IR 05000335/1993027
| ML17228A416 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 12/14/1993 |
| From: | Robert Carrion, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17228A415 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-93-27, 50-389-93-27, NUDOCS 9401040283 | |
| Download: ML17228A416 (20) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETl'ASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 303234199 Report Nos:
50-335/93-27 and 50-389/93-27 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Hiami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Facility Name:
St. Lucie 1 and
/ F8~
SUMMARY Inspection Conducted:
November 15-19, 1993 Inspector R.
P. Carrion, Ra iation Specia ist
~g'
Approved by:>>
T.
R. Decker, Chief D te Signed Radiological Effluents and Chemistry Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of the organization of the Chemistry Department and Radwaste Group, primary water chemistry, the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS), monitoring of the Refueling Water Tank (RWT)
leak migration, confirmatory measurements, status of the Unit 1 nitrogen system check valve installation, radiation monitor changeout, radioactive waste shipping operations and transportation documentation, contaminated sludge disposal, and biofouling.
Results:
The licensee's organization of its Chemistry Department and Radwaste Group satisfied Technical Specification (TS) requirements.
(Paragraph 2)
The licensee's plant water chemistry was maintained well within required TS limits.
(Paragraph 3)
The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report met the requirements of the TSs.
(Paragraph 4)
The licensee's PASS was capable of fulfillingits intended sampling function.
(Paragraph 5)
94010402EI3 931215.
PDR ADOCK 05000335 Q
PDR,
'
The licensee continued to monitor isotope migration due to the RWT leak.
(Paragraph 6)
The licensee maintained a good Counting Room radiochemical analysis program, as evidenced by the results of the Confirmatory Measurement results and Cross Check Program.
(Paragraph 7)
The licensee was making progress in the upgrade of the Unit 1 nitrogen system to prevent future valve leakby potential with the installation of double check valves.
(Paragraph 8)
The licensee had acted prudently in the replacement of the three Unit 1 liquid process radiation detectors..
(Paragraph 9)
The licensee's radwaste processing and shipping was conducted in a competent, professional manner and the radwaste shipping documentation was thorough and in compliance with the applicable regulations.
(Paragraph 10)
The licensee had proceeded in a prudent manner on the issue of contaminated sewage sludge disposal.
(Paragraph ll)
The licensee had implemented a good program to manage its biofouling problem.
(Paragraph 12)
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- H. Buchanan, Health Physics (HP) Supervisor
- E. Burges, Material Management
"C. L. Burton, Plant Manager A. P. Butler, Environmental Supervisor J.
Conner, Technical Staff Section Supervisor R.
E. Cox, Chemistry Effluents Supervisor
- R. Dawson, Maintenance Manager
- W. Dean, E/M Department Head
- J. A. Dyer, guality Control Supervisor D.
H. Faulkner, Primary Chemistry Supervisor
- R. J. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor
- J. Geiger, Vice President, Nuclear Assurance.
- T. Glenn, Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) Department D. A. Harte, Nuclear Analyst
- L. McLaughlin, Licensing Manager
- D. A. Sager, Vice President
- Plant Saint Lucie
- J. Scarola, Operations Manager
- B. Sculthorie, Predicted Maintenance Super visor
- R. B. Somers, HP (Radwaste)
C. Wallace, Site Engineering
- C. D. White, Plant Licensing Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included technicians and administrative personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- S. A. Elrod, Senior Resident Inspector
- M. S. Miller, Resident Inspector
"Attended exit interview Acronyms and Initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
Organization (84750 and 86750)
Technical Specification (TS) 6.2 describes the licensee's organization.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's organization, staffing levels, and lines of authority as they related to the Chemistry Department and Radioactive Waste Group to'verify that the licensee had not made organizational changes which would adversely affect the ability to control radiation exposures or radioactive materia e 3.
There had been no structural changes in the Chemistry Department since the previous inspection.
However, the Purchasing Supervisor had retired and one (of the two) former Environmental Supervisors had transferred to the newly created Protection Services Unit as its Environmental Supervisor.
The duties of the Purchasing Supervisor had been added to those of the Data management Supervisor.
In addition, the normal periodic rotation of technicians (which was made to assure that the technicians maintain a high level of expertise in all areas within the Department)
had taken place.
