofnewwatchstanders.Additionally,FPLwillimplementtheTechnicalSpecificationrequirementprohibitingtheroutineheavyuseofovertimeinrevisionstotheplant'sadministrativeprocedures.Pleasecontactuswithquestionsontheenclosedviolationresponses.Verytrulyyours,T.F.PlunkettPresidentNuclearDivisionTFP/JAS/EJWAttachmentcc:RegionalAdministrator,USNRC,RegionIISeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LuciePlant9707020148'tr70625PDRADOCK050003358PDRIIIIlllllllllllllllllllllliIIIIlllllanFPLGroupcompany
L-97-165AttachmentP~ae1ViolationATechnicalSpecification6.8.1.arequiresthatwrittenproceduresbeestablished,implemented,andmaintainedcoveringtheactivitiesrecommendedinAppendixAofRegulatoryGuide1.33,Revision2,February,1978.AppendixA,paragraph1.dincludesadministrativeproceduresforproceduraladherence.ProcedureQI5-PSL-1,Revision1,"Preparation,Revision,Review/ApprovalofProcedures,"Section4.7.1requiresverbatimcompliancetoproceduresbyallpersonnel.Contrarytotheabove,duringtheperiodofApril19toApril29,thelicenseefailedtofollowOperatingProcedure0010122,Revision68,"In-PlantEquipmentClearanceOrders,"asevidencedbythefollowingexamples:iSection8.15.9.Bofthesubjectprocedurestates"TheClearanceControllershallreturntotheappropriateshoptoobtainapprovalfortheClearanceBoundaryModificationfromallClearanceHolderspresentlysignedintotheClearanceControlForm."Contrarytotheabove,onApril19,aMaintenanceSupervisorreleasedaclearancetoallowtheboundarymodificationofanEquipmentClearanceOrderontheCirculatingWaterSystemandfailedtoinformtheMechanicalForeman,theclearanceholder.2.Section8.15.6ofthesubjectprocedurestates,inpart,that"...aboundarymodificationNOTrequiringaworkstoppageshallonlybeperformedinamannerthatdoesNOTcreateanyunsafeconditionsforthepersonnelworkingwithintheboundaries."Contrarytotheabove,onApril19,aboundarymodificationwasexecutedontheCirculatingWatersystemthatallowedworktocontinuenearapumpwithoutitsassociatedmotorbreakertaggedopenforapproximatelysixdays.Thiswasapotentiallysignificantunsafeworkingcondition.Section8.15.11ofthesubjectprocedurerequiresthatthereviewandapprovalcycleforhangingnewtags"shallbeperformedinthesamemannerastheoriginalClearanceOrder."Section8.9.1.CrequiresthattheReactorControlsOperatororqualifiedoperatorshall"...Verifyboundaryusingcontrolleddocuments(i.e.,prints,procedures)and,asnecessary,theassistanceoftherequestor."Contrarytotheabove,onApril25,aboundarymodificationontheEmergencyDieselGeneratorwasexecutedwithoutadequatelyverifyingthatthenew L-97-165AttachmentP~ae2boundarysufficientlyisolatedallopenworkonthesystem.ThisledtotheDCsoakbackpumpinadvertentlystartingwhilethelubeoilsystemwasdrainedforongoingmaintenance.Contrarytotheabove,onApril28,thelicenseebegantoexecuteaclearanceorder(ECO2-97-03-423R)todeenergizewiringtoallowremovalofThermolagintheReactorAuxiliaryBuilding.Theverificationoftheboundarywasinadequateinthatittaggedopenthewrongbreakers.ThiswasidentifiedwhentheContainmentEvacuationAlarmsoundedwhenoneofthecontainmentradiationmonitorswasdeenergized.iContrarytotheabove,onApril29,thelicenseeexecutedaboundarymodificationonaShutdownCoolingSystemclearance,2-97-291R,withoutadequateverificationoftheboundariesasevidencedbyaventvalveandadrainvalveinadvertentlyleftopen.Thisledtothelossofseveralhundredgallonsofreactorcoolanttothesafeguardssump.