IR 05000334/1993019
| ML20057A630 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 09/02/1993 |
| From: | Meyer G, Temps R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057A612 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-334-93-19-OL, NUDOCS 9309150073 | |
| Download: ML20057A630 (6) | |
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i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
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REGION I
l BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT 1 i
OPERATOR LICENSING REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT i
REPORT NO:
50-334/93-19 (OL-RQ)
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DOCKET NO:
50-334
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l LICENSEE:
Duquesne Light Company
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FACILITY:
Beaver Valley.1 DATES:
' August 23 through 26,- 1993 l
t EXAMINERS:
Paul Bissett, Senior Operations Engineer l
Frank Jaggar, INEL (centract examiner)
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l b1' O CHIEF EXAMINER:
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- 6bert R. Temps, Sr. Opera '
Engineer
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I PWR Section, Operations B
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Division of Reactor Safety-l i
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- 9-Vi 3 APPROVED BY:
. PWR Section, Operations Bran [ch~
Ihate'
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/6enn W. Meyer, Chief Division of Reactor Safety l
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9309150073 030902 M
PDR ADOCK 05000334
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY l
During the week of August 23,1993, written requalification examinations and operating tests l
were administered to two senior reactor operators (SROs) and eight reactor operators (ROs).
These individuals, along with six other SRO fill-ins, were configured as four crews for i
evaluation during the dynamic simulator examination. The examinations were graded concurrently and independently by the NRC and by the facility training staff. The operating crews were evaluated as satisfactory during the simulator portion of the examination.
Facility grading paralleled the NRC grading. The facility determined that one staff-licensed SRO fill-in's performance did not meet their expectations for performance and the individual will receive remediation.
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The NRC assessed as positive the training department's identification of the SRO who exhibited performance weaknesses. Also, the examiners noted that the facility's scenarios were of very good quality, exceeded the NRC's minimums for malfunction content, and were
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challenging. The written examination questions continued to be of good quality, with some
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improvement noted over last year's questions.
l As sixteen individuals were evaluatcJ during the simulator examination and since all crews l
and individuals were evaluated as satisfactory, Duquesne Light Company's (DLC's) Beaver l
Valley 1 requalification program was rated as satisfactory, thus retaining its satisfactory rating.
Two emergency operating procedure (EOP) issues were identified during the simulator l
examinations. One issue dealt with the placement of the ste-p in FR-S.1, " Response to l
Nuclear Power Generation /ATWS," which directs the operators to locally trip the breakers for the motor generators associated with the control rod drive system. The examiners noted that this action seemed to occur much later in Beaver Valley's EOPs than in other site's
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EOPs and that, in one scenario, the elapsed time was twelve minutes until this step was reached. The other issue dealt with a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event in which an EOP step directed the operators to compare secondary side radiation levels with pre-event values and to make an EOP transition based on these readings. The examiners observed that
two crews interpreted this step differently, with subsequent transition to different EOPs.
Also, under certain circumstances, some of the detectors could be isolated, thus not l
providing relevant or accurate information on which to base an EOP transition. The training staff was requested to review this concern to see if use of secondary radiation levels alone l
provides enough information to the operators to determine the proper EOP transition. The training staff committed to review both of these concerns and to make EOP revisions if warranted. These concerns are being carried as an open item.
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DETAILS l
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TYPE OF EXAMINATION: Requalification I
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1993 EXAMINATION RESULTS:
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NRC RO SRO CREW TOTAL Grading Pass / Fail Pass / Fail Pass / Fail Pass / Fail l
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Written 8/0 2/0 10/0 Simulator 8/0 2/0 4/0 10/0 i
Walk-through 8/0 2/0 10/0 i
Overall 8/0 2/0 4/0 10/0
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CREW TOTAL j
Grading Pass / Fail Pass / Fail Pass / Fail Pass / Fail Written 8/0 2/0 10/0 Simulator 8/0 2/0 4/0 10/0
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Walk-through 8/0 2/0 10/0
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Overall 8/0 2/0 4/0 10/0 i
NOTE: Six SRO fill-ins were examined on the simulator only. All six were evaluated as
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satisfactory by the NRC. The facility evaluated five as satisfactory and one was found
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unsatisfactory based on nonsafety-related performance deficiencies.
I.0 EXAMINATION PREPARATION AND ADMINISTRATION 1.1 Examination Materials The training department submitted a proposed examination for review by the NRC, as well as a complete copy of their requalification examination question bank. The proposed examination was of good quality, fully met, and, in several instances, exceeded the standards j
delineated in the Examiner Standards and required only minimal revision by the NRC exam team. The examiners noted that the simulator scenarios were more challenging than typical requalification scenarios and that the written examination questions continued to be of good j
quality, with even some improvement noted over last year's questions. The examination materials were validated during a site visit the week of August 2,1993. The validation went smoothly and no problems were noted during the wee l 1.2 Examination Administration
The examination was administered the week of August 23,1993, and was administered over
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a four day period, August 23 through 26. Examination administration proceeded smoothly
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and no problems were encountered during administration of the simulator scenarios, static and classroom written examination, and in-plant and simulator job performance measures j
(JPMs).
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2.0 JPM EVALUATION Each operator was administered a total of 5 JPMs, two on the plant reference simulator, one in the control room and two in-plant. All operators passed this portion of the examination.
Three individuals each failed one JPM apiece. Two of these individuals failed the same JPM i
for the same reason. Both failures occurred at step 3.7.c of JPM IPL-080, "BV-1 Actions to Establish Station Blackout Cross-Tie to BV-2." This is a new JPM and reflects a l
modification recently installed in the plant to allow cross-tie of emergency buses during a l
l station blackout condition on either unit. In light of the fact that two of the five individuals administered this JPM failed it, the facility was requested to review the training provided on this modification.
3.0 DYNAMIC SIMULATOR EVALUATION
Scenarios were run on four crews on August 23 and 24,1993. Each crew was comprised of
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l four operators with the following positions:
l Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS)
Assistant Nuclear Shift Supervisor (ANSS)
Reactor Operator (RO)
l Plant Operator (PO)
Each crew was comprised of two SRO licensed individuals and two RO licensed individuals.
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Six of the SROs participating in the scenario examinations were crew fill-ins and were l
evaluated on the simulator only. Each crew also had an assigned Shift Technical Assistant;
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l however, as this is a nonlicensed position, the STAS were not evaluated. Each crew was l
administered two scenarios with the SROs rotating between the NSS and ANSS positions and the ROs rotating between the RO and PO positions.
All four crews were rated as satisfactory on their performance during the scenarios. All sixteen individuals also received a satisfactory rating from the NRC examination team. _ One SRO, a staff licensed crew fill-in, exhibited performance deficiencies during the examination.
While in the ANSS position, the individual demonstrated weaknesses in setting priorities and directing the crew's actions. However, the crew was able to compensate for the SRO's weaknesses and as a result, overall plant safety was not jeopardized. The training staff
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l determined that the SRO's actions did not meet their standards of performance, and he was
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given an unsatisfactory rating. The training staffinformed the NRC that a remediation program would be implemented for this individual.
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i Simulator Performance I
Simulator performance during the examination was quite good. There were no opemtional I
problems encountered during the scenario administration, and the machine ran all malfunctions as planned.
4.0 EOP ISSUES Two emergency operating procedure (EOP) issues were identified during the simulator examinations. Both concerns are being tracked as an open item pending review of the facility's evaluation and response to these concerns. IFI (50-334/93-19-01).
The first issue dealt with the placement of step 9 in FR-S.1, " Response to Nuclear Power
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Generation /ATWS," which orders the operators to locally trip the reactor. The examiners noted that this action seemed to occur much later in Beaver Valley's EOPs than in other site's EOPs. The examiners noted that the delay in performing step 9 was compounded by the fact that the previous step (step 8) states to check if the immediate actions of E-0,
" Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection," have been performed if a safety injection actuation has occurred. If this is the case, as it
's for two of the scenario sets, a considerable delay was observed while the operators wen.
10 and verified the first fourteen immuiiate action
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steps. Then, upon transitioning bau w FR-S.1, the order was given to locally trip the
l reactor. In one case, this order did not occur until twelve minutes after the initiation of FR-S.I. The concern over timeliness oflocally tripping the reactor was discussed with the l
facility training staff. At the exit meMng, the chief examiner was informed that a change to the EOP was a' ready being evaluated. Tentatively, the change would involve swapping the l
order of steps 8 and 9 so that the local trip would be ordered prior to any transition to E-0 l
I should a safety injection actuation occur.
The second issue dealt with step 23 of E-0, which requires the operators to check secondary radiation levels consistent with pre-event levels. If secondary radiation levels are not
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consistent, then a transition to E-3, " Steam Generator Tube Rupture," is made. The examiners observed two crews interpret this step differently, with subsequent transition to l
different EOPs. Both crews were given a scenario that involved ruptured and fauhed steam l
generators. While in E-0, one crew made a transition to E-3 at step 23, while another crew I
continued on to step 24 where a transition to E-1, " Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant,"
was made. Both crews were essentially provided the same information; yet, different transitions were made. While a transition to E-1 when a SGTR is present (but not diagnosed in step 23) does net create a condition adverse to plant safety, it does place the operators in a repetitive loop in E-1 so that the one crew was forced to implement ES-0.0, "Rediagnosis,"
which then directed them to an E-3 or ECA-3 series procedure.
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One factor, which complicated the evaluation at step 23, was that steam generator tube I
leakage had occurred prior to the initiation of the SGTR, so that secondary radiation readings were already present prior to the " event," thus masking the radiation effects.of the SGTR.
Also, due to the faulted steam generator inside containment, many of the secondary detectors were isolated due to the main steam line isolation signal and containment isolation signals;
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t thus, the detectors were not providing accurate information.
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The examiners discussed tids issue with the training staff and requested that they review their i
training to the operators on this step. The examiners also requested that the training staff
evaluate whether secondary radiation levels alone provide enough information on which to base a transition to E-3, or if other parameters, such as steam generator levels, should also l
be considered at step 23. Further, the examiners suggested a review of lessons learned from the March 1993 SGTR event at Palo Verde Unit 2, which encompassed some of the same i
i issues. The training staff stated that they would review this issue for enhancement in the training area and for possible revision of the EOP.
f 5.0 WRITTEN EVALUATION j
Evaluation of examination answers indicated no generic knowledge deficiencies.
6.0 EXIT INTERVIEW SUMMARY
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The preliminary simulator and JPM results were discussed at an exit meeting held on August 26,1993. The chief examiner discussed iteras 1 though 4 above.
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The chief examiner expressed appreciation for the training staff's cooperatbn and j
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efforts in developing and administering the examination.
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Facility personnel at the exit meeting acknowledged the chief examiner's comments.
j No questions were asked and no commitments were made by DLC at the exit j
meeting.
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D.
The following facility personnel were present:
-l C. Bakken, NSS
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T. Burns, Director-Operations Training E. Chatfield, General Manager-NSU L. Freeland, General Manager-NOU T. Kuhar, Training Supervisor F. Lipchick, Sr. Licensing Supervisor K. Ostrowski, Unit I Operations Manager L. Schad, Simulator Supervisor D. Szucs, Sr. Engineer, Nuclear Safety Department l~-
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