IR 05000335/1993002
| ML17227A780 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 03/02/1993 |
| From: | Elrod S, Landis K, Michael Scott NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17227A779 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-93-02, 50-335-93-2, 50-389-93-02, 50-389-93-2, NUDOCS 9303300028 | |
| Download: ML17227A780 (21) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-335/93-02 and 50-389/93-02 Licensee:
Florida Power S. Light Co 9250 West Flagler Street Ni ami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name:
St.
Lucie 1 and
License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Approved by:
Inspection Conducted:
Janua y 5 to February 1,
1993.
Inspectors:
~~S.
A. flrod, Senior Resident Inspector N. A. Scott, esident Inspector K.
D. Landis, Chief Reactor Projects Section 2B Division of Reactor Projects D te igned Dat S gned
~
~is Date Signed SUNNARY Scope:
This routine resident inspection was conducted onsite in the areas of plant operations review, surveillance observations, maintenance observations, fire protection, and followup of events.
Backshift inspection was performed on January 6, 7, 10, ll, 12, 22, 24, 26, and 27; and February l.
Results:
Plant operations area:
During most of the period, operations maintained stable plant conditions for both units.
During a Unit 2 heatup (Node 5 to Node 3)
on January 29 and 30, for 2A1 reactor coolant pump testing, operators maintained excellent control over plant conditions.
The 2A1 reactor coolant pump vibration problems continued, so the operators returned Unit 2 to Node 5 just prior to the end of the inspection period.
(paragraph 3.b)
Operations responded well to an emergency core cooling system room exhaust fan problem, supporting the problem investigation and providing a dedicated fan operator as needed.
This design problem was properly 930330Q028 930302 PDR ADOCK 05000335
reported and a licensee event report was being generated.
(paragraph 3.b)
Surveillance area:
Surveillance performed during this period went well with one exception.
The surveillance procedure for exhaust fans 9A and 9B (Emergency Core Cooling System Room Exhaust)
was found to be deficient.
Due to lack of system understanding since unit construction, the fans were found to be operating with one fan degraded.
At the end of the inspection period, compensatory corrective actions were in place, and this was being evaluated for long term correction.
(paragraphs 3.b and 4)
Naintenance area:
Overall, work surrounding a high vibration problem on the 2A1 reactor coolant pump was good.
Control during the complex lifts of the motor rotor were excellent.
(paragraph 5.d)
While inspecting the 2B component cooling water pump following the vibration monitoring team's recommendation, the licensee found an unwanted strainer in the suction piping of the 2B component cooling water pump.
The licensee took proper action to remove the strainer and check the other component cooling water pumps on that unit.
Investigation of other potentially effected pump's status revealed a
potentially weak licensee closeout of a previous NRC Information Notice on the subject of startup strainers.
An unresolved item (URI) was generated.
(paragraph 5.e)
URI 335,389/93-02-01, Startup Strainer Issues, paragraph 5.e Engineering area:
Engineering provided timely support to operations and maintenance on the reactor coolant pump and heating and ventilation exhaust issues (see above).
Engineering adequately supported evaluation of the Unit 1 refueling water tank and the fuel oil storage tank material condition problems found by the inspector.
(paragraph 3.a)
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees D. Sager, St.
Lucie Plant Vice President G. Boissy, Plant General Manager J.
Barrow, Fire/Safety Coordinator H. Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor C. Burton, Operations Manager R. Church, Independent Safety Engineering Group Chairman R. Dawson, Maintenance Manager W. Dean, Electrical Maintenance Department Head J. Dyer, Plant guality Control Manager R. Englmeier, Site equality Manager H. Fagley, Construction Services Manager
, R. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor J. Holt, Plant Licensing Engineer L. McLaughlin, Licensing Manager G. Madden, Plant Licensing Engineer A. Menocal, Mechanical Maintenance Department Head L. Rogers, Instrument and Control Maintenance Department Head J. Scarola, Site Engineering Manager C. Scott, Outage Manager J. Spodick, Operations Training Supervisor D. West, Technical Manager J.