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementI)applicabletoUnit2.R~eseaseAFPLconcurswiththeviolation.2.REASONFORVIOLATIONInearly1997,theSt.LuciePlantConditionReport(CR)processidentifiedcontinuingproblemswiththeEquipmentClearanceOrder(ECO)processsuchasinadequateclearanceboundaries,mispositioneddevices,andothererrors.Collectively,theseepisodeshavereducedthemarginof,personnelsafetyprotectionandchallengedequipmentandsystemintegrity.TheCRTrendReportforthefirstquarterof1997identifiedthecontinuingadversetrendofECOerrors,and,asdirectedbytheSiteVicePresident,theCorrectiveActionsGroupissuedaConditionReporttoinvestigatethetrend.OperationsmanagementsubsequentlycommissionedaClearanceTeamtoperformaRootCauseAnalysisoftheECOevents.TheClearanceTeamconductedsurveysofOperations,MaintenanceandWorkControlpersonnel,andanalyzedtheresultsoftabulateddata.TheteamidentifiedseveralunderlyingcausalfactorsfortheECOevents,involvingmultipleaspectsoftheECOprocess.TheteamconcludedthatalthoughtheECOprocessissound,thereareproblems
I97-165AttachmentP~ae3causedbytheinterfacesandlevelsofpersonnelinvolvedincarryingouttheprocess.Themajorunderlyingcasualfactorsarerelatedto:inadequateattentiontodetailbypersonnelinvolvedindevelopingclearanceboundaries,andtrainingintheuseoftheECOprocedure.3.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDCorrectiveactionstakenonthespecificECOeventscitedinthisnoticeofviolationare:A.IntheinstancewhereaMaintenanceSupervisorreleasedaclearancetoallowtheboundarymodificationofanECOontheCirculatingWaterSystemandfailedtoinformtheMechanicalForeman(theclearanceholder),thefollowingcorrectiveactionsweretaken:AllworkstoppedfortheinvolvedMechanicalMaintenancerotatingequipmentcrewtoconductastanddownmeetingwiththeMechanicalMaintenanceForeman.Emphasiswasgiventotheimportanceofclearanceverificationpriortothestartofworkeachshift.Outstandingclearanceswereverifiedpriortorestartofwork.2.Theclearancecontrollerobtainedaproperclearancetoallowforcontinuationofworkonthe2B2CirculatingWaterPump.TheabovecorrectiveactionsarealsoapplicabletotheinstancewhereaboundarymodificationwasexecutedontheCirculatingWaterSystemthatallowedworktocontinuenearapumpwithoutitsassociatedmotorbreakertaggedopenforapproximatelysixdaysbecausetheissuewasassociatedwiththesameclearance.IntheinstancewhereaboundarymodificationontheEmergencyDieselGenerator(EDG)wasexecutedwithoutadequatelyverifyingthatthenewboundarysufficientlyisolatedallopenworkonthesystem,thefollowingcorrectiveactionsweretaken:1.TheEDGDCOilSoakBackPumpwassecuredandthefusesremoved.2.,Theworkwassecureduntiltheclearanceboundaryproblemwasresolve L-97-165AttachmentP~ae4D.IntheinstancewheretheverificationoftheboundarytodeenergizewiringtoallowremovalofThermolagintheReactorAuxiliaryBuildingwasinadequateinthatittaggedopenthewrongbreakers,theclearanceboundarywascorrected.E.IntheinstancewhereFPLexecutedaboundarymodificationonaShutdownCoolingSystemclearancewithoutadequateverificationoftheboundaries,theclearanceboundarywascorrected.Inadditiontotheabove,whereappropriate,theindividualsinvolvedwiththecitedECOeventswerecounseledinaccordancewithplantpolicy.Inadditiontothecorrectiveactionsspecifictothecitedexamples,onMay11,1997,duringtheUnit2Cycle10refuelingoutage,thePresidentoftheFPLNuclearDivisionissuedastopworkorder.Toliftthestopworkorder,aonetimerevisionwasmadetotheclearanceproceduretorequireathirdpartyindependentmanagementverificationofallexistingandnewECOs,aswellasallECOboundarymodifications,establishedduringtheoutage.OperationspersonnelinvolvedinverifyingECOrequestswererelocatedfromtheClearanceCentertoaseparateareaforclearanceboundaryresearch.