There had been no changes in the Radwaste Group since the last time this area was reviewed.
(Refer to Inspection Report (IR) 50-335, 389/93-17, Paragraph 2.)
The inspector concluded that the licensee's organization in the areas of Chemistry and Radioactive Waste 'satisfied the requirements of the TS.
No violations or deviations were identified..
Plant Primary Water Chemistry (84750)
During the inspection, St. Lucie Unit 1 was operating at one hundred percent power and Unit 2 was operating at fifty percent power.
Unit
was in its twelveth fuel cycle and Unit 2 was in its seventh fuel cycle.
The next Unit 2 refuelin'g outage was scheduled to begin in February 1994 and the next Unit 1 refueling outage was scheduled to begin in the summer of 1994.
The inspector reviewed the plant chemistry controls and operational controls affecting primary plant water chemistry since the last inspection in this area.
TS 3.4.7 specifies that the concentrations of dissolved oxygen (DO), chloride, and fluoride in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
be maintained below 0. 10 parts per million (ppm), 0. 15 ppm, and 0. 10 ppm, respectively.
TS 3.4.8 specifies that the specific activity of the primary coolant be limited to less than or equal to 1.0 microcuries/gram (pCi/g) dose equivalent iodine (DEI).
These parameters are related to corrosion resistance and fuel integrity.
The oxygen parameter is established to maintain levels sufficiently low to prevent general and localized corrosion.
The chloride and fluoride parameters are based on providing protection from halide stress corrosion.
The activity parameter is based on minimizing personnel radiation exposure during operation and maintenance.
Pursuant to these requirements, the inspector reviewed daily summaries for both units which correlated reactor power output to chloride, fluoride, and dissolved oxygen concentrations, and specific activity of the reactor coolant.
For both Units 1 and 2, the arbitrarily-chosen period of September 1,
1993 through October 31, 1993 was reviewed and the parameters were determined to have been maintained well below TS limits.
Typical values for DO, chloride, and fluoride were less than five parts per billion (ppb), less than four ppb, and less than four
ppb, respectively, for both units.
Typical DEI values at steady-state conditions ranged from 6.24E-3 pCi/g to 1.31E-4 pCi/g for Unit 1 and from 1.41E-2 pCi/g to 3. 14E-3 pCi/g for Unit 2.
Neither unit had shown any evidence of leaking fuel.
The inspector concluded that the Plant Water Chemistry was maintained well within the TS requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report (84750)
TS 6.9. 1.7 requires the licensee to submit a Semiannual Radiological Effluent Release Report within specified time periods covering the, operation of the facility during the previous six months of operation.
The inspector reviewed the semiannual radioactive effluent release report for the first half of 1993.
This review included an examination of the liquid and gaseous effluents for that period as compared to those of years 1991, 1992, and the first half of 1993.
The data for those years are summarized as follows.
St. Lucie Radioactive Effluent Release Summary Unplanned Releases a.
Liquid b.
Gaseous 1991 1992 1993*
Activity Released (curies)
a ~
b.
Gaseous 1.
Fission and Acti-vation Products Iodines Particulates Tritium 2.
3.
4.
Liquid 1.
Fission and Acti-vation Products 2.
Tritium 3.
Gross Alpha 1.28E+0 1.25E+3 3. 10E-5 4.24E+3 1.43E-2 2.96E-4 1.74E+2 1.02E+0 8.00E+2 3.27E-5 9.90E+2 5.69E-3 2.31E-4 6.04E+1 4.92E-1 8.18E+1 2.34E-5 2. 72E+1 1.81E-3 7.18E-5 6. 11E+0
- First half of 1993 only.
A comparison of the listed data for 1991, 1992, and the first half of 1993 showed significant declines in the gaseous activity release Discussions with cognizant licensee personnel attributed the improvement to new fuel which had shown no evidence of leaking since being loaded into the reactor.
For the first half of 1993, St.
Lucie liquid, gaseous, and particulate effluents were well within TS,
CFR 20, and
CFR 50 effluent limitations.
Two Unplanned Releases were identified in the Report and had been addressed in previous IRs.
(Refer to Paragraph 7 of IR 50-335, 389/93-09 and Paragraph 9 of IR 50-335, 389/93-17 for details.)