West, Operations Supervisor W. White, Security Supervisor D. Wolf, Site Engineering Supervisor E. Wunderlich, Reactor Engineering Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Personnel
- R. Crlenjak, Chief, Operational Programs Section, NRC Region II
- P. Burnett, Reactor Inspector, NRC Region II
S. Elrod, Senior Resident Inspector
- C.
Rapp, Reactor Inspector, NRC Region II M. Scott, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
Plant Status and Activities Unit 1 began and ended the inspection period at power - day 126.
Condenser waterbox cleaning, and attendant power reduction of about
percent, occurred on January 11 - 14, 199 Unit 2 began the inspection period at full power but was shut down on January 13 due to higher than normal 2A1 RCP vibration.
The licensee noted that the pump vibration levels were trending up and conservatively shut down Unit 2 prior to sustaining further damage.
The motor rotor and bearings were replaced.
The mode changes for post-repair testing of the coupled RCP at various plant conditions were:
Mode 5 to Hade 4:
January 29 - 9: 10 p.m.,
Mode 4 to Mode 3:
January 30 - 6:55 a.m,,
Mode 3 to Mode 4:
January 31 - 9:30 p.m.,
and Mode 4 to Mode 5:
February 1 - 1:30 a.m.
During post-motor-repair testing, the pump was identified as the instigator of the motor vibration problems.
The motor problems had previously masked the pump problems until January 30.
At the end of the inspection period, the licensee was in Mode 5 and preparing to enter the RCS reduced inventory condition to support pump repairs.
An NRC team inspection was conducted on January 25 - 29.
The inspection concerned ASHE Code Section XI check valve program implementation.
The results will be included in IR 335,389/93-01.
Review of Plant Operations (71707)
'a ~
Plant Tours The inspectors periodically conducted plant tours to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.
The inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess eq'uipment or material was stored properly, and combustible materials and debris were disposed of expeditiously.
During tours, the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates.
Some tours were conducted on backshifts.
The frequency of plant tours and control room visits by site management was noted to be adequate.
(1)
The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF, ECCS, and support systems.
Valve, breaker, and switch lineups as well as equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room.
The following accessible-area ESF system and area walkdowns were made to verify that system lineups were in accordance with
licensee requirements for operability and equipment material conditions were satisfactory:
Unit 1 containment fan coolers, Unit 1 containment instrument air compressors, Unit 1 containment seismic monitors, and Unit 1 containment penetrations.
The inspector accompanied non-licensed operators on an at-power tour of the Unit 1 containment.
-The operators performed their normal at-power containment anomaly inspection and a special inspection of the unit's containment penetrations.
During the tour, the inspector noted a small boric acid build-up (dry boric acid powder with little or no wetting)
on valves V3624 and V3634, which are safety-related NOVs for SIT outlet isolation.
Rust was highly noticeable on CCW piping to the instrument air compressors,
"8" containment cooler, and quench tank.
Neither the boric acid nor the rust condition created an operability concern.
Operations submitted NPWOs on the boric acid buildup.
The projected painting schedule for the Spring, 1993, Unit 1 outage addressed the CCW piping rust problem.
IR 335,389/92-21 cited a violation involving containment penetrations.
During this current tour, operators checked several penetrations in preparation for a response to the cited violation.
All penetrations checked by the operators were in their proper condition.
Unit 2 penetrations had been satisfactorily checked by operations earlier in the week.
During a tour of the Unit
EDG FOSTs, the inspector noted heavy external rust on the FOST cross connect piping and the transfer pump recirculation piping.
The licensee was informed and gC deficiency report H93-001 was generated.
The pipe is Class D (non-safety-related)
and, in normal alignment, posed no problem.
The affected portions are used during FOST fill and tank recirculation.
Portions of the pipe were being scheduled for replacement during the Spring, 1993, refueling outage.