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSArootcauseanalysisofECOeventswasconductedbytheClearanceTeam.TheClearanceTeamdevelopedalistofquestionsandconductedsurveysofover50personnelfromOperations,Maintenance,andtheWorkControlGroup.Theresultsofthosesurveysweretabulated.Theresultsoftheinterviewsweretabulated,andwereanalyzedbytheClearanceTeambyconductingcauseandeffectanalysisonthemostsignificantcontributorstothesymptomaticcausesofECOevents.Aspreviouslystated,themostsignificantcausalfactorsfortheECOeventspertaintoinadequateattentiontodetailbypersonnelinvolvedindevelopingclearanceboundaries,andtrainingontheuseoftheECOprocedure.TheClearanceTeamisintheprocessofdevelopingspecificactionstoaddressthesecausalfactors.TherecommendedcorrectiveactionswillbepresentedtoplantmanagementforactionbyJuly7,1997.5.FullcompliancewasachievedonJune11,1997,whenthelastoftheindividualConditionReportswascomplete L-97-165AttachmentP~ae5ViolationB't.LucieUnit1and2TechnicalSpecification6.2.2.fstates,inpart,thatadequateshiftcoverageshallbemaintainedwithoutroutineheavyuseofovertimeexceptinthecaseofunforeseencircumstances.Contrarytotheabove,fromDecember,1996,throughApril14,1997,thelicenseeemployedtheroutineheavyuseofovertimeonthepartofReactorControlOperatorstoovercomeashortageoflicensedoperators.Theshortagewastheresultofalackofpriorplanningandmanagementdecisionstorelocatelicensedoperatorselsewhereintheorganizationandwas,therefore,notunforeseen.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementI)applicabletoUnit1andUnit2.R~eseaseB1.FPLconcurswiththeviolation.2.REASONFORVIOLATIONFPL'spriorlicensedoperatorstaffingplanningwasunsatisfactoryinthatFPLdidnotadequatelyaccountforattrition,carried-overvacation,illness,orextraordinaryplantconditionsandeventswhichwoulddilutetheavailableon-shiftwatchstanderpool.Specifically,astheplant'sprocessesandprocedureswereupgradedandimproved,licensedoperatingpersonnelwereidentified,asrecommendedbyindustrygoodpractices,andusedinotherthanon-shiftpositionstoimplementchangesinplantprocesses,procedures,andprograms.TheuseofthesepersonneltoimplementneededprocessimprovementssubsequentlyreducedthepopulationofindividualsavailableforControlRoomwatchstanding.PlantmanagementdidnotproperlyacknowledgetheimpactofthispracticeontheovertimerequirementsforControlRoomwatchstanders.AcontributingcausetotheviolationwasthattheSt.LuciePlantadministrativeprocedureswhichimplementtherequirementsofSt.LucieUnits1and2TechnicalSpecification6.2.2.fdidnotprovideadministrativecontrolstoprecludethe"...routineheavyuseofovertime."Theadministrativeproceduresaddressedonlythequantitativelimitsonovertimeduringdiscreteperiods(e.g.,limitingworktonomorethan16hoursinany24hourperiod;limitingworktonomorethan24hoursinany48hourperiod,etc.).
L-97-165AttachmentP~ae6Asaresult,FPLdidnothaveinplacesufficientadministrativecontrolstoassurethatreactoroperatorworkinghoursdidnotinvolvetheroutineheavyuseofovertime.3.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDFollowingthecompletionoftheSt.LucieUnit2Cycle10refuelingoutageonMay31,1997,theshiftwatchdurationforReactorOperatorswasreducedto8hoursfromapriordurationof12hours.Thisreductioninshiftdurationresultedintheoperatingpersonnelreturningtoanormal8-hourday,40-hourperweekschedulewhiletheplantisoperating.Tominimizelicensedoperatorovertimeduringpoweroperationthroughtheendof1997,FPLhasaugmentedthedualunitoperatingshiftstaffingatSt.LucieUnits1and2.ThreeoftheshiftsincludesixReactorOperatorsandtwooftheshiftsincludefiveReactorOperators.Toaccomplishthisaugmentedshiftstaffing,FPLwilltemporarilynolongermantheNuclearWatchEngineer(NWE)position(whichisnotrequiredbyTechnicalSpecifications),previouslymannedbyalicensedReactorOperator/SeniorOperator.LicensedindividualswhohadbeenfillingtheNWEpositionwillbeginstandingControlRoomReactorOperatorwatchesonanas-neededbasis.ThedestaffingoftheNWEpositionrequiredthatthenon-licensedSeniorNuclearPlantOperator(SNPO)betrainedandassignedasFireBrigadeTeamLeadertoreplacethelicensedNWE,whohadpreviouslyservedasFireBrigadeTeamLeader.Additionally,licensedReactorOperatorsassignedtotheWorkControlCenterarebeingreturnedtoControlRoomReactorOperatorwatchstandingduties,onanas-neededbasis.4.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSFPLwilladdresstherequirementsofSt.LucieUnits1and2TechnicalSpecification6.2.2.finSt.LuciePlantadministrativeproceduresbyaddingadministrativecontrolstoprecludetheroutineheavyuseofovertime.ThiscorrectiveactionwillbecompletedbyDecember31,1997.FPLhasanongoingprogramoftraining,qualification,andlicensingofadditionalwatchstanders.Theoperatorlicensingplanisasfollows:
L-97-165AttachmentP~ae7ThreeSeniorOperatorcandidatestooktheirOperatorLicenseexaminationsinJune1997;ThreeSeniorOperatorcandidatesarescheduledtotakeOperatorLicenseexaminationsinOctober1997;ThirteenReactorOperatorcandidatesarescheduledtotakeOperatorLicenseexaminationsinOctober1997;ThreeSeniorOperatorcandidatesarescheduledtobegintraininginJuly1997andtotakeOperatorLicenseexaminationsinJuly1998;AdditionalReactorOperatorcandidatesarescheduledtobegintraininginJuly1997andtotakeOperatorLicenseexaminationsinlate1998orearly1999.5.FullcompliancewasachievedonMay31,1997,withthereductioninshiftdurationfor~~~~~ReactorOperatorsto8hoursfromapriordurationof12hours.6.AdditionalInformationFPLisclearlyfocusedonoperatingitsnuclearunitswiththehighestregardfornuclearsafety,conservativedecision-making,andcompliancewithallregulatoryrequirements.IntheinstanceidentifiedbyViolationB,FPLrespectfullynotesthatFPLhasnotbeenabletoidentifyanypreviousNRCStaffdefinitionofthetermfromTechnicalSpecification6.2.2.fthatarethesubjectofViolationB(i.e.,"routineheavyuse"and"unforeseeable")eithergenericallyoronaspecificdocket.FPLbelievesthat,inkeepingwiththecurrentregulatoryemphasisonverbatimcompliancewithallaspectsoftheregulationsandoperatinglicenseprovisions,newstaffpositionsonregulatoryrequirementsshouldbeclarifiedthroughgenericcommunications,withtheattendantopportunityforcomment.Thesubsequentissuanceoftheclarifyinggenericcommunicationwillprovidelicenseeswithpriornoticetoimplementandcomplywiththenewstaffpositionsontheregulatoryrequirementspriortoenforcementaction.FPLbelievesthatNRCpositionsandinterpretations,subsequentlyestablishedasregulatoryrequirementsthroughenforcementaction,arenotappropriatelybaseduponrecommendationsprovidedinNUREGdocumentsauthoredbyNRCcontractors.Infact,theCommissionanditsAppealBoardhaveruledthataNUREGdocumentdoesnotestablishbindingregulatoryrequirements.CuratorsoftheUniversitofMissouriCLI-95-1,41NRC71,98(1995).
L-97-165jAttachmentP~ae8Notwithstandingtheabove,FPLconcursthataviolationoftheTechnicalSpecificationshadoccurredinthatFPLhadnotestablishedandimplementedappropriateadministrativecontrolstolimitthelicensedoperatorworkinghoursthroughadequateshiftcoveragewithouttheroutineheavyuseofovertime.FPLwilldevelopandimplementadministrativerequirementstoprecludetheroutineheavyuseofovertimeconsideringtheresearchandguidanceprovidedinNUREG/CR-4248,"RecommendationsforNRCPolicyonShiftSchedulingandOvertimeatNuclearPowerPlants."