Minor revisions had been made to the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) concerning the determination of setpoints for radioactive liquid effluent monitors during this reporting period.
No revisions had been made to the Process Control Program (PCP) during the first half of 1993.
The following table summarizes solid radwaste shipments for burial or disposal for the previous two and a half years.
These shipments typically include spent resins, filter sludge, dry compressible waste, and contaminated equipment.
St. Lucie Solid Radwaste Shipments 1991 1992 1993*
Number of Waste Disposal Shipments Volume (cubic meters)
Activity (curies)
- First half of 1993 only.
182.1 825.7
213. 8 388.2
21.8 12198 To date, November 16, 1993, the'icensee made eighteen radwaste shipments, including two to guadrex, six to Scientific Ecology Group, Incorporated (SEG),
and ten to the disposal facility.
For solid radwaste, the most significant change noted for the period reviewed was that the volume of the shipments had declined.
(The large activity reported for the period was due to a shipment of irradiated hardware.)
The inspector concluded that the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report was complete and satisfied TS requirements.
No violations or deviations were identifie Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)
(84750)
NUREG-0737 requires that the licensee be able to obtain a sample of the reactor coolant and containment atmosphere.
Furthermore, the sample must be promptly obtained and analyzed (within three hours total) under accident conditions without incurring a radiation exposure to any individual in excess of 3 and 18 3/4 rem to the whole body and/or extremities, respectively.
TS 6.8.4.e requires that a program be established, implemented, and maintained to ensure the capability to obtain and analyze, under accident conditions, reactor coolant, radioactive iodines and particulates in plant gaseous effluents, and containment atmosphere samples.
The PASS should provide these capabilities and should enable the licensee to obtain information critical to the efforts to assess and control the course and effects of an accident.
The inspector reviewed the most recent PASS operability log sheets for both units and discussed the results with the Primary Chemistry Supervisor.
The operability tests had been performed within the required six-month time limits, on October 13, 1993, for Unit 1 and September 2,
1993 for Unit 2.
A comparison of six parameters (pH, boron, dissolved oxygen, and dissolved hydrogen concentrations, gross activity, and DEI) of the daily-analyzed RCS sample to the readings taken from the PASS satisfied the acceptance criteria of both units, except for the hydrogen concentration of Unit 1.
The hydrogen meter of the PASS was inoperable at the time of the inspection and needed new parts.
The parts were scheduled to arrive on site in early December and installation would be done shortly thereafter.
In the meantime, the backup method, i.e.
a grab sample, was available.
The inspector concluded that the PASS was capable of fulfillingits intended sampling function.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Refueling Water Tank (RWT) Leak Status (92700)
The RWT leak was addressed in IR 50-335, 389/93-17, which described the circumstances surrounding the leak, measures taken by the licensee, and planned actions to monitor the released material.
The licensee had treated the event as an Unplanned Release and had written a Liquid Release Permit (1-93-59A) to account for the activity released.
The permit indicated that 59625 gallons of water, containing 0.038 curies of solid gamma-emitters (half of which was accounted for by three radioisotopes
- Cr-51, Co-58, and Co-60)
had leaked from the RWT into the groundwater table.'eleased tritium and beta-emitters (principally Fe-55)
were not included in the above-referenced released activity, but were determined to be 6.512 curies and 0.038 curies, respectively.
The licensee planned to incorporate this information into the monthly, quarterly, and annual totals of Curies released, including
the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report.
In addition, records of this event were to be included in the site decommissioning planning records.
The licensee had been monitoring the migration of the isotopes released through a system of eighteen monitoring wells (recently expanded to twenty)
and four recovery wells, originally established to monitor a diesel fuel leak from the nearby diesel fuel tanks.
The inspector went to the RWT location to review the general area, including nearby structures and monitoring wells.
The inspector also reviewed results of analyses from well samples taken on July 14, October 20, and November 9, 1993.
The results found that tritium concentrations in the three wells
'earest the RWT had dropped by factors of over 150 and 430 (for Monitor Well No.
4 and Recovery Well No. 2, respectively)
and increased only moderately for Honitor Well No.
18D.
In wells located more distant from the RWT, tritium activities were reported to be less than the Minimum Detectable Activity (HDA) or slightly higher.
