IR 05000335/1997006
| ML17229A476 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/1997 |
| From: | PLUNKETT T F FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 50-335-97-06, 50-335-97-6, 50-389-97-06, 50-389-97-6, L-97-227, NUDOCS 9709300033 | |
| Download: ML17229A476 (9) | |
Text
CATEGORY1REGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9709300033DOC.DATE:97/09/24NOTARIZED:NOFACIL:50-335St.LuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPower&LightCo.50-389St.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPower&LightCo.UTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONLUNKETT,T.F.FloridaPower&LightCo.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)~
SUBJECT: Respondstoviolationsnotedininsprepts50-335/97-06&50-389/97-06.Correctiveactions:evaluatedworkperformedunderConditionRept97-0028&foundacceptable&developedstand-alonetroubleshootingprocedure.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-InspRept/NoticeofViolationResponseNOTES:DOCKETI0500033505000389ERECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD2-3PDINTERNAL:ACRSILECENNRRRCHHHFBNRR/DRPM/PERBOEDIRRGN2FILE01EXTERNALLITCOBRYCEgJHNRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL1122111,1111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEWIENS,L.AEOD/SPD/RABDEDRONRR/DISP/PIPBNRR/DRPM/PECBNUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS3NOACNUDOCSFULLTEXTCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111DNNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSORREDUCETHENUMBER'OFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR20ENCL20 FloridaPower8LightCompany,6501SouthOceanOrive,JensenBeach,FL34951tPLSeptember24.1997L-97-22710CFR$2.201U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoaNoticeofViolationNRCInteatedInsectionReort97-06FloridaPowerandLightCompany(FPL)hasreviewedthesubjectNoticeofViolationand,pursuantto10CFR$2.201,theresponsestotheviolationsareattached.Sincethelatecalendaryear1996violationinwhichascopechangewasimproperlymadetoanuclearplantworkorder,St.LuciePlanthasstrivedtoimprovetheconductofmaintenanceintheplant.Significantimprovementsarebeingmadetotheplant'sworkprocess.Astand-alonetroubleshootingprocedurewasdeveloped,andadditionalproceduralguidanceonnuclearplantworkorderscopechangesisbeingdeveloped.Concerningtheviolationforuntimelycorrectiveaction,wehavedeterminedthatthe1996changebySt.LuciePlanttotheConditionReportprocess,whichhasbeeninuseforseveralyearsatTurkeyPoint,willpreventsimilarfutureviolations.Theimportanceofthefirepenetrationsealcorrectiveactionswerenotrecognizedduringtheconversionofthepreviousprogram,orSTARs,tothecurrentConditionReportandPlantManagerActionItemprocess.TheSt.LucieQualityAssuranceDepartmentisperforminganindependentassessmentontheconversionprocesstodetermineifcorrectiveactionsmayhavebeenmissedduringtheearly1996transitionperiod.Pleasecontactuswithquestionsontheenclosedviolationresponses.Verytrulyyours,Thomas.F.PlunkettPresidentNuclearDivisionTFP/JAS/EJWAttachmentIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIICCRegionalAdministrator,USNRC,RegionIISeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LuciePlant'tr70'i'3000339709'24PDRADOCK050003358PDRanFPLGroupcompany
L-97-227Attachment~PeelViolationA10CFR50,AppendixB,CriterionV,Instructions,Procedures,andDrawings,requiresinpart,thatactivitiesaffectingqualityshallbeprescribedbydocumentedinstructions,procedures,ordrawingsofatypeappropriatetothecircumstances.Ascopechangewasmadetonuclearplantworkorder(NPWO)2830onNovember20,1996whichcontainedstepbystepinstructionsforperformingtesting/troubleshootingactivitiestodemonstrate,inpart,theoperabilityofthe125voltdcbus'rosstiecircuitbreaker.'Contrarytotheabove,thetesting/troubleshootingactivitieswerenotperformedinaccordancewithproceduresofatypeappropriatetothecircumstancesinthatthestepbystepinstructionscontainedinthescopechangetoNPWO2830didnotprovideadequatedetailsforthetesting/troubleshootingactivitiesbeingperformed.Thescopechangedidnotadequatelydelineatetestingprerequisitesandwasnotappropriatelyintegratedwiththeotherworkcontroldocumentsbeingusedforthisevolution.Forexample,itwasnotclearwhichstepsoftheoriginalworkorderweretobecompletedpriortoperformingthestepsinNPWO2830.Also,itwasnotclearwhichofthebreakerswastobeworked.