CATEGORY1~REGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)~I~'CCESSIONNBR:9707020148'DOC.DATE:97/06/25NOTARIZED:NOFACIAL:50-,335St.LuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPower6LightCo.50~389St.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPower&LightCo.yJTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONUNKET'Z,T.F.FloridaPower&LightCo.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)
SUBJECT: ForwardsresponsetoNRCltrreviolationsnotedininsprepts50-335/97-04650-389/97-04.Correctiveactions:EDGDCoilsoakbackpumpwassecured&fusesremoved.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-InspRept/NoticeofViolationResponseNOTES:DOCKET.I0500033505000389RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD2-3PDINTERNAL:ACRSAEOD/TTCFILECENTERNRR/DRCH/HHFBNRR/DRPM/PERB0GN2FILE01COPIESLTTRENCL1122111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEWIENS,L.AEOD/SPD/RABDEDRONRR/DISP/PIPBNRR/DRPM/PECBNUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS3COPIESLTTRENCL1111111111.1111RNAL:LITCOBRYCEgJHNRCPDR1111NOAC11NUDOCSFULLTEXT11NOTETOALL"RZDS"RECZPZENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTEICONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMOWFNSD"S(EX'15-2083)TOELZMZNATEYOURNAMEFROMDZSTRZBUTZONLZSTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEED)TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIES'REQUIRED:LTTR20ENCL'"'20 S
FloridaPower&LightCompany,6501SouthOceanDrive,JensenBeach,FL34957'PLU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555June25,1997L-97-16510CFR$2.201Re:St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationNRCInteratedInsectionReort97-04FloridaPowerandLightCompany(FPL)hasreviewedthesubjectNoticeofViolationand,pursuantto10CFR$2.201,theresponsestotheviolationsareattached.Asnotedintheinspectionreport,FPLhadpreviouslyidentifiedtheadversetrendintheplant'sequipmentclearanceprocessasaresultofthequarterlyanalysisofConditionReports.St.LuciePlantmanagementsubsequentlyconvenedamulti-disciplinaryteaminthefirstquarterofcalendaryear1997toevaluatetheadversetrendandtoidentifycausesandcorrectiveactions.SeveralcorrectiveactionshavealreadybeenimplementedandremainingactionstobetakenwillbepresentedtoplantmanagementforapprovalbyJuly7,1997.WithrespecttoViolationBonreactoroperatorovertime,FPLhasincreasedtheshiftstaffingofReactorOperatorsthroughpersonnelreassignments,down-relievingofon-shiftpersonnel,andthetrainingandlicensingofnewwatchstanders.Additionally,FPLwillimplementtheTechnicalSpecificationrequirementprohibitingtheroutineheavyuseofovertimeinrevisionstotheplant'sadministrativeprocedures.Pleasecontactuswithquestionsontheenclosedviolationresponses.Verytrulyyours,T.F.PlunkettPresidentNuclearDivisionTFP/JAS/EJWAttachmentcc:RegionalAdministrator,USNRC,RegionIISeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LuciePlant9707020i48'970625PDRADGCK050003358PDRlllllllllllllilllllllllllllllllIlllllll,anFPLGroupcompany
~'J~.'rfa~s'pWl1)lII,TI\ll1 L-97-165AttachmentP~ae1ViolationATechnicalSpecification6.8.1.arequiresthatwrittenproceduresbeestablished,implemented,andmaintainedcoveringtheactivitiesrecommendedinAppendixAofRegulatoryGuide1.33,Revision2,February,1978.AppendixA,paragraph1.dincludesadministrativeproceduresforproceduraladherence.ProcedureQIS-PSL-1,Revision1,"Preparation,Revision,Review/ApprovalofProcedures,"Section4.7.1requiresverbatimcompliancetoproceduresbyallpersonnel.Contrarytotheabove,duringtheperiodofApril19toApril29,thelicenseefailedtofollowOperatingProcedure0010122,Revision68,"In-PlantEquipmentClearanceOrders,"asevidencedbythefollowingexamples:Section8.15.9.Bofthesubjectprocedurestates"TheClearanceControllershallreturntotheappropriateshoptoobtainapprovalfortheClearanceBoundaryModificationfromallClearanceHolderspresentlysignedintotheClearanceControlForm."Contrarytotheabove,onApril19,aMaintenanceSupervisorreleasedaclearancetoallowtheboundarymodificationofanEquipmentClearanceOrderontheCirculatingWaterSystemandfailedtoinformtheMechanicalForeman,theclearanceholder.2.Section