The October samples were analyzed for gross beta activity and, with the exception of Monitor Well No.
18D where 2.30E-5 pCi/ml was detected, all were found to be less than 3.23E-6 pCi/ml.
Similarly, gross activity analysis done on the November samples were found to be less than the HDA in all cases.
The inspector concluded that the licensee was adequately monitoring the migration of the release and that the public health and safety was not jeopardized by this release.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Confirmatory Measurements (84750)
CFR 20.201(b) requires the licensee to perform surveys as necessary to evaluate the extent of radiation hazards.
'a ~
Beta Emitters b.
In an effort to evaluate the licensee's analytical capabilities, the licensee was provided spiked liquid samples for analysis pursuant to the NRC Confirmatory Measurements Program.
The licensee was requested to analyze a batch of samples for tritium (H-3), iron-55, and strontium-90.
The licensee reported the analytical results of this batch on September 21, 1993.
As indicated in Attachment 1, the licensee's analytical results were in agreement with the prepared concentrations for the three isotopes identified.
Attachment 2 provides the criteria for assessing the agreement between the licensee's analytical results and the prepared concentrations.
Cross Check Program
'(84750)
The inspector reviewed Chemistry Department Standard Practice and Policies, CD-SPP-l, Rev. 6, "guality Control of Analytical Results,"
dated June 24, 1993.
The purpose of the procedure was
to monitor, identify, evaluate, and eliminate sources, or potential sources of error in laboratory data and to provide a
schedule of analyses to accomplish that purpose.
To assure that the licensee's analytical capabilities to accurately detect and identify gamma-emitting radionuclides and non-radiological chemistry parameters, as well as to quantify their concentrations, were maintained at a high level, the licensee participates in exercises whereby it analyzes numerous samples, as specified by CD-SPP-l.
In the case of the non-radiological chemistry parameters, an independent laboratory had been contracted to conduct a cross check exercise twice per year.
In the case of the radiological chemistry parameters, a
cross check exercise using its three detectors in the Counting Room was conducted annually with the Turkey Point Chemistry Department or with the Plant St. Lucie Health Physics Department.
Typically, a 4000 ml liquid Marinelli flask of a liquid release sample; a 4600 cc gaseous Narinelli beaker, a particulate filter, and a charcoal cartridge from the plant vents or air samplers; and a 34 cc glass bulb for a gaseous sample from a Gas Decay Tank (GDT) were used.
The results were then compared for agreement/disagreement.
(These exercises are very similar to the confirmatory measurements exercise in which the NRC Region II mobile laboratory splits, analyzes, and compares radioactive material sample results.)
The inspector reviewed the 1993 results.
The non-radiological chemistry parameters were cross checked in January and June.
The results of the licensee's analyses were in agreement in every case with those of the independent laboratory.
The radiological chemistry parameters were not all analyzed at the same time.
The 4600 ml Harinelli beaker and the 34 cc glass bulb samples were analyzed in February, while the 4000 ml Narinelli liquid, particulate filter, and charcoal cartridge samples were analyzed in June.
The results of the Counting Room's analyses were in agreement in every case with those of the HP Department, indicating that the licensee's analysis system was capable of accurately identifying radioisotopes over a wide energy spectrum.
Also, although not pr oceduralized, every other year the licensee purchased a standard of Xe-133 from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for cross checking the detectors in the Counting Room.
A standard was last purchased in the Spring of 1993.
From the review made during this inspection, the inspector concluded that the licensee maintained a good Counting Room radiochemical analysis program as well as good analytical capabilities to accurately detect and quantify non-radiological chemistry parameters.
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Check Valve Installation Status (92700)
Due to two similar unplanned releases via leakby of the nitrogen supply valve, the licensee had decided to install a double check valve on the nitrogen supply line to the Unit 1 Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB)
identical to that of Unit 2 to prevent back flow from the potentially radioactive RAB to the Secondary Plant side of the nitrogen system.
(The installation would bring the Unit 1 design to a par with the Unit 2 design, which had incorporated the double check valve into its original design.
Refer to Paragraph 7 of IR 93-09.)
The licensee currently plans to execute the check valve installation via Plant Change/
Hodification (PCH)-142-193.
The engineering had been completed and the Procurement Department had ordered the valves.