The inspectors judged that utility resolution of the problem was progressing in a timely manner.
During another tour of Unit 1, the inspector noticed that some RWT anchor bolts exhibited severe corrosion.
The RWTs are located outdoors on the ocean side of the plant.
At least five [of 45] of the exposed anchor bolt shanks had
more than a superficial loss of cross section.
NCR 1-741 was generated against the as-found condition.
Engineering answered the NCR indicating that there was no immediate operability concern but they would want the exact condition of all 75 anchor bolts prior to providing final disposition.
The inspectors judged that utility resolution of this problem was progressing in a timely manner.
Plant Operations Review The inspectors periodically reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions.
This review included control room logs and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs, and equipment tagout records.
The inspectors routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours.
They observed and evaluated control room staffing, control room access, and operator performance during routine operations.
The inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections to ensure that operations and security performance remained at acceptable levels.
Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedures.
Control room annunciator status was verified.
Except as noted below, no deficiencies were observed'1)
During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the following tagouts (clearances):
2-1-34
-
2A SFP cooling pump, and 2-1-35 -
2B CCW pump.
(2)
On January 6, operations issued a night order
[an internal instruction from operations management to on-shift operators]
regarding the institution of a revised self-check program for the operators.
This new program was named
"STOP" which was short for "Stop," "Think," "Operate,"
and
"Performance observe and verify."
The new program will be implemented during this requalification cycle.
The licensee initiated this program in response to several recent events,
[e.g., inadvertently starting a Unit 1 spray pump (IR 335,389/92-21)
and closing the wrong 480 V breaker on Unit 2 (IR 335,389/92-18)].
The inspectors will follow up on the
"STOP" program as a part of the routine inspection program.
(3)
On January 8,
1993, Unit
ESFAS partially actuated due to a
relay failure, but there were neither pump starts nor water injection.
The 602A subgroup relay in the 2B SIAS actuation module path failed to its fail-safe condition.
When the relay failed, it caused safety injection header valves HCV-3616,
-3625,
-3626, and -3645, which are HOVs, to open.
Two check valves upstream of these injection valves between the
RCS and the ECCS pumps held RCS pressure as expected.
The ECCS system remained operable in this condition.
The licensee notified the inspector and NRC Hg within minutes.
The inspector was in the control room monitoring activities within minutes following the actuation.
With the valves in the open position, the relay was replaced and tested in the presence of the inspector.
The licensee applied appropriate administrative controls to the job.
Sensitive system review was performed per AP 0010142, Rev 9, Unit'eliability - Manipulation of Sensitive Systems, and a
pre-evolution discussion between operators and the system engineer occurred prior to job performance.
NPWO 0132/63 was the controlling working document.
After relay.
replacement, the effected ESFAS worked properly during a
channel check and relay functional test.
The relay was out of service for approximately two and a half hours.
Subsequent licensee review of NPRDS data and discussions with the ESFAS equipment vendor indicated this type relay failure was a low probability event.
The licensee plans to dissect the failed relay during a root cause evaluation.
LER 335/93-001 was generated.
On the weekend of January 8 - 9, 1993, the 2A1 RCP upper
"X" motor vibration probe alarm begin to occasionally annunciate at approximately 9 mils (0.009 inches).
Though this alone has not been unusual for short periods, the site predictive maintenance group began to trend RCP vibration levels on a
daily basis.
In the afternoon of January 11, the vibration measurements from three of four motor probes indicated upward trends.
On the morning of January 12, the maximum levels were in the
to 13 mil range.
The built-in probe system's maximum indication range was 15 mils.
Site and corporate senior management were notified and the details were discussed with the RCP pump and motor vendors.
Based on the projection of vibration reaching 15 mils within the next twenty four hours
[projected late afternoon January 12], site management started preparing for a plant shut down and short notice outage to repair the RCP.
Instructions to operations personnel were that should vibration levels reach the 15 mil vibration detector range limit without any other abnormal indication, site management was to be notified and an orderly plant shutdown be initiated.