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementI)applicabletoUnitl.~ReseseAFPLconcurswiththeviolation.REASONFORVIOLATIONFPLidentifiedadeficiencyregardingthefailuretoestablishsurveillancetestingprocedurestoensuretheoperabilityoftheDCbustiebreakersduringFPL'spreparationfortheNRCsArchitectEngineerDesignInspection.Duringon-linetestingofthesebreakers,afailurewasnotedontheundervoltage(UV)device.ThisfailurenecessitatedtroubleshootingwithinaTechnicalSpecificationACTIONstatementfortheaffected1CAFWpump,whichwasaccomplishedbyscopechange1AtotheNPWO.TheoriginalNPWOwasacontingencyforadditionalbenchtesting/troubleshootingofafailedfunctionaltest.Justpriortofunctionallytestingthe125VDCbreaker,adecisionwasmadetoperformadditionaltesting/troubleshootingofthebreakerinplace,insteadof"benchtestingastheoriginalNPWOscope'outlined.Thefieldscopechange1A,writtenbyElectricalTechnicalSupport,wastoallowinplacetesting/troubleshootingwithanenergizedDCbu e L-97-227'ttachment~Pee2Thespecificscopechangewasperformedbyatechnicalsupportpersonwhowasasubjectmatterexpert.Detailedscopechangeinstructionswerefelttobeunnecessarysincesupervisoryoversightwasprovided,andbecausetheworktobeperformedwasconsideredtobewithintheskillofthecraft.However,theexistingproceduralguidanceforscopechangeswasinadequate.PlantAdministrativeProcedureADM0010432Rev7,"ControlofPlantWorkOrders,"didnotcontainsu6icientinformationonminimumrequirementsforperformingascopechangetoaNPWOanddidnotcontaininstructionsorguidancefortheuseofdirectsupervisionandtechnicaloversightwhileperformingwork.Additionally,atthetimeofthiscondition,St.LuciePlantdidnothaveastand-alonetroubleshootingprocedure.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDA.TheworkperformedwasevaluatedunderCondition,Report97-0028,andwasfoundtobeacceptable.B.Astand-alonetroubleshootingprocedure,GMP-21,"TroubleshootingProcess,"wasdevelopedandapprovedonMarch10,1997.C.AtrainingbulletinwasprovidedtoMaintenancesupervisiononApril15,1997,fortheNPWOfieldscopechangeprocess,andwhentosolicitassistancefromtheNPWOplanners.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSA.PlantAdministrativeProcedureADM0010432,"ControlofPlantWorkOrders,"willbefurtherclarifiedtoincludeadditionalguidanceonthelevelofdetailrequiredwhenperformingafieldscopechangetoNPWOsbyOctober10,1997.B.AdditionaltrainingwillbeprovidedtoMaintenancesupervisorsandtechnicalsupportpersonnelonthelevelofdetailtousewhenpreparingscopechangestoNPWOs,andwhentosolicitreviewandpreparationsupportbytheNPWOplannersbyOctober20,1997.FullcompliancewasachievedonAugust25,1997,withthecompletionofitems3.Band3.Cabov eL-97-227'ttachment~Pae3ViolationBTechnicalSpecificationSection6.8.1statesthatwrittenproceduresshallbeestablished,implemented,andmaintainedcoveringthefireprotectionprogramimplementation.FinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)Appendix9.5ASection8,QualityAssuranceProgram,statesthattheQAprogramforfireprotectionisapartoftheoverallcompanyQAprogramandiscontainedintheFloridaPowerandLightTopicalQualityAssuranceReport(FPLTQR).FPLTQRSection16.1statesthatdocumentedmeasuresshallbeusedtoassurethatconditionsadversetoqualitysuchasfailures,malfunctions,deficiencies,deviations,defectivematerialsandequipmentandnonconformancesarepromptlyidentifiedandcorrectedassoonaspractical.Contrarytotheabove,inJanuary1995,correctiveactionwasnotinitiatedtoresolveassoonaspracticalthe222outof365mechanicalfirebarrierpenetrationsealsinstalledinvarioussafetyrelatedareasoftheSt.Luciefacilityinwhichalicensee'sengineeringevaluationdeterminedwerenotboundedbythevendor'sdesignandtestdocumentation.