Upon receipt of the valves on site, the Facility Review Group (FRG) would have to review and approve the associated Plant Work Order (PWO) prior to installation, which was scheduled for late June 1994, during the next scheduled Unit
refueling outage.
The inspector concluded that the licensee was taking appropriate action to upgrade the nitrogen system to prevent future valve leakby potential by the installation of the double check valves and that progress to date was satisfactory.
o violations or deviations were identified.
Radiation Honitoring Equipment Changeout (84750)
The replacement of three Unit 1 liquid process radiation detectors, Component Cooling Water (CCW) detectors RE-26-56 and RE-26-57 and Waste Hanagement System (WHS) liquid effluent radiation detector RE-6627, was necessitated by general corrosion due to unprotected exposure and degradation of electrical connections and components due to moisture intrusion.
The associated ratemeters, RIS-26-56 and RIS-26-57 for the CCW detectors and RIS-6627 for the WHS, were also replaced due to the inability to obtain spare, parts and general obsolescence.
The liquid effluent radiation detector, RE-6627, is an off-line detector designed to record the activity released via the radwaste discharge line.
Its piping has been designed such that an isolation valve is located at both inlet and outlet lines.
The valve was designed to close on activity above a setpoint limit, as well as on loss of power or loss of instrument air.
The replacement was done per Work Request 91025836 and was completed on Hay 20, 1993.
The inspector reviewed Chemistry Procedure No. 1-C-64, Rev.
16,
"Calibration of the Liquid Waste Discharge Radiation Honitor," approved on Hay 4, 1993 (and its associated Temporary Change Request, TC 1-93-345)
and Chemistry Procedure No. 1-C-68, Rev
~ 14, "Calibration of the Component Cooling Water Radiation Honitors," approved on Hay 4, 1993.
The procedures provided instructions for the calibration and functional tests of the respective monitors.
The procedures were determined to be well-written and complete.
The inspector also reviewed
the results of the monitor calibrations and functional tests done after the new equipment was installed and found them to be done in accordance with the procedures.
The inspector concluded that the licensee had acted prudently in the replacement of the three Unit 1 liquid process radiation detectors and that their calibration and functional testing was adequate to assure detection of radioactive material in their presence.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Radwaste Processing and Transportation (86750)
CFR 71.5 (a) requires each licensee who transfers licensed material outside of the confines of its plant or other place 'of use, or who delivers licensed material to a carrier for transport, shall comply with the applicable requirements of the regulations appropriate to the mode of transport of the Department of Transportation (DOT) in 49 CFR, Parts 170 through 189.
Pursuant to these requirements, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's activities affiliated with these requirements, to determine whether the licensee effectively packages, stores, and ships radioactive solid materials.
The licensee's program for the packaging and transportation of radioactive materials, including solid radwaste, was conducted by the Radioactive Waste Group within the Health Physics Department.
Radwaste was processed and packaged (including the preparation of shipping documentation)
by the Radwaste Group, with the assistance of Radiation Protection Men (RPM) on loan from the Health Physics Operations Department to complete specific tasks, such as loading a shipment or compacting contaminated material.
'a ~
Radioactive Material Shipping Documentation Packages Seventy-one shipments of radioactive materials had been made as of November 19, 1993 for the calendar year.
The inspector reviewed documentation packages for three radioactive material shipments made since Inspection 93-17.
They were Radioactive Material Shipment Nos. 93-59, 93-61, and 93-67, and included two Low Specific Activity (LSA), Type A shipments, destined for decontamination facilities and/or incineration or compaction before final disposal, and one Limited l}uantity shipment of rented scaffolding to a decontamination facility.
The packages contained thorough documentation about the shipments and included items such as unique shipment and shipping container numbers, waste content and volume, total activity, analytical summary and breakdown of isotopes with a half-life greater than five years, special comments, etc.
The radiation and contamination survey results were within the 49 CFR requirements and the shipping documents were being maintained as require b.
Observation of Radioactive Haterial Shipment The inspector observed the loading of a radioactive material shipment (Shipment No. 93-71)
and its associated activities to evaluate the effectiveness of training, activities and attitudes of personnel, adequacy of procedures, etc.