Should other abnormal conditions arise on the 2Al pump at high vibration level, the RCP and the Unit 2 were to be tripped.
In any case, operations was directed to have Unit 1 shut down prior to day shift on January 13.
Unit 1 shutdown was commenced at 11: 15 p.m.
on January 1 At this time, maximum vibration levels had been constant at approximately 14.5 mils for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
With vibration level
[maximum - upper motor "X" probe]
reaching slightly greater than 15 mils, as read from remote discreet vibration measurement equipment, the turbine was brought off line at 1:53 a.m.
on January
and the reactor was tripped to complete the shutdown at 1:55 a.m.
At 2Al RCP shutdown [5: 17 a.m.
on January 13 - Unit 2 in Mode 3 at NOP and NOT], maximum vibration levels were approximately 17 mils as read from test instruments plugged into the installed cabinet.
Initial indicati'on was that the pump motor had a problem in its upper end.
The site's spare RCP motor coincidentally was in Tampa being overhauled.
Total reassembly of the spare motor would have taken approximately one additional week.
The licensee, based on evaluation, decided to use only the spare motor's rotor.
The 2Al motor rotor swapout occurred during the next approximate week.
With the inspector present, the existing motor rotor was removed on January 19 and the spare rotor was installed on January 22.
These complex motor rotor lifts were accomplished without many problems and none that jeopardized the equipment or reactor safety.
Some minor work practice problems and area house keeping problems are discussed in paragraph 5 of this report.
With a new rotor and motor bearings installed, the uncoupled motor was satisfactorily operated on January 25.
The vibration levels were very low (1.5 mils was the highest).
The licensee considered this a positive step in their root cause analysis.
On January 28, 1993, subsequent to the performance of a routine pressure differential indicating switch (PDIS)
calibration (NPWO 0117/63) related to the Unit
HVE 9A and B fans (the ECCS areas exhaust fans),
the licensee determined information not recognized previously by the operations staff.
The two PDIS (25-16A and B) actuate local gages in the hallway of the RAB and, through other circuitry, alarms in the control room.
The local gages read differential pressure between the ECCS area and the RAB hallway.
The alarm being actuated in the control indicated insufficient negative pressure in the ECCS areas (at the time of a postulated accident).
The information that was not previously known was that, aside from a "differential pressure less than" setpoint, the energization of a certain time delay relay by a SIAS signal was also required for alarm actuation.
Time delay relay energization was
subsequently found to also be accomplished by holding the start switch in the start position for 40 seconds or greater.
The previous, existing (since unit construction)
surveillance for the TS 3.7.8. 1 HVE 9X (9A and 9B = 9X) fans was to operate for 15 minutes (2-AP 0010125, Schedule of Periodic Tests, Checks, and Calibrations, Check Sheet 4)
and look for abnormal control room alarms, Without satisfying the interlocks/ permissives discussed above (SIAS signal or relay contact), this test did not establish proper test conditions.
Later, upon setting up the proper conditions for a test via TC 1-93-16 to 2-AP 0010125 on January 28, the licensee found that with normal RAB ventilation running neither HVE 9A nor 9B would create an acceptable negative pressure in the ECCS areas.
The HVE 9A fan achieved-0.05 inches of water differential pressure with the HVE 10X (one of two) running.
The HVE 9B fan achieved
+0.35 inches of water differential pressure.
It would not make the ECCS room pressure negative with respect to the Auxiliary Building.
These results were documented in In-house Event Report 93-006 and voluntary LER 335/93-02, which was issued on the last day of the inspection period.
Later on January 28, to conditionally satisfy the TS requirements and provide proper ECCS area ventilation under all conditions, the licensee secured normal stack ventilation (HVE 10X) and retested the HVE 9X fans.