8.15.6ofthesubjectprocedurestates,inpart,that"...aboundarymodificationNOTrequiringaworkstoppageshallonlybeperformedinamannerthatdoesNOTcreateanyunsafeconditionsforthepersonnelworkingwithintheboundaries."Contrarytotheabove,onApril19,aboundarymodificationwasexecutedontheCirculatingWatersystemthatallowedworktocontinuenearapumpwithoutitsassociatedmotorbreakertaggedopenforapproximatelysixdays.Thiswasapotentiallysignificantunsafeworkingcondition.Section8.15.11ofthesubjectprocedurerequiresthatthereviewandapprovalcycleforhangingnewtags"shallbeperformedinthesamemannerastheoriginalClearanceOrder."Section8.9.1.CrequiresthattheReactorControlsOperatororqualifiedoperatorshall"...Verifyboundaryusingcontrolleddocuments(i.e.,prints,procedures)and,asnecessary,theassistanceoftherequestor."Contrarytotheabove,onApril25,aboundarymodificationontheEmergencyDieselGeneratorwasexecutedwithoutadequatelyverifyingthatthenew
sL-97-165AttachmentP~ee2boundarysufficientlyisolatedallopenworkonthesystem.ThisledtotheDCsoakbackpumpinadvertentlystartingwhilethelubeoilsystemwasdrainedforongoingmaintenance.Contrarytotheabove,onApril28,thelicenseebegantoexecuteaclearanceorder(ECO2-97-03-423R)todeenergizewiringtoallowremovalofThermolagintheReactorAuxiliaryBuilding.Theverificationoftheboundarywasinadequateinthatittaggedopenthewrongbreakers.ThiswasidentifiedwhentheContainmentEvacuationAlarmsoundedwhenoneofthecontainmentradiationmonitorswasdeenergized.Contrarytotheabove,onApril29,thelicenseeexecutedaboundarymodificationonaShutdownCoolingSystemclearance,2-97-291R,withoutadequateverificationoftheboundariesasevidencedbyaventvalveandadrainvalveinadvertentlyleftopen.Thisledtothelossofseveralhundredgallonsofreactorcoolanttothesafeguardssump.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementI)applicabletoUnit2.R~esenseA1.FPLconcurswiththeviolation.2.REASONFORVIOLATIONInearly1997,theSt.LuciePlantConditionReport(CR)processidentifiedcontinuingproblemswiththeEquipmentClearanceOrder(ECO)processsuchasinadequateclearanceboundaries,mispositioneddevices,andothererrors.Collectively,theseepisodeshavereducedthemarginofpersonnelsafetyprotectionandchallengedequipmentandsystemintegrity.TheCRTrendReportforthefirstquarterof1997identifiedthecontinuingadversetrendofECOerrors,and,asdirectedbytheSiteVicePresident,theCorrectiveActionsGroupissuedaConditionReporttoinvestigatethetrend.OperationsmanagementsubsequentlycommissionedaClearanceTeamtoperformaRootCauseAnalysisoftheECOevents.TheClearanceTeamconductedsurveysofOperations,MaintenanceandWorkControlpersonnel,andanalyzedtheresultsoftabulateddata.TheteamidentifiedseveralunderlyingcausalfactorsfortheECOevents,involvingmultipleaspectsoftheECOprocess.TheteamconcludedthatalthoughtheECOprocessissound,thereareproblems
0L-97-165AttachmentP~ae3causedbytheinterfacesandlevelsofpersonnelinvolvedincarryingouttheprocess.Themajorunderlyingcasualfactorsarerelatedto:inadequateattentiontodetailbypersonnelinvolvedindevelopingclearanceboundaries,andtrainingintheuseoftheECOprocedure.3.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDCorrectiveactionstakenonthespecificECOeventscitedinthisnoticeofviolationare:A.IntheinstancewhereaMaintenanceSupervisorreleasedaclearancetoallowtheboundarymodificationofanECOontheCirculatingWaterSystemandfailedtoinformtheMechanicalForeman(theclearanceholder),thefollowingcorrectiveactionsweretaken:1.AllworkstoppedfortheinvolvedMechanicalMaintenancerotatingequipmentcrewtoconductastanddownmeetingwiththeMechanicalMaintenanceForeman.Emphasiswasgiventotheimportanceofclearanceverificationpriortothestartofworkeachshift.Outstandingclearanceswereverifiedpriortorestartofwork.2.Theclearancecontrollerobtainedaproperclearancetoallowforcontinuationofworkonthe2B2CirculatingWaterPump.B.TheabovecorrectiveactionsarealsoapplicabletotheinstancewhereaboundarymodificationwasexecutedontheCirculatingWaterSystemthatallowedworktocontinuenearapumpwithoutitsassociatedmotorbreakertaggedopenforapproximatelysixdaysbecausetheissuewasassociatedwiththesameclearance.C.IntheinstancewhereaboundarymodificationontheEmergencyDieselGenerator(EDG)wasexecutedwithoutadequatelyverifyingthatthenewboundarysufficientlyisolatedallopenworkonthesystem,thefollowingcorrectiveactionsweretaken:1.TheEDGDCOilSoakBackPumpwassecuredandthefusesremoved.2.Theworkwassecureduntiltheclearanceboundaryproblemwasresolve