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation.(SupplementI)sR~eseaseBFPLconcurswiththeviolation.However,thenumberofunboundedmechanicalfirebarrierpenetrationsis218,notthe222statedinthenoticeofviolation.Itappearsasthoughpenetrationsinmorethanonediscrepancylistresultedinthosepenetrationsbeingcountedmorethanonce.2.REASONFORVIOLATIONTheapparentcauseofthiseventwasweaknessesassociatedwiththepreviousproblemidentificationandcorrectiveactionprocess,STAR,inplaceduringtheoriginalIN94-28review.Anoperabilityassessmentontheconditionofthe218firepenetrationsealswasnotperformedundertheSTARprogram,andtheneedforfieldmodificationswasnotidentified.TheoriginalSTARonlyidentifiedtheneedtoperformadditionalevaluations.TheimportanceoftheseevaluationswasnotrecognizedduringtheSTARtoConditionReport(CR)andPlantManagerActionItem(PMAI)conversionthatoccurredinearly1996.TheSt.LucieSTARprogramwassubsequentlyreplacedbytheCRprocess.TheCRprocedureensuresthatoperabilitydeterminationsareperformedforpotentially L-97-227'ttachmentP~ae4degradedSystems,Structures,andComponents(SSCs),andprovidespositivetrackingmechanismsforrequiredcorrectiveactions.3.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDA.AConditionReportwasgeneratedtodocumentthiscondition.FPLpersonnelperformedanoperabilityassessmentforthe218penetrationsealsthatwerenotdirectlyboundedbytestdata.Ofthispopulation,theoperabilityassessmenthasshownthatsevenpenetrationsealsinUnit1andeightpenetrationsealsinUnit2areinoperable.TheseinoperablepenetrationsealshavehadFireBreachPermitsgeneratedandpostedintheareaofthesealandarebeingmonitoredbythehourlyrovingfirewatchasrequiredbytheAppendix"R"FireProtectionProgramatSt.Lucie.Itshouldbenotedthattheroutingoftheexistinghourlyfirewatchesdidnotneedtobechangedtoaccommodatetheinoperablefiresealpenetrations.B.St.LucieiscurrentlydevelopingascheduletocompleteGenericLetter86-10mechanicalfirepenetrationevaluationswhichwillbeperformedforthe218mechanicalsealsthatarenotboundedbytestedconfigurations.C.St.Lucieiscurrentlydevelopingascheduletodevelopmodificationsoftheinoperablemechanicalfirepenetrationstoensurethatthethreehourfirebarriercriteriawillbemet.4.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSA.Thepreviousproblemidentificationandcorrectiveactionprogram,theSt.LucieSTARprocedure,wasreplacedwiththeConditionReportprocedure(PlantAdministrativeProcedureAP-0006130,"ConditionReports").B.OperatingExperience(OE)itemswhicharedeterminedtorequirereviewbySt.LuciePlantarenowaddressedusingtheSt.LuciePlantConditionReportprocess.ConditionReportsareusedtodocumenttheevaluationandcorrectiveactionsforsuchapplicableOEitemsandprovideavehicletoassurethatproperevaluationsarecompletedanddocumented,andthatcorrectiveactionsareproperlycapturedandtrackedtocompletion.TheConditionReportprocessproducesstandardizedresponsestoOEitems,ensurestimelyandenhancedvisibilityofOEreviews,andestablishesminimumstandardsfordocumentation,review,andapproval.(PlantAdministrativeProcedureADM-17.03,"OperatingExperienceFeedback")
L-97-227AttachmentP~ae5C.TheQualityAssuranceDepartmentisperforminganindependentassessmentbysamplingpastSTARtoCRandPlantManagerActionItem(PMAI)conversions-todetermineifanycorrectiveactionsmayhavebeenmissedintheconversion.Thisactivitywillbecompletedbythebeginningofthe1997Unit1SL-15refuelingoutage.D.TheEngineeringDepartmentsupervisorsrecentlyreviewedandprioritizedallopenPlantManagementActionItems(PMAIs)assignedtoEngineeringbasedonsafetyorregulatorysignificance.WhilenotincludedasadiscreteactivitywithinthescopeofthePMAIreview,FPLisconfidentthatthereviewprovidedassurancethatadditionalOPERABILITYconcernswhichshouldhavebeenidentifiedinSTARswerenotmissedinthe1996STARto.CRandPMAIconversionprocess.Fullcompliancewith10CFR50AppendixRrequirementswasachievedonJuly28,1997whenthe15inoperablemechanicalfirebarrierpenetrationswereincludedintheexistinghourlyrovingfirewatchpatrols.