With the HVE 10A and B (main RAB monitored but unfiltered exhaust)
fans off, the HVE 9A fan produced a satisfactory differential pressure of -0.25 inches of water between the ECCS areas and the rest of the RAB - more negative than the setpoint document acceptance criteria of -0.20 inches of water
- while the HVE 9B fan would not.
Based on HVE 9B not meeting the TS criteria (run the fans for 15 minutes each with no abnormal alarms),
the licensee entered a
7 day LCO action statement on the HVE 9B fan.
The HVE 9B fan was returned to service on February 2 after adjustments to the fan's dampers and louvers.
The licensee was still pursuing design issues at the end of the inspection period.
To provide continued utilization of the HVE IOX fans, the licensee changed a procedure and posted an extra licensed operator.
Temporary change 1-93-15 to AP 0010120, Duties and Responsibilities of Operators on Shift, Rev 56, made provisions for a dedicated licensed operator on shift to be available to secure the HVE 10X fans should a SIAS signal be initiated or control room accessibility become an issue.
This would insure that the ECCS exhaust fans would perform their intended function.
The conditions of the procedure were for the length of time required to do the troubleshooting, evaluation, and a possible PC To satisfy the long-term design issues and to prove that the existing condition had not created a risk to the public, the licensee began an investigation and evaluation.
The investigation looked into the RAB ventilation design and further tested the RAB fan parameters for engineering ongoing evaluation.
Section 9.4.3.3 of the FSAR required a
slight or B fans with the unstated assumption that any configuration of other RAB fans were running.
The investigation was continuing beyond the end of the inspection period.
The findings to date (engineering evaluation JPN-PSL-SEHP-93-006, Rev 0) indicated that:
under the worst accident conditions, the radiation pathway release contributed by the ECCS area was a
small fraction of the
CFR 100 limits.
Unit 2 had a different ventilation system than Unit
and was not affected by this design anomaly.
The ECCS equipment area ventilation was operable under the existing conditions.
The general purpose for the RAB ventilation was to insure that all gas releases from the containment to the RAB, or released within the RAB, were minimized, radiologically monitored, and filtered as required.
The ECCS areas of the RAB were expected to see some gases released in the worst-case accidents.
The HVE 9X fans were to collect these gasses, force them through filter assemblies for purification, and monitor them prior to release via a separate release point from the main plant vent stack.
The ECCS area negative pressure was to limit the migration of these gases from within the ECCS area to the remainder of the RAB.
The HYE 10X fans provide monitored but unfiltered RAB exhaust ventilation via the main plant vent stack.
The licensee's analysis determined that, in spite of the procedure deficiency, the monthly surveillance test procedure still performed the function of assuring that the ECCS room exhaust fans could perform their safety function.
Operations was reviewing potential procedure changes.
Engineering was reviewing potential design resolutions.
The inspectors found the licensee's initial actions to be adequate.
On January 28, 29, 30, and 31, the 2A1 RCP was operated in its normal, coupled configuration at various RCS and plant configurations with unsatisfactory results.
Motor vibrations remained low throughout the testing but pump vibration was high.
Testing was continued into NOT and NOP condition where normal RCS pressure would effect the hydrostatic bearing in the pump 'and bring vibration levels
in line.
When this did not occur,. balance weights were added to the pump coupling/pump to motor spool piece joint to damp the pump oscillations.
This had been satisfactorily done on the I@I RCP approximately two years earlier.
The inspectors were present for the run at NOT and NOP and then the run at the point when the first balance weighted pump run occurred and witnessed the limited impact of the elevated system pressure and the'alance weight.
On January 31, the licensee decided that the 2Al RCP had additional unidentified problems that could not be resolved without pump disassembly, a process exceeding three weeks duration.
The plant was cooled down and placed on SDC cooling (Mode 5)
on January 31.
Repair of the pump would run beyond the end of the inspection period.
Technical Specification Compliance Licensee compliance with selected TS LCOs was verified. This included the review of selected surveillance test results.
These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, and switch positions, and by review of completed logs and records.
Instrumentation and recorder traces were observed for abnormalities.