L-97-165AttachmentP~ae4D.IntheinstancewheretheverificationoftheboundarytodeenergizewiringtoallowremovalofThermolagintheReactorAuxiliaryBuildingwasinadequateinthatittaggedopenthewrongbreakers,theclearanceboundarywascorrected.E.IntheinstancewhereFPLexecutedaboundarymodificationonaShutdownCoolingSystemclearancewithoutadequateverificationoftheboundaries,theclearanceboundarywascorrected.Inadditiontotheabove,whereappropriate,theindividualsinvolvedwiththecitedECOeventswerecounseledinaccordancewithplantpolicy.Inadditiontothecorrectiveactionsspecifictothecitedexamples,onMay11,1997,duringtheUnit2Cycle10refuelingoutage,thePresidentoftheFPLNuclearDivisionissuedastopworkorder.Toliftthestopworkorder,aonetimerevisionwasmadetotheclearanceproceduretorequireathirdpartyindependentmanagementverificationofallexistingandnewECOs,aswellasallECOboundarymodifications,establishedduringtheoutage.OperationspersonnelinvolvedinverifyingECOrequestswererelocatedfromtheClearanceCentertoaseparateareaforclearanceboundaryresearch.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSArootcauseanalysisofECOeventswasconductedbytheClearanceTeam.TheClearanceTeamdevelopedalistofquestionsandconductedsurveysofover50personnelfromOperations,Maintenance,andtheWorkControlGroup.Theresultsofthosesurveysweretabulated.Theresultsoftheinterviewsweretabulated,andwereanalyzedbytheClearanceTeambyconductingcauseandeffectanalysisonthemostsignificantcontributorstothesymptomaticcausesofECOevents.Aspreviouslystated,themostsignificantcausalfactorsfortheECOeventspertaintoinadequateattentiontodetailbypersonnelinvolvedindevelopingclearanceboundaries,andtrainingontheuseoftheECOprocedure.TheClearanceTeamisintheprocessofdevelopingspecificactionstoaddressthesecausalfactors.TherecommendedcorrectiveactionswillbepresentedtoplantmanagementforactionbyJuly7,1997.FullcompliancewasachievedonJune11,1997,whenthelastoftheindividualConditionReportswascomplete L-97-165AttachmentP~ae5ViolationBSt.LucieUnit1and2TechnicalSpecification6.2.2.fstates,inpart,thatadequateshiftcoverageshallbemaintainedwithoutroutineheavyuseofovertimeexceptinthecaseofunforeseencircumstances.Contrarytotheabove,fromDecember,1996,throughApril14,1997,thelicenseeemployedtheroutineheavyuseofovertimeonthepartofReactorControlOperatorstoovercomeashortageoflicensedoperators.Theshortagewastheresultofalackofpriorplanningandmanagementdecisionstorelocatelicensedoperatorselsewhereintheorganizationandwas,therefore,notunforeseen.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementI)applicabletoUnit1andUnit2.R~eseaseB1.FPLconcurswiththeviolation.2.REASONFORVIOLATIONFPL'spriorlicensedoperatorstaffingplanningwasunsatisfactoryinthatFPLdidnotadequatelyaccountforattrition,carried-overvacation,illness,orextraordinaryplantconditionsandeventswhichwoulddilutetheavailableon-shiftwatchstanderpool.Specifically,astheplant'sprocessesandprocedureswereupgradedand'improved,licensedoperatingpersonnelwereidentified,asrecommendedbyindustrygoodpractices,andusedinotherthanon-shiftpositionstoimplementchangesinplantprocesses,procedures,andprograms.TheuseofthesepersonneltoimplementneededprocessimprovementssubsequentlyreducedthepopulationofindividualsavailableforControlRoomwatchstanding.PlantmanagementdidnotproperlyacknowledgetheimpactofthispracticeontheovertimerequirementsforControlRoomwatchstanders.AcontributingcausetotheviolationwasthattheSt.LuciePlantadministrativeprocedureswhichimplementtherequirementsofSt.LucieUnits1and2TechnicalSpecification6.2.2.fdidnotprovideadministrativecontrolstoprecludethe"...routineheavyuseofovertime."Theadministrativeproceduresaddressedonlythequantitativelimitsonovertimeduringdiscreteperiods(e.g.,limitingworktonomorethan16hoursinany24hourperiod;limitingworktonomorethan24hoursinany48hourperiod,etc.).