The shipment was a
High Integrity Container (HIC) of dewatered sludge from various Unit 1 tanks and sumps destined for SEG for processing prior to burial at the disposal facility at Barnwell, South Carolina.
The wor k proceeded well; each member of the work detail handled his responsibilities in an efficient, professional manner.
The HIC was loaded into the cask and the cask was capped.
The technicians proceeded to take a radiation survey at the surface of the cask to assure compliance with regulatory requirements.
Before the truck left the site, the inspector reviewed the final survey records of the shipment and conducted a "spot check" of several of the survey points.
The inspector found that the survey points checked were in agreement.
The inspector concluded that the survey was properly done and well documented.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's program for processing and transporting radioactive materials was adequate to satisfy regulatory requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
ll.
Contaminated Sewage Sludge Disposal (92700)
The issue of contaminated sludge and its disposal was addressed in Paragraph 12 of IR 50-335, 389/93-17.
Since that inspection, the vendor contracted by the licensee to de-water the sludge had completed the task and the resultant solids had been mixed with lime and placed in twenty-five new 55-gallon drums, which were being temporarily stored near the Unit 1 sewage treatment plant (STP).
The isotopic analysis of the de-watered solids was reviewed by the inspector.
The greatest activity reported was for tritium, less than 4.4E-5 pCi/g.
Typical examples included Co-58 and Co-60, which were reported to be 2.16E-6 pCi/g and 4.57E-6 pCi/g, respectively.
The licensee planned to ship this material to SEG for incineration, which would substantially reduce the volume, before final disposal.
The shipment was tentatively scheduled for early January, 1994.
Because processing the material into an acceptable disposal form to meet new regulatory requirements had become more difficult and expensive, the licensee was exploring other alternatives, including:
Securing approval from the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) to dispose of the material by land applicatio Shipping the untreated material to the local municipal STP.
(Activity levels of the untreated material are typically about 0. I pico-Curies per gram (pCi/g),
an extremely small fraction of the allowable level.)
Continuing to use the services of the vendor.
Tying the licensee's STPs directly into the county's proposed new STP to be built near the plant site.
The inspector concluded that the licensee had proceeded in a prudent
. manner on this issue.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Microbiologically-Induced Corrosion (HIC) and Biofouling (92700)
The inspector interviewed cognizant licensee. personnel about HIC and was told that it had not been a problem at Plant St. Lucie because the raw water piping was coated/lined.
There had been no evidence. of HIC in any of the closed-loop systems.
However, minor problems attributed to sulfides (due to nearby mangrove swamps and associated vegetable decay)
had been identified.
Historically, biofouling has been (and continues to be)
a problem for the licensee.
Approximately five years ago,
"tube guards" (a type of strainer which fit in the end of each individual tube in the condenser's tube sheet)
were used and found to be effective.
However, they were found to be incompatible with the currently-employed non-oxidizing biocide and have been removed.
"Sidestream studies" were conducted from late 1991 until early 1993.
These studies were basically models of the system on which the effectiveness of various fouling control methods were evaluated.
Technologies reviewed included chlorine, bromine, and non-oxidizing biocides, as well as mechanical methods and coatings.
Based on these studies, the licensee chose to pursue the use of a non-oxidizing biocide, even though extensive toxicity testing was required to show that the effluent was biologically acceptable.
The licensee was completing the testing phase of a full scale effectiveness study on the Unit 2 intake bays.
The results to date had indicated a 50/ reduction in macrofouling growth.
Based on these results, the licensee had begun treating all of the Unit I intake bays with the non-oxidizing biocide.
The licensee had been continuously chlorinating the service water system.
The licensee planned to continue its evaluation of antifoulant coatings.
Some of the products on the test panels in the intake canal were promising.
These products would be evaluated further via additional test patches to be placed in the intake well In addition, the licensee was evaluating thermal methods to control microfouling.
Recently, the licensee had taken Unit 1 down in power, removed one of the four Condensate Water Pumps from service, drained its waterbox, and maintained the temperature at 120'F for two hours.
The pump was then started and the waterbox was rinsed.
Two benefits were noted upon the completion of this activity.
The primary benefit was a
reduction in condenser backpressure by about one inch of mercury.
(The condenser can operate with a backpressure of up to four and a half inches of mercury.)