The,licensee's compliance with LCO action statements was reviewed on selected occurrences as they happened.
The inspectors verified that related plant procedures in use were adequate, complete, and included the most recent revisions.
Physical Protection The inspectors verified by observation during routine activities that security program plans were being implemented as evidenced by: proper display of picture badges; searching of packages and personnel at the plant entrance; and vital area portals being locked and alarmed.
guality Assurance
,The inspectors reviewed quality assurance activities.and findings concerning control room operations to determine if the objectives were being met.
The following audits were reviewed:
(1)
0SL-OPS-92-901 Performance Monitoring Monthly Summary November 5, 1992 (2)
0SL-OPS-92-903 (3)
PSL-OPS-92-905 Identification and Control of Items Handling, Storage and Shipping'
The audits had two findings that were of low severity level but suggested plant improvements.
The audits demonstrated a good understanding of the items reviewed.
f.
Required Notices The posting of required notices to workers was satisfactorily reviewed.
RCP motor work [work administration, lifts, and operational oversight]
was conservativ'e, well integrated, and well controlled.
Once the design problem with the HVE-9X fans was identified, the licensee response was positive.
The inspectors will continue to monitor the root cause and resolution development into the next inspection period.
4.
Surveillance Observations (61726)
Various plant operations were verified to comply with selected TS requirements.
Typical of these were confirmation of TS compliance for reactor coolant chemistry, RWT conditions, containment pressure, control room ventilation, and AC and DC electrical sources'he inspectors verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, LCOs were met, removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished properly,'est results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficienci'es identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The following surveillance tests were observed:
a.
OP 2-2200050A, Rev 3, 2A EDG Periodic Test and General Instructions.
b.
ILC 2-1400050, Rev 24, [Unit 2]
RPS - Monthly Functional Test.
c.
OP 2-220050B, Rev 3, 2B EDG Periodic Test and General Instructions.
The above surveillances were satisfactorily performed without impact to plant safety.
A deficiency in the surveillance test procedure for the Unit I HVE 9 fans (ECCS room exhaust)
was discussed in paragraph 3.b.5.
5.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities involving selected safety-related systems and components were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.
The following items were considered during this review:
LCOs were met; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; functional tests and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were
accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; and radiological controls were implemented as required.
Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment.
Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed:
a
~
C.
d.
NPWO 0132/63
- Replace group actuation relay 602A (see paragraph
above).
NPWO 5868/62
- Overhaul 2A SFP cooling pump.
NPWO 6099/62
- Remove 2AI RCP motor-to-pump shaft spool piece.
The motor-to-pump shaft spool piece was removed for an uncoupled run of the motor for testing/investigative purposes.
Overall, the spool piece removal went smoothly.
There was room for procedure enhancement in that the procedure did not specify use of jacking bolts to remove the motor-half shaft coupling or the spool piece disk spacer.
The couplings had threaded holes for jacking bolts.
Left to their own devices, the mechanics initially utilized cruder methods.
In response to inspector questions, they obtained the jacking bolts.
The licensee indicated that the procedure would be revised to incorporate these tools.
NPWO 6149/62
-
2A1 RCP motor rotor removal/installation.
In the early morning hours on January 20, the licensee completed a
very complex crane liftwhich removed the motor rotor from the stator housing.
The lift involved tilting and translating the parti ally removed rotor to clear an overhanging concrete structure.
Cooperation between the mechanical, electrical and health physics groups was good.
The lift procedure was "dry run" by the personnel performing the lift to debug the procedure and clarify points prior to the lift.
During the lift, rotor motion and work was conservatively halted several times to verify proper job performance.
The rotor was successfully removed for inspection and subsequent replacement.
Following removal, the old rotor was inspected on a stand in the containment due to fixed contamination.
After the licensee installed the new rotor in the motor on January 22, the old rotor was removed from the containment and moved to the FHB.