L-97-165AttachmentP~ae6Asaresult,FPLdidnothaveinplacesufficientadministrativecontrolstoassurethatreactoroperatorworkinghoursdidnotinvolvetheroutineheavyuseofovertime.3.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDFollowingthecompletionoftheSt.LucieUnit2Cycle10refuelingoutageonMay31,1997,theshiftwatchdurationforReactorOperatorswasreducedto8hoursfromapriordurationof12hours.Thisreductioninshiftdurationresultedintheoperatingpersonnelreturningtoanormal8-hourday,40-hourperweekschedulewhiletheplantisoperating.B.Tominimizelicensedoperatorovertimeduringpoweroperationthroughtheendof1997,FPLhasaugmentedthedualunitoperatingshiftstaffingatSt.LucieUnits1and2.ThreeoftheshiftsincludesixReactorOperatorsandtwooftheshiftsincludefiveReactorOperators.Toaccomplishthisaugmentedshiftstaffing,FPLwilltemporarilynolongermantheNuclearWatchEngineer(NWE)position(whichisnotrequiredbyTechnicalSpecifications),previouslymannedbyalicensedReactorOperator/SeniorOperator.LicensedindividualswhohadbeenfillingtheNWEpositionwillbeginstandingControlRoomReactorOperatorwatchesonanas-neededbasis.ThedestaffingoftheNWEpositionrequiredthatthenon-licensedSeniorNuclearPlantOperator(SNPO)betrainedandassignedasFireBrigadeTeamLeadertoreplacethelicensedNWE,whohadpreviouslyservedasFireBrigadeTeamLeader.Additionally,licensedReactorOperatorsassignedtotheWorkControlCenterarebeingreturnedtoControlRoomReactorOperatorwatchstandingduties,onanas-neededbasis.4.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSFPLwilladdresstherequirementsofSt.LucieUnits1and2TechnicalSpecification6.2.2.finSt.LuciePlantadministrativeproceduresbyaddingadministrativecontrolstoprecludetheroutineheavyuseofovertime.ThiscorrectiveactionwillbecompletedbyDecember31,1997.FPLhasanongoingprogramoftraining,qualification,andlicensingofadditionalwatchstanders.Theoperatorlicensingplanisasfollows:
L-97-165AttachmentP~ee7ThreeSeniorOperatorcandidatestooktheirOperatorLicenseexaminationsinJune1997;ThreeSeniorOperatorcandidatesarescheduledtotakeOperatorLicenseexaminationsinOctober1997;ThirteenReactorOperatorcandidatesarescheduledtotakeOperatorLicenseexaminationsinOctober1997;ThreeSeniorOperatorcandidatesarescheduledtobegintraininginJuly1997andtotakeOperatorLicenseexaminationsinJuly1998;AdditionalReactorOperatorcandidatesarescheduledtobegintraininginJuly1997andtotakeOperatorLicenseexaminationsinlate1998orearly1999.5.FullcompliancewasachievedonMay31,1997,withthereductioninshiftdurationforReactorOperatorsto8hoursfromapriordurationof12hours.6.AdditionalInformationFPLisclearlyfocusedonoperatingitsnuclearunitswiththehighestregardfornuclearsafety,conservativedecision-making,andcompliancewithallregulatoryrequirements.IntheinstanceidentifiedbyViolationB,FPLrespectfullynotesthatFPLhasnotbeenabletoidentifyanypreviousNRCStafFdefinitionofthetermfromTechnicalSpecification6.2.2.fthatarethesubjectofViolationB(i.e.,"routineheavyuse"and"unforeseeable")eithergenericallyoronaspecificdocket.FPLbelievesthat,inkeepingwiththecurrentregulatoryemphasisonverbatimcompliancewithallaspectsoftheregulationsandoperatinglicenseprovisions,newstaffpositionsonregulatoryrequirementsshouldbeclarifiedthroughgenericcommunications,withtheattendantopportunityforcomment.ThesubsequentissuanceoftheclarifyinggenericcommunicationwillprovidelicenseeswithpriornoticetoimplementandcomplywiththenewstafFpositionsontheregulatoryrequirementspriortoenforcementaction.FPLbelievesthatNRCpositionsandinterpretations,subsequentlyestablishedasregulatoryrequirementsthroughenforcementaction,arenotappropriatelybaseduponrecommendationsprovidedinNUREGdocumentsauthoredbyNRCcontractors.Infact,theCommissionanditsAppealBoardhaveruledthataNUREGdocumentdoesnotestablishbindingregulatoryrequirements.CuratorsoftheUniversitofMissouriCLI-95-1,41NRC71,98(1995).
L-97-165AttachmentP~ee8Notwithstandingtheabove,FPLconcursthataviolationoftheTechnicalSpecificationshadoccurredinthatFPLhadnotestablishedandimplementedappropriateadministrativecontrolstolimitthelicensedoperatorworkinghoursthroughadequateshiftcoveragewithouttheroutineheavyuseofovertime.FPLwilldevelopandimplementadministrativerequirementstoprecludetheroutineheavyuseofovertimeconsideringtheresearchandguidanceprovidedinNUEEG/CR-4248,"RecommendationsforNRCPolicyonShiftSchedulingandOvertimeatNuclearPowerPlants."
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