The secondary benefit was an increase in the Condensate Water Pump flowrate (of between 10000 to 15000 gallons per minute (gpm)), which represented an increase of approximately ten per cent of total pump flow.
The licensee planned to monitor new products and processes as the rapidly-changing technology made them available, including hydrogen peroxide, chlorine dioxide, improved mechanical methods, and new coatings.
The inspector concluded that the licensee had implemented a good program to manage its biofouling problem.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Exit Interview (84750)
The inspection scope and results were summarized on November 19, 1993, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection results, including likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents and/or processes reviewed during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Acronyms and Initialisms CC CCW CFR Ci CP DEI DHRS DO DOT F
FPL FRG g
GDT gpm HIC
- cubic centimeter
- Component Cooling Water
- Code of Federal Regulations
- curie
- Chemistry Procedure
- Dose Equivalent Iodine
- Department of Health and Rehabilitative Control
- Dissolved Oxygen
- Department of Transportation
- Fahrenheit
- Florida Power and Light
- Facility Review Group
- gram
- Gas Decay Tank
- gallons per minute
- High Integrity Container
LSA pCi HDA MIC ml NIST NRC ODCM PASS pCi PCM PCP ppb ppm PSL PWO RAB RCS Rev RPH RWT SEG STP TS WHS
- Health Physics
- Instrumentation and Controls
- Inspection Report
- liter
- Low Specific Activity
- micro-Curie (1.0E-6 Ci)
- Minimum Detectable Activity
- Microbiologically Induced Corrosion
- milli-liter National Institute of Standards and Technology Nuclear Regulatory Commission Off-site Dose Calculation Manual Post Accident Sampling System pico-Curie (1.0E-12 Ci)
Plant Change/Modification Process Control Program parts per billion parts per million Plant Saint Lucie Plant Work Order Reactor Auxiliary Building Reactor Coolant System Revision Radiation Protection Han
- Refueling Water Tank
- Scientific 'Ecology Group, Incorporated
- Technical Specification
- Waste Management System
~
I \\
~
ATTACHMENT 1 COMPARISON OF NRC AND SAINT LUCIE ANALYTICALRESULTS
'EPORTED SEPTEMBER 21, 1993 Type of Sample:
Unknown NRC Spikes Units:
Ci/ml Radio-nuclide H-3 Fe-55 Sr-90 Licensee's Value Ci ml 1.17 E-4 1.06 E-5 1.96 E-5 NRC Reso-
~V1 Ci (1.12 +/- 0.05)E-4
(1.08 +/- 0.05)E-5
(1.99 +/- 0.10)E-5
Compar-Ratio ison 1.04 Agree 0.98 Agree 0.98 Agree
'
ATTACHMENT 2 CRITERIA FOR COMPARISONS OF ANALYTICALMEASUREMENTS This attachment provides criteria for the comparison of results of analytical radioactivity measurements.
These criteria are based on empirical relationships which combine prior experience in comparing radioactivity emission, and the accuracy needs of this program.
In these criteria, the "Comparison Ratio Limits"'enoting agreement or disagreement between licensee and NRC results are variable.
This variability is a function of the ratio of the NRC's analytical value relative to its associated statistical and analytical uncertainty, referred to in this program as "Resolution".
For comparison purposes, a ratio between the licensee's analytical value and the NRC's analytical value is computed for each radionuclide present in a given sample.
The computed ratios are then evaluated for agreement of disagreement bases on
"Resolution.",
The corresponding values for "Resolution" and the "Comparison Ratio Limits" are listed in the Table below.
Ratio values which are either above or below the "Comparison Ratio Limits" are considered to be in disagreement, while ratio values within or encompassed by the "Comparison Ratio Limits" are considered to be in agreement.
TABLE NRC Confirmatory Measurements Acceptance Criteria Resolution vs.Comparison Ratio Limits Resolution Comparison Ratio Limits for A reement
< 4 4-7 8-15 16 - 50 51 - 200
> 200 0.4 - 2.5 0.5 - 2.0 0.6 - 1.66 0.75 - 1.33 0.80 - 1.25 0.85 - 1.18
'Comparison Ratio = Licensee Value NRC Reference Value Resolution NRC Reference Value Associated Uncertainty