The inspector had been present for old motor rotor lift, rotor inspection, and installation of the new motor rotor.
gC was present for rotor installation and captured area cleanliness control issues in gC report f93-004.
Cleanliness control, a minor problem, was the only problem during the new rotor installation.
gC evaluation of other aspects was positiv e e.
NPWO 4979/62
-
2B CCW pump overhaul.
The 2B CCW pump overhaul was begun just.as soon as Unit 2 mode conditions would support its overhaul.
The pump was worked on a
normal overhaul schedule.
From a previous boroscopic inspection of the impeller, the pump was known to exhibit some erosion on the suction side of the impeller vanes.
This was believed to have been induced from normal system water wear and slight cavitation induced by the piping configuration.
The plant vibration monitoring team had recently detected an increased slope in vibration level changes.
The licensee conservatively opened the pump for inspection During the pump overhaul, with the pump shaft and impeller removed, the system engineer could see down through the lower casing half into the bolted-up suction piping.
In this piping, the system engineer noticed an object which turned out to be a
startup strainer that had been used during initial system operation to capture potential debris and prevent pump or CCW heat exchanger damage.'hen removed, the strainer was intact but it was not in its original shape.
The strainer frame had collapsed and the strainer had moved from its retainer (strainer body) in the suction pipe to a pipe diameter reduction just prior to pump entry.
The strainer coritained no entrained material, however the pump's impeller had sustained no noticeable damage from possible debris in the system.
The licensee response to the above problem satisfactorily evaluated the other assembled and running CCW pumps on Unit 2.
The investigation, which involved differential pressure testing (see below NPWO)
and downstream piping boroscopic examination, found no problem with the other two system pumps, i.e.
no strainers were present.
One additional feature was to be checked when the 2B pump was operational which was to occur after the end of the inspection period.
To date, the inspectors were satisfied with the Uni't 2 CCW pumps and will followup as 2B CCW returns to service.
There had been a
NRC Information Notice 85-96, Temporary Strainers Left Installed In Pump Suction Piping, issued on strainers in 1985.
The licensee had reviewed their plant against the IN via their Operating Experience Feedback Program (FOP).
The INs are issued for review against plant generic issues that may apply to other licensees'lants.
The FOP on IN 85-96 was sketchy and incomplete.
The Unit 2 CCW, AFW, and ICW, and part Unit 1 safety-related pumps were not addressed explicitly by the FOP that had been closed with outstanding NPWOs open to remove strainers in future outages.
The closure had taken from 1985 to 1988.
From the sketchiness of the FOP response, there was apparently informal transmission on suction strainer statu The strainer found in the 2B CCW pump suction was unexplained.
Potentially, in the past (in the construction era or under the FOP) the licensee could have looked in the strainer body and could have seen no strainer present.
There was no available documentation to this effect at the end of the inspection period.
Several weeks after the finding of the 2B CCW pump strainer, at the inspectors'equest, the issue was re-visited.
During system walkdowns by system engineers strainer indications were found in two Unit 2 AFW pump suction lines.
What appeared to be tabs for strainers were observed at flanged joints in the suction piping.
The P 5 ID for the suction piping showed the strainers as being installed with differential pressure gages across the strainers.
A note on the drawings indicated that with the strainers installed, the gages shall be in operation.
The gages were not being utilized by the plant and remain isolated from the system.
The last AFW pump surveillance was satisfactory and the suction pressures on all three pumps while running were the same.
The unit was shut down at the time.
The issue of startup suction strainers remains unresolved.
The following areas require additional licensee/inspector investigation.
(1).
A review of other strainers present in other systems.
(2).
Analysis of plant condition with strainers present.
(3).
Documentation requirements under ANSI/ASHE N45.2. 1, Cleaning of Fluid System and Associated Components for Nuclear Plants, Section 9,
Records (documentation of piping component cleanliness history).
(4).
Temporary modification requirements under ANSI N18.7, Administrative Controls and guality Assurance of the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants.
Until these questions are resolved, this item will be identified as URI 335,389/93-02-01, Startup Strainer Issues.
NPWO 0906/64
- Support Technical Staff in obtaining CCW pump 2A and 2C suction pressure data NPWO 5587/66
- Inspect the motor lead to cable power connections on the 2B containment spray pump motor.
This was the second satisfactory inspection of this nature.
The motor lead to power cable connections were inspected on the 2A LPSI pump motor at the end of 1992.
These confirmatory inspections were followups to a problem seen on the 2A condensate pump motor.
The inspectors were satisfied with the "as-built" motor electrical connection The maintenance observed was well controlled.
The 2A1 RCP motor work, which constituted the majority of work performed, was slow and careful.
The suction strainer issues will be resolved during the next inspection period.
Fire Protection Review (Units
and 2)(64704)
During the course of their normal tours, the inspectors routinely examined facets of the Fire Protection Program.
The inspectors reviewed transient fire loads, housekeeping, fire watch activity, ignition source/fire risk reduction efforts, and fire barriers during plant tours.
During tours, the inspector observed activities satisfactorily coordinated between the licensee and a vendor.
The Unit 1 cable spreading room halon protection system was being serviced and inspected by the vendor.
Site QC and corporate QA were observing for audit purposes.
Site fire protection personnel were controlling the activity.
Site fire protection activities were satisfactory.
Onsite Followup of Events (Units 1 and 2)(93702)
Nonroutine plant events were reviewed to determine the need for further or continued NRC response, to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate, and to determine that TS were being met and that the public health and safety received primary consideration.
Potential generic impact and trend detection were also considered.
These were discussed elsewhere in the report
[HVE 9 fan, paragraph 3.b.(5)
and ESFAS actuation, paragraph 3.b.(3)].
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 12, 1993, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
Proprietary material is not contaihed in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Item Number Status Descri tion and Reference 335,389/93-02-01 open URI - Startup Strainer Issues, paragraph 5.e.
Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms AC A/C AFW ANSI AP ASHE Code Alternating Current Air Conditioner Auxiliary Feedwater (system)
American National Standards Institute Administrative Procedure American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
ATTN CCW CFR DC DPR ECCS EDG ESF ESFAS FHB FOST FPL FSAR HCV HVE IE(C ICW i.e.
IN IR JPE JPN LCO LER LPSI MOV NCR NOP NOT NPF NPRDS NPWO NRC OP PCM PDIS PSL Pub QA IQC RAB RCP RCS Rev RII RPS RWT SDC SFP SIAS SIT St.
ting license)
, etc.)
ating license)
Attention Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulations Direct Curren'.
Demonstration Power Reactor (A type of opera Emergency Core Cooling System Emergency Diesel Generator Engineered Safety Feature Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Fuel Handling Building Fuel Oil Storage Tank The Florida Power h Light Company Final Safety Analysis Report Hydraulic Control Valve Heating and Ventilating Exhaust (fan, system Instrumentation and Control Intake Cooling Water that is
[NRC] Information Notice
[NRC] Inspection Report (Juno Beach)
Power Plant Engineering (Juno Beach)
Nuclear Engineering TS Limiting Condition for Operation Licensee Event Report Low Pressure Safety Injection'(system)
Motor Operated Valve Non Conformance Report Normal Operating Pressure Normal Operating Temperature Nuclear Production Facility (a type of oper Nuclear Plants Reliability Data System Nuclear Plant Work Order Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operating Procedure Plant Change/Modification Pressure Differential Indicating Switch Plant St. Lucie Publication guality Assurance guality Control Reactor Auxiliary Building Reactor Coolant Pump Reactor Coolant System Revision Region II - Atlanta, Georgia (NRC)
Reactor Protection System Refueling Water Tank Shut Down Cooling Spent Fuel Pool Safety Injection Actuation System Safety Injection'ank Saint
Temporary Change Technical Specification(s)
[NRC